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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the history of agricultural change in Uruguay over the long nineteenth century, 
as a case study in the agrarian roots of Latin American long-term development. Cowhides were first 
exported on a large scale in , under Spanish rule, starting a series of commodity booms that culminated 
with frozen beef in . By then, Uruguay had the highest number of cows per person and one of the 
highest per capita incomes in the world; the country only retains the first of those accolades today. How 
were resources (natural and human) put to work to lay that development path? Which were its 
environmental basis and limits?  
To answer these questions, I draw on a wide range of previously under-utilised primary sources, as 
well as on present-day scientific literature on grassland ecology. My approach is methodologically eclectic, 
and techniques vary as suits the diversity of the materials and the questions asked in each chapter. These 
include different quantitative methods (from descriptive statistics to regression analysis), georeferencing 
and an array of data visualizations, as well as instances of micro-historical narrative. A major concern 
throughout is to place the Uruguayan case in comparative perspective, mainly within Latin America but also 
beyond, in order to consider the findings of this dissertation in relation to the wider history of ‘agrarian 
capitalism,’ and to interrogate the usefulness of that term itself.   
It is found that in the late-nineteenth century, as lands were enclosed with steel wire, traditional 
grazing on unfenced ranges gave way to agricultural innovations for which latifundia were neither an 
obstacle nor a necessity. Fertile land, still physically abundant, was now institutionally scarce, which 
encouraged immigrants to concentrate in cities and find urban occupations. However, agriculture remained 
the largest employer in the economy, with rural wage labour becoming increasingly permanent rather than 
seasonal. While these changes underpinned the rising productivity of agriculture, they greatly limited the 
resources for smallholder farming, completing a process of concentration and specialization which began 
during the ill-named ‘lost decades’ in the aftermath of independence.  
This profound transformation in working people’s relation to the land shaped the agricultural 
landscapes, economic specialization, and demographic patterns that define modern Uruguay. But rural 
development and its legacy were also about what did not change. Throughout the nineteenth century and 
beyond, the agricultural export economy continued to draw its comparative advantage from the ecological 
services of its grassland environment. As these became more expensive relative to the declining terms of 
trade of beef, leather, and wool, Uruguayan agriculture entered a long cycle of stagnation: the background 
to the country’s divergent twentieth-century siesta. 
Please cite as:  
Travieso, Emiliano, ‘Resources, Environment, and Rural Development in Uruguay, -’ (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Cambridge, ).  
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Preface 
There was a game I used to play to pass the time when we travelled north to see my grandparents. I would 
look out the window, where the green plains were flying by, and try to find an angle where I could see a 
landscape of ‘only nature.’ To my childhood self that meant no people, which is not difficult in large parts of 
rural Uruguay, but also no fences, no houses, no tractors, no artificial ponds. Just grass, trees, livestock, and 
sky. I often succeeded, or so I thought. As I grew up, I realised the game was rigged from the start: it was 
impossible to find ‘only nature’ because the grasslands were a domesticated landscape. The complexity of 
nature had long been simplified, and a new complexity, economic and environmental, had taken its place. 
This dissertation is about the crucial century in that transformation, how it made Uruguay relatively rich, 
and which were its limits. 
In a way, then, the story of this thesis started more than two decades ago. In a more concrete sense, 
though, it developed over the last three years of research, learning, and teaching. These were made possible 
by a Cambridge International Scholarship awarded by the Cambridge International Trust, as well as by 
additional research funding generously provided by the Ellen McArthur Fund, King’s College Cambridge, 
and the Faculty of History’s fieldwork and travel grants. I am also greatly indebted to the Cambridge Group 
for the History of Population and Social Structure (Campop) for its facilities, research environment, and 
much else besides. Collective thanks are due as well to the students I was fortunate to teach in courses 
(‘papers’ in Cambridge lingo) on Latin American history, global history, and historical argument and 
practice. Teaching encouraged me to keep my own research in perspective and expanded my horizons, as I 
had to grapple with the often vast periods and regions covered by the few Cambridge courses on the history 
of the majority world (which is a problem for undergraduates, but turned out to be a great learning 
experience for me as their supervisor). 
My largest debt is to my supervisor, Gareth Austin, whose constant advice has been endlessly 
stimulating and will continue to shape my thinking. To those who know Gareth, I can simply say being 
supervised by him is exactly as wonderful as you think it would be. To those who do not, let me say I left 
every supervision meeting knowing many more things than before, and filled with enthusiasm and renewed 
curiosity. I cannot think of a better way of mentoring. 
At the Faculty of History I learnt much from Leigh Shaw-Taylor and Amy Erickson in regular 
conversations over coffee. Leigh also offered invaluable suggestions on how to construct reliable estimates 
from birth record data, while Oliver Dunn shared extremely useful tips for curating a personal digital 
archive. Mourat Güvenç from the Istanbul Studies Centre visited us in April  and taught an impromptu 
course which changed the way I thought about data description and visualization. I also received important 
advice, particularly on what became Chapter , from William O’Reilly over several conversations, as well as 
from Nicholas Guyatt and Caroline Goodson. My resolve to work on the ‘lost decades’ was strengthened by 
an email exchange with William Gervase Clarence-Smith, by chats with María Alejandra Irigoin and Victor 
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Bulmer-Thomas, and by timely encouragement from Tony (A.G.) Hopkins over lunch at King’s College. At 
my college special thanks go to John Arnold and Roseanna Webster, with whom I convened a work-in-
progress seminar and from whom I learnt a great deal. I owe much also to my fellow PhD students in 
economic history; in particular, I am immensely grateful to Tom Westland for his scholarly generosity, his 
cooking, and above all for his friendship. 
Throughout my PhD work, I benefitted from many conversations away from Cambridge. Especially 
important was the dialogue with scholars from Universidad de la República in Montevideo. Several chapters 
were shaped by sound advice from the economic historians María Inés Moraes, Henry Willebald, and Pablo 
Castro, and the agronomists Marta Chiappe, Gabriel Oyhantçabal, and Virginia Rossi. Important 
suggestions came from Spain too, particularly from Alfonso Herranz-Loncán and Marc Badia-Miró in 
Barcelona, Dácil Juif in Madrid, and Juan Infante-Amate in Seville. Of the many conferences where I 
presented preliminary results, none left such a deep impression as the re:work summer school in Addis 
Ababa in November , to which I owe the pleasure of visiting Ethiopia as well as the opportunity of 
discussing my work with Fred Cooper, who made crucial points I am still thinking about. Exchanging drafts 
with Samantha Payne, who I also met in Addis, was a great help. The archivists and librarians of the 
institutions mentioned in the list below also deserve my thanks, which they will receive again in person as I 
will undoubtedly find myself back in their workplaces in the years to come. 
Two of the chapters are at ‘review and resubmit’ stage with academic journals: Chapter  with the 
American Historical Review and Chapter  with the Economic History Review. I would like to thank the 
editors Alex Lichtenstein and Giovanni Federico, as well as the anonymous reviewers, for their insightful 
suggestions which have significantly improved those papers and this thesis in general. Additionally, in the 
first year of my PhD I published an early version of the railway data appearing in Chapter  in the Revista 
Uruguaya de Historia Económica; I am thankful to its anonymous reviewers for their detailed comments. 
I have been incredibly fortunate to share this journey with Ellen Gordon as we were both working 
on our PhDs and spending time in Uruguay, the UK, Argentina, Ecuador, and Spain. In the final stages of 
this thesis, we had to move house several times (including across the Atlantic) amidst the coronavirus 
pandemic, but her brilliance and kindness made it all better. My final thanks are to my parents, who first 
taught me the importance and the joy of being curious about the world. This thesis is dedicated to them. 
Finally, here are the required declarations: this dissertation is the result of my own work and 
contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration; it is not substantially the same as any 
work that has already been submitted before for any degree or qualification; it does not exceed , words 
in length (excluding footnotes and lists of sources), and while many errors were prevented by the advice of 
friends and colleagues, the ones that remain are all of my own making. 
Emiliano Travieso 
King’s College, Cambridge, September  
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Notes on translations, software, and abbreviations 
Language and translations 
All translations are mine. For simplicity, they are all into ‘modern’ English: when working with documents 
in ‘archaic’ Spanish I translate ‘vuesa merced’ as ‘you’ (instead of ‘thy grace’), and so on. Following the 
Faculty’s guidelines, the original Spanish (less frequently Portuguese or French) is provided in footnotes. I 
apologise to readers because this often makes for bottom-heavy pages, but my hands were tied. Also for 
simplicity, the word ‘Uruguay’ is generally used somewhat loosely to refer to the territory of the present-day 
republic, and distinctions between its different historical names are only made when relevant to the argument. 
Software, colours, and typefaces 
All the statistical analysis and graphs in this dissertation were produced using R .. and RStudio ., 
equipped with the following packages: tidyverse, ggthemes, tinter, extrafont, grid, ggpubr, cowplot, 
colorspace, spdep, RCurl, olsrr, and stargazer. Full references to these statistical software (all open-source) 
can be found in the section ‘Sources’. Maps were drawn in ArcMap .., licensed by ESRI. The Appendix 
is a guide to the replication packages for all analyses, graphs, and maps. The files themselves are included as 
Additional Materials to this dissertation. 
Data visualizations were inspired by the design principles of Jacques Bertin, Sémiologie graphique 
(Paris, ) and informed by the library of graphs and the technical advice found in Claus Wilke, 
Fundamentals of Data Visualization (Sebastopol, CA, ). The default colour palette chosen for graphs is 
colourblind-friendly; it was presented by Masataka Okabe and Kei Ito in their article ‘Colour Universal 
Design’ (https://jfly.uni-koeln.de/color/). The sequential colour scheme used for Maps . and . is also 
colourblind friendly and was developed by Mark Harrower and Cynthia Brewer, ‘Colorbrewer.org: An 
Online Tool for Selecting Colour Schemes for Maps.’ The Cartographic Journal ,  (): -. Map . 
is an exception: because more categories were needed, a custom colour scheme was used, borrowed from 
the population density maps in Osamu Saito and Leigh Shaw-Taylor (eds.), Occupational Structure and 
Industrialization in a Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, forthcoming). 
I have typeset the dissertation myself using the typefaces Minion, created by Robert Slimbach, and 
Montserrat, designed by Julia Ulanovsky. The glyphs marking the end of each chapter are examples of cattle 
brands from the colonial period, photographed by myself in the Archivo General de la Nación in 
Montevideo (MVD, ExMHN, Cajas cronológicas, Caja ). I borrowed this design idea from Juan Carlos 
Garavaglia’s Les hommes de la pampa (Paris, ). 
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Abbreviations for archives and libraries 
BA: Archivo General de la Nación (Buenos Aires, Argentina). 
BN: Biblioteca Nacional (Montevideo, Uruguay). 
MVD: Archivo General de la Nación (Montevideo, Uruguay). 
AGA: Archivo General Administrativo. 
ExMHN: Ex-Archivo Museo Histórico Nacional. 
CAR: Parroquia, Archivo y Museo de Nuestra Señora del Carmen (Carmelo, Uruguay). 
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AER: American Economic Review 
AHR: American Historical Review 
EcHR: Economic History Review 
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HAHR: Hispanic American Historical Review 
JEH: Journal of Economic History 
JLAS: Journal of Latin American Studies 
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Introduction 
The Latin American countryside is often blamed for the region’s historic economic backwardness. 
Agricultural land, it was long argued, was irrationally divided and underused, producing a landscape 
dominated by archaic, inefficient haciendas. Rural labour was no better: peasants and farm hands held on 
to traditional, ‘pre-capitalist’ values, while large landowners were almost feudal, busier preparing for the 
next civil war than investing in innovations. Although this view has been falsified in many contexts, it 
continues to overshadow discussions about Latin American development. Scholars in many strands of 
dependency theory (s-s), new institutional economics (s-s), and, more recently, ‘path 
dependence’ and ‘persistence’ literatures have looked for the origins of rural backwardness in Iberian 
colonialism and its ‘extractive institutions’. And yet, until well into the twentieth century most Latin 
Americans successfully sustained their livelihoods through agriculture, and some Latin American countries 
greatly prospered on the back of the agrarian economies that emerged from the colonial past. Uruguay’s 
livestock export agriculture made the country rich in the late-nineteenth century, when it accounted for a 
third of GDP. By  Uruguayan incomes were only  lower than France’s and about three times higher 
than the Latin American mean (excluding Argentina, which underwent a similar process). What was the 
environmental basis of Uruguay’s prosperous agrarian capitalism? Which were the ecological limits facing 
it as a result of periods of extensive growth (c.-s) and agricultural intensification (c.-)? 
How can they contribute to explain the later stagnation of Uruguayan agriculture in the twentieth century? 
This dissertation examines Uruguay’s rural development during the long nineteenth century—the 
crucial period of the ‘Great Divergence’—by taking both the natural environment and the colonial legacy 
seriously.1 In so doing, it purposefully crosses the historiographical divide of ‘modernization’ (c.s), 
which has left most accounts of Latin American export-led growth during the First Globalization separated 
from colonial and early-independent history. The thesis argues that ‘rural modernization’ in Uruguay 
between  (by when most lands were enclosed) and  must be explained in relation not only to the 
opportunities and challenges of the world economy of the First Globalization, but also to the potential and 
limits of its own environment, a ‘second nature’ resulting from geography as well as from preceding history. 
In telling the story of how a small economy exploited its environment to transform itself from a colonial 
backwater to a prosperous agricultural exporter, this dissertation will challenge both triumphalist accounts 
of economic modernization and declensionist ‘disaster capitalism’ narratives. Agricultural intensification 
significantly increased living standards for people in Uruguay, while at the same time contributing decisively 
to ecological change with far-reaching consequences. Though economic historians have in recent years 
 
1 Economic historians use the term ‘Great Divergence’ as a shorthand for the emergence and consolidation of an 
enormous gap in levels of material welfare between rich Western societies and most of the rest of the world since c., 
ushered in by the Industrial Revolution. For a brief overview see Robert C. Allen, Global Economic History: A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford, ): -. 
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focused on institutions as history’s crucial legacy, this thesis will argue that the environment can be as 
powerful a bearer of the past’s grip on the present. 
This introduction discusses two ways in which this case study can contribute to the general economic 
history literature, argues for an interdisciplinary approach to Uruguay’s rural past, and maps out the 
structure and style of the dissertation. Conceptual debates are then taken up in Chapter , which also defines 
the geographical and chronological boundaries of the case study more precisely. 
 
1 Contributions 
While the questions that drive this dissertation are specific to Uruguay’s economic history, they can 
contribute to two broader debates in the field, concerning Latin America’s part in the Great Divergence and 
economy-environment interactions in global economic history. Over the last two decades, scholars have 
continued to provide evidence for Latin America’s long-run decline relative to the United States or to the 
West more generally, but there is no consensus on its timing or its foundations.2 While some influential 
interpretations emphasised the path-dependent effect of ‘initial’ colonial institutions, scholars have more 
recently questioned the standard account of the Iberian colonial state as predatory and monolithic and 
rekindled other competing explanations, from factor endowments to early-independent political economy.3 
Because not all of Latin America fell behind at the same time or to the same extent, any explanation for Latin 
America’s relative backwardness should also account for very large variations within the continent, as an 
earlier generation of economic historians noted.4 In this context, the ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis, in which 
Uruguay is cited as a positive example, has succeeded in making such long-term debates once again relevant 
to economists and other social scientists, but its tendency to ‘compress history’ can blind it to crucial changes 
 
2 Luis Bértola and José Antonio Ocampo, The Economic Development of Latin America Since Independence 
(Oxford, ); Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, third edition 
(Cambridge, ); Robert H Bates, John H Coatsworth, and Jeffrey G Williamson, ‘Lost Decades: Postindependence 
Performance in Latin America and Africa,’ JEH ,  (); Leandro Prados de la Escosura, ‘Lost Decades? Economic 
Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,’ JLAS ,  (). Chapter  discusses in detail the state-of-the-
art of Latin American economic history, which is only hastily sketched in this paragraph. 
3 See, respectively, Douglass C. North, ‘Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction,’ World 
Development ,  () and David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (London, ); Regina Grafe and 
Alejandra Irigoin, ‘A stakeholder empire: the political economy of Spanish imperial rule in America,’ EcHR ,  (); 
Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth Lee Sokoloff, Economic Development in the Americas since : Endowments and 
Institutions (Cambridge, ) and John H Coatsworth, ‘Economic and institutional trajectories in nineteenth-century 
Latin America,’ in Latin America and the World Economy Since , ed. John H. Coatsworth and Alan M. Taylor 
(Cambridge, MA, ). Page numbers and specific citations are provided in Chapter . 
4 Jorge Gelman, ‘Senderos que se bifurcan. Las economías de América Latina luego de las Independencias,’ in 
Institucionalidad y desarrollo económico en América Latina, ed. Luis Bértola and Pablo Gerchunoff (Santiago, ); 
Leticia Arroyo Abad, ‘Persistent inequality? Trade, factor endowments, and inequality in republican Latin America,’ 
JEH ,  (); Ciro Flamarion Cardoso and Héctor Pérez-Brignoli, Historia económica de América Latina 
(Barcelona, ). 
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in the trajectories it tries to trace.5 By offering an economic history of Uruguayan agriculture that spans the 
late-colonial period and the First Globalization boom, this dissertation provides a detailed, ‘decompressed’ 
case study of one Latin American nineteenth-century trajectory representative of the Southern Cone 
economies, which became, during the key century of the Great Divergence, comparatively much richer than 
the rest of the region. Rather than producing a new set of cross-country regressions, the focus on a single 
case, observed in comparative perspective, can provide new insights into the agrarian bases for long-term 
divergence within Latin America as well as between the region and the leading world economies. 
This thesis also aims to contribute to the study of environment-economy interactions in global 
economic history, which have been, relative to institutions and technology, overlooked in our field, with 
quantitative historians of agrarian societies divided ‘between those who count calories and those who count 
cash.’6 Working on the long-term development of modern livestock agriculture in the country with the 
highest ratio of cattle to people in the world (then and now) offers a unique chance to bring economic and 
environmental history into dialogue with one another.7 In particular, it provides an opportunity to go 
beyond the two ‘before and after’ stories that dominate accounts of environment-economy interactions in 
periods of ‘transition to capitalism’ or ‘modernization’. In the ‘disaster capitalism’ narratives, more common 
in environmental history, the story is often one of a fall from grace: a human community lived in relative 
harmony with nature, making a rational use of its resources and allowing ecosystems to replenish, until 
capitalism (either from the outside or the inside, from above or from below) and its handmaiden, the 
modern state (either colonial or national), brought about feverish agricultural intensification and the 
beginning of the end of a sustainable relationship with the environment. On the other hand, the ‘Promethean 
capitalism’ narrative, often found implicit in our own sub-discipline, is a story of dramatic progress: a society 
was bound by an inefficient allocation of resources or a political economy which limited accumulation (the 
tale can be told in both Marshallian and Marxist prose), until the right set of institutions or the powerful 
levers of technological change allowed it to tap into productive resources that had been locked away in 
nature, irrationally underused all along.  
 
5 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in 
the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,’ QJE ,  (); Gareth Austin, ‘The ‘Reversal of Fortune’ 
Thesis and the Compression of History: Perspectives from African and Comparative Economic History,’ Journal of 
International Development ,  (). 
6 Gareth Austin, ‘Introduction,’ in Economic development and environmental history in the Anthropocene: 
perspectives on Asia and Africa, ed. Gareth Austin (London, ); the quotation is from Paul Warde, Ecology, Economy 
and State Formation in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, ): . 
7 The ratio was  cows per person in  and is now almost .. The only other countries where cattle outnumber 
people are New Zealand (.), Argentina (.), Australia (.), and Brazil (.), while in Botswana the ratio is almost  to 
. The world average is . head of cattle per person, and the ratio in the United States and the European Union are . 
and . respectively. Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Censo General de la República en , 
Tomo II, Parte II (Montevideo, ); FAS/USDA, Livestock and Poultry: World Markets and Trade (Washington, ). 
 
 
This dissertation can challenge both ‘before and after’ narratives because the rise of capitalist livestock 
agriculture was the main driver of ecological change as well as economic development in nineteenth-century 
Uruguay. It will do so by interrogating the ‘before’ in light of the ‘after’, asking to what extent the vast 
anthropogenic landscape transformation and the regionally leading income levels associated with Uruguay’s 
export-oriented agriculture preceded its ‘modernization’, and considering the historical legacies of the 
dynamic relationship between ecological change and economic development. 
 
2 Approach 
Because this dissertation is driven by questions rather than by the intention of exploiting a dataset or testing 
a theory, the empirical toolkit is a varied one, chosen to fit the challenges each chapter faces and the nature 
of the primary material available. Since the period chosen is unusually long, deliberately crossing the 
traditional watersheds of colonial/post-colonial (c.-) and ‘pre-modern’/‘modern’ (c.-) 
periodizations, sources for economic history are of diverse volume, quality, and survival rates: encouraging 
but patchy for the late-colonial years, at their scarcest in the decades following independence, more generous 
and consistent during the First Globalization. Working across archives and libraries in Uruguay, Argentina, 
and the UK, this dissertation relies on a wide range of sources, from manuscript ledgers kept by the colonial 
viceroyalty in the late s to printed statistical reports produced by the modern republic in the early s, 
but also on records left by individual people, ranches, and corporations. 
This eclectic body of sources are combined with a careful consideration of present-day scientific 
literature on the historical ecology of Uruguay’s grasslands. The discussion focuses on nature-economy 
interactions, asking how local environments sustained agrarian development as well as how that 
development transformed the specific natural resources that gave rise to it. Throughout, I tried to count 
what could be meaningfully quantified, narrate stories which could not, and deploy statistical methods to 
extract the message from large datasets when the sources allowed me to construct them. As a result, distant 
but interconnected methodological paths are explored, from econometrics and historical economic 
geography to the reconstruction of occupational structures and micro-historical gazes on individuals and 
localities. 
If sources are eclectic by necessity, my approach to theory is so by choice. This is a practical decision 
rather than an ideological one: being flexible allowed me to fruitfully engage with evidence and conclusions 
from different schools and eras of economic historiography on rural development in Uruguay, Latin 
America, and the wider world. Thinking about ‘agrarian capitalism’—a system in which rural economic 
resources, including mostly privately-owned land and mostly free labour, are allocated chiefly through 
markets8—facilitates a dialogue with the vast and influential scholarship of the s and s, when the 
 
8 Chapter  offers a fuller discussion of the concept (pp. -). 
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economic past became the chief concern for historians of Latin America. Some of the debates of the time, 
notably the obsession with figuring out which ‘mode of production’ colonial Latin America should be 
shoehorned into, are best let lie, but that is not reason enough to put that entire historiography on the discard 
heap.9 This dissertation also tries to learn from the careful consideration of gender and of the everyday, 
pioneered by rural historians in the s, which challenged several macro-narratives of the region’s 
economic past. Finally, I will not shy away from relying on mainstream economic theory or deploying 
econometric methods when they can add to understanding, bringing much of the analysis closer to the 
language and argumentative style of new economic historians. 
A flexible approach to theory is also useful in that it lends itself better to interdisciplinary readings, which 
in this thesis encompass three concentric circles. First, within the sub-disciplines of history, the approach 
chosen here defines ‘economic history’ broadly (i.e. research into the economic past, whether it uses the tools 
of the economist or not), and it makes an effort to bring it into a closer dialogue with environmental history. 
Second, within the wider circle of the social sciences, this dissertation is an attempt to do ‘social science 
history’, that is, to use the methods and the language of social scientists (in my case, of geographers as well as 
economists) to analyse the past. Third, in explaining long-term agricultural development, I ventured beyond 
the realm of the social sciences into the natural ones. My intention has been to grasp the general message of 
relevant research in animal and plant science, and the reader will find nothing more sophisticated than that 
in this dissertation. But, as the law of marginal returns suggests, I benefitted enormously from the very basic 
knowledge I gained from reading and conversing with life scientists. Some questions for which I would have 
looked for answers in markets or institutions had instead straightforward technical or biological 
explanations.10 This helped me to ask better questions to the sources and to be parsimonious about my 
answers: if something was explained by the natural processes at play, there was no immediate need to come 
up with political or cultural rationales for it. Moreover, the evidence of contemporary agronomy is especially 
relevant to understand past farming systems in the Uruguayan case because many of the techniques of 
livestock agriculture—pasture-based grazing, open-air herd management on horseback, early calving—have 
changed remarkably little in the long term when compared to the system of landholding, the set of labour 
relations, or the technologies for the processing and marketing of livestock by-products.  
 
9 Positions varied from an adherence to the canonical list of modes of production explicitly mentioned by Marx 
(which led many to argue that colonial Latin America had to be ‘feudal’) and issuing modes à la carte (a ‘colonial mode 
of production’ with many variants); see the debate between Ernesto Laclau, ‘Feudalismo y capitalismo en América 
Latina,’ in Modos de Producción en América Latina, ed. Carlos Sempat Assadourian, et al. (Buenos Aires, ) and 
Andre Gunter Frank, ‘Dependence is dead, long live dependence and the class struggle: an answer to critics,’ World 
Development ,  (). A survey of the Latin American controversy is Colin Henfrey, ‘Dependency, modes of 
production, and the class analysis of Latin America,’ Latin American Perspectives , - (); for a global overview, 
see Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘The modes of production controversy,’ New Left Review ,  (). 
10 Several of these will become apparent in the chapters that follow. A persuasive plea, in West African context, for 
social scientists to study farming systems with greater care can be found in Paul Richards, ‘Farming systems and 
agrarian change in West Africa,’ Progress in Human Geography ,  (). 
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3 Style, standpoint, and structure 
Like most research in economic history, this dissertation is primarily concerned with explanation: what was 
the resource basis and the environmental causes and consequences of Uruguay’s rural development before 
? But rather than a piece of historical economics, it is an attempt at history, that is, at telling true stories 
about the past to evoke other ways of life, often very different from our own.11 In practice this means that 
the reader will encounter frequent changes in style and tone: narrative history being framed by the analysis 
of structures, the lean quantitative contours of livestock production marbled by the lives of individual, 
named rural people. These are, after all, only two modes of presenting ideas and evidence and I see no reason 
why economic historians should give one of them up: descriptive prose and the sparse lines of graphs have 
nothing to fear from each other. 
The standpoint chosen is rural and local, but not narrowly so: an important concern is to understand 
the changing dynamics between city and country as well as the connections between global processes and 
local scenarios. External demand from global markets was a necessary condition for the agricultural 
transformations that this dissertation studies, and many of them reshaped urban spaces more rapidly and 
intensely than rural life. But changes occurred only through local resources and rural strategies, and so the 
focus will be on them. All the while, a comparative perspective prevents hypotheses from becoming too 
provincial, recalibrating the sights to identify what is exceptional about nineteenth-century Uruguay and 
what is typical of Latin America, or even of agrarian societies in general. As Marc Bloch argued long ago, 
historians working on monographical studies can gain much from reading preceding scholarship ‘on topics 
analogous to theirs, not only, as everybody does, concerning their own region, not even only, as almost 
everybody does, concerning neighbouring regions, but also, and this is forgotten too often, about more 
remote societies.’12 The relevance of any case study, whether large or small, is greatly enhanced by thinking 
and reading comparatively. Thus, there is not a ‘comparative chapter’ in this dissertation: all look for relevant 
comparisons to make sense of Uruguayan economic history, and to make that history count beyond its 
chronological and geographical confines. 
The chapters are therefore connected and make reference to each other, but should also stand on their 
own: each looks at a series of interrelated questions from a particular set of sources, and use different 
methodologies to make inroads into diverse aspects of Uruguay’s long-term rural development. Following 
 
11 On history as the art and science of telling true stories about the human past, see John Arnold’s brief and brilliant 
History: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, ); a persuasive and entertaining defence of historical economics is 
Deirdre N. McCloskey, Econometric History (Basingstoke, ). 
12 ‘Aux auteurs de monographies, il faut répéter qui’ils ont le devoir de lire ce qui s’est publié avant eux, sur des 
sujets analogues aux leurs, non seulement, comme ils le font tous, à propos de leur propre région, non seulement même, 
comme ils le font presque tous, à propos des régions immédiatement voisines, mais aussi, ce qui est trop souvent 
négligé, à l’ocassion de sociétés plus lointaines’ Marc Bloch, ‘Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes,’ 
Revue de synthèse historique XLVI, XX (): . For a more recent defence of the comparative approach also as a way 
of writing historical case studies, see Jürgen Kocka, ‘Comparison and beyond,’ History and Theory ,  (). 
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Chapter , which elaborates on theory and historiography, the next four chapters are divided chronologically 
in two parts. Each of these parts corresponds to a broad ‘spatial code’ for agrarian development, that is, a set 
of structures which shaped the economic use of rural landscapes.13 It also corresponds to a specific scholarly 
literature in ‘modern’ or ‘pre-modern’ Latin American economic history.  Seldom defined, the concept of 
‘modernization’ is associated with an export-led transition towards modern economic growth, mobilised by 
imported industrial technology and foreign capital, that took place in most Latin American economies 
c.-. ‘Modernization’ is used in this dissertation as a descriptive container for the purposes of 
engaging with historiography, but it is handled with care because it complicates comparative perspectives: 
describing s Uruguay as ‘pre-modern’ would confuse most global historians. That transition to an 
industrial-era agricultural export economy is, in my telling, not the culmination nor the beginning of the 
story but its turning point. 
Chapters  and  deal with the period before that turning point. Chapter  uses land, tax, credit, and 
employment records of both wage earners and slaves to describe the late-colonial agrarian economy, as well 
as qualitative sources to reconstruct the agricultural calendar and daily labour routines. It argues that the 
hybrid labour system of large colonial estancias, where free labourers worked alongside slaves and often 
under their direct supervision, was an efficient response to the specifics of local landholding structures, crop 
choices, and the patterns of cattle herd behaviour. Chapter  relies on local records to overcome the source 
hiatus following the demise of the colonial state. Economic historians have labelled the period immediately 
after independence (c.-) as ‘lost decades’ in Latin American history, but the contours of economic 
and ecological change in the Uruguayan countryside—the demise of slavery and the rise of sheep farming—
can be glimpsed from the sources we do have, which should not be overlooked simply because the national 
state had not yet developed its record-keeping infrastructure. 
In the aftermath of wire-fenced enclosures, chapters  and  focus on land and labour during the First 
Globalization. Chapter  uses a new spatially-explicit dataset of rural districts to explore, through regression 
analyses, the impact of unit sizes and soil types on the propensity to invest in cattle crossbreeding. The results 
show that latifundia (very large landholdings) were not any more or less likely to improve their cattle herds 
than smaller units: location and soils, rather than the size of holdings, determined the extent of agricultural 
intensification. Chapter  reconstructs the population geography and the occupational structure of Uruguay 
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century to interrogate the long-standing claims that 
‘modernization’ greatly limited economic opportunities for rural workers. It innovates by using not only 
censuses but also individual level records, including thousands of birth certificates, to provide evidence for 
productivity gaps within agriculture and between it and manufacturing. Finally, the Conclusion borrows 
title and inspiration from a seminal book on the economic history of an agrarian society which, from the 
perspective of nineteenth-century Uruguay, was extremely remote. It reflects on how the transformations of 
 
13 Henri Lefevbre’s concept of ‘spatial code’ (introduced in The production of space (Oxford, )) is defined and 
tailored to our present purposes in Chapter . 
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Uruguayan agriculture during the Great Divergence shaped the subsequent history of the country as well as 
the conditions for its future development. 
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chapter one 
Debates, Context, and Concepts 
 
 
This chapter sets the stage for the rest of the thesis by introducing the reader to Uruguay in the long 
nineteenth century and its part in narratives of Latin American development. Because this dissertation takes 
an eclectic approach to theory and methodology, what follows is not a systematic exposition of methods and 
sources (which will be presented as they are called upon), but a critical reflection on the most influential 
thesis surrounding long-running debates in Latin American and Uruguayan economic history. Besides 
staking a position in those debates, this first chapter identifies a series of issues and hypothesis which then 
are taken up in greater detail and with new evidence in subsequent ones.   
The aim throughout is to foreground how a resource perspective on Uruguayan historical rural 
development can contribute to our understanding of Latin America’s relative backwardness and on the 
implications of this story for global economic history, in particular regarding the place of geography in 
explanations of economic change in the past. The need to cross disciplinary boundaries is emphasised: if 
economic historians want to understand how the natural world interacts with long-term development paths, 
we have to learn from the experts on environmental change, whose understanding of geography is much 
more useful (and exciting) than the one generally implicit in our own sub-discipline. 
Section  delves deeper into the debate about Latin America’s long-term development, discussing the 
most influential explanations based on colonial origins, domestic institutions,1 and factor endowments. 
Sections  introduces the chronological and geographical boundaries of the case study, and places it in 
comparative perspective. Section  surveys the main interpretive strands in the specialist literature on 
Uruguay’s historical rural development and identifies old questions which remain open and new ones that 
need to be asked. Section  returns to conceptual issues: it defends the environment as a perspective and not 
merely as a set of ‘initial conditions’ for long-term economic development, and argues for its place on the 
stage beyond the first act in the stories economic historians tell. 
 
1 In the economic history literature, institutions are most commonly defined as ‘the rules of the game, the patterns 
of interaction that govern and constrain the relationship of individuals’ including ‘formal rules, written laws, formal 
social conventions, and informal norms of behavior’ and ‘the means by which rules and norms are enforced.’ Douglass 
C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: a conceptual framework for 
interpreting recorded human history (Cambridge, ): . See also the seminal North, ‘Institutions’. 
 
 
1 Who is to blame for Latin American backwardness? 
No Latin American country is considered a developed economy, and rightly so: most of the region is in the 
bottom half of the global income distribution, inequalities between households and communities are 
notoriously world-leading, and basic physical infrastructure is sorely lacking across large swathes of the 
continent.2 And yet, the region has undoubtedly developed: the secular trend since we have reliable figures 
is, despite its unevenness, one of substantial improvements in poverty alleviation, educational attainments, 
and life expectancy. Indeed, some Latin American countries have become fairly affluent by global standards. 
Uruguay is one of the smallest economies in the continent, but it is a good site to think about Latin America’s 
divergent development, because despite the fact that it has failed to catch-up with the West, it is classified as 
a high-income economy by the World Bank, enjoys a high Human Development Index rating, and boasts 
the lowest levels of income inequality in the region.3  
If there is one challenge that economic historians of Latin America cannot renounce it is to explain the 
region’s secular failure to converge towards the material standards of living of the leading world economies, 
not least to the two very rich neighbours to the north—Canada and the United States. So who is to blame 
for Latin American relative backwardness? In academic circles, as well as in the political arena, three suspects 
have been repeatedly brought in for questioning throughout the decades. While many scholars would agree 
they acted together, the quest for the prime suspect continues. This section surveys the most influential 
answers in the comparative literature, and tests them using the case of Uruguay in comparative perspective. 
Uruguay is of course not representative of Latin America as a whole: it is far smaller than its immediate 
neighbours and, like all cases, has its peculiarities. In many ways it could be seen as an outlier because of its 
archeologically shallow pre-colonial past, its unusually short colonial history, and its extraordinary 
ecological homogeneity when compared to almost every other Latin American country. But that is, I will 
argue, precisely the point: explanations for Latin American backwardness should be tested also when trying 
to account for differences within the continent. And those were, and continue to be, very large indeed. 
 
  
 
2 Prevailing popular views about Latin America seem to believe some of these features of backwardness are 
somehow part of Latin America’s ‘essence’. A  article in The Economist began: ‘Inequality is as Latin American as 
good dance music and magical-realist fiction.’ Nov. th, . 
3 World Bank Country & Lending Groups, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/-
world-bank-country-and-lending-groups; UNDP, Human Development Report  (New York, ); UN ECLAC, 
Panorama social de América Latina  (Santiago, ): . 
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1.1. Colonial origins 
‘For those who see history as a competition, Latin America’s backwardness and poverty are merely the result 
of its failure. We lost; others won. But the winners happen to have won thanks to our losing.’4 The opening 
pages of Eduardo Galeano’s Open veins of Latin America (), incidentally the most widely translated and 
reprinted book ever written by a Uruguayan, took the dependentista interpretation, then in full swing in 
Latin American universities, to a much larger audience across the continent and beyond. Europe, through 
the Iberian powers, had extracted wealth and sweat from Latin America and set the region on an 
underdevelopment trajectory.5 In dependentista scholarship this was framed as part of a wider critique of 
imperialism and what scholars in that tradition saw as its continued role in Latin American poverty and 
inequality.6 Imperial influences extended beyond the formal empires of Spain and Portugal (as well as France 
in the case of Haiti, almost always included in this literature), to encompass the ‘neo-colonial’ designs of 
Britain in the late-nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth. The argument about neo-
colonial extraction exerted much less of an influence in later global economic historiography, perhaps 
because it has been generally accepted that Latin America had already fallen behind before Anglo-American 
‘neo-imperialism’ appeared on stage. Whether Anglo-American interventions (from Britain’s ‘informal 
empire’ to the United States’ military invasions) played a part in stifling Latin American development is a 
question in dire need of more (and better) quantitative evidence, and should become fertile ground for the 
methodological tools of the new economic history in order to test dependentista claims in a rich historical 
context.7 I look forward to tackling that issue in the future; it falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
 
4 Eduardo Galeano, Open veins of Latin America (New York, ): . The original Spanish edition was published 
in  simultaneously in Montevideo by Universidad de la República and in Mexico City by Siglo XXI, and it had an 
immediate political impact in those cities and almost everywhere in between; see Isabel Allende, ‘The Open Veins of 
Latin America,’ Monthly Review ,  (). Despite its many empirical limitations and its, in my view, mistaken 
thesis, the book continued to be for many young Latin Americans throughout the decades (including the one writing 
this) a stimulating first encounter with their continent’s economic history. 
5 To square the successful Iberian extraction of Latin America’s resources with the relative backwardness of Spain 
and Portugal within Europe, dependentistas pointed out that those resources ultimately fuelled north-western European 
industrialization: in Galeano’s much-cited metaphor ‘Spain owned the cow, others drank the milk.’ Open veins, . 
6 In the social sciences, two of the most influential versions were Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, 
Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley, ) and Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York, ). Within historical writing, a representative and influential 
English-language study in the dependentista tradition is Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of 
Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective (New York, ). Classics in the Spanish and Portuguese 
language scholarship are Sergio Bagú, Economía de la Sociedad Colonial. Ensayo de Historia Comparada de América 
Latina (Buenos Aires, ) and Celso Furtado, Formac ̧ão Econômica da América Latina (Rio de Janeiro, ). 
7 Recent contributions which show there was a negative impact are Noel Maurer, ‘The Empire Struck Back: Sanctions 
and compensation in the Mexican oil expropriation of ,’ JEH ,  (); Xavier Duran and Marcelo Bucheli, 
‘Holding Up the Empire: Colombia, American oil interests, and the  Urrutia-Thomson Treaty,’ JEH ,  (). 
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But as far as Iberian colonialism is concerned, there are loud—and largely unacknowledged—echoes of 
dependentista voices in the currently dominant institutionalist interpretations of economic divergence 
between North and Latin America. This is more evidently the case with Northian institutionalism, dominant 
in the s, which emphasised how pernicious the Iberian cultural and institutional legacy was for long-
term economic development; but it is also true, perhaps more subtly but not less consequentially, in the neo-
institutionalist orthodoxy of the early twenty-first century, epitomised by the highly stimulating and hugely 
influential work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (AJR).8 Let us look more closely. 
The first, ‘new institutional economics’ version tied development prospects to the predominant national 
identity of European settlers and the institutions they brought with them. North and Landes were two of the 
main proponents of this thesis, which essentially transplanted to the Americas a cultural rationale for the 
economic leadership of Britain vis-à-vis the rest of Europe. North argued that Spanish American ‘failure’ 
was a consequence of ‘a centralized monarchy in Castile (...) that defined the institutional evolution of both 
Spain and Latin America’ through ‘a minute regulation of the economy.’9 In Latin America, Landes claimed, 
‘the skills, curiosity, initiatives, and civic interests of North America were wanting’ because Spain exported 
‘its weaknesses’: ‘its spiritual homogeneity and docility, its wealth and pursuit of vanities.’10 This culturalist 
argument can be traced back in modern European thought at least to Max Weber, and also has a venerable 
tradition in Latin American thinking.11 Already in  the Cuban intellectual and political leader José Martí 
offered a succinct formulation: ‘North America was born of the plough, Spanish America of the hunting dog.’12  
Despite extensive work by historians of colonial Latin America challenging that perception, the idea of 
a monolithic institutional template prevailing throughout a centralist, bureaucratic and extractive Spanish 
empire in the New World remains hugely influential as a historical background for development economists 
and political scientists working on Latin America.13 The economic history of Uruguay in the long-
 
8 The best critical discussion of the ‘new institutionalist orthodoxy’ in relation to Latin America’s colonial legacy 
and long-term development is Rafael Dobado González, ‘Herencia colonial y desarrollo económico en Iberoamérica: 
una crítica a la "nueva ortodoxia",’ in Latinoamérica y España, -: un crecimiento económico nada excepcional, 
ed. Enrique Llopis and Carlos Marichal (México, ). 
9 North, ‘Institutions’, ; cf. Regina Grafe and Maria Alejandra Irigoin, ‘The Spanish Empire and its legacy: fiscal 
redistribution and political conflict in colonial and post-colonial Spanish America,’ Journal of Global History ,  (). 
10 Landes, Wealth and Poverty, . 
11 For Landes culture held all the answers: ‘Max Weber was right. If we learn anything from the history of economic 
development, it is that culture makes almost all the difference.’ Weber's famous, and by now largely discredited, thesis 
linked Protestantism with economic rationality and the rise of capitalism. David S. Landes, ‘Culture Makes Almost All 
the Difference,’ in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E. 
Harrison (New York, ); Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London, ). 
12 ‘Del arado nació la América del Norte, y la Española, del perro de presa.’ José Martí, Discurso en la Sociedad 
Literaria Hispanoamericana, December th .  
13 María Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe, ‘Bargaining for Absolutism: a Spanish Path to Nation-State and 
Empire Building,’ HAHR ,  (). 
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nineteenth century falsifies such a generalization: if Spanish colonial institutional heritage is congenitally 
incompatible with economic prosperity, then the globally leading living standards in Uruguay (and in next-
door Argentina) at the turn of the twentieth century are difficult to explain. Regional variation across Latin 
America is, I would argue, the strongest evidence against what Frankema has termed the ‘metropolitan 
institutions perspective’ on the New World divergence.14  
A more recent variation on this theme emphasises not metropolitan political culture but metropolitan 
real wages, and argues for their impact through migration and labour markets. Allen, Murphy, and 
Schneider (AMS) argue that between colonization and independence North American cities were already 
the most prosperous in the world, whereas Latin America’s lagged behind. Those initial differences in wages 
explain, in their view, long-term divergence in per capita incomes, and are in turn explained by 
contemporary real wages in London and Madrid.15 While it could be persuasive from a region-wide 
perspective, this argument fails to explain the very significant real wages differentials within colonial 
Spanish America that become apparent when the barebones subsistence baskets are adjusted to include local 
dietary preferences. Attempts to construct real wages for colonial Montevideo have failed to produce 
plausible results, I think, because they persist in using a European basket as a model, which substitutes cheap 
local beef with expensive pulses.16 Indeed, when the consumption basket across the river in colonial Buenos 
Aires is modified from a generalised, and quasi-vegetarian, ‘Latin American basket’ (as the one used in 
AMS's estimates) to allow for significant consumption of beef (which makes historical sense, both in terms 
of the pattern suggested by qualitative sources and relative food prices), real wages there turn out to be 
amongst the highest in the world.17 Arroyo Abad, Davies, and van Zanden have documented these 
substantial differences in real wages between Latin American cities in colonial times, which suggest that the 
settlers’ wages in their labour market of origin were not as influential as AMS posit.  
But let us turn to the most influential and in my view most sophisticated versions of ‘colonial origins’ 
arguments. AJR’s two major contributions to this literature are a decisive improvement over its neo-
Weberian precedent (and remain, in my opinion, better than AMS’s attempt) because they have the potential 
to account for variation within Latin America.18 Even if, in my view, they fail on that count, both their 
 
14 Ewout Frankema, Has Latin America Always Been Unequal? A Comparative Study of Asset and Income Inequality 
in the Long Twentieth Century (Leiden, ): . 
15 Robert C Allen, Tommy E Murphy, and Eric B Schneider, ‘The Colonial Origins of the Divergence in the 
Americas: A Labor Market Approach,’ JEH ,  (): . 
16 Cf. María Inés Moraes and Florencia Thul, ‘Los salarios reales y el nivel de vida en una economía 
latinoamericana colonial: Montevideo entre -,’ Revista de Historia Económica ,  (). 
17 Leticia Arroyo Abad, Elwyn Davies, and Jan Luiten van Zanden, ‘Between conquest and independence: Real wages 
and demographic change in Spanish America, –,’ EEH ,  (). Even today Uruguay and Argentina top the 
international rankings of beef consumed per capita, with more than  pounds per person per year. FAS/USDA, Livestock. 
18 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: 
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contributions deserve the attention and reflection of global economic historians. In their  article, AJR 
point not to the national identity of the colonisers but to the colonisation policies they adopted as a result of 
the mortality rates they faced. The empirical basis for this claim are constructed through cross-country 
regressions showing that initial settlement practices determined early institutions (particularly rules 
concerning private property and constraints on executive power) which persisted after independence and 
explain long-run (and indeed present-day) economic performance. Where settlers faced low levels of 
potential mortality, they attempted to replicate European (i.e. ‘good’) institutions; where Europeans were 
more likely to die as a result of the local disease environment the institutional response was to set up 
‘extractive states.’19  
Latin America in general, and Uruguay (together with Argentina and Chile) in particular, present a 
problem for AJR’s analysis. Even if we assume that their choice of evidence on settler mortality is plausible 
(a big if, as Albouy has shown) and that it constitutes a strong instrumental variable (which was persuasively 
challenged by O'Brien), their version of the colonial origins thesis fails to explain variation within South 
America, Central America, or the ‘Latin’ Caribbean.20 If we reproduce AJR’s main regression with their own 
dataset, specifications and scale, but plotting only Latin American countries, the correlation between 
colonial settler mortality and income per capita in —the cornerstone of their argument—largely 
disappears, with only four outliers showing some significant variation in the independent variable (Graph 
.). Observed together, the differences between these four cases (Panama, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, 
and Haiti) are evidence against the hypothesis, as they all had high levels of ‘settler mortality’ related to their 
disease environments, but show substantial income divergence in . There is also no correlation between 
the two variables within Central America and the ‘Latin’ Caribbean more broadly. 
 
 
  
 
An Empirical Investigation,’ AER ,  (); Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Reversal of Fortune’. Two of the 
authors have since reached a much broader audience with their message in Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (New York, ). 
19 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Colonial Origins’. 
20 David Y. Albouy, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. Comment,’ 
AER ,  (); Patrick O‘Brien, ‘Colonies in a globalizing economy, -,’ in Globalization and Global 
History, ed. Barry K. Gills and William R. Thompson (London, ). 
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GRAPH 1.1. Testing AJR’s ‘colonial origins’ within Latin America 
(using the same specifications and dataset as the original paper) 
 
Notes: only some countries are labelled to avoid overcrowding the figure. AJR do not include Cuba; to be able to 
reproduce their exercise, I also exclude it here. Most of Mexico is not strictly in Central America, but geographically in 
North America and historically in ‘Mesoamerica’; for simplicity, the category ‘Central America’ includes Mexico here. 
Source: author’s recalculation of the data in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Colonial Origins’, .  
 
Neither does ‘settler mortality’ in colonial times explain income differences within South America in 
. Given that any approach that tries to account for Latin American backwardness must also explain 
variation within the subcontinent, the case of Uruguay, as well as Argentina and Chile, are difficult to fit into 
AJR’s conclusions, as they had virtually the same levels of colonial ‘settler mortality’ as Bolivia and 
Guatemala but enjoyed considerably higher living standards in  (and the gaps are even bigger in ). 
Perhaps this is why even though AJR cite Donald Denoon’s classic work as historiographical support for the 
exceptionalism of ‘settler colonies’ as those which had ‘representative institutions which promoted what the 
settlers wanted and what they wanted was freedom and the ability to get rich by engaging in trade,’ they fail 
to mention that Denoon's understanding of ‘settler capitalism’ encompasses Argentina, Uruguay and Chile 
(and indeed South Africa), whereas AJR only Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States.21 
 
21 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Colonial Origins’, ; Donald Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics 
of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere (Oxford, ). 
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In a  article, AJR articulated an influential variation: the ‘reversal of fortunes’ (RF) thesis. Again, to 
a large extent AJR replicate and extend to diverse parts of the world, apparently without realising so, an 
argument with a long and distinguished pedigree in Latin Americanist scholarship, namely that the density 
and organization of pre-Columbian populations determined the kind of institutions that Europeans 
established after conquest.22 They further argue that the effects of said institutions (and indeed some of those 
institutions themselves) persisted over five centuries and contribute to explain the world income distribution 
today. The authors rely on Uruguay, as well as neighbouring Argentina, to advance their argument, 
comparing them with Guatemala and Bolivia respectively. In their account, as areas with very low 
urbanization rates at the time of European conquest, Argentina and Uruguay gave way to more ‘inclusive 
institutions’ and economies with ‘little forced labour’, which would explain their present-day prosperity 
relative to areas more densely populated at the time of Spanish arrival. 23 A pattern of ‘little forced labour’ in 
the colonial River Plate, however, is simply not supported by the sources, as Chapter  of this dissertation 
will show in detail. The colonial rural economy produced a hybrid pattern of labour relations, which relied 
on both slave and free labour in changing ratios determined by seasonality and by short-term fluctuations 
in demand, with the largest and most export-oriented estancias employing more slaves than free workers 
for the majority of permanent tasks. Uruguay’s rural economy in particular, despite being consistently 
classified by historians as a ‘society with slaves’ rather than a ‘slave society’, relied on slave labour to a large 
extent after independence as well, as Chapter  will prove.24 
Furthermore, the danger of compressing history which Austin pointed out mainly in reference to Africa 
also applies to AJR’s analysis of Latin America: there is simply too much history between the first Iberian 
settlements and the late twentieth century.25 In fact, by the early s—long after Spanish conquest—the 
Bolivian altiplano (colonial Upper Peru) was still richer than the River Plate: Potosí was the largest urban 
and trading centre in the Western Hemisphere, and only second to Seville in the Spanish empire.26 The 
‘reversal’ between these two areas was a result of the eighteenth century decline of Upper Peruvian silver 
mining and the rise of the livestock export economy in the late-colonial River Plate, both endogenous 
economic developments that cannot be traced back to Spanish conquest and initial settlements. The story 
then became one of persistence (and indeed deepening) of fortunes over the nineteenth century. Afterwards, 
the trend changed towards convergence between Latin American economies in general, and Bolivia 
experienced significant catching-up with Argentina and Uruguay until a series of crises in the late-twentieth 
 
22 Stein and Stein expressed it succinctly already in : ‘had the Englishmen found a dense and highly organized 
Amerindian population, the history of what is called the United States would record the development of a stratified, 
bi-racial, very different society.’ Stein and Stein, Colonial Heritage, . 
23 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Reversal of Fortune’, , fn. . 
24 The classic use of the ‘slave economy/society with slaves’ distinction in Latin American economic historiography 
is Cardoso and Pérez-Brignoli, Historia económica. 
25 Austin, ‘Compression of History’. 
26 Jane E. Mangan, Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí (Durham, ). 
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century.27 Coming up with a single label (whether it is ‘persistence’ or ‘reversal’) for the comparative 
development of these two regions would obscure more than it would explain. 
Similarly, when AJR argue that income differences between Uruguay and Guatemala have not only 
reversed from  to  but that ‘are now much larger’ than they once were, they are missing centuries 
of change.28 According to their figures, in  ‘Guatemala’ was  percent richer than ‘Uruguay’, and in 
 Uruguay was  percent richer than Guatemala. This simple story changes when we take into 
consideration that by  Uruguayan incomes were  percent higher than Guatemala’s, pointing to a 
‘reversion of the reversal’ during the twentieth century, with the Guatemalan economy outperforming 
Uruguay significantly.29 This also puts the ‘original’ reversal into perspective: when did it start and how long 
did it last for? The Uruguay-Guatemala comparison demonstrates how merely adding a third observation 
complicates the narrative, and makes the whole process messier and more dynamic, i.e. more historical.  
Below present-day inequalities, within Latin America and elsewhere, there are many historical layers. 
Looking at the diverse and changing fortunes of Latin American economies through time highlights the 
dangers of what Bloch called ‘the idol of origins’:30 not all of Latin American economic history was perfectly 
contained within the seeds of Iberian colonization. But even as a set of explanations connecting the colonial 
period to the present, the institutionalist orthodoxy is exceedingly narrow. Both ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
institutionalism focus almost exclusively on colonial origins: the explanatory variables are not institutions 
or processes which developed throughout the colonial period, but only factors limited to its onset. All the 
weight is placed upon the original identity of the colonisers or the institutions set up during initial 
colonization. Indeed, no consideration is given to how the duration of the colonial period—notably varied 
across the region—could have affected colonial institutions or their legacy. While most of the region gained 
its independence sometime between the s and s, ‘colonial origins’ themselves have very different 
chronologies depending on the country. The beginning dates for military conquest and, even more 
importantly for our purposes, the setting up of colonial economies varied hugely across Latin America: the 
earliest was in the island of Hispaniola, where Spanish mills were producing molasses as early as ; the 
latest in Uruguay, where the first colonial estancias to slaughter cattle were set up in the s.31 This lack 
 
27 Alfonso Herranz-Loncán and José Alejandro Peres-Cajías, ‘Tracing the reversal of fortune in the Americas: 
Bolivian GDP per capita since the mid-nineteenth century,’ Cliometrica ,  (); Bértola and Ocampo, Economic 
Development, -. 
28 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Reversal of Fortune’, . 
29 The figures are taken from Jutta Bolt, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong, and Jan Luiten van Zanden, ‘Rebasing 
“Maddison”: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development,’ Maddison Project Working 
Paper,  (). 
30 Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l‘histoire, ou métier d'historien (Paris, ): -. 
31 Genaro Rodríguez Morel, ‘The Sugar Economy of Española in the Sixteenth Century,’ in Tropical Babylons: sugar 
and the making of the Atlantic World, -, ed. Stuart B. Schwartz (Chapel Hill, ); Julia Sarreal, The Guaraní 
and Their Missions: A Socioeconomic History (Stanford, ): -. 
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of attention to something as crucial as the duration of colonial experience is one of the major weaknesses of 
this strand of institutionalist economic history in its approach to Latin America’s long-term development, 
and is emblematic of its wider ‘compression of history’ problem.32  
 
1.2. Domestic institutions 
A second group of institutionalist interpretations move beyond colonial origins to consider the persistent 
effect of practices that developed in Latin America in a colonial or early-independent setting. These are also 
part of the ‘history matters’ movement in development economics, but for them the key to understanding 
Latin American economic backwardness is not to be found in the initial policies or rules of Iberian 
colonization but in the institutions that developed throughout the colonial period and/or in the aftermath 
of independence.33 There are three major strands, emphasising different institutions and conjunctures: the 
‘persistence school’ identifying colonial economic institutions which set countries or particular regions on 
a growth-limiting institutional path; the ‘legal origins’ scholars emphasising the development of different 
frameworks for economic activity; and the proponents of the ‘lost decades’ thesis who argue the cycle of 
political unrest and civil strife following independence was the defining moment for Latin American 
institutional trajectories. 
In ‘persistence’ studies a particular historical institution is identified, defined as a ‘treatment’ applied to 
some regions and not others, and then its effects on long-term development are calculated and the 
mechanisms behind them are discussed. Melissa Dell’s research into the very long-term negative effects of 
the mita system of labour coercion in Peru continues to spark studies into the persistent legacy of other 
colonial institutions (some of which continued to exist after independence), including missions, monastic 
orders, and slavery.34 It can only be assumed that this literature will continue to expand, in a gold rush for 
 
32 Austin, ‘Compression of History’. 
33 Referring to a common feature of the titles or first sentences of such articles, Jan de Vries has coined the 
expression ‘history matters movement’ to name this fast-growing economics and social science literature devoted to 
studying path-dependent processes in historical data sets containing ‘natural experiments’. Many historians are rightly 
shocked to read about ‘proofs’ that ‘history matters’ to understand development, a finding that hardly needed 
discovering. Jan de Vries, ‘Changing the Narrative: The New History That Was and Is to Come,’ Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History XLVIII,  (): ; Nathan Nunn, ‘The importance of history for economic development,’ 
Annual Review of Economics ,  ().  
34 Melissa Dell, ‘The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita,’ Econometrica ,  (); Felipe Valencia Caicedo, 
‘The mission: Human capital transmission, economic persistence, and culture in South America,’ QJE ,  (); 
Maria Waldinger, ‘The long-run effects of missionary orders in Mexico,’ Journal of Development Economics  (); 
Daron Acemoglu, Camilo García-Jimeno, and James A Robinson, ‘Finding Eldorado: Slavery and long-run 
development in Colombia,’ Journal of Comparative Economics ,  (). These results have been criticised by 
economic geographers for their lack of attention to the problem of spatial autocorrelation: Morgan Kelly, ‘The Standard 
Errors of Persistence,’ SSRN Working Paper, . Chapter  will address this methodological problem as it relates to 
the impact of latifundia on agricultural innovation in Uruguay. 
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‘good, bad, and ugly colonial activities’ which can perhaps be correlated with better or worse outcomes in 
present-day development.35 Again, this line of inquiry is not new in economic history, although because of 
its concern with the distant past it might have felt like a breath of fresh air to development economists. 
Classic works in Latin American economic historiography had famously argued for the persistent effect of 
colonial-era economic institutions, such as the sugar ingenio in Cuba, the fazendas of Brazil, and Uruguay’s 
‘latifundist estancia’.36 This dissertation hopes to show, through the analysis of the latter, that economic 
institutions have a history of their own, and their impact on growth and development is not always the same: 
they cannot be assumed to be tools of persistence because they are themselves subject to change. There were 
estancias in Uruguay’s countryside throughout the more than  years covered by this thesis, but their 
economic value, their impact on inequality, and the kind of commercial agriculture they practised changed 
through time. Chapters , , and  will show how social relations in estancias shifted dramatically in the 
nineteenth century, notably because of the demise of slavery, and so did productive strategies, as land 
became more valuable and new export commodities available. It would be unhelpful, not to mention quite 
boring, to instead debate whether the estancia as an institution was ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for Uruguayan historical 
development. 
A second strand of the ‘domestic institutions’ approach is provided by the legal origins school. The time 
of ‘origin’ here is not the early-colonial period, but the aftermath of independence, when the newly 
independent Latin American states settled on a legal framework inspired by French law, partly as a result of 
the previous experience with Iberian colonial law, which was also based on the Latin civil law tradition. In 
the influential interpretation of La Porta, López de Silanes, and Shleifer the fact that North America’s legal 
system developed instead along an English common law path contributed to stronger financial markets and 
lower government regulation which—perhaps because their article was published just before rather than 
just after the  financial crisis—the authors unequivocally associated with higher levels of economic 
development.37 Other scholars have responded by emphasising ‘legal pluralism’ in the formerly colonised 
 
35 Miriam Bruhn and Francisco A Gallego, ‘Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for 
Economic Development?,’ Review of Economics and Statistics ,  (). 
36 This is a sprawling literature which I cannot survey here; seminal references for the cases mentioned are, 
respectively, Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio: el complejo económico social cubano del azúcar (La Habana, ); 
Gilberto Freyre, Casa-grande e senzala: formac ̧ão da familia brasileira sob o regimen de economia patriarchal (Rio de 
Janeiro, ); Lucía Sala de Touron, Nelson de la Torre, and Julio C. Rodríguez, Evolución económica de la Banda 
Oriental (Montevideo, ). For a survey of research in the early s into the history and effects of some of those 
institutions, see the contributions to Enrique Florescano, ed. Haciendas, latifundios y plantaciones en América Latina 
(Mexico City, ). 
37 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The economic consequences of legal origins,’ 
Journal of Economic Literature ,  (): ; see also Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal origins,’ QJE 
,  (). This argument had been articulated before by Jonathan RT Hughes, ‘What Difference Did the Beginning 
Make?,’ AER ,  () and North, ‘Institutions’, and is very much espoused by development economists who 
emphasise the alleged lack of clearly-defined property rights as the crucial obstacle for development in parts of Asia, 
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world, and have shown how it was often not possible for local authorities (either national or colonial) to 
apply pret à porter legal systems imported wholesale from elsewhere. Indeed, a diversity of legal systems 
coexisted within colonial empires and even within a single colony, and colonial authorities were often quite 
reluctant to apply their own legal traditions or rules.38 Chapter  of this dissertation will show that local 
conditions mattered more than legal traditions to determine effective rules surrounding land and labour 
during the colonial period when, at least in the letter, all of Spanish America was under a single code. In so 
doing it will falsify one crucial assumption of the ‘legal origins’ literature on the pivotal issue of access to 
agricultural land: that ‘English land law provided a legal and institutional basis for a relatively equal 
distribution of freehold land in the American colonies, while Spanish and Portuguese law led to the creation 
of large estates and unequal distribution of land throughout what would become Latin America.’39 
Finally, there are scholars who point to the political unrest following independence as the time when 
Latin American institutional trajectories went wrong. Chapter  deals with the problems of growth 
accounting in early-independent Latin America which affect the evidential backbone of the ‘lost decades’ 
thesis. For now it suffices to consider how a causal link between political violence in the aftermath of 
independence, ‘institutional breakdown’, and limits to economic growth has been used to explain Latin 
American backwardness.40 The most influential framework in this stream of literature is North, Wallis, and 
Weingast’s binary model of ‘open access orders’ and ‘natural states’, later christened ‘limited access orders’: 
again an alternative between a set of ‘good’ and one of ‘bad’ institutions.41 In my view, one problematic 
methodological issue here is that the ‘open access order’ is in effect defined retroactively as requiring a set 
of threshold conditions that the authors identify from a dozen present-day developed OCDE economies (the 
rest of the world being considered ‘natural states’), and then cast backwards or sideways to other times and 
places—exactly the opposite of a ‘reciprocal comparison’.42 As in this literature all of Latin America is defined 
as ‘natural states’, the framework seems ill-suited to explain variation across the continent, and hence I would 
 
Africa, and Latin America; see Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and 
Fails Everywhere Else (New York, ). 
38 See the overview in Leigh Gardner and Tirthankar Roy, The Economic History of Colonialism (Bristol, ): Box .. 
39 North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence, . 
40 Douglass C. North, William Summerhill, and Barry Weingast, ‘Order, Disorder and Economic Change: Latin 
America vs. North America,’ in Governing for Prosperity, ed. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton Root (New Haven, 
); Coatsworth, ‘Trajectories’. For an unsuccessful attempt to quantify the effects of ‘institutional breakdowns’ on 
growth rates, see Rok Spruk, ‘The Rise and Fall of Argentina,’ Latin American Economic Review  (). 
41 ‘Natural states’ solve the threat of endemic violence, which the authors identify as the core problem all societies 
deal with ‘through the formation of a dominant coalition whose members possess special privileges’; an ‘open access 
order’, by contrast, benefit from ‘impersonal markets and impersonal exchange’ which ‘prevents the political system 
from manipulating economic interests.’ North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence, -; see also Douglass C. North, John 
Joseph Wallis, Steven Benjamin Webb, and Barry R. Weingast, In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the 
Problem of Development (Cambridge, ). 
42 For a definition of the principle of ‘reciprocal comparison’ in economic history, see Kenneth Pomeranz, The 
Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, ): . 
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argued cannot be trusted as a tool to explain Latin American historical economic backwardness. I find 
Schlueter’s application of this framework to Uruguay in particular, in the context of the comparison with 
New Zealand, unpersuasive precisely because it is somewhat teleological: the label of ‘limited access order’ 
is applied to Uruguay at the beginning of the enquiry rather than arising as a plausible explanation when 
looking for answers to the gap in living standards between the two countries.43 Furthermore, even if we 
consider ‘limited access order’ and ‘open access order’ as the boundaries of a continuum along which 
societies move, it is not always clear in which direction historical development is moving. Between Chapter 
 and Chapter  of this dissertation, Uruguay’s rural economy became more ‘open access’ in some 
fundamental ways, such as by abolishing labour coercion, but more ‘limited access’ in others, as common 
rural folk were increasingly less able to obtain a plot of their own.  
 
1.3. Geography and endowments 
Because the Americas hold an immense range of geographical variation, a third group of general 
explanations for the inequalities in material standards of living between New World societies has 
concentrated on location and natural endowments. Following AJR’s distinction, we can broadly differentiate 
between ‘simple geography’ hypotheses which point to time-invariant features resulting from a country’s 
location as explanations for its development trajectory, and a group of ‘sophisticated geography’ 
interpretations that consider how the natural environment shapes patterns of economic development 
(including institutions) in particular conjunctures, and how that influence endures even if the geographical 
‘first movers’ themselves change or become less important through time. 
‘Simple geography’ hypotheses have a long genealogy in political and economic thought, which 
includes, but is not limited too, some rather crude versions very popular with late-nineteenth century elites 
in Uruguay and in other temperate-zone settler societies, as well as in Victorian Britain.44 A much more 
interesting set of ‘geography hypotheses’ returned at the turn of the twenty-first century, with a series of 
studies emphasizing that coastal, temperate areas have the highest levels of ‘economic density’ (multiplying 
national average incomes by local population densities) in the world, whereas nearly all tropical countries 
are low income economies, three times poorer than the average temperate country.45 Such explanations can 
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- (Basingstoke, ). 
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development is often traced back to Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois (). On the Victorian hierarchy of climates 
and its racist overtones, see David N Livingstone, ‘The moral discourse of climate: historical considerations on race, 
place and virtue,’ Journal of Historical Geography ,  (). 
45 The seminal paper is John Luke Gallup, Jeffrey D Sachs, and Andrew D Mellinger, ‘Geography and economic 
development,’ International Regional Science Review ,  (); and, with specific reference to Latin America, John 
Luke Gallup, Alejandro Gaviria, and Eduardo Lora, Is Geography Destiny? Lessons from Latin America (). These 
 
 
 
also seem at first sight very persuasive to account for historical economic inequalities across the Americas, 
as Graph . shows.  
However, I agree with AJR’s critiques of such explanations, which have been further elaborated and 
evidenced in a Latin American context by Nugent and Robinson through an effective comparison of coffee 
agriculture in Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala.46 First, latitude is by definition static, 
standards of living are not. If we chose a different benchmark year, say  when the tropical oil-exporters 
were booming and Venezuela was richer than Uruguay, and Chile poorer than Ecuador, or sometime in the 
upswing of import-substitution industrialization, when large mostly tropical economies—Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico—outperformed more lightly populated temperate-zone countries, then the relationship would no 
longer be so persuasive. It should be noted, however, that some of the explanatory factors (urbanization in 
 in the ‘Reversal of Fortunes’) or instrumental variables (settler mortality in the beginning of 
colonization in ‘Colonial Origins’) used by neo-institutionalists themselves are every bit as static as latitude. 
Second, a correlation or an instrumental variable does not an explanation make.47 We should instead 
try to understand when and why latitude seems to correlate with higher incomes. In , after decades of 
favourable terms of trade for primary producers, and especially so for temperate agricultural producers, 
latitude is just a stand-in for the commodity lottery. Countries in the Americas whose location allowed them 
to specialise in temperate-zone agricultural commodities (such as Uruguayan beef and wool) competed 
against high-income producers in Europe and Australasia and thereby reaped the benefits of international 
trade to a much larger extent than those who produced tropical agricultural commodities (coffee, cacao, 
bananas) for which the marginal world producer was a low-income economy.48 In contexts when growth 
was less tied to export agriculture, such as the import-substitution era in the mid-twentieth century, latitude 
is less impressive as an apparent explanation of divergences in living standards across the Americas. 
 
   
 
approaches were inspired by the extremely thought-provoking work of Diamond, Guns, germs, and steel: the fates of 
human societies (New York, ) which appeared a few years earlier. 
46 Jeffrey B. Nugent and James A Robinson, ‘Are Factor Endowments Fate?,’ RHE ,  (). 
47 On the difference between an instrumental variable and an explanation in the context of AJR’s analysis, see Dani 
Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Princeton, ): -. 
48 Díaz Alejandro is credited with the idea of the ‘commodity lottery’, which was then popularised by Bulmer-
Thomas in his classic economic history of Latin America. Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro, ‘Latin America in the s,’ in 
Latin America in the 's: The Role of the Periphery in World Crisis, ed. Rosemary Thorp (London, ); Bulmer-
Thomas, Economic History. For conclusive evidence of how the lottery was biased against tropical agricultural 
commodities in this period, and an interpretative model of its consequences, see Giovanni Federico and Antonio Tena‐
Junguito, ‘Lewis revisited: tropical polities competing on the world market, –,’ EcHR ,  (). 
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GRAPH 1.2. Tristes tropiques? Distance from the Equator and average incomes in 1913 
Distance calculated from the centroid of each country; dashed line = tropics  
 
Notes: distance from the equator is calculated from the geometric centre of each country’s mainland territory: to avoid 
having negative values, I have multiplied the southern latitudes (usually expressed as negative) by -. Observations 
include every country in Latin America or North America with a per capita GDP estimate for  in the Maddison 
Database. Only some observations mentioned in the discussion are labelled to avoid overcrowding the figure. 
Sources: incomes from Bolt et al., 'Rebasing 'Maddison''; centroid latitudes from Google Public Data Explorer. 
 
Similar weaknesses could be pointed out in the ‘resource curse’ narrative which has been applied to 
Latin America and many other contexts in the developing world, another ‘simple geography’ framework 
from which this dissertation deliberately steers clear. Depending on local conditions and global contexts, 
the discovery or expansion of natural resources can be a blessing or a curse, much like any other positive 
shock in a resource base (including fast population growth).49 In particular, natural resources can sustain 
both specialization and diversification, a discussion Chapter  will engage with in when explaining 
structural change in Uruguay during the First Globalization. 
But not all environmentally-based explanations of economic backwardness or development need be 
static. The best-known approach to long-term divergence in the Americas to successfully offer a 
 
49 For an overview of the natural resources as blessing or curse literature in development economics, see Frederick 
van der Ploeg, ‘Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?,’ Journal of Economic Literature ,  (). 
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‘sophisticated geography’ perspective is Engerman and Sokoloff ’s. In their view, the local environments 
European colonisers found in the New World shaped institutions and, in particular, the distribution of 
political power and economic resources.50 With the exception of plantation crops, especially sugar, most 
New World agriculture did not benefit from economies of scale, which allowed widely different patterns of 
land distribution to emerge in different colonies. Those endogenous institutional responses to local 
geographical contexts defined different distributional arrangements which persisted after the initial 
endowments themselves changed, and, in Engerman and Sokoloff ’s view, contribute to explain large gaps in 
literacy and political voice into the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, by which point the income 
gap between North and Latin America had widened immensely. This perspective is both analytically clear 
and historically nuanced. While acknowledging that all New World territories were in general land-
abundant, Engerman and Sokoloff consider how the specific content of ‘land’ varied significantly and 
contributes to explain different colonial experiences, within Latin America as well as between North and 
South. Uruguay in particular is singled out in their analysis, together with Argentina and Costa Rica where 
the main crops were also grown by smallholders in the colonial economy, as the most ‘progressive’ of Latin 
American nations in terms of literacy and voting rights by the late-nineteenth century.  
My point of contention, and the reason why I think Engerman and Sokoloff ’s approach could turn out 
to be too pessimistic about future perspectives for convergence, is that geography is still treated by them as 
a sort of ‘prime mover’ which is front and centre as a catalyst in the genesis of institutions, but then exits the 
stage, rather than continuing to shape economic strategies through time—and being in turn shaped by them. 
Keeping geography in the cast of historical explanations is important because it is more than capable of 
change, not only in terms of its relative economic value (especially in response to technology and terms of 
trade), but also materially as a result of productive strategies, as Chapters  and  explore in relation to 
sheep-farming and cattle crossbreeding in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Uruguay. Furthermore, 
because Engerman and Sokoloff are still working within the neo-institutionalist framework, they see 
institutions as the fundamental, or even the only, long-term drivers of historical change: ‘initial’ geography 
matters, but only through them. As Chapter  will show, geography and natural resources also affect long-
term economic development through channels which are not ‘institutional’ in the Northian sense (i.e. ‘rules 
of the game’), such as demographic growth, immigration, and population geography. 
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50 Kenneth L Sokoloff and Stanley L Engerman, ‘Institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the 
new world,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives ,  (); Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic Development. 
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So who is to blame for Latin American economic backwardness? As Bulmer-Thomas notes in the preface to 
the latest edition of his Economic history of Latin America, the diversity of experiences  
suggests great caution when seeking to explain the relative backwardness of Latin American 
countries today. Not only are the differences among the republics enormous, but there have 
also been many role reversals, with countries performing well subsequently performing 
poorly and vice versa. Sweeping generalizations designed to explain Latin America’s 
performance in terms of inherited colonial institutions or factor endowments are simply 
incapable of capturing this complexity.51  
But neither caution nor dissatisfaction with the current neo-institutionalist fashion should move us to 
abandon all hope of general explanation. I still believe grappling with very large questions such as this one 
is what makes up the very core of our sub-discipline, and if we are not willing to engage with them, then 
others will answer for us. It also matters greatly for the social value of what we do: why should public monies 
continue to sustain economic historians (instead of being invested towards other worthwhile ends) if we do 
not dare offer answers to the big questions of long-term development? So, without abandoning the historian’s 
healthy scepticism of grand theories, let me take a stand. If I had to confine myself to one of the boxes I have 
spent the last few pages stacking up, it would be within the ‘sophisticated geography’ camp, but with two 
caveats.  
First, geography shapes more than institutions. While it is easy to agree that institutions in the Northian 
sense matter greatly, they matter insofar as they relate to resources which precede them: the best property 
rights regime alone could not have made a great agricultural civilization emerge in Antarctica. But the 
indirect impact of geography does not end there: specific natural resources can also attract people, who then 
have an influence all of their own as producers and consumers. When thinking about the divergence 
between the United States and Latin America, we should pay attention to how the extraordinary variation 
in natural resources across the New World affected the ability of different regions to attract population, in 
the context of the secular demographic deficit that characterised the Americas.52 Before the ‘age of mass 
migration’, that deficit was addressed with brutal violence by the transatlantic slave trade, and if we were 
looking at inequalities between colonies in the Americas in the eighteenth century it would be easy to 
 
51 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, xx. 
52 With the exception of central Mexico and the Andean highlands, whose higher historical population densities 
also explain much of their long-term development; see Ewout Frankema, ‘The biogeographic roots of world inequality: 
Animals, disease, and human settlement patterns in Africa and the Americas before ,’ World Development  
(): -. Long-term comparisons within particular regions in Latin America can highlight the impacts of 
historical settlement patterns: one which I think could be extremely fruitful would be comparing Ecuador and Uruguay, 
countries of a similar scale with extremely different settlement patterns before, during, and after colonial rule. 
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conclude that the leading colonies were those that could use slaves more profitably because their export 
agriculture benefitted from substantial scale economies, regardless of the nationality of the colonial 
authorities.53 Going into the mid-nineteenth century and beyond, large-scale voluntary migration solved 
the demographic deficit to different extents in different places, and it would be difficult to imagine the 
United States’ trajectory of economic development without its continental-size market.54 This also partially 
accounts for divergence within Latin America: the fastest-growing economies of the nineteenth century, the 
ones which urbanised earlier and have in general the best development indicators today, were the ones which 
attracted more migrants: the Argentine littoral, São Paulo and its hinterland, Cuba, Chile’s central valley, 
and Uruguay.  
Second, ‘geography’ should not be taken merely as an initial condition, but as an ongoing influence. 
Countries cannot move places, but their places do change, and the same location can have different 
implications for growth across time. This is why the environment’s contributions, broadly understood, can 
help to account for both growth and stagnation. Uruguay’s temperate grasslands explain its nineteenth-
century growth, under a diversity of political regimes and in spite of decades of conflicts; they also explain 
its more disappointing twentieth-century performance, not only because world market trends shifted, but 
also because pastures themselves had changed as a result of the rural development they had sustained.  
A key advantage of this approach, and a reason why it could appeal to historians of different periods of 
Latin America’s past, is that it does not prioritise one of them over all others as the key conjuncture in which 
the continent’s fortune was set. Indeed, explanations in history are never far from debating timing. If Latin 
America’s economic decline is predominantly an early-nineteenth century phenomenon then it can be more 
easily traced to the ‘wrong’ set of colonial institutions or blamed on post-colonial decades of ‘macho 
warlordism’ (to use Landes’s rather unsophisticated category).55 However, if there is evidence for a late-
twentieth century decline then explaining current economic performance primarily as a function of colonial 
legacies is less plausible. The next section turns from causation to chronology, and discusses how our 
understanding of the rise and fall of Uruguay’s relative prosperity can illuminate debates on Latin American 
backwardness and on economic development in the periphery more generally. 
 
  
 
53 Frankema, Latin America, . 
54 An insightful reflection into the differences and similarities of forced and voluntary migration to the Americas 
is David Eltis, ‘Free and coerced transatlantic migrations: Some comparisons,’ AHR ,  (). 
55 Landes, Wealth and Poverty, . 
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2 Context: the Great Divergence, Uruguay, and the long-nineteenth century  
This section maps out the place and period where our story unfolds. This dissertation is an old-fashioned 
national case study, but one framed in comparative and global perspective. Therefore, the case of nineteenth-
century Uruguay is introduced in its relevant contexts: Uruguay’s long-term development and Latin 
America’s diverse growth trajectories, both set against the background of the ‘Great Divergence’ in global 
economic history. The geographical setting is then defined with reference to both ecological and political 
boundaries, and the relevance of such a small case study is considered. Finally, periodization is discussed in 
relation to the historiography and the history, justifying the choice of dates for the story’s beginning and end. 
 
2.1. Uruguay’s long divergence 
The economic history of Uruguay in comparative perspective could be summarised in two local divergences 
in living standards, set against the background of the Great Divergence in global economic history. It is a 
tale of both material development and relative backwardness. Uruguay was a rich country by the standards 
of the late-nineteenth century, and it is a high-income economy by the standards of the early twenty-first. 
And yet between those two conjunctures it has more or less persistently lost ground vis-à-vis the leading 
world economies: a ‘long divergent siesta’ in Bértola’s words.56 Before this siesta, however, there was a time 
of differentiation from most of the rest of Latin America during the early-nineteenth century, when 
economic growth in the territories of present-day Uruguay and the Argentine littoral took a different path 
to that of their neighbours, more resembling other successful settler economies in the world periphery, such 
as Australia and New Zealand.57 Estimates of average incomes in Uruguay and Argentina are very dubious 
before , the first year for which sources provide reasonably good sectorial output data and consequently 
grounds for plausible historical national accounts. By then, however, both countries already had income 
levels substantially higher than their neighbours.58  
 
56 Luis Bértola, ‘An overview of the economic history of Uruguay since the s,’ in EH.net Encyclopedia 
(https://eh.net/encyclopedia/bertola-uruguay-final/). 
57 For a survey of the comparative economic historiography of these four ‘southern settler economies’ and a 
reciprocal Uruguay-New Zealand comparison, see Emiliano Travieso, ‘United by grass, separated by coal: Uruguay and 
New Zealand during the First Globalization,’ Journal of Global History ,  (): -. 
58 The reconstruction of historical national accounts since the s for Uruguay and Argentina was pioneered by 
Bértola and Cortés Conde and Harriague respectively. Their revised figures remain the sources for the latest version of 
the Maddison Project Database since . The benchmarks for , ,  and  are based on guesstimates 
by Prados de la Escosura, themselves built on Newland and Poulson’s estimates of per head growth of agricultural 
output in the Argentine littoral on the basis of volumes of cattle hides exports, which were then applied to Uruguay 
wholesale. Luis Bértola, El PBI de Uruguay - y otras estimaciones (Montevideo, ); Roberto Cortés Conde 
and Marcela Harriague, Estimaciones del producto interno de la Argentina (Buenos Aires, ); Prados de la Escosura, 
‘Lost Decades?’; Carlos Newland and Barry Poulson, ‘Purely Animal: Pastoral Production and Early Argentine 
Economic Growth –,’ EEH ,  (); Bolt et al., ‘Rebasing “Maddison”’. 
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Graph . shows Uruguay’s long-term per capita income in comparison with four globally-leading 
Western economies (the US, the UK, France, and Germany) and the three groups into which Latin American 
economic historiography usually divides the region. The first group encompasses the sites of the largest pre-
Columbian societies which later became core regions of the Spanish American empire and most of which 
developed large mining sectors (Mexico, the northern Andean countries, most of Central America, and 
Paraguay). The second group comprises countries characterised by a history of tropical export agriculture 
and in most cases large-scale slave plantations (Brazil, the ‘Latin’ Greater Antilles, Venezuela, and part of 
Central America). The third group is the southern cone countries, which were lightly populated before 
European arrival (and indeed for a long time after it), and specialised in temperate-zone grain and livestock 
agriculture, as well as mining in the case of Chile.59 It should be borne in mind that  in the graph was a 
fast-moving goalpost, as rich Western economies enjoyed cycles of historically unprecedented growth.  
Despite the fact that divergence relative to the West was already noticeable in the late-nineteenth 
century, by , when the basis of the modern agrarian export economy had been consolidated under the 
First Globalization, Uruguayan living standards still rivalled France’s. The relative decline sharpened during 
the mid- and late-twentieth century, as both time series analysis and prevailing popular perceptions in 
Uruguay suggest.60 This can be traced to the disruption of trade during the interwar period and was 
strikingly evident by the s, when incomes in Uruguay had clearly stagnated and fell behind the 
industrialised world, as the rest of Latin American economies caught up with it (as well as with neighbouring 
Argentina). The relative leadership of Uruguayan living standards in the Latin American context 
disappeared almost entirely during the military dictatorship (-), after which incomes were barely 
 higher than the mean of the rest of the region. The regional predominance achieved in the long-
nineteenth century has only regained footing in the early-twenty-first century as a result of a new episode 
of globalization and commodity export-led growth, this time resulting from Chinese demand. In  
incomes in Uruguay were  higher than the Latin American mean, but still represented less than half of 
average incomes in the rich West. Uruguay’s long-term trajectory, if not necessarily its present income level, 
is therefore emblematic of Latin American divergent development, and of both the promise and the pitfalls 
of a narrow specialization pattern.  
 
 
 
59 The classic reference for this typology of Latin American economies is Cardoso and Pérez-Brignoli, Historia 
económica. For a recent application incorporating more quantitative evidence, see Bértola and Ocampo, Economic 
Development, -. 
60 Luis Bértola and Gabriel Porcile, ‘Argentina, Brasil, Uruguay y la Economía Mundial: una aproximación a 
diferentes regímenes de convergencia y divergencia,’ in Ensayos de Historia Económica. Uruguay y la región en el mundo 
(-), ed. Luis Bértola (Montevideo, ); Gabriel Oddone, El declive: una mirada a la economía de Uruguay 
del siglo XX (Montevideo, ). 
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GRAPH 1.3. A long divergence: Uruguay, Latin America(s), and the West, 1870-2016 
Comparative trends in average incomes (Western incomes = 100) 
 
Notes: ‘Western incomes’ are calculated as the simple mean of the PPP per capita GDP of France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. ‘Group ’ is the simple mean of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay;  ‘Group ’ of Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama, 
Venezuela, and Brazil; ‘Group ’ of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. National incomes are added to the group average 
when since the year for which there are estimates in the Maddison Database. Yearly data shown for all series in light 
lines; dark lines represent the trend calculated using a generalised additive model. 
Source: Bolt et al., 'Rebasing 'Maddison'', using their single benchmark series of real GDP per capita in  USD. 
 
2.2. The scenario: Uruguay, or grasslands north of the River Plate 
This dissertation is a study of rural economic resources and activities in a grassland region north of the River 
Plate, which was known in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the Banda Oriental. It included the 
colonial jurisdiction of Montevideo south of the Río Negro as well as the formerly (until ) Jesuit-
managed countryside north of it. After a successful rebellion against Spain, this territory became the 
independent Provincia Oriental (-), later the Provincia Cisplatina under Luso-Brazilian rule 
(-), and, with some territorial losses along the way, the modern Republic of Uruguay since . 
This is, by South American standards, an unusually small territory—a ‘little country’ (paisito) as Uruguayans 
 
 
themselves often call it.61 It is also very ecologically consistent when compared to the rest of Latin America: 
its lowlands and hilly plains are located entirely within the warm temperate subtropical zone, with a small 
range of perennial grasses as the dominant land cover, and elevations rarely reaching  metres.62 The scale 
and homogeneity of the territory, as well as its historically small population, make economic and ecological 
change more easily tractable and legible than in a larger, more environmentally diverse country. In more 
pragmatic terms, the scale also lends itself well to a long-term study by a single researcher within the confines 
of a three-year doctoral dissertation. However, it could also pose a challenge for the external validity of the 
findings: why should economic historians care about the development path of such a small country? 
The default historian’s answer, and I think a very valid one, would be that every story is valuable, 
including small ones, because they all have a place in the kaleidoscope of past human experience, which is 
what history is ultimately about.63 But I think I can also argue for the external validity of the findings on 
Uruguay from the perspective of understanding economic change, in the present as well as the past. The 
previous section hopefully persuaded the reader that if we want to understand Latin American economic 
backwardness we need to grapple with the region’s historical diversity; because Uruguay is an outlier in terms 
of its present-day development indicators, it holds one of the keys to the Latin American puzzle. 
Furthermore, a major concern of this dissertation is uncovering the implications that the history of 
Uruguay’s rural economy during the long-nineteenth century has for our understanding of long-term 
growth in what was once called the ‘Third World’. Explaining how and to what extent the rise and 
transformations of export agriculture can sustain higher living standards in developing regions, and with 
what consequences for their environments, is a major task for economic historians of most countries in the 
majority world, large or small. Furthermore, few countries have developed an export economy so 
consistently dependent on livestock agriculture, and no other has as many cows per person, which makes 
Uruguay a uniquely useful site to think about economy-environment interactions in historical perspective. 
 
61 Uruguayan geography textbooks are usually quick to point out, however, that at , square kilometres the 
territory is not small by European standards; see Cayetano di Leoni and Santa di Lorenzo, Geografía Escolar. º y º 
Año: Uruguay y las Américas (Montevideo, ). On the cultural history surrounding the idea of paisito, see William 
Acree, ‘Uruguay, Gateway to Nineteenth‐Century Cultural History of the Río de la Plata,’ History Compass ,  (). 
62 A classic introduction to the physical geography of Uruguay is Jorge Chebataroff, Tierra uruguaya: introducción 
a la geografía física, biológica y humana del Uruguay (Montevideo, ); for a more recent overview of the country’s 
physical and human geography, see Marcel Achkar, Ismael Díaz, Ana Domínguez, and Fernando Pesce, Uruguay: 
naturaleza, sociedad, economía. Una visión desde la geografía (Montevideo, ). 
63 Of course, the postmodern philosophy of history would argue that the very question should be dismissed, 
because ‘history and historical consciousness belong to culture, and no question can be asked about the usefulness of 
culture’ (Frank R. Ankersmit, ‘Historiography and postmodernism,’ History and Theory ,  (): ). I retain what 
some may consider a naïve, ‘modernist’ position that we should in fact ask questions about the usefulness of historical 
research for human development, broadly understood. That does not mean that historians should only study large 
processes: the history of a single day, a single locality, or a single individual can illuminate big why questions, as micro 
historians have persuasively shown; for a defence of microhistory on these grounds, see Filippo de Vivo, ‘Prospect or 
refuge? Microhistory, history on the large scale: A response,’ Cultural and Social History ,  (). 
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And finally, as it happens in all fields of scientific enquiry, we do not know which findings will in hindsight 
turn out to be pivotal, so we have to study all cases, whatever their size. 
Map . shows mid-nineteenth century Uruguay in its environmental context. If before  Uruguay 
was fought over by its two large neighbours and has since often been described as a ‘buffer state’ between 
them, its geography, read from north to south, also occupies an area of transition between the southern 
limits of the Brazilian forest zone and the treeless Argentine Pampas across the Plate estuary. Within the 
broad biogeographical region known as River Plate Grasslands (RPG)—encompassing all of Uruguay, most 
of the Argentine littoral, and the southern tip of Brazil—Uruguay is entirely situated within the ‘Campos’ 
biome, characterised by extensive grassland cover dotted by many stretches and patches of woodland 
alongside rivers and ridges.64 The Campos grasslands themselves differ from their humid Pampas 
counterparts on the other side of the estuary because their soils are generally shallower and hence not equally 
suitable to extensive cereal agriculture. This contributes to explain why they were largely left out of the global 
process of ‘grassland conversion’ since the late-nineteenth century, during which vast grazing areas were 
turned to cropland, from the American great plains and the Canadian prairies to the Russian and Ukrainian 
steppe and the Sahel of West Africa.65 
  
 
64 The canonical definition of the RPG in the agronomic literature and the typology of its sub-regions is A. Soriano, 
‘Río de la Plata Grasslands,’ in Natural Grasslands, ed. R. T. Coupland (Amsterdam, ). More recent specialist research 
has confirmed the usefulness of the classification and developed it further, see Germán Baldi and José M. Paruelo, ‘Land-
use and land cover dynamics in South American temperate grasslands,’ Ecology and Society ,  () and José M. 
Paruelo, Estebán G Jobbágy, Martín Oesterheld, Rodolfo A Golluscio, and Martín R Aguiar, ‘The Grasslands and Steppes 
of Patagonia and the Río de la Plata Plains,’ in The Physical Geography of South America, ed. Thomas T. Veblen, Kenneth 
R. Young, and A. R. Orme (Oxford, ). A recent analysis of long-term change in the Uruguayan Campos is Pierre 
Gautreau, ‘Rethinking the dynamics of woody vegetation in Uruguayan campos, –,’ Journal of Historical 
Geography ,  (); for a survey of the recent specialist research into the Brazilian Campos, see Gerhard E Overbeck 
et al., ‘Brazil‘s neglected biome: the South Brazilian Campos,’ Perspectives in Plant Ecology, Evolution and Systematics , 
 (). The discussion in this paragraph and the next is informed by these works. 
65 New Zealand was another exception to the global pattern: see Travieso, ‘United by grass’, . For a environmental 
history perspective on the process of grassland conversion, see John R. McNeill, ‘Energy, population, and environmental 
change since : entering the Anthropocene,’ in The Cambridge World History. Volume VII, Part , Production, 
Destruction, and Connection, -Present, ed. John R. McNeill and Kenneth Pomeranz (Cambridge, ): . 
 
 
MAP 1.1. Uruguay in the mid-nineteenth century 
 
Notes: ‘market towns’ are those which by  had regular stage-coach services connecting directly to the capital. 
Sources: biogeographical regions taken from Soriano, ‘Rio de la Plata Grasslands’. Market towns in the mid-nineteenth 
century taken from The Republic of Uruguay (), . 
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The Southern Campos concentrate the most fertile lands in Uruguay, and share floristic similarities 
with the rolling Pampas—tussock grasses predominate and subtropical grasses are rare—but have been, as 
a whole, much less influenced by crop farming than them. The Northern Campos extend onto the 
neighbouring Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul, and are characterised by basaltic substrate soils 
covered by more subtropical grasses than the other subdivisions of the River Plate Grasslands. These broad 
differences between the two Campos landscapes contribute to the environmental basis of a long-term north-
south divide within Uruguay. As Chapter  will demonstrate for the first time with local data, the Southern 
Campos concentrated most of Uruguay’s population at the start of the twentieth century, and, as Map . 
shows, they were already home to almost all market towns by the mid-s. Chapters  and  will return 
to biogeographical variation across Uruguay as a factor behind differences in productive strategies. 
One of the ways in which this dissertation is old-fashioned is in its clinging to a national unit of analysis, 
which has fallen out of favour in environmental history, even if it remains standard in quantitative economic 
history.66 As argued above, ecological as well as political boundaries were taken into account when defining 
the scope of analysis, but it must be acknowledged that when these entered in conflict, such as along the 
Uruguay-Brazil border, administrative boundaries were preferred. While the primary work is restricted to 
the two Campos regions on the Uruguayan side of the estuary and up to the Brazilian border, the discussion 
will, however, be framed in the context of the wider region and informed by recurrent comparisons, 
especially but not solely across Latin America.  
A final point on the geographical setting: the centralism that has traditionally characterised the 
historiographies of Uruguay and Argentina, in which most stories are told from or with predominant reference 
to the capital cities, should be challenged but not ignored. It reflects two important structural features: firstly 
that both countries have been, since the late-eighteenth century, more urbanised than the rest of Latin America; 
and secondly that Montevideo and Buenos Aires have historically been ‘too big’ for the rest of their countries, 
departing from the rank-size rule of urban hierarchy.67 The perspective chosen here prioritises rural locations 
and strategies, so Montevideo will come into view only when we need to follow rural produce or rural people 
to the capital, or when decisions made there affect how resources are mobilised in the countryside. Telling the 
story from the capital’s perspective would be misleading, but leaving it out entirely would be implausible. 
 
66 In economic history, quantitative estimates are often only possible and most informative at the national level, 
where most economic policy is formulated; in environmental history, many processes would be impossible to 
understand within the pencil-fine borders of nation-states. On the limits of the national scale in comparative and global 
economic history, see Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world 
economy (Princeton, ): -; on environmental history’s potential to encourage debates about scale, see John R. 
McNeill, ‘Observations on the nature and culture of environmental history,’ History and Theory ,  (): . 
67 A lognormal distribution of city sizes would mean that the second city in a country should be half as large as 
the first, whereas in the River Plate the second population agglomeration in each country has been about ten times 
smaller than the urban continuum around the port-capitals throughout the twentieth century. Chapter  will further 
explore this hypothesis in the Uruguayan context. For a discussion of the rank-size rule and urban hierarchy in 
economic history, see E. A. Wrigley, Poverty, progress, and population (Cambridge, ): -. 
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2.3. The period: crossing a historiographical divide 
Despite its longue durée continuities, the long-nineteenth century remains an unusual choice in the 
historiographies of Uruguay, the River Plate, and Latin America more broadly. Historians of the 
subcontinent have tended to confine themselves to one side of a nineteenth-century divide, whether in the 
form of a political watershed (independence from Spain or Portugal and state building, c. ) or a 
technological one (‘modernization’, c.). Economic historians in particular, usually keener on long time 
scales than their colleagues in cultural or political history, have mostly set their watches to start in the mid- 
to late-nineteenth century.68 The problem Hopkins pointed out in relation to West Africa in , namely 
that very few comprehensive economic histories of developing regions dare to cast their net further back 
than the late nineteenth century, is perhaps even truer for Latin America now than it was then.69 When 
edited works deal with broader timeframes, as does the Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, they 
do so separating the colonial era and ‘short nineteenth century’ from the ‘long twentieth century’ (-
) in different volumes.70 
If this trend continues, the most studied decades of Uruguay’s economic past (c. -) run the 
risk of becoming truncated from preceding history. This would be problematic because it could create the 
misleading impression of ‘modernization’ (meaning largely the economic impact of industrial technologies 
of transport and food production brought to the region by foreign, usually British, capital) creating a 
prosperous agrarian export economy out of thin air, rather than greatly expanding the limits of already well-
developed economic strategies. Such is to a large extent the way in which some global economic historians 
read the Southern Cone’s past: countries where economic history ‘began in earnest only in the middle of the 
th century.’71  
Crossing the nineteenth-century divide is possible because - may be seen as a distinct period 
defining the long road to agrarian capitalism and broadly coinciding with the onset and development of 
industrialization in north-western Europe and the Great Divergence in global economic history. From a 
local perspective, as was argued in the previous sections, it could be said to be the period of Uruguay’s 
divergence with respect to most of its Latin American peers, and, before , with respect to most of the 
 
68 Landmark examples for Latin America as a whole are Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History; Bértola and Ocampo, 
Economic Development; and for Uruguay and Argentina: M. H. J. Finch, La economía política del Uruguay 
contemporáneo, -, a. edition (Montevideo, ); Lucas Llach and Pablo Gerchunoff, Entre la equidad y el 
crecimiento. Ascenso y caída de la economía argentina, - (Buenos Aires, ). 
69 A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London, ): -.   
70 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth, and Roberto Cortés Conde, The Cambridge Economic History of 
Latin America,  vols. (Cambridge, ); only one chapter deals with the decades immediately following independence. 
71 Allen, Global Economic History, . 
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world periphery.72  is a useful starting point for both historical and archival reasons, as it signals the 
opening of the colonial customs in Montevideo and the first year when cattle hide exports surpassed , 
units, marking the beginning of the transition from a peasant economy in the Spanish borderlands to a 
frontier export economy. Three policy changes from Madrid in the late s contributed decisively to that 
early transition: the creation of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate in , which transferred administrative 
power over the latter region from Lima to Buenos Aires; the Treaty of San Ildefonso in , which closed 
the last chapter of the military and diplomatic struggle between the Iberian empires in the River Plate, with 
Spain gaining definitive sovereignty over Colonia del Sacramento; and the Edict of Free Trade which in  
enfranchised the ports of Montevideo and Buenos Aires, allowing them to trade directly with other Spanish 
colonies and import slaves duty free. Those institutional changes resulting from the Bourbon Reforms in 
the metropolis certainly favoured economic opportunity, but it was local responses to it that brought about 
change and transformed political borderlands into economic frontiers.73 To emphasise that perspective I 
prefer  as a starting year to ,  or , the dates most often used as watersheds by historians 
of colonial and early-nineteenth-century River Plate.74 
 is an appropriate year to draw this study to a close. From the perspective of the international 
economy, it marked the change of trend in the terms of trade of foodstuffs and other agricultural 
commodities, creating new challenges for primary exporters. The First World War also disrupted 
transatlantic migration routes, affecting the main source of workers for the labour-scarce River Plate. From 
a local point of view,  was the first year when the value of Uruguayan frozen beef exports surpassed that 
of salt-cured beef, marking the consolidation of a modern agrarian export economy. By then railway 
networks traversed the plains, wire-fencing separated landed estates, and subsistence farming was negligible. 
Meanwhile, in the now densely populated port city of Montevideo steamships arrived with large cargoes of 
coal and were loaded with corned beef and frozen meat, electricity was readily available, and a market for 
locally manufactured consumer goods emerged. Uruguay was more heavily urbanised than any other Latin 
American country, and export values and average incomes per capita were, together with Argentina’s, by far 
the highest in the region.  
 
72 Williamson has persuasively argued that the most significant century in the Great Divergence from the 
perspective of the periphery was the one before . Jeffrey G Williamson, ‘Globalization and the Great Divergence: 
terms of trade booms, volatility and the poor periphery, –,’ European Review of Economic History ,  (). 
73 On the historiographical genealogies behind the categories of ‘borderland’ and ‘frontier’, with reference mainly to 
North America, see Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, ‘On Borderlands,’ Journal of American History ,  (). 
74 Representative examples for different areas of the broader region are Jonathan C. Brown, A Socioeconomic 
History of Argentina, - (Cambridge, ); Lyman L. Johnson, Workshop of Revolution: Plebeian Buenos Aires 
and the Atlantic World, – (Durham, ); Julia Sarreal, ‘Disorder, Wild Cattle, and a New Role for the 
Missions: The Banda Oriental, –,’ The Americas ,  (); Julio Djenderedjian, ‘Roots of Revolution: 
Frontier Settlement Policy and the Emergence of New Spaces of Power in the Río de la Plata Borderlands, –,’ 
HAHR ,  (). 
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The late-nineteenth century ‘rural modernization’ under the First Globalization is therefore the hinge 
upon which our story turns rather than its point of departure. That hinge, in Uruguay’s grasslands, was 
made of imported wire. Wire fencing was the instrument of enclosures between  and : it reflected 
and defended the increased value of land and livestock resulting from changing factor ratios and the 
improved quality of cattle and sheep following intensive cross-breeding.75 Just as it divided the 
countryside, wire-fencing also divides the rest of this dissertation in two parts, each of them characterised 
by a different ‘spatial code’ for extensive livestock agriculture, a concept which will be defined and 
extended below. 
 
3 Uruguayan rural history and ‘agrarian capitalism’ 
The most urbanised country in Latin America, Uruguay’s history is nonetheless defined by its rural world.76 
As Chapter  demonstrates, agriculture was the main employer in the economy at least until the early 
twentieth-century, and the country’s long-term comparative advantage in livestock agriculture continues to 
dominate the export economy and the landscape. Rurality is also very much present in everyday Uruguayan 
urban life through diet, language, and art as well as through downstream industries connected to agriculture 
(marketing, shipping, and, increasingly, hospitality and agro-tourism). It is therefore unsurprising that rural 
development has occupied such a prominent role in research and reflection in or about Uruguay, capturing 
the imaginations of political leaders, foreign commentators, and scholars of different disciplines. While each 
chapter will deal in detail with the conventional wisdom surrounding specific questions, this section 
introduces four generations of the specialist historiography and sets out this dissertation’s contributions in 
that context. Because many of the scholarly debates were had across the estuary, both Argentine and 
Uruguayan literature are sometimes considered. 
 
3.1. Four vintages 
Regarding economic history as such, four main vintages of research and reflections on the agrarian question 
can be identified.77 The classic interpretation was developed in the s and s by a series of works 
 
75 The two classic accounts of the expansion of wire fencing in Uruguay José Pedro Barrán and Benjamín Nahum, 
Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno: Tomo I (Montevideo, ): - and Raúl Jacob, Consecuencias sociales del 
alambramiento (Montevideo, ). A similar process was underway in the late nineteenth century in the American 
Plains, where barbed wire—rather than the very limited ability of state authorities to prevent encroachment—gave 
formal land titles real meaning. For an economic analysis of wire-fencing from  to  in the US, see Richard 
Hornbeck, ‘Barbed wire: Property rights and agricultural development,’ QJE ,  (). 
76 See urbanization estimates for Latin America since  in Bértola and Ocampo, Economic Development, . 
77 As I was revising this chapter in August , Moraes published a critical survey of the specialist scholarship. 
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influenced by the Annales school, in some cases relying on a Marxist or dependentista theoretical toolbox, 
that established a consensus narrative of historical agrarian development in the region.78 Barrán and 
Nahum’s seven-volume Historia Rural, published from  to , was the most ambitious of these 
projects, and it built a powerful narrative centred on the ‘diabolical blessing’ of the natural grasslands and 
its counterpart in mentalités: the traditional values and lack of innovative capacity of ranchers who formed 
a ‘cattle establishment’ essentially defined since the late colonial period.79 The rural landscape on both sides 
of the River Plate was presented by this generation of scholars (often basing their interpretation on colonial 
reports and travellers’ journals) as a kingdom of cows, before and after colonial rule, where the abundance 
of beef made crop farming a negligible and unpalatable occupation.80  
The second historiographical vintage was the ‘renaissance of rural history’ that developed in the late 
s, coinciding with the return to democracy after the Argentine and Uruguayan military dictatorships, 
and offered a revisionist view of the ‘pre-modern’ rural world in the River Plate. Instead of the traditional 
contradiction between the landless, nomadic, and invariably male free-rider (gaucho) and the ‘feudal’, and 
also male, absentee landowner (estanciero), these authors proposed a landscape peopled with young families 
making their living in ‘productive units’ of diverse sizes, which did not necessarily nor usually coincide with 
‘units of property’, where cattle raising left room for grain agriculture and land markets (albeit segmented 
and imperfect) existed.81 Exploiting tithe records and probate inventories to construct case studies of local 
areas, the historians of the ‘renaissance’, led by Garavaglia and Gelman, painted a more vivid picture of the 
rural world in the late-colonial period and beyond, and drew attention to major blindspots of previous 
 
My assessment broadly coincides with hers, including my perception of my own place in the literature: an early version 
of Chapter  of this dissertation is cited by her as part of the ‘new agrarian history’ of Uruguay. See María Inés Moraes, 
‘Agrarian history in Uruguay: From the “agrarian question” to the present,’ Historia Agraria,  (). 
78 After Pivel Devoto's pioneering Raíces coloniales de la Revolución Oriental de  (Montevideo, ), which 
founded ‘post-traditional’ economic historiography in Uruguay, the most influential work on the rural economy was 
Washington Reyes Abadie, Oscar H. Bruschera, and Tabaré Melogno, La Banda Oriental: pradera, frontera, puerto 
(Montevideo, ). For a Marxist perspective, see the seminal work by Sala de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez, 
Evolución económica. A sophisticated reading of the economic history of Uruguay, with emphasis on the agrarian question 
and influenced by dependency theory, is Instituto de Economía, El proceso económico del Uruguay (Montevideo, ). 
79 José Pedro Barrán and Benjamín Nahum, Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno,  vols. (Montevideo, -). 
They published an English-language summary of their conclusions as José Pedro Barrán and Benjamín Nahum, 
‘Uruguayan rural history,’ HAHR ,  (). For an excellent analysis of the intellectual journey behind Barrán’s 
economic history writing, see María Inés Moraes, ‘Más que historia, más que economía: la historiografía económica de 
Barrán y Nahum,’ Revista de la Biblioteca Nacional  (). 
80 Horacio C. E. Giberti, Historia económica de la ganadería argentina (Buenos Aires, ); Aníbal Barrios Pintos, 
De las vaquerías al alambrado (Montevideo, ); Ernesto Campal, La pradera (Montevideo, ). 
81 Carlos A. Mayo, Estancia y sociedad en la Pampa, - (Buenos Aires, ). Key works of this period in the 
specialist English-language scholarship are Ricardo D. Salvatore and Jonathan C. Brown, ‘Trade and Proletarianization in 
Late Colonial Banda Oriental: Evidence from the Estancia de las Vacas, -,’ HAHR ,  (); Ricardo D. 
Salvatore and Jonathan C. Brown, ‘The Old Problem of Gauchos and Rural Society,’ HAHR ,  (). 
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scholarship, notably in the history of the everyday.82 For the mid-nineteenth century, Hilda Sábato 
challenged mainstream views on land tenure particularly in regards to sheep raising in the Buenos Aires 
province.83  
A third and more recent strand of scholarship developed since the late s and was theoretically and 
methodologically informed by the New Economic History.84 Tellingly, most of these scholars were trained as 
economists and taught in economics faculties, and came at economic history from that perspective, unlike 
those of the previous generations. More and better counting was put at the service of testing some of the 
claims of the classic interpretation, which still was (and in some questions remains) the conventional wisdom. 
In particular, the classic view regarding traditionalist mentalities of rural producers even after technological 
modernization was revised when Millot and Bertino argued that latifundia and rational capitalist behaviour 
were not only compatible but mutually reinforcing, a question revisited, with new evidence, in Chapter .85 
Other authors in this strand questioned some of the results of the scholars of the ‘renaissance’, particularly as 
they relate to the use of tithe records as a proxy for sectoral output, claiming that the predominance of cattle 
over wheat was, already in the colonial period, stronger than the revisionists claimed.86 Samuel Amaral’s The 
Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas is the best example of a lengthy study in this new tradition, providing a 
micro-economic analysis of pastoral estancias before their modernization as firms à la Coase, and of 
estancieros as entrepreneurs looking to minimise transaction costs.87 Perhaps a sign of the times, whereas 
previous works had discussed social relations of production and tried to uncover the strategies and 
livelihoods of workers and peasants, Amaral focused on the behaviour of large ranchers, treating labour 
relations only as a function of the employers’ demand.88 This led him to the astonishing claim that labour in 
the countryside was not scarce and there was indeed under-employment, which, as Chapter  argues, would 
make the level and trend of real wages in the River Plate countryside difficult to explain and does not square 
with the extremely low labour/land ratios in the region, especially before the mid-nineteenth century. 
 
82 Gelman and Garavaglia reviewed the 'renaissance' in Juan Carlos Garavaglia and Jorge Gelman, ‘Rural history 
of the Rio de la Plata, -: results of a historiographical renaissance,’ Latin American Research Review ,  
(). Two landmark studies are Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Les hommes de la Pampa: une histoire agraire de la campagne 
de Buenos Aires (-) (Paris, ) and Jorge Gelman, Campesinos y estancieros: una región del Río de la Plata a 
fines de la época colonial (Buenos Aires, ). 
83 Hilda Sábato, Agrarian Capitalism and the World Market: Buenos Aires in the Pastoral Age, - (Albuquerque, ). 
84 Cf., for Latin America’s largest economies, the contributions to Stephen H. Haber, ed. How Latin America Fell 
Behind: Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, - (Stanford, ). 
85 Julio Millot and Magdalena Bertino, Historia económica del Uruguay. Tomo II, - (Montevideo, ).  
86 Samuel Amaral and José María Ghio, ‘Diezmos y producción agraria: Buenos Aires, –,’ RHE ,  (). 
87 Samuel Amaral, The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas: The Estancias of Buenos Aires, - (Cambridge, 
). A similar approach for the period between independence and ‘modernization’ informs the estimates and analysis 
in Newland and Poulson, ‘Purely Animal’. 
88 On the contrast between the two approaches, see Jonathan C. Brown, ‘Review of The Rise of Capitalism on the 
Pampas: The Estancias of Buenos Aires, -,’ HAHR ,  (), -. 
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But not all work produced with the tools of the new economic history has followed the same 
interpretative line or focused on the same questions. In the twenty-first century, a ‘new agrarian history’ of 
Uruguay is integrating the new themes opened up by the ‘renaissance’ of rural history with the methods 
often associated with new economic history approaches, whilst keeping in mind the classic debates of the 
s and s. These studies are often characterised by a more explicitly regional or comparative 
framework, pay more attention to reconstructing local economies, and emphasise technical change in 
overlooked local subsectors.89 My own work is part of this ongoing generation of research and aims to make 
some specific contributions to it, which are detailed in Chapters  to .  
 
3.2. ‘Agrarian capitalism’: controversy and a working definition 
These different vintages of local economic historiography agree on the centrality of livestock agriculture in 
the economic history of Uruguay and the River Plate grasslands in general, but differ greatly in several 
important conclusions regarding the nature of rural livelihoods (was there a peasantry proper, and did 
gauchos actually exist?), the rationality of economic agents in the countryside (were large landowners an 
obstacle to capitalism?), and the timing of structural changes (how large was the preponderance of ranching 
over farming, and when did it develop?). Among those structural changes, the rise of agrarian capitalism is 
a major point of contention. The clarity of the debate is not helped by the fact that the term itself is seldom 
discussed, as often happens with the word ‘capitalism’ agrarian or otherwise,90 and the implied meanings 
differ greatly between authors.  
For the first generation of historians reviewed here, capitalism often meant two different things. For the 
Marxists, it was about relations of production: proletarianization buttressed by ‘modern bourgeois property 
relations’ surrounding the means of production. Those relations were, in early Uruguay, anchored in the 
‘merchant periphery’ of the economy, in opposition to what they considered the predominant ‘feudal 
features’ of a countryside where ‘primitive accumulation’ was slowly taking place.91 For their contemporaries 
 
89 María Inés Moraes, ‘Tendencias y coyunturas agrarias del Litoral rioplatense, -: un análisis 
cuantitativo,’ Investigaciones de Historia Económica ,  (); Jorge Álvarez, ‘Technological Change and Productivity 
Growth in the Agrarian Systems of New Zealand and Uruguay (-),’ in Agricultural Development in the World 
Periphery, ed. Vicente Pinilla and Henry Willebald (); Julio Martínez-Galarraga, Adrián Rodríguez Miranda, and 
Henry Willebald, ‘Patterns of regional income distribution in Uruguay (-): a story of agglomeration, natural 
resources and public policies,’ in Time and Space: Latin American Regional Development in Historical Perspective, ed. 
Marc Badia-Miró, Daniel Tirado-Fabregat, and Henry Willebald (London, ); Pablo Castro Scavone, ‘La 
mecanización del agro en Uruguay -, aplicación de un modelo logístico para medir su trayectoria,’ RUHE , 
 (); Alcides Beretta Curi, ‘Los caminos de innovación en el agro: inmigración, redes de agricultores, elites y 
viticultura en el Uruguay de la modernización (-),’ Tempos Históricos ,  (). 
90 This is a problem stretching far beyond Uruguay: ‘capitalism’ often goes undefined even in ‘new histories of 
global capitalism’; see, for example, Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York, ). 
91 ‘Rasgos feudales’, or ‘feudatarios’, was an expression used to describe economic relations in the countryside by 
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Barrán and Nahum, it was primarily about economic mentalities: the slow transition to agrarian capitalism 
over the nineteenth century was to be traced in the emergence of positive rural attitudes towards profit-
maximization and capital accumulation, which were shaped by material changes (sheep farming, wire-
fencing, beef factories).92 Later scholars influenced by the ‘new economic history’ had, on the other hand, a 
much less demanding definition of rural capitalism, and hence a longer chronology for it: simply ‘the 
prevalence of market forces’ which they saw as ‘prevailing on the pampas in the early nineteenth century, 
when the colonial mercantilism vanished.’93 More recent scholarship is, I think usefully, less concerned with 
choosing one of these meanings of ‘capitalism’ (bourgeois property of the means of production, profit-driven 
mental attitudes, brisk markets in factors and goods), and has added to the emphasis on institutional aspects 
a renewed interest in the technological trajectory that shaped actually existing rural capitalism in the 
region.94  
‘Agrarian capitalism’ will be used in this dissertation as an analytical device (not the only one) to think 
about the major changes in the way Uruguayan resources were mobilised for rural development in the long 
nineteenth century. For these limited purposes, I define it as an economic system in which rural resources 
are for the most part privately owned—including agricultural land and free labour which is owned by the 
workers themselves—and allocated primarily through markets.95 Additionally, the term for me suggests not 
only ‘capitalism in the countryside’ (i.e. rural capitalism) but that capitalism extends from the countryside 
to define the economy as a whole: an agrarian capitalist society is also one where economic development is 
rural-based, meaning that agriculture employs more labour and/or produces more output than 
manufacturing or services.96 To the classic question of since when and to what extent Uruguay’s countryside 
became capitalist, this thesis adds its mirror image: in which sense(s) is ‘agrarian capitalism’ useful to 
understand Uruguay’s long-term rural development? Both issues will haunt us throughout the chapters that 
follow; we will finally confront them in the Conclusion. 
 
the influential Marxist historians Sala de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez, Evolución económica; Estructura 
económico-social de la colonia (Montevideo, ); Después de Artigas (-) (Montevideo, ). The colonial 
estancia was also described as the ‘feudal core’ of that society by earlier historiography, notably by Pivel Devoto, Raíces 
coloniales, who was far from Marxism. 
92 Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I; José Pedro Barrán and Benjamín Nahum, Agricultura, crédito y transporte 
bajo Batlle, - (Montevideo, ). 
93 Amaral, Rise of Capitalism, . 
94 The best example is María Inés Moraes, ‘El capitalismo pastor. Dinámica tecnológica e institucional de la 
ganadería uruguaya entre -,’ Historia Agraria  (). 
95 Of the range of definitions lately proposed by scholars, the one I am using has the most in common with Jürgen 
Kocka’s in his Capitalism: A Short History (Princeton, ). For an overview of the recent debates see the contributions 
to Jürgen Kocka and Marcel van der Linden, eds., Capitalism: The Reemergence of a Historical Concept (London, ). 
96 Many scholars have debated whether the historical origins of capitalism were ‘agrarian’ or ‘merchant’. The 
literature is vast; see, for example, the contrasting positions persuasively articulated by Ellen Meiksins Wood, The 
Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (London, ): - and by Kocka, Capitalism, -. 
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If these are questions which remain open to answers, yet others need to be asked and given centre stage. 
First among them is the role of women in the rural economy, which this dissertation explores by studying 
the division of labour and access to resources along gender lines in both colonial and post-colonial contexts. 
Second, the part played by coercion in the rural economy is poorly understood, which led the foremost 
historian of slavery in Uruguay to ask ‘is it possible to integrate slavery to the narrative of Uruguayan 
economic history before ?’97 This dissertation argues it is, and fruitfully so: slavery and emancipation 
have a crucial part to play in our understanding of long-term rural development in Uruguay. Third is the 
natural environment: despite studying an extraordinarily useful site to think about the relationships between 
animals and people, Uruguayan historiography has yet to find its environmental turn.98 Cows and sheep will 
therefore be near the centre of this dissertation, but the story will not be told from their perspective, but 
from that of the women and men who worked with them. I would find it fascinating to read a history of 
Uruguay written from the point of view of the cattle that have so greatly outnumbered people ever since the 
eighteenth century, but writing it is far beyond my literary powers. Instead, animals and soils will figure 
prominently in quantitative figures and estimates, which will try to account for ecological flows as well as 
economic values.  
Throughout the dissertation, I try to not merely add these dimensions to the more traditional questions 
in the specialist literature, but to consider how thinking more deeply about gender, coercion, and the 
environment can inform our understanding of the classic debates surrounding the rise of agrarian capitalism 
in Uruguay, and Latin America more generally. The result will not be a comprehensive account of long-term 
economic development in rural Uruguay, much less an histoire totale of the Uruguayan countryside, but a 
series of journeys into that history from a resource perspective. That being said, and despite the fact that 
each chapter should stand on its own, this dissertation hopes to be more than the sum of its parts. The thread 
that joins them is an analytical approach aimed at bringing economic and environmental history into 
dialogue with one another. 
 
4 ‘Geographical possibilism’ and economy-environment interactions 
Whereas economic historians have been almost universally agreeing that ‘institutions matter’ for three 
decades,99 it seems more difficult for many of them to acknowledge that geography does too. Because the 
 
97 Alex Borucki, ‘¿Es posible integrar la esclavitud al relato de la historia económica uruguaya?,’ Boletín de Historia 
Ecónomica ,  (). 
98 A pioneering contribution explicitly dealing with eco-systems in the analysis of the agrarian economies of next-
door Buenos Aires was advanced by Juan Carlos Garavaglia, ‘Ecosistemas y tecnología agraria: Elementos para una 
historia social de los ecosistemas agrarios rioplatenses (-),’ Desarrollo Ecónomico ,  (). 
99 A quick online search suggests that  articles published in the Economic History Review between  and 
 had the word ‘institutions’ in their abstract, compared to only  with the words ‘geography’ or ‘environment’, and 
 with the word ‘technology’. These are, of course, not mutually exclusive. 
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approach followed in this dissertation (as well as its title) emphasises resources and environment, two words 
once associated with ‘geographical determinism’, it is important to make some conceptual points clear before 
venturing forward. While some geography-based explanations are decidedly unhelpful, we ignore 
environment-economy interactions at our own risk—and this applies both to scholarship about the past and 
to development policy for the future. A plausible solution is recovering the old concept of ‘geographical 
possibilism’ and reworking it in light of recent developments in both environmental history and life sciences. 
Specific methodological avenues through which that integration can take place are taken up in each of the 
following chapters, but for now let us consider the general criticisms levelled at economic history approaches 
which focus on resources and the environment. 
We can classify objections to geography as an explanation—or, more accurately, as a set of explanatory 
variables—in two groups. The first arrives to economic history from neo-institutionalist approaches to 
development economics, but would also be at home in some historiographical circles. I am referring to the 
notion that geography is by definition static, or in economics parlance ‘time invariant’, and hence can only 
explain persistence in historical development, never change.100 If geography matters for long-term economic 
prosperity, then how can geographically ‘blessed’ places be poor? Or, if the blessings of natural resources are 
in fact a curse in disguise, then how come the curse is sometimes lifted?101 To this some historians might 
add that geographical explanations can too easily fall into determinism, denying agency to the people of the 
past and obscuring the many contingencies that make up history.102 Perhaps these worries, in the context of 
the postmodern assault on histoire totale, led to what Genovese and Hochberg called in the late s a 
‘debilitating separation of geography from history’.103 Among historically-minded economists, a static role 
for geography is welcomed, as it makes adding geographical control variables easier (a dummy for 
landlockedness, another for tropical location) and it can provide useful exogenous, once-and-for-all 
treatments, after which persistence sets in: whether a region had oil gold and silver deposits, or how rugged 
its terrain was.104 
The second set of objections comes to our sub-discipline from the very core of neoclassical economics: 
producers care about total costs and so they will readily substitute one factor for another. So, at the aggregate 
level, scarcity of fertile land will be solved like any other scarcity: it is just a matter of calculating what the 
 
100 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Reversal of Fortune’, -. 
101 Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, ‘Natural Resources and Democracy in Latin America: Neither Curse nor Blessing,’ 
in The Oxford Handbook of Latin American Political Economy, ed. Javier Santiso and Jeff Dayton-Johnson (New York, ). 
102 This became an increasingly popular position among those questioning the basic tenants of social science 
history, in a historiographical transformation that Lawrence Stone famously called ‘The Revival of Narrative: 
reflections on a new old history,’ Past & Present,  (). See, for a brief overview, Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in 
the twentieth century: from scientific objectivity to the postmodern challenge (Middletown, ): -. 
103 Eugene D. Genovese and Leonard Hochberg, Geographic Perspectives in History (Oxford, ): vii. 
104 The ‘persistence school’ discussed above in section . is full of examples of this selective integration of 
geography into explanatory models. 
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elasticity of substitution is. Or simply assuming it away: ‘the elasticity of substitution between natural 
resources and labour-and-capital-goods is no less than unity.’105 If that is so, development ad infinitum can 
be achieved by reinvesting the rents from natural resource exploitation in physical capital, thereby 
preventing the stock of productive capital from ever depleting.106 To this theoretical reasoning, some 
economic historians add the evidence of reconstructed national accounts: since  ‘the gifts of nature have 
ended up as economically speaking trivial—at two or three percent of national income.’107 In this perspective, 
differences in natural resources between economies cannot explain divergent outcomes because they make 
up an insignificant percentage of costs for most industries, are responsible for a small and decreasing share 
of national output in most countries, and they are not to be considered more ‘basic’ or ‘essential’ than any 
product which enters into the production of other products. 
These objections are almost part of the common sense of most economic historians, and both stem 
from a rather narrow construction of ‘resources’ and ‘geography’. However, they are analytically distinct, so 
let me tackle them individually. If we are willing to overcome self-imposed barriers to intellectual exchange 
with other disciplines, then it becomes obvious that no one who thinks deeply about geography believes it 
to be ‘static’ in any meaningful way. This is true most evidently of geographers, but it also applies to 
agronomists, philosophers, rural and urban sociologists, architects, and many others. In a sprawling 
literature across all these fields, spaces (‘natural’ and ‘built’, although the distinction is blurred) are thought 
of as the products of interrelations, and geography is seen as a process, not a closed system.108 The way we 
approach geography, particularly when thinking about long-term development, should not ignore the expert 
advice of scholars in other disciplines, who seem to agree that ‘if space is a product, our knowledge of it 
must be expected to reproduce and expound the process of production.’109 And if there is a process of 
production behind all economic spaces, then studying it requires a kind of history: good news for our guild. 
From a historian’s point of view, then, geography and factor endowments are more long-lasting than 
(most) policies and (many) institutions, but that is no excuse to think of them as static—it just means we 
should measure their change on a longer scale.110 Which should not be a problem: changing time scales is 
after all the historian’s bread and butter—and, for economic historians in particular, the long-term is often 
where we feel more at home. Studying such transformations is interesting among other things because the 
 
105 R. M. Solow, ‘Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources,’ Review of Economic Studies  (): . 
106 Assuming additionally that physical capital does not depreciate. John M. Hartwick, ‘Intergenerational Equity 
and the Investing of Rents from Exhaustible Resources,’ AER ,  (): . 
107 Deirdre N. McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can‘t Explain the Modern World (Chicago, ): . 
108 A highly readable way into this vast literature is Doreen B. Massey, For Space (London, ): -. 
109 Lefebvre, Production, . 
110 In this sense, Sugihara’s approach to what he calls factor-endowment conditions (hence subject to change) is 
more historical than Engerman and Sokoloff ’s; see Kaoru Sugihara, ‘The second Noel Butlin lecture: labour‐intensive 
industrialisation in global history,’ Australian Economic History Review ,  (). 
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direction of that change cannot always be neatly traced in an ‘environment versus economy’ axis. The 
historical evolution of forest and shrubland formations in Uruguay across both the northern and southern 
Campos nicely illustrates this point. While the initial development of export-oriented livestock production 
in the late-colonial period (studied in Chapter ) and the introduction of sheep-farming in the s 
(Chapter ) reduced floristic diversity on the evergreen prairies, the further development of the sector in the 
late-nineteenth century created new ecological niches for indigenous forests (montes nativos) to thrive and 
persist up to the present. The intensification of livestock agriculture between the s and the s had 
the unintended effect of encouraging a diversity of native forest vegetation features: the enclosure of 
pastureland and the construction of transportation networks, roads first and railroads later, fragmented the 
landscape and created gaps where woody vegetation could thrive, undisturbed by livestock herds.111 The 
consequences of agricultural intensification included, in this particular context, both productivity increases 
(Chapter ) and more ecological diversity. This historical result resonates with experimental findings by life 
scientists who have shown that the relationship between grazing and plant species composition and 
structure is difficult to generalise, even within a single biogeographical region, such as the River Plate 
Grasslands.112 To economic historians interested in the environment (or environmental historians interested 
in the economy), this story suggests that instances of unintended re-afforestation are not invariably the result 
of economic catastrophe, but can in fact be linked to episodes of economic growth.113 
Regarding the second set of objections, while I often admire the elegance of neoclassical economic 
theory and its ability to offer counter-intuitive insights, there is a fundamental limitation in thinking about 
the impact of geography on economic growth only in terms of the changing market cost of natural resources. 
Firstly, relative cheapness cannot be automatically equated with a lack of importance.114 Water provision, for 
example, is a minor cost for livestock producers in a well-irrigated landscape such as Uruguay’s southern 
Campos, but cows still need freshwater and no amount of specialised labour, veterinary advice, or GPS 
tracking systems will change that. As I write this in a time of lockdown during a pandemic I am even more 
aware than usual that not ‘all products are basic.’115 Secondly, markets are notoriously bad at offering price 
signals consistent with sustainability beyond a short time horizon: if this applies to urban mortgage markets, 
 
111 Gautreau, ‘Rethinking the dynamics’. 
112 Alice Altesor, Martín Oesterheld, Elsa Leoni, Felipe Lezama, and Claudia Rodríguez, ‘Effect of grazing on 
community structure and productivity of a Uruguayan grassland,’ Plant Ecology ,  (). 
113 Cf. Peter Boomgaard, ‘The Forests of Southeast Asia, Forest Transition Theory and the Anthropocene, -
,’ in Economic development and environmental history in the Anthropocene: perspectives on Asia and Africa, ed. 
Gareth Austin (London, ): -. 
114 Kander, Malanima, and Warde made this point regarding energy carriers in Power to the People: Energy in 
Europe Over the Last Five Centuries (Princeton, ): . 
115 McCloskey provides an unusually clear statement of this radically neoclassical thesis: ‘people feel instinctively 
that oil is “basic,” because it enters into so many products. To this the economist answers that all products are basic, 
which is to say that all products enter directly or indirectly into the production of others. “Basic” is therefore pretty 
much meaningless. Pencils and flower pots and bed frames are as “basic” as oil.’ McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity, . 
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then it surely applies to long-term soil quality.116 The irony is of course that if and when relative market costs 
change in the future, and the share of land in national income becomes once again large, it may be too late 
to do something about it. This is, incidentally, another reason why the Uruguayan case, a high-income 
country where soil rents remain relevant, matters for students of global development.117 Thirdly, ecologists 
have conclusively shown that substitutability of non-natural capital for natural capital is far from perfect: 
soil erosion or a nitrogen losses cannot be entirely solved by throwing more physical capital at land.118 
Therefore, this dissertation will steer away from aggregate measures of natural capital, as they would 
fail to capture the fundamentals of economic and environmental change during the period. The most widely 
used natural capital methodology, developed by the World Bank, assumes perfect substitutability between 
natural resources and manufactured capital, does not account properly for depreciation in resources 
(particularly in soils), and, crucially for the case of Uruguay, does not consider livestock as capital (which 
would be very puzzling to many local rural producers past and present).119 While attempts to provide long-
term series of natural capital are useful in signalling the changing market value of land and can be a welcome 
addition to estimations of national income accounts, they fall short when trying to explain economic and 
environmental change in a specific geographic and historical context.120 
The approach to geography I am arguing for is of course not new in economic history. Already in , 
Lucien Febvre made a plea for a kind ‘geographical possibilism’ that placed human agency at its core (‘no 
necessities, only possibilities’) which was taken up in the decades that followed by the regional economic 
histories produced by the scholars of the Annales.121 Thinking about which economic strategies are made 
possible by the natural environment, rather than what sort of economic behaviour is ‘determined’ by it, is a 
good place to start. In this context, Henri Lefebvre’s concept of ‘spatial code’ can be a useful analytical tool 
for understanding economy-environment interactions through time. A spatial code is ‘a means of living in 
that space, of understanding it, and of producing it’ which emerges as a ‘practical relationship, as part of an 
interaction between “subjects” and their space and surroundings.’122 To bring this concept to (rural) 
economic history, we can think of a spatial code as including a system of land tenure, a preference for certain 
 
116 I owe the idea of ‘time horizons’ to the Ellen McArthur Lectures delivered by Avner Offer in Cambridge in . 
117 For a present-day economic analysis, see Gabriel Oyhantçabal and Martín Sanguinetti, ‘El agro en Uruguay: 
renta del suelo, ingreso laboral y ganancias,’ Problemas del desarrollo ,  ().  
118 Robert Costanza et al., ‘The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital,’ Nature  (). 
119 World Bank, The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the New Millenium 
(Washington D.C., ). 
120 A recent example for Uruguay is Silvana Sandonato and Henry Willebald, ‘Natural Capital, Domestic Product 
and Proximate Causes of Economic Growth: Uruguay in the Long Run, –,’ Sustainability ,  (). 
121 Lucien Febvre, La terre et l‘évolution humaine: introduction géographique à l‘histoire (Paris, ): . For an 
overview of subsequent annaliste ideas on the integration of history and geography, see Peter Burke, The French 
Historical Revolution: The Annales School, - (Stanford, ): -. 
122 Lefebvre, Production, -; -. The quotations are taken from pages - and . 
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agricultural techniques, a prevailing crop repertoire, particular investments in ‘landesque capital’, etc.123 As 
an interrelated set of structures, a spatial code has an inertia of its own, which makes it generally long-lasting, 
but not in perpetuity. Factor endowments make a range of spatial codes possible, but do not mechanically 
cause one of them to prevail. Indeed, the two parts in which this dissertation is divided correspond to two 
different spatial codes within broadly similar factor endowment conditions: in the late-nineteenth century, 
as lands were enclosed with barbed wire, traditional grazing on unfenced ranges gave way to agricultural 
intensification and greatly limited the resources available for peasant farming. The comparative advantage 
in land-extensive agriculture did not change, but the way in which it was reproduced on the ground did. 
For these concepts to be effective analytical tools, rather than simply help us stage a rhetorical 
discussion, we need to fill them with specialist knowledge on the interactions between agriculture and 
ecology. After all, with a task so great as trying to understand long-term economic development, we 
economic historians need all the help we can get. I can only aspire to a layman’s understanding of the relevant 
life sciences literature on these themes, but I believe open-minded researchers (and open-minded citizens 
in general) should endeavour to understand the key messages from scientific scholarship, especially when it 
comes to our societies’ relationships with the environment. The reader will hopefully come across this 
understanding of geography’s place in economic history, and the curiosity for the findings of other 
disciplines it requires, many times in the chapters that follow. 
 
 
 
    
 
123 ‘Landesque capital’ refers to enduring landscape modifications (such as terracing and irrigation) that are tied 
to the land and increase its productivity; see Mats Widgren and N. Thomas Håkansson, ‘Landesque Capital: what is 
the concept good for?,’ in Landesque Capital: The Historical Ecology of Enduring Landscape Modifications, ed. Mats 
Widgren and N. Thomas Håkansson (Walnut Creek, ).   
Part I | The Closing Frontier, 1779-1870s 
When the first large shipments of cowhides left the colonial harbours of Montevideo and Buenos Aires in 
, their geographical location at the fringes of the Iberian New World was an appropriate measure of 
their political and economic position.1 The scarcely populated plains surrounding the River Plate were then 
home to parochial peasant societies in which wheat agriculture was the major occupation of labour and, 
judging from tithe records, the largest sector in the economy.2 By , after two decades of external trade 
in local leather for African slaves monetised in Potosí silver, living standards in the two southernmost 
Atlantic ports were arguably the highest in Latin America and their urban growth outpaced that of Lima 
and Mexico City, the core cities of Spain’s (then faltering) empire.3 In the decades that followed the gap only 
widened. In the s another ecological windfall, this time starring sheep, sustained Uruguay’s average 
incomes at levels comparable to those of rich Western societies whilst most Latin American economies grew 
at very modest rates.4  
Throughout this period, the vast majority of the countryside remained unenclosed, rural slavery was 
widespread, and agricultural land was widely available to free households. The two chapters that follow deal 
with the developments within this ‘spatial code’ chronologically. Chapter  focuses on the late-colonial 
period, explaining how slavery, wage labour, and peasant smallholding interacted within a farming calendar 
dominated by grain and livestock agriculture. Chapter  takes on the so-called ‘lost decades’ following the 
end of Spanish colonial rule, focusing on two crucial social and economic transformations: the slow process 
of emancipation from slavery in the context of civil war and the fast adoption of Merino sheep by producers 
across Uruguay.
1 For a classic account of cores and fringes in colonial Latin America see James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, 
Early Latin America: A History of Colonial Spanish America and Brazil (Cambridge, ).  
2 In  almost  of tithes in the colonial hinterlands of Buenos Aires and Montevideo were levied on grain 
(predominantly wheat), compared to less than  on cattle by-products. Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Economía, sociedad 
y regiones (Buenos Aires, ): . 
3 On wages see Arroyo Abad, Davies, and van Zanden, ‘Between Conquest and Independence’. On population growth, 
Lyman L. Johnson and Susan M. Socolow, ‘Población y espacio en el Buenos Aires del siglo XVIII,’ Desarrollo Económico 
,  (); Raquel Pollero, Historia demográfica de Montevideo y su campaña (-) (Montevideo, ): . 
4 The comparison between the economic performance of the River Plate and Peru over the decades following 
independence is particularly revealing: Jorge Gelman, ‘¿Crisis postcolonial en las economías sudamericanas? Los casos 
del Río de la Plata y Perú,’ in Latinoamérica y España, -: un crecimiento económico nada excepcional, ed. 
Enrique Llopis and Carlos Marichal (México, ). 
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chapter two 
Environment and Rural Slavery  
in the River Plate Frontier, 1779-1810 * 
 
 
In the spring of , Patricio Belén became the overseer (capataz mayor) of a very large estancia in colonial 
Banda Oriental, present-day Uruguay. From his saddle, he oversaw herds totalling upwards of , tame 
cattle and , horses and supervised up to  rural workers, both slaves and free labourers. Patricio was a 
slave himself, as were six of the seven foremen who reported to him, each in charge of a puesto, a large 
‘section’ of the estate, with its designated herds and ranch hands. Regardless of their managerial position, 
however, slaves were not allowed to sow wheat in their own plots, or at least that was the case until Francisca 
Ximénez, Patricio’s wife, successfully challenged the rule that same year. By then the estancia sold thousands 
of cowhides every year for export to Cádiz, many of which eventually found their way to Liverpool and 
London, as well as firewood, wheat, and meat for the urban markets of Montevideo and Buenos Aires. Slaves 
in this estancia—women as well as men, those herding on horseback and those tending the orchard—
secured a small share of those profits, in cash and in kind: cloth and tools, tobacco and yerba mate.1 If 
particularly well documented, the set of social relations surrounding agriculture in this estancia was not 
exceptional. As a colonial surveyor reported in the s, throughout the Banda Oriental ‘Spaniards [i.e. 
Spanish people and white creoles] have no issue working alongside Negros, mulattos’ even when ‘the 
foreman belongs to one of these classes.’2 
This chapter puts forward three propositions about how environment-economy interactions shaped 
this unusual character of rural slavery in the Banda Oriental, where livestock agriculture relied on free and 
unfree labour in different proportions throughout the year and white creoles could find themselves routinely 
under the supervision of black slaves. It contends, first, that resource ratios in the Banda Oriental (abundant 
land, scarce labour, scarce capital except for cattle) made slavery profitable, but did not completely displace 
free labour which remained predominant in most farms and ranches during most of the agricultural 
calendar. Second, that the disaggregated content of those natural resources (the specifics of climate, 
 
* A slightly shorter version of this chapter is at third-round R&R stage with the American Historical Review. I thank 
the six anonymous reviewers and the AHR editor, Alex Lichtenstein, for their very many comments and suggestions. 
1 BA, IX.--, ff.-, ‘Cuaderno de Vestuarios de Esclabos, raciones, y otros gastos peculiares a la 
Administracion de esta Estansia’ (January ). 
2 ‘los españoles no ponen reparo en servir de peones junto con los negros, mulatos é indios; y aun cuando el dueño 
o capataz sea de alguna de estas últimas tres clases.’ Félix de Azara, Viajes por la América del Sur (Montevideo, ): . 
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topography, soils, and animals) encouraged crop choices and ranching task systems that created possibilities 
for enslaved workers to attain levels of managerial authority reserved for Europeans or white creoles in the 
countryside of most American colonies, whether Iberian, Anglo, or French. Third, that this grassland 
ecology influenced a set of social relations stretching well beyond livestock production, shaping the personal 
autonomy of slaves, as well as the gender distribution of resources and tasks. All three propositions can be 
summarised in an argument that is a form of ‘geographical possibilism’:3 the environment of the Banda 
Oriental presented slaves with opportunities that were unavailable elsewhere, and that they boldly exploited 
to reshape some aspects of the social relations of domination in which they were involved. For historians of 
Latin America, this interpretation of rural slavery in an overlooked case offers a new account of how 
economic resources were mobilised to sustain a late-colonial boom. To global economic and labour 
historians, this chapter extends an invitation to consider the environment as one of the forces that can, in 
different places and periods, either limit workers’ autonomy or give them strength. 
The argument is developed through a game of scales, alternating between the workings of the rural 
economy as a whole and a micro-historical site that brings them to life. Section  introduces some key 
aspects of slavery in the River Plate countryside in the context of broader historiographical debates and 
sketches this chapter’s interventions. Sections  and  describe and explain the ‘spatial code’ (the series of 
institutions and techniques surrounding economic uses of land) that characterised rural development in 
colonial Uruguay.4 Section  uses quantitative sources to characterise the Banda Oriental as an economic 
frontier defined by widespread access to farmland but concentrated ownership of livestock. It is shown that 
the land market was much more restricted than elsewhere in Latin America, and considerably less brisk than 
the rural labour market, which included both seasonal wage negotiations and the buying and selling of 
property rights in people. Section  looks more closely at which crops were grown and which animals raised, 
by whom and how, reconstructing the local agro-ecology with evidence from primary sources and insights 
provided by modern scientific literature. Here, attention is focused on how the distribution of farming 
tasks—much like that of land itself—was differentiated by gender, and on how the seasonal complementarity 
of wheat and cattle shaped the demands for labour and the relationships between slaves and free workers. 
Section  joins the threads together in a series of entangled stories of struggles for autonomy within the 
world of work that the previous sections reconstructed. Throughout, the analysis highlights the effects of 
the interaction of the natural environment, colonial institutions, and economic forces on the character of 
rural slavery as a labour system and on the opportunities available to enslaved people to expand their 
material welfare and their social ties. 
 
 
3 The term, introduced in Chapter , was coined by Lucien Febvre, La terre, . 
4 Lefebvre’s concept of ‘spatial code’ was expanded upon in Chapter  (pp. -); see Lefebvre, Production, -, 
-. 
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1 Labour in the colonial countryside: two debates  
Francisca and Patricio lived in an immense, fenceless, estancia known to contemporaries and historians as 
‘Estancia de las Huérfanas’, or more simply ‘Estancia Las Vacas’, and which will be our window into the ways 
of life surrounding economic resources and activities. It covered about , hectares of the south-west 
corner of the Banda Oriental (Map .). The estancia had been established decades earlier by Jesuits, who 
kept  black slaves there, as recorded in the inventory they compiled at the time of their expulsion in . 
By the late s it was owned by the Hermandad de la Caridad, a lay corporation of influential male 
merchants and bureaucrats based at Buenos Aires, the viceregal capital standing on the opposite shore.5 
Since the s, with the ‘renaissance’ of rural history in Argentina and Uruguay, scholars have revisited this 
and other historical estancias as sites to discuss the nature of the late-colonial rural economy in the River 
Plate.6 For our present purposes—understanding how the natural environment shaped the autonomy of 
workers and the uses of land—two debates stand out.  
The first debate centres on what we could call ‘the economics of the gaucho’. Gauchos were free, mobile 
rural workers on horseback who became the unnamed soldiers of revolutionary armies, fierce characters 
poets could hymn—and did.7 Scholars celebrated them too in their own way: traditional historiographies 
constructed the gaucho as a founding national myth on both shores of the Plate.8 But why did gauchos work 
for wages only for a few months each year? For European observers at the time it was straightforward: local 
rural people were lazy and had no use for the comforts that permanent employment could provide.9 Some 
historians have taken the evidence of contemporary comment on the gaucho’s ‘disinclination for work’ at 
face value and argued that it was an expression of rustic, pre-capitalist values effectively resisting 
 
5 Religious and local scholars first transcribed many of this estancia’s manuscripts in the first half of the twentieth 
century: Carlos Leonhardt, ‘Documentos inéditos relativos a los antiguos Jesuitas en la actual República Oriental del 
Uruguay,’ Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay V,  () and Natalio Abel Vadell, Antecedentes 
históricos del antiguo puerto de Las Vacas (El Carmelo), el extinguido pueblo de Las Víboras y de la calera de las Huérfanas 
(Buenos Aires, ). On the Hermandad and its status in River Plate viceregal politics and commerce, see Susan M. 
Socolow, The Merchants of Buenos Aires, -: Family and Commerce (Cambridge, ): -. 
6 For an overview, see Garavaglia and Gelman, ‘Rural history’. 
7 Literary celebrations of gauchos became more common as their way of life faded in the late-nineteenth century. 
The most influential of them, and still mandatory reading when I went to secondary school, is José Hernández, El 
gaucho Martín Fierro (Buenos Aires,  []). Also in  across the estuary another signal fictional narrative of 
the gaucho was published: Antonio D. Lussich, Los tres gauchos orientales (Montevideo,  []). In the twentieth 
century many poets, from Borges to Neruda, continued to write odes to the gaucho. 
8 On the gaucho’s part in nation-building, see, for Argentina and Uruguay respectively, Juan Carlos Garavaglia, 
‘Gauchos: identidad, identidades,’ América: Cahiers du CRICCAL,  (); Museo Histórico Nacional, ‘En torno al 
gaucho y lo gauchesco,’ Revista Histórica LVI, - (). Three remarkable social histories of the gaucho are Ricardo 
E. Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho (Buenos Aires, ), Fernando O. Assunção, El gaucho: estudio socio-
cultural (Montevideo, ), and Richard W. Slatta, Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier (Lincoln, ). 
9 See, for example, Félix de Azara, Memorias sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata en  (Madrid, ): -. 
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‘proletarianization’ (i.e. dependence on wages).10 Other scholars, however, pointed to the workings of the 
labour market as an explanation, arguing either that demand for ranching work was highly seasonal and low 
for most of the year, or that it was labour supply which was generally low and especially so in summer.11  
 
MAP 2.1. Estancia Las Vacas and its puestos, 1791 
Note: location map shows present-day borders for orientation purposes. 
Sources: drawn by the author. Georeferenced maps: Instituto de Historia, Facultad de Arquitectura, Plano  
(Montevideo, ), Lucía Sala de Tourón et al., Evolución económica, -. Information on foremen and puestos 
taken from: BA, IX.--, f., ‘Plan que manifiesta los Gastos Ordinarios’, July . 
 
 
10 Salvatore and Brown, ‘Trade and Proletarianization’, . 
11 See, respectively, Samuel Amaral, ‘Rural production and labour in late colonial Buenos Aires,’ JLAS ,  (); 
Amaral, Rise of Capitalism, -, and Jorge Gelman, ‘New Perspectives on an Old Problem and the Same Source: 
The Gaucho and the Rural History of the Colonial Rio de la Plata,’ HAHR ,  (); Gelman, Campesinos, -; 
cf. Salvatore and Brown, ‘Old Problem’. 
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I will argue over the next sections that most free rural working people, for whom gauchos are no more 
than a reductive and male shorthand, chose not to be employees for most of the year because the labour 
market only enticed them during the months between the sowing and the harvesting of their main crops 
(wheat, corn, and beans).12 Their reservation wage (the minimum rate at which they were willing to sell 
their labour) was high not because they valued leisure much more than consumption but because they had 
a strong outside option: working in a small household productive unit without entering a permanent relation 
of dependence. Access to fertile soils, as well as the abundance of livestock to provide muscle energy and 
manure, contributed decisively to making smallholder permanent cropping sustainable in the region.13 
Present-day studies show how vulnerable these lands are to soil erosion, and therefore how ecologically 
fragile their economic potential can be, but as of the late-eighteenth century this was a very distant prospect, 
as they had never been farmed before the colonial period.14 The economics of the gaucho were, therefore, 
the result of an ecology and a property rights environment which made their reservation wage very high. 
This contributes to explain why there was a demand for slave labour in the colonial livestock economy of 
the River Plate, the second historiographical debate this chapter addresses, and to which we now turn. 
Traditional scholarship assumed, rather than proved, the lack of versatility, individual initiative, and 
even horsemanship of slaves.15 Pre-industrial, extensive ranching needed autonomous riders scattered 
throughout the open range, and, almost by definition in these interpretations, slaves could not be 
autonomous which made them ‘incompatible’ with pastoral agriculture as it was practiced in the region.16 
These premises were falsified by economic historians already in the s, who found ample evidence for 
coerced labour in colonial estancias, but have nonetheless persisted as a predominant common sense with 
broad implications for the historical imagination of Argentina and Uruguay as ‘white nations’ in the Latin 
American context.17 Further challenging this myth, in the s and s rural historians reconstructed 
the colonial countryside in greater detail and showed that ‘slavery was perfectly compatible with the River 
 
12 With tithe records as evidence, Garavaglia argued that crop farming rather than cattle raising was the major 
sector of the economy in the late-colonial period. Juan Carlos Garavaglia, ‘Economic growth and regional 
differentiations: The River Plate region at the end of the eighteenth century,’ HAHR ,  (). 
13 The central areas of the colonial Banda Oriental were some of the most fertile in the River Plate Grasslands 
biogeographical region; see Soriano, ‘Grasslands’. 
14 Native peoples practiced forms of semi-cultivation before European arrival, but not deliberate tilling; see Renzo 
Pi Hugarte, Los indios del Uruguay (Montevideo, ). On soil erosion as a result of agricultural practices over the last 
two centuries, see Baldi and Paruelo, ‘Land-use’. 
15 Carlos M. Rama, ‘The Passing of the Afro-Uruguayans From Caste Society into Class Society,’ in Race and Class 
in Latin America, ed. Magnus Mörner (New York, ): . 
16 Giberti, Ganadería, . 
17 Sala de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez, Estructura económico-social, -. On the historical ‘whitening’ 
of Uruguay and Argentina, see George Reid Andrews, Blackness in the White Nation: A History of Afro-Uruguay (Chapel 
Hill, ); The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires, - (Madison, ). 
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Plate colonial estancia.’18 Standing on their shoulders, this chapter places that rural world in the context of 
the literature on slaves’ autonomy and ‘internal economies’ in the Americas. Because colonial Uruguay and 
Argentina have consistently been defined as ‘societies with slaves’ rather than ‘slave societies’ in Latin 
American history (a useful classification in some respects), these comparative perspectives have been 
somewhat neglected, particularly from the point of view of economic history.19 The significance of slaves 
working alongside free labourers and reaching positions of managerial authority can only be appreciated 
against the background of other New World histories. 
From the vantage point of this thesis, which focuses on how productive resources, including people, 
were mobilised for agricultural development, these two debates on gauchos and slavery must be brought 
into dialogue with one another.20 This chapter’s interventions in both debates hinge on an environmental 
turn in the economic history of agriculture in late-colonial Uruguay. I rely on quantitative sources on land 
ownership and use, contemporary accounts by natural scientists, and modern scientific literature to offer a 
more considered analysis of the impact of soils, climate, and animal behaviour on rural work and rural 
workers.21 I also draw insights from economic models to help explain how the availability of agricultural 
land for free peasants posed a problem for large estancias, as output was limited by labour rather than land, 
and under which conditions it made sense for them to obtain slaves. On this point, I should note that I 
disagree with some rural historians on the merits of the explicit use of modern economic analysis to explain 
pre-industrial economic life: the fact that evidence suggests that large colonial landowners could not 
calculate, say, the present value of a slave’s work compared to a free labourer’s does not mean that using such 
conceptual tools to understand their behaviour is anachronistic, any more than is resorting to ‘relations of 
production’ or ‘gender’, to name two other useful categories of analysis which are also, as such, conspicuously 
absent from colonial-era manuscripts.22  
 
  
 
18 Mayo, Estancia y sociedad, . See also, for an overview, Juan Carlos Garavaglia and Jorge Gelman, ‘Mucha tierra 
y poca gente: un nuevo balance historiográfico de la historia rural platense (-),’ Historia Agraria,  (). 
19 Borucki, ‘Esclavitud’. A comparative work on New World rural slavery which does include the River Plate is 
Andrew Sluyter, Black Ranching Frontiers: African Cattle Herders of the Atlantic World, - (New Haven, ). 
20 As Lyman Johnson argued for the case of artisans in colonial Buenos Aires, to understand the experiences of 
slaves in the Americas outside the world of the plantation we need to place them side by side with wage workers: ‘The 
Competition of Slave and Free Labor in Artisanal Production: Buenos Aires, –,’ International Review of Social 
History ,  (): . 
21 The environmental perspective on the agricultural history of the River Plate was pioneered by Garavaglia, 
‘Ecosistemas’; ‘Paisaje rural, agrosistemas y producción agraria (siglo XVIII),’ in Procesos americanos hacia la 
redefinición colonial, ed. Enrique Tandeter and Jorge Hidalgo Lehuedé (Madrid, ). 
22 Cf. Mayo, Estancia y sociedad, . 
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2 Resource ratios, property, and markets 
In the s, Montevideo and its immediate jurisdiction were home to only about , people but to more 
than , cattle and horses.23 By the turn of the century there were about . million ruminants in the 
countryside of Buenos Aires, a city of , inhabitants.24 The ratios of cattle to people in the River Plate 
eventually decreased from those fabulous levels of : in the late colonial period to : by the s, but 
they remained the highest in the world by a large margin.25 Population densities, on the other hand, were 
amongst the lowest anywhere: less than  people per square kilometre in the jurisdictions of Buenos Aires 
and Montevideo by , even lower than other thinly populated areas at the time such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa (where recent guesstimates range from . to .) or the United States (.), and on a wholly different 
order of magnitude compared to Europe (., excluding Russia).26  
In the late eighteenth century, the ‘vast countryside’ of the Banda Oriental was the frontier’s frontier, ‘a 
sort of far west of mad and stormy prosperity’ as Halperin defined it.27 Rural settlement there had to be 
encouraged, in the words of one petitioner to the governor of Montevideo in , to protect the colony 
against ‘the intrigues of Lusitanian ambition and the invasions of unfaithful Indians’.28 High-mobility native 
communities such as the Charrúa, the Genoa, and the Minuanes, their number estimated at a few thousand, 
continued to live in these prairies. They engaged the colonial formations (Spanish towns to their south, 
Portuguese to their north, and, until , Jesuit missions to their north-west) at their loosely defined 
fringes.29 The abundance of horses, who found a ‘paradise’ in the River Plate, further increased the ability of 
these small native populations to effectively resist any form of labour coercion or wholesale incorporation 
into the colonial economy.30 
 
23 Pollero, Historia demográfica, ; Comisión Nacional, Archivo Artigas, vol. I (Montevideo, ): -. 
24 Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Pastores y labradores de Buenos Aires: una historia agraria de la campaña bonaerense, 
- (Buenos Aires, ): -; Johnson and Socolow, ‘Población y espacio’. 
25 Michael George Mulhall, Mulhall‘s Dictionary of Statistics (London, ): -. 
26 Gareth Austin, ‘Resources, techniques, and strategies south of the Sahara: revising the factor endowments 
perspective on African economic development, –,’ EcHR ,  (): -. 
27 ‘una suerte de far west de alocada y tormentosa prosperidad’ Tulio Halperin Donghi, Revolución y guerra: 
formación de una élite dirigente en la Argentina criolla (Buenos Aires, ): -. Contemporary descriptions of this 
‘vast countryside’ and proposals to populate it can be found in BA IX---, Exp. , ‘Expediente sobre el arreglo y 
resguardo de la campaña de este Virreynato.’ 
28 ‘làs intrigas de la ambicion Lusitana y las imbasiones de los Indios infieles.’ MVD, Archivo de la Escribanía de 
Gobierno y Hacienda, Exp. , No. , Pedro Medrano on behalf of Juan José Durán to the Governor of Montevideo, 
May th, , published in Juan E. Pivel Devoto, Colección de documentos para la historia económica y financiera de 
la República Oriental del Uruguay: Tierras, - (Montevideo, ): -. 
29 Pi Hugarte, Indios; Sarreal, ‘Disorder, Wild Cattle’. 
30 Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of  (Westport, ): ; 
Gustavo Verdesio, Forgotten Conquests: Rereading New World History from the Margins (Philadelphia, ). 
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A generous ecology translated low population densities into an abundance of fertile land, which was 
extremely cheap when compared to labour: four acres of farmland near Montevideo cost about the same as 
a ranch hand’s weekly wages, and even less near Colonia.31 As a result, there was a land market only for 
property rights over particularly well-placed farms. Over three-fourths of agricultural lands were not 
obtained through market means, but through direct grants from the local authorities, in contrast with 
urban plots for which there was a more active market (Table .).32  
Access to farmland was widespread among free households, most of whom relied solely on the labour 
of their families to produce food for themselves and sell wheat, corn, fruits, or vegetables to urban markets. 
Indeed, according to the surviving records summarised in Table ., most of the people recorded as owning 
farms (chacras of about  hectares) in the Montevideo countryside in the late-colonial decades did not 
have the honorific title of ‘Don’ or ‘Doña’, which by then reached most subjects.33 The cheapness of 
agricultural land also reached large estates. Estancias (which varied greatly in their size, but were at least of 
, hectares) were very rarely used as collateral when taking out a loan, thus highlighting the low 
economic value of property rights over large tracts of land.34 This scenario contrasts with other highly 
productive but not so thinly populated South American agrarian hinterlands, such as the Colombian Cauca 
valley, where during the same period hacienda land was often used as collateral.35 By the same token, sales 
of estancias in the Montevideo countryside were comparatively rare, with only about one in ten new owners 
in the late-eighteenth century having bought their land.36 The very low relative frequency of sales is even 
more noticeable if put in a wider Latin American context: in the agricultural hinterland of Lambayeque on 
Perú’s northern coast, Ramírez estimated that more than  of large haciendas were acquired through sales 
from  to , a similar proportion to the one Taylor reported for colonial Oaxaca in southern Mexico; 
further north in León, Brading found that more than  of his sample of haciendas had been sold a mean 
of four times between  and the mid-nineteenth century.37 
 
31 Evidence for Montevideo in the mid-eighteenth century: ‘El Cabildo al Gobernador de Montevideo, Tasación 
de ,’ published in Juan Alejandro Apolant, Padrones olvidados de Montevideo del siglo XVIII (Montevideo, ). 
For Colonia in the late-eighteenth century: Gelman, Campesinos, -. 
32 In a West African context, Fenske has found evidence of thin land markets within a context of fenceless abundant 
land: James Fenske, ‘Land abundance and economic institutions: Egba land and slavery, –,’ EcHR ,  (). 
33 The entry for the honorary title Don in the Diccionario de Autoridades () claimed its use had extended to 
‘the majority of subjects,’ which suggests that people without the title were poorer than most. On the uses of Don and 
Doña see Lockhart and Schwartz, Early Latin America, -. 
34 Of  surviving mortgage records from the Banda Oriental between  and  only  of them used 
estancias as a collateral. MVD, AGA, ‘Registro general de hipotecas’, printed in Pivel Devoto, Colección, -. 
35 Magnus Mörner, ‘Rural economy and society in Spanish South America,’ in Colonial Spanish America, ed. Leslie 
Bethell (Cambridge, ): . 
36 Of  surviving estancia property deeds registered in Montevideo between  and  only  had been 
sold. MVD, AGA, Reg. , Caja , Libro . 
37 Susan E. Ramírez, Provincial Patriarchs: Land Tenure and the Economics of Power in Colonial Peru (Albuquerque, 
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TABLE 2.1. Surviving land titles from the Montevideo jurisdiction, 1733-1807 
Kind of property N % market transfers % ‘Don’ % female owner 
Solares (for urban housing) 62 32.3 23.4 9.4 
Sitios (urban plots) 48 31.3 52.1 10.4 
Chacras (arable farms) 83 18.1 43.4 4.8 
Estancias (cattle ranches) 166 12.7 63.3 9.0 
Total 359 19.9 50.1 8.1 
Notes: ‘ market transfers’ shows the share of surviving land deeds which were obtained through a sale, rather than via 
a merced or concesión by the Cabildo or the Governor. ‘ Don’ refers to the share of land deeds (regardless of how they 
were obtained) which were owned by a person with the honorific title of ‘Don’ or ‘Doña’. Solares and sitios were located 
intramuros (i.e. within the citadel), the former being destined to carry housing; chacras were farmland plots usually 
facing a course of water; estancias were very large pastoral plots averaging , acres, and often limited by natural 
features (forests and courses of water). 
Source: MVD, AGA, Reg. , Caja , Libro . 
 
Land abundance shaped the material definition of property rights over livestock, the main form of 
capital in this agrarian economy. Unlike in many other rural societies, in the colonial River Plate animals 
belonging to different people were most often not separated by hedges or fences. While land titles were 
usually vague in defining plot boundaries and pastures remained unfenced, the colonial state kept a register 
of private cattle brands.38 Every cattle-owner, large or small, household or corporation, could register their 
brand and when they sold pastoral land they often sold the brand with it, transferring the property rights 
not on cattle and horses standing on the estancia land, but on animals bearing the estancia brand. Animals 
belonging to different owners would often graze together, which required workers to periodically conduct a 
collective roundup and separation (aparte) of the herds, based on the brands stamped on their hides. This 
simple technology allowed livestock to be separated legally rather than physically, as befitted the abundance 
of grazing resources.39 Open fields also allowed for the avoidance of the Malthusian checks on the cattle 
population on each individual estancia: if animals were too many, they could move in and out of 
 
): ; William B. Taylor, Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca (Stanford, ): -; David A. Brading, 
Haciendas and Ranchos in the Mexican Bajío: León, - (Cambridge, ): -. 
38 A sample of original records from the cattle brand registry can be found in MVD, ExMHN, Cajas cronológicas, 
Caja . I have used some of them as glyphs to mark the end of each chapter in this dissertation. 
39 William Cronon made a similar observation in the context of the American Great West in his Nature‘s 
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York, ): , fn. . 
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neighbouring land.40 Unfenced pastures and branded animals were central to the late-colonial ‘spatial code’, 
which would persist until the mid-nineteenth century. As we shall see, ranching techniques were attentive 
to those mechanisms and to the properties of cattle themselves: to borrow from a medieval historian, this 
frontier society was ‘thinking with ecology’ rather than following metropolitan rules and practices 
surrounding livestock farming.41 
The openness of the agricultural frontier affected how colonial law surrounding inheritance and land 
rights were applied by colonial authorities, for whom local conditions usually prevailed over de jure 
principles.42 This conceptual independence from metropolitan practices was often explicitly defended in 
court: even if dividing land into smaller plots made sense in Spain, a Montevideo lawyer argued, ‘applying 
this general rule to the distribution of land can only be sensible in a country where there are many working 
hands capable of taking advantage of such distribution; not in a new country, where local circumstances 
make such a system impracticable.’43 Whereas in the rest of Spanish America, from Mexico to Chile, it was 
often necessary to resort to primogeniture entailment (mayorazgo) to avoid the pulverization of land holding 
resulting from the civil law principle of partible inheritance, in the River Plate the  abundance of agricultural 
land made that legal device unnecessary, even in the context of rapid population growth in the late colonial 
period.44  
Therefore, in late-colonial Uruguay, parents sought, and obtained, grants of ‘new’ public land for their 
children, which encouraged a pattern of early marriage and high birth rates characteristic of a newly settled 
frontier (‘newly settled’ from the perspective of the settlers themselves, of course). This had important 
implications for the gender division of productive resources. It was not uncommon for parents to request 
land for their single daughters, as opposed to only for their sons, and more than  of all plots (cuadras 
cuadradas) near Montevideo and  of estancias were registered as owned solely by single women or widows 
 
40 For a reflection on Malthusian checks on herds in the context of open grazing lands, see Tim Ingold, Hunters, 
Pastoralists, and Ranchers: Reindeer Economies and Their Transformations (Cambridge, ): -. 
41 Jamie Kreiner, ‘Pigs in the flesh and fisc: an early medieval ecology,’ Past & Present ,  (): . 
42 On the ‘legal origins’ thesis and how local practices undermine it, see the discussion in Chapter . Cf., for a 
similar prevalence of local conditions over metropolitan rules in the Cape Colony where grants of pastoral land were 
also of about , acres, Christie Swanepoel and Johan Fourie, ‘Why local context matters: property rights and debt 
trading in colonial South Africa,’ Studies in Economics and Econometrics ,  ().  
43 ‘pero esta regla general aplicada al repartimiento de terrenos, solo puede tenèr lugar en un Pueblo donde haya 
muchas manos trabajadòras capazes de hacèr valèr en su utilidad las ventajas de aquella particion: no en un Pueblo 
naciente, y que por las circunstancias locales, hace impracticable aquel Systhema.’ Medrano on behalf of Durán to the 
Governor of Montevideo,  May . Archivo de la Escribanía de Gobierno y Hacienda, AGN-MVD, Exp. , No. 
, published in Pivel Devoto, Colección, -. 
44 Magnus Mörner, ‘Economic Factors and Stratification in Colonial Spanish America with Special Regard to 
Elites,’ HAHR ,  (): ; Carlos A. Mayo, ‘Landed but not powerful: the colonial estancieros of Buenos Aires 
(-),’ HAHR ,  (): . 
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registered as household heads between  and .45 A similar pattern of female ownership could be 
found, according to Metcalf, further north, in another South American frontier controlled by a different 
crown: the parishes of Santana de Parnaíba, in São Paulo’s hinterland.46 
These figures underestimate women’s legal rights to land, because, under civil law, assets were jointly 
owned by a married couple. More importantly, women’s material access to a plot of their own was more 
widespread than legal ownership. In this landscape of unenclosed agricultural land, rural people made their 
living in productive units of diverse sizes, which did not necessarily coincide with units of property, 
particularly in the case of large estancias. 47 Living within the Las Vacas estancia, for example, Francisca had 
effective control over her own plot and could sell its produce, even though she had no legal rights over the 
land. Small-scale peasant cultivation without formal titles was even more common in the extensive crown 
lands (tierras realengas) that occupied most of the landscape in the Banda Oriental. ‘Squatting’ in this way 
was not necessarily an act of rebellion: as the revolutionary policy in the s would show, and as I 
demonstrate in Chapter , the peaceful continued cultivation of a plot was understood to be a legitimate 
form of obtaining and preserving property. Large cattle-owners did not always agree, however, and their 
continued and largely unsuccessful complaints to colonial authorities are the strongest evidence for how 
widespread and effective squatting was. Writing to the governor of Montevideo in , one estancia owner 
(hacendado) claimed that ‘the incessant work of raising and multiplying my cattle’ produced ‘indubitable 
rights’ over extensive public land, and argued that his prosperity would be ‘destroy(ed) and annihilate(d)’ by 
‘an Indian named Juan’, his wife, and six children who grew food and wheat on ‘his’ land.48 The fact that 
hacendados kept complaining to the colonial government about people occupying their land, or public land 
they claimed as their own, suggests that they could not effectively exclude poor peasants from accessing it, 
even those who, like Juan, were not ‘citizens’ (vecinos) in the eyes of the colonial state.49 
 
45 I have found  surviving records of new estancia grants in the Montevideo jurisdiction in the late-eighteenth 
century requested by parents on behalf of their children: in  cases the beneficiaries were female, in  cases they were 
male, and in  cases I could not identify their gender. MVD, AGA, Reg. , Caja , Libro .  
46 Alida C. Metcalf, ‘Women and means: women and family property in colonial Brazil,’ Journal of Social History 
,  (). 
47 María Inés Moraes, ‘Las economías agrarias del litoral rioplatense en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII: paisajes 
y desempeño’ (PhD diss., Universidad Complutense de Madrid, ), . 
48 ‘Estos derechos incontestables Señor Governador con el incesante trabajo de criar y aumentar mis ganados para 
conservar y sostener la crecida familia de siete hijos ymi Esposa pretenden destruir y aniquilar un Yndio llamado Juan 
que seha poblado dentro delos terrenos que poseo en las propias Aguadas de mis ganados con notable perjuicio de 
estos y de que precisamente ha de balerse echando mano para mantener la dilatada familia de una mujer y seis hijos à 
donde está agregado sin tener él ni ellos una sola cabeza; à mas de esto ciembra trigo en mis terrenos’ MVD, AGA, 
Archivo de la Escribanía de Gobierno y Hacienda, Exp. , No. , Manuel José Galup on behalf of Feliciano Correa 
to the Governor of Montevideo,  March , printed in Pivel Devoto, Colección, -. 
49 For a survey of land disputes between hacendados and peasant communities in the Banda Oriental, see Sala de 
Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez, Evolución económica, -. On the meanings of vecino in Spanish America see Tamar 
Herzog, Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America (New Haven, ): -. 
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This scenario of comparatively widespread physical and institutional access to agricultural land had 
contradictory consequences for the autonomy of labour, as it strengthened the bargaining hand of free 
working people while at the same time creating incentives for coercion. Where household labour did not 
suffice and production was stifled by labour scarcity, ‘Nieboer conditions’50 prevailed: there was for part of 
the year no wage level that suited both would-be employers and would-be employees, because the latter 
would prioritise, as the administrator of Estancia Las Vacas acknowledged, ‘looking after his milk cows, 
sowing and harvesting wheat (…) as it is natural that he should prefer to do.’51 For large-scale producers who 
had so many cattle that they needed many dependent workers, this posed a problem because it gave would-
be employees a strong outside option and allowed them to command high wages. Surveying the Banda 
Oriental at the request of the crown, Félix de Azara found this was true of most common folk he met in the 
countryside: many of them were in his eyes ‘almost naked’ but, to his dismay, when he tried to hire them to 
look after his animals they replied ‘I am also looking for someone to serve me, would you like to do so?’52 
Small-scale producers relied on non-dependent institutional arrangements for extra-familial labour, 
particularly on arrimados or agregados (‘attached’): individuals or families incorporated to the productive 
unit by their own free will, who were allowed to use the resources embedded in the farm (tools, buildings 
and work animals) and keep most of their produce as pay for their participation in the most labour-
demanding tasks during the agricultural year.53  
However, this cannot be considered a classic Nieboer-Domar scenario because, as we have seen, the 
late-colonial ‘spatial code’ entailed both a relatively open access to farmland and extremely unequal 
ownership of cattle.54 Both Nieboer and Domar thought abundant livestock could dilute the conditions for 
 
50 The Nieboer hypothesis, in Ervsey Domar’s version, suggests a trilemma between free peasants, free land, and 
a non-working landowning elite: two out of those three, but never all three, are to be found in historical agricultural 
systems. It has been written about by historians working in different contexts, especially in Africa but also in Asia and 
Latin America; see, for example, Gareth Austin, ‘Factor markets in Nieboer conditions: pre-colonial West Africa, 
c.–c.,’ Continuity and Change ,  (); David Feeny, ‘The decline of property rights in man in Thailand, 
–,’ JEH ,  (); Johnhenry Gonzalez, Maroon Nation: A History of Revolutionary Haiti (New Haven, 
): -. The original formulations are H. J. Nieboer, Slavery as an Industrial System (The Hague, ) and Evsey 
D. Domar, ‘The causes of slavery or serfdom: a hypothesis,’ JEH ,  (). 
51 ‘en cuydar sus bacas lecheras, sembrar, y recojer su simentera, y cuidar de su mujer, e hijos, como era natural lo 
executase con preferencia’ BA, IX.--, f., ‘Pliego de prevenciones con treinta articulos para el govierno del 
Administrador de la Estancia de las Bacas’, ‘Otras prevenciones para el Govierno de la Estancia’, art. . 
52 ‘hai en estos campos muchos hombres que absolutamente no quieren trabajar, ni servir por titulo ó precio 
alguno. Yo he contratado muchos casi desnudos, y cuando les he preguntado si querian servirme cuidando mis caballos, 
me han contestado con la mayor serenidad del mundo: “yo también busco quien quiera servirme, quiere V. hacerlo?”’ 
Azara, Viajes, . 
53 Garavaglia, Les hommes, -. 
54  records of household asset valuations survive from an extraordinary tax levied in  in Montevideo: cattle 
account for a third of the wealth and their distribution was more unequal than that of any other asset, whereas 
agricultural land accounted for only  of total wealth. My calculations on the data from 'El Cabildo al Gobernador 
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coercion: if large cattle-owners can benefit from economies of scale, then they would be able to use labour 
more productively, and workers would be better off selling their labour to them rather than being 
independent producers.55 And indeed this occurred in the Banda Oriental, but only when it suited the 
agricultural calendar: scale economies were constrained to times of peak labour demand in ranching, which 
coincided with the downtimes of peasant grain agriculture. Sustaining production year-round with free 
workers alone was extremely costly for a commercial estancia, which made acquiring slaves economically 
beneficial. Discussing the relative profitability of slavery is usually very difficult for economic historians 
because, as Wright pointed out in relation to the US South, it is hard to find a context in which free and 
coerced labour performed ‘the same tasks in the same place at the same time’.56 Late-colonial Uruguay offers 
one of those rare occasions. 
At Estancia Las Vacas the average monthly wage of a permanent free rural labourer (peón) was  pesos, 
whereas the provisioning of a slave with clothes and sundries cost under  pesos (food was provided to both 
free workers and slaves), to which we should add the initial cost of buying an enslaved person, which varied 
with age, skill, and health, but for young rural slaves in the region averaged  pesos.57 To meaningfully 
compare these costs over several years we need to consider their present value: the sum which, invested at 
prevailing interest rates, would pay for the costs over a period of time.58 The present value of hiring a ranch 
hand throughout the year (most of them worked in the estancia for only part of the agricultural calendar) for 
five consecutive years was  pesos, whereas the present value of buying and provisioning a slave for the 
same period was  pesos; by the sixth year, the present value of peón wages ( pesos) was higher than 
the inventory value and provisioning of a slave ( pesos). Therefore, investing in slaves for year-round 
ranching tasks made economic sense if they stayed in the estancia and remained healthy for six years or 
 
de Montevideo, Tasación de ' published in Apolant, Padrones, using the decomposition technique of Robert I 
Lerman and Shlomo Yitzhaki, ‘Income inequality effects by income source: a new approach and applications to the 
United States,’ The Review of Economics and Statistics  (). Details can be found in the Appendix. 
55 Nieboer thought that most pastoral societies proved that ‘there is no great need for slave labour where 
subsistence depends on capital,’ while Domar toyed with the idea that the expansion of sheep breeding could have 
helped spur the end of serfdom in England. Nieboer, Slavery, ; Domar, ‘Causes of slavery’, . 
56 Gavin Wright, Slavery and American Economic Development (Baton Rouge, ): . 
57 Peón wages taken from BA, IX.--, ff., ‘Plan que manifiesta los gastos ordinarios que se causaran 
anualmente en la Estancia de Las Vacas’. Supplies for slaves included, on a yearly basis,  pesos worth of clothing (two 
shirts, one poncho, a piece of cotton cloth, a pair of trousers, a jacket, and two blankets), a provision of Paraguayan 
yerba mate ( pesos), tobacco (. pesos), and salt (. pesos). BA, IX.--, ff.-, ‘Cuaderno de Vestuarios de 
Esclabos, raciones, y otros gastos peculiares a la Administracion de esta Estansia’ (January ). Average slave price 
in the wider region from Carlos Newland and María José San Segundo, ‘Human Capital and Other Determinants of 
the Price Life Cycle of a Slave: Peru and La Plata in the Eighteenth Century,’ JEH ,  (). 
58 I have taken as reference the average annual interest rate of the surviving records of  loans with recorded rates 
recorded in Montevideo between  and . MVD, AGA, ‘Registro general de hipotecas’, printed in Pivel Devoto, 
Colección, -. For a summary of the concept of present value and how to calculate it, see David G. Luenberger, 
Investment Science (Oxford, ): -. For a similar calculation for the Buenos Aires countryside, see Amaral, ‘Rural 
production’, -. 
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more. This alternative was even more profitable when slaves assumed managerial positions, substituting for 
even higher paid workers: the overseer’s salary, before Patricio took over the position, was  pesos per 
month. If the present value method for comparing profitabilities can be accused of anachronism, systematic 
comparisons between free and coerced labour were certainly known to contemporaries. The notion that 
‘young slaves save peones’ and that large estancias were ‘stocked with Negros in order to save wages’ appears 
repeatedly in sources from Estancia Las Vacas and the Banda Oriental at large.59  
There was, therefore, an economic rationale for labour coercion in some contexts, but that does not by 
itself explain how slavery came to be part of this rural economy. African slaves arrived in the region on an 
increasing scale in the late-eighteenth century through Luso-Brazilian supply networks and under the 
institutional framework of the Spanish colonial state. Slave imports, mostly illegal, had begun in , 
almost as soon as Buenos Aires was re-founded, and flourished up to the early-seventeenth century, with at 
least , Africans landed.60 Legal slave trading grew rapidly in the late-eighteenth century, now with 
Montevideo, the best natural harbour in the region, as its main port. More than , black slaves, from a 
wide variety of regions south of the Sahara (Angola in the case of Patricio’s father) as well as from Brazil (Rio 
de Janeiro in the case of his mother) arrived to River Plate ports in the last  years of colonial rule.61 Besides 
providing coerced labour for their own cities and hinterlands, Buenos Aires and Montevideo served as 
Atlantic entrepôts for slave trading into the South American interior and Pacific, supplying Peru and Chile.62 
Slavery on the shores of the Plate never reached an absolute scale comparable to the major plantation 
economies of the New World: Brazil, the circum-Caribbean, and the southern United States. But neither did 
European immigration before the late nineteenth century, which meant that, by ,  of the colonial 
population in the jurisdictions of Buenos Aires and Montevideo was enslaved, a proportion not dissimilar, 
for example, to that of the American Carolinas ( according to the  American census).63 With the 
 
59 ‘quatro esclavos mozos que ahorran  peones’ BA, IX.--, f., ‘Relacion delos Esclavos de Ambos Sexos, que 
quedan existentes en la Estancia de las Bacas’ by Don Francisco Cabrera, Hermano Mayor,  July ; ‘las estancias 
grandes ... están surtidas de negros, por ahorrarse los conchabos’ Agustín de la Rosa to the Viceroy Arredondo,  
December , published in Rodríguez Molas, Historia social, . 
60 Kara D. Schultz, ‘“The Kingdom of Angola is not Very Far from Here”: The South Atlantic Slave Port of Buenos 
Aires, –,’ Slavery & Abolition ,  (). 
61 The names of Patricio’s parents appear in the parish record of his marriage to Francisca; their origins were listed 
by the Jesuit inventories in . CAR, ‘Assiento de los Cassados en esta Parroquia de las Vivoras’, f.; BA, Colonia, 
Gobierno, Temporalidades, Leg. , ‘Imbentario detodo lo que contiene la estancia de las Bacas en  de Diziembre de 
’, printed in Vadell, Antecedentes, . Slave trade figures are taken from Alex Borucki, ‘The slave trade to the Río 
de la Plata, –: Trans-imperial networks and Atlantic warfare,’ Colonial Latin American Review ,  (). 
62 Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton, ): -; Alex Borucki, 
David Eltis, and David Wheat, ‘Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America,’ AHR ,  (): . On 
urban slavery in late-colonial Montevideo and Buenos Aires see, respectively, Alex Borucki, From Shipmates to Soldiers: 
Emerging Black Identities in the Río de la Plata (Albuquerque, ): -, and Lyman L. Johnson, ‘Manumission in 
Colonial Buenos Aires, -,’ HAHR ,  (). 
63 Borucki, ‘Slave trade’, ; Johnson, Workshop of Revolution, ; United States, Return of the whole number of 
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outbreak of revolution in -, and through the years of civil war and political instability that followed, 
slaves actively sought new paths to freedom.64 The institutional framework surrounding slavery changed as 
well: slave trading was legally banned by creole revolutionaries in Buenos Aires in  and in the Banda 
Oriental in , and slavery was abolished by the republics of Uruguay and Argentina in  and  
respectively.65 Chapter  will chart in detail the slow and unsteady path of abolition in rural Uruguay. 
Labouring peasants and African slaves and their descendants formed the bases of a hybrid labour 
system which underpinned economic growth in the late-colonial River Plate. Larger estancias were more 
likely to have slaves, and estancias with more slaves also tended to have more landesque capital (holding 
pens, ditches, orchards) and other capital goods (carts and tools), as well as larger cattle herds, which 
accounted for the lion’s share of rural wealth.66 Judging from the value and composition of their assets, large 
hacendados in late-colonial Uruguay were cattlelords first, labourlords second, and landlords only third.67 
This section has argued that factor ratios contribute to understand their economic incentives for acquiring 
slaves. Let us now explore how labour was organised and how the crop repertoire and the life cycle of cattle 
help explain how managerial authority was reconfigured to the extent that a slave overseer could decide 
which free workers to hire or dismiss. 
 
3 Agro-ecology and farming systems 
In Estancia Las Vacas, as in most of southern Uruguay, arable agriculture was practiced alongside ranching. 
Fine-textured, fertile, dark clay soils, and a warm temperate climate provided an excellent basis for grassland 
cover while at the same time allowing for a range of cereal, vegetable, and tree-crop agriculture.68 A crop 
repertoire focused on grains and the unparalleled natural advantages for extensive ranching had three 
important consequences for relations of production and work routines. First, the seasonal complementarities 
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between the labour demands of ranching, which peaked during the branding of young animals in autumn 
and spring, and wheat agriculture, with its midsummer harvest, shaped the changing balance of free and 
unfree labour in large estancias. Second, a physical environment better suited for grain and livestock 
production rather than plantation crops encouraged the emergence of diversified farm routines, for peasant 
smallholders and dependent workers alike. Third, the long life-cycle of cattle and their affiliative behaviour 
favoured longer-term overseers and promoted independent decision-making on the part of foremen, who 
were looking after large herds separated by miles of unfenced grasslands. These three factors help explain 
the emergence of a tasking system of labour organization, in which working intensely was more common 
than working steadily, free workers often received instructions from slaves, and the autonomy of workers 
grew with the size of the herds. 
Wheat was the main cash crop in Estancia Las Vacas as well as in the colony at large.69 Dark-coloured 
soils in the southern Banda Oriental were generally fertile enough in the late colonial period that there was 
little need for manure, and wheat could be grown in plots of different sizes. Its cultivation cycle employed 
more workers than any other economic activity in the countryside during ploughing in early autumn, 
sowing in May or June, and, especially, harvesting in January.70 During the harvest, rural labour was at its 
scarcest: smallholders had to prioritise their own farms, and there were many opportunities for high-wage, 
short-term employment in farms that could not rely solely on family labour. As a result, large estancias had 
to pay more for piecemeal or occasional work than usual: whereas monthly wages at Las Vacas were normally 
between  and  pesos ( to  reales), in summer daily wages of  reales were paid to temporary workers.71 
Slaves in this estancia made up the majority of the workforce during January and February, whereas in winter 
free workers outnumbered slaves.72 The hybrid labour system was, therefore, flexible enough to 
accommodate the seasonality of the region’s main crop. 
Conversely, demand for ranching work decreased in January, as high temperatures and the humid 
subtropical climate made slaughtering and skinning more difficult, resulting in a natural seasonal 
complementarity between wheat and livestock production.73 The main event in the calendar of the livestock 
economy, and the financial year of Las Vacas and most estancias, took place in autumn and sometimes 
additionally in spring. The yerra (from the local pronunciation of herrar, to brand with hot iron) was a time 
of intense work, when cattlemen branded all the cattle born the previous year (usually about a third of the 
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total herd) and castrated young steers.74 A team of twelve skilled ranch hands could brand and castrate  
head of cattle per day.75 Given the size of the herds at Las Vacas many additional workers had to be hired, 
most of them from the neighbouring estancias or villages. Periods of peak work often led to reconfigurations 
of authority in slave economies, as Morgan has noted in the case of whites assisting specialised black slaves 
during wheat harvesting in the Chesapeake.76 In the Banda Oriental, where free workers could routinely 
find themselves supervised by slaves, the mechanics of the yerra made the black foremen’s managerial 
authority particularly noticeable because many more ranch hands had to be directed: Patricio oversaw  
additional free workers hired for these ‘extraordinary tasks’ during the autumn of  alone.77   
In the late colonial period, population growth and an expanding export economy made raising tame 
cattle (ganado de cuenta) increasingly more important than hunting wild cattle (ganado cimarrón).78 
Extensive ranching became a year-long endeavour, involving the two contradictory phases of most forms of 
animal husbandry: nurturing life and ending it. Keeping herds healthy and tame required a daily task known 
as parar rodeo. This daily roundup of cattle in each puesto ensured that animals stayed aquerenciados (tame 
and at home in the area) and allowed workers to take stock, without dismounting, of the different groupings 
within a herd and identify missing animals. This deceptively simple method worked because it arose from a 
keen understanding of the psychology of cows. Parar rodeo benefitted from the persistency of the 
intraspecies social bonds cattle form, preserved by affiliative behaviour expressed through grooming and 
preferred grazing partnerships, as well as their tendencies to develop matriarchal family groups and the 
logics of dominance which make herds recognisable by their top-cow.79 Moreover, individual cows and 
calves knew their cuadrilla (their small group within the herd) and their querencia (their ‘home’ pastures 
within the estancia) because of their well-developed ability to identify environmental cues and individually 
recognise up to  herdmates primarily through their coat markings (and, in the case of calves, through 
their mother’s calls), as well as their excellent spatial memory.80 Sharp travellers such as Diego de Alvear in 
 or Charles Darwin in  perceived how economic strategies in these open ranges depended on those 
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very traits.81  
The life cycle of cattle and their behavioural patterns defined which forms of labour organization were 
more effective in two important ways. First, whereas the cycles of plantation crops can be as short as seven 
months (in the case of indigo) or at most as long as fourteen (for rice or some varieties of sugar cane), cattle 
need two years to reach adulthood and a cow will only start bearing calves when she is about  months old, 
with pregnancy lasting over nine. Therefore, while in some plantation economies overseers were often 
employed for only one or two years,82 in the River Plate there was an incentive for large estancias to keep the 
same managers in place for longer, so that they could see the production cycle through and keep track of 
herd numbers. This in-built preference for long-term foremen and overseers in ranching, in the context of 
a high turnover of free workers, helps to explain why slaves were often chosen for such positions. Therefore, 
the Uruguayan case offers support for Gavin Wright’s argument that the key advantage of slavery over free 
labour, for slave-owners of course, was not about productivity, but about the stability guaranteed by owning 
workers.83 
Second, because cattle, unlike crops, move about, to be effective at keeping track of large herds slaves 
had to be in the saddle, which had unintended consequences for their autonomy, both in terms of everyday 
mobility and in strengthening the threat of fleeing as a bargaining tool.84 Pablo, one of the foremen at 
Estancia Las Vacas, would often ride to Colonia to meet ‘his young woman’. As a result, he was one of the 
slaves who at times ‘for their love neglect their duties for four or even six days’, as one official reported in 
.85 That was of course a problem, he explained, but one difficult to solve: forbidding Pablo to see his 
girlfriend in Colonia could prompt him to flee the estancia. Increased mobility also mattered greatly for the 
autonomy of free workers. The abundance of horses, which Darwin thought ‘the destruction of all industry’ 
when he visited the region in the s, allowed them to move between distant farms and ranches and take 
up short-term employment.86 
The end of the life cycle of cattle also took place in the estancia, and it was a necessary stage in the 
production of its top commodity. Cowhides accounted for the majority of Las Vacas’s sales and were the key 
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regional export staple in the late-colonial period.87 In the late-eighteenth century the landscape resulting 
from extensive ranching was often described as primitive and unseemly (‘the rude beginnings of agriculture’, 
as Adam Smith put it), in contrast with the precise lines of well-dressed cropland, or the neat grid of a 
plantation.88 Despite the apparent disorder of an estancia’s fields and the blood and mess that came with 
slaughtering large animals, the production of cowhides and other cattle by-products could be 
straightforwardly divided into codified tasks, not unlike more orderly forms of contemporary commercial 
agriculture, such as tidal rice cultivation.89 After raising the cattle, the production process in a Banda 
Oriental estancia such as Las Vacas was organised into sequential activities (slaughtering, skinning, salting, 
drying), and resulted in easily countable commodities (dried hides, salted tongues, strips of beef jerky) that 
could then be tallied periodically. At the same time, distances and animal populations were simply too large 
to enforce a constant supervision of workers without incurring great costs. If we think in terms of Stefano 
Fenoaltea’s model of slave economies, this is a case where the cheapness of agricultural land and the long 
production process characteristic of pre-industrial ranching meant that cows were worth far more than the 
land they grazed on.90 This placed an emphasis on care rather than physical effort, in the context of a very 
extensive use of land. Therefore, tasking (where workers complete set assignments in a self-regulated way) 
rather than ganging (where they stay in the field for set periods under constant oversight) was the most cost-
effective way of organizing labour for ranching in this frontier environment.91 
The instructions Patricio received evidence how much ‘acquired knowledge and practice in the tasks of 
the countryside’ was needed to manage the tasking system for slaughtering and skinning.92 Each puesto had 
to produce a minimum of three full cowhides (dried and clean, observing the ‘appropriate quality’) per man 
per week, which the foremen had to control, stockpile, and take to the administrator once per month. Each 
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slave foreman was also responsible for enforcing these standards on free ranch hands and, if they failed to 
deliver the quantity or quality of hides, had to notify the administrator of the estancia so the worker would 
have a real and a half docked (about  per cent of their weekly pay) per missing hide.93 Patricio, overseeing 
them all, had to ride to each puesto at least once a week and assess their work and the composition of the 
herds. As herds grew, each puesto became more and more a ranch in itself, and the autonomy of its foreman 
grew accordingly. Workers, free and unfree alike, were judged by their weekly results. As long as assignments 
were completed, they could manage their time and the length of their working day as they saw fit. Therefore, 
it would seem that the fact that ranch hands and foremen (slave and free) preferred to work intensely rather 
than steadily does not stem, as Salvatore and Brown suggested, from ‘the ingrained gaucho habits of refusing 
to obey orders or to follow work routines’.94 Such a pattern is found in many other pre-industrial, rural 
contexts, and allowed workers to make the most of a system of labour organization that rewarded, and 
indeed required, autonomous time management.95 In their own time, slaves and peones working in the 
puestos could produce for the market or receive payment for additional tasks, such as hunting wild dogs, 
through which they improved their material lives, buying clothes and tools.96 
Finally, even if productive units in the River Plate littoral effectively practiced mixed farming, the 
gender division of labour was noticeable between tillage and pastoral agriculture. Ranching in Estancia Las 
Vacas was almost exclusively done by young adult men, enslaved and free: the foremen were in their late 
thirties and most of the ranch hands in their early twenties, with newly bought male slaves starting work in 
their mid-teens.97 But much of the material life of the estancia was sustained by women and older men, who 
tended vegetable plots with garlic, onions, maize, and squash, as well as pens with pigs and chickens. 
Whereas slave cattlemen had opportunities to make money, six older slave men aged between  and  
who had to ‘sow all kinds of seeds’ for the estancia’s own consumption were specially banned from ‘working 
on their own account’.98 They also had to tend to the orchard, which in  occupied twelve acres and 
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included one thousand peach trees, two hundred quince trees, and one hundred and fifty apple trees.99  
Three slave women of a similar age had to work in the main house, ‘cooking, kneading, making candles, 
choosing wheat, and washing.’100 All these activities left them little time for autonomous production. Their 
masters were also clear in that these slaves were not allowed to raise small stock or keep plots of their own, 
or indeed ‘anything else of which they may recognise as their property’.101 Thus, while farm routines were in 
general diversified in this mixed grain-livestock agriculture, they differed along gender and age lines, as did 
the scope for the slaves’ relatively autonomous ‘internal economy’.  
 
4 Spaces and struggles for autonomy 
Even for slave cattlemen and their families there were limits to independent agriculture. While most slaves 
in Estancia Las Vacas were allowed to tend to their own plots and to keep poultry, as was ‘the common 
practice in the estates on this bank [of the River Plate],’102 there was one major absence in their crop 
repertoire: wheat. There were, from the masters’ point of view, good reasons for this. Harvesting their own 
grain would reduce slaves' working hours in summer, precisely when free labour became more expensive, 
and distinguishing between the estancia’s own grain and that belonging to other production units within it 
(such as slaves’ family plots) could prove problematic when bringing the harvest to market.103 Francisca 
Ximénez, Patricio’s wife, was a free mulatto woman (parda libre) but she was married to a slave, so the ban 
reached her as well, curtailing her ability to engage in cash cropping. Or at least it did until she challenged 
the rule in June , when she asked the Hermandad to sow wheat in her own plot, to complement her 
other crops and vegetables. The administrator of the estancia (the top authority there, and the only one 
above her husband), a white creole named Don Florencio García, communicated Francisca’s request to the 
Hermandad in Buenos Aires, who saw no alternative but to grant her permission to grow wheat ‘in order to 
keep her husband happy, as it is very important to keep him in this hacienda.’104  
It is unclear how Francisca phrased her request, or how she gathered the administrator’s support to get 
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the Hermandad to reverse its rule on wheat farming. Being married to the overseer certainly contributed to 
her status and gave her some leverage. But her experience in dealing with the institutional framework of the 
colonial countryside must have played a part as well, and it preceded her life with Patricio: she had been 
married before to Gabriel Carmona, a free vecino of the parish.105 Wheat, in any case, afforded her new 
opportunities to make money. A small-scale sphere of exchange existed in parallel to the much better 
recorded long-distance trade.106 By the time of her death six years later Francisca had saved enough silver to 
leave  pesos (about ten weeks’ full wages of a ranch hand) as alms for the parish and to pay for a very 
expensive funeral (entierro maior) which included a sung mass and was usually reserved for merchants or 
well-to-do farmers.107 
Being married to Francisca was crucial for Patricio’s status too, both an expression of and a boon to his 
autonomy. Marrying free women was perhaps the most striking way in which a slave’s managerial authority 
in the economic arena translated to social mobility, guaranteeing his children’s freedom.108 And because a 
free woman’s time was her own, it also expanded the limits of their ‘internal economy’: while the husband 
received the allowance of tobacco, salt, yerba mate, and beef, the wife could tend to her plot to both 
complement their diet and make money. The husband could also contribute to this domestic economy once 
ranching tasks were completed.109 As a result of these compound strategies, slave foremen in Las Vacas ‘are 
well dressed, buy horses of  pesos and more, and spend money with their women.’110 Every slave foreman 
was either married to a free woman or was recorded in  as ‘wanting to marry’.111 Patricio did so twice: 
a few years after Francisca Ximénez’s death, he married another free vecina.112 
 
105 CAR, ‘Assiento de los Cassados en esta Parroquia de las Vivoras’, f.. 
106 The idea of a face-to-face frontier exchange economy was developed for the case of colonial Louisiana by Daniel 
H. Usner, ‘The Frontier Exchange Economy of the Lower Mississippi Valley in the Eighteenth Century,’ William and 
Mary Quarterly  (). Historians have been so far unable to establish the scale of a similar economy in the River Plate 
frontier, although they have found its traces: Garavaglia, ‘Paisaje’, . 
107 CAR, ‘Assiento de los Difuntos en esta Parroquia de las Vivoras desde el año de ’, f.. On the social 
hierarchy of funerals in the late-colonial River Plate, see Facundo Roca, ‘Prácticas funerarias y lugares de entierro en 
el Buenos Aires tardo-colonial: un estudio sobre la parroquia de Nuestra Señora de Montserrat,’ Andes ,  (). 
108 Mixed marriages played a similar role in the Sao Paulo rural frontier, see Alida C. Metcalf, Family and Frontier 
in Colonial Brazil: Santana de Parnaíba, - (Berkeley, ): -. 
109 For an insightful analysis of the interactions between the tasking system and the slaves’ domestic economy, see 
Philip D. Morgan, ‘Work and Culture: The Task System and the World of Lowcountry Blacks,  to ,’ William 
and Mary Quarterly  (). 
110 ‘estos indibiduos andan bien tratados de ropa tienen dinero compran caballos a quatro y mas pesos, hasen 
gastos con las mansebas’ BA, IX---, f., Agustín de la Cuesta to Don Martín José de Altolaguirre, Estancia Las 
Vacas,  June , ‘Sobre el casamiento del Esclavo Domingo Belen.’ 
111 ‘quiere casarse’ BA, IX.--, f., ‘Relacion delos Esclavos de Ambos Sexos, que quedan existentes en la 
Estancia de las Bacas.’ 
112 Patricio and his second wife, Francisca Godoy, went on to have five free children: Martín (b.), Teodoro 
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Interracial marriages were not unthinkable in the multi-ethnic frontier society of the late colonial Banda 
Oriental. A diversity of mostly young people, creole and European as well as indigenous, mulatto, and black, 
made their living on these unfenced prairies. The social and economic gaps between them were of course 
very large, but not comparable to the racial binary separating most whites and most blacks in plantation 
societies in Brazil, the Caribbean, or the American South.113 Still, such unions ran against some conventions 
and were tolerated rather than encouraged by slaveowners. In , Domingo, a slave from West Central 
Africa in his early forties who was one of the most experienced foremen in Estancia Las Vacas, had to 
pressure an Hermandad official into acknowledging his right to marry a free woman.114 The official refused 
at first ‘telling him that it was forbidden to grant these permissions for slaves to marry free people’ and that 
he could leave if he had a prospective new master that bought him from the estancia. To this Domingo 
replied ‘that he had no buyer nor wanted to leave this House or have another master’ and offered ‘other 
reflections touching his inner voice (fuero interno), so I decided to consult the father chaplain, who assured 
me that in good conscience he [Domingo] could not be challenged, more so when he was of use to this 
House.’115 The records of the nearby parish church of Víboras prove Domingo’s success: in the spring he 
married María Pascuala Gaete, a free mulatto woman.116 
It was not unheard of for free labourers to work alongside slaves in other slave societies in the Americas, 
or even for slaves to exert some degree of authority over agricultural production.117 Especially in contexts of 
tasking systems of labour organization, such as the South Carolina lowcountry, slave drivers could influence 
planters’ decisions regarding hiring free workers and even, as in one case cited by Chaplin, informally 
conduct ‘the business of the plantation.’118 What makes the case of late-colonial Uruguay particular in the 
New World context is the extent that this managerial authority could reach. In the previous sections I have 
argued that this space of possibility for slave agency was shaped by environmental factors, including those 
 
(), Miguel (), Cipriano (), and Tiburcia (). CAR, ‘Libro Parroquial del Partido de Vivoras que 
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113 Morgan, Slave Counterpoint, . 
114 Domingo was already in the estancia by the time the Jesuits left. They recorded him as a -year-old native of 
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consultar el asunto con el padre capellan quien me aseguro que en conciencia no se le podia pruebar y mas quando el 
hera de utilidad para esta casa’ BA, IX---, f., Agustín de la Cuesta to Don Martín José de Altolaguirre, Estancia 
Las Vacas, June th . 
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Casamentos mistos: liberdade e escravidão em São Paulo colonial (Sao Paulo, ); Herbert S. Klein and Francisco 
Vidal Luna, Slavery in Brazil (Cambridge, ): . 
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derived directly from physical geography and animal behaviour, and those resulting from human 
intervention and agricultural choices. The story of Patricio’s rise to the position of senior foreman reveals 
once more the interactions between those factors while foregrounding the exercise of human agency. A 
version of this tale has been told before by Carlos Mayo in his ‘imprecise and necessarily incomplete 
biography’ of Patricio.119 Working across archives in Uruguay and Argentina, I have uncovered some crucial 
details Mayo could not find about Patricio’s family and work life, which I will use to bring to life the argument 
about the possibilities opened up by the natural environment not only for production techniques but also 
for the autonomy of workers. 
In , when still one of the eight foremen in charge of a single puesto, Patricio was already seen as a 
man ‘of much intelligence for the countryside.’120 He had broken his collar bone and looked older than he 
was (only  he was described as being ‘about ’) but was at the height of his powers as a cattleman.121 In 
June that year, the herds in Patricio’s care were singled out as still providing good bulls and oxen in the 
context of a crisis brought about by what the administrator García considered terrible management by Don 
Agustín Rodríguez Villegas, a white Chilean who had been the overseer for about eight months.122 Rodríguez 
Villegas had pulled most workers from the puestos to build a new central corral, without first ‘going over the 
estancia and surveying the cattle herds or the droves of horses’ García wrote to his superiors in Buenos 
Aires.123 The very scarce labour resources were misallocated to the point where for months not a single horse 
had been tamed. As winter approached there were not enough horses or oxen ready to replace the ones that 
had died or been injured or sold, leaving some workers without the two biological machines which 
empowered their labour. Wild dogs were not being kept in check and threatened calves, while their mothers 
had become more difficult to handle as they were not being rounded up with enough regularity. The delicate 
ecological balances which allowed a few dozen workers to control thousands of animals were on the brink, 
and, as a result, so were profits, both present and future.  
García’s report was prompted by a narrowly averted catastrophe. One day in early July that year 
Rodríguez Villegas tried to use the new large corral to hold more than five hundred cattle, which resulted in 
a stampede. As hundreds of cows broke the pens and fled towards the Las Vacas stream, Rodríguez Villegas 
 
119 ‘imprecisa y necesariamente incompleta biografía’ Carlos A. Mayo, ‘Patricio de Belén: nada menos que un 
capataz,’ HAHR ,  (). 
120 ‘de mucha inteligencia para el campo’ BA, IX.--, f., ‘Relacion delos Esclavos de Ambos Sexos, que quedan 
existentes en la Estancia de las Bacas.’ 
121 ‘su edad como de  años’ BA, IX.--, f.; Vadell, Antecedentes, . Mayo thought that Patricio’s age could 
not be established with any certainty, but cross-referencing other two sources—Jesuit records that make him  years 
old in  and a colonial official’s report that makes him  in —I believe it can. Mayo, ‘Patricio’, ; Leonhardt, 
‘Documentos’, -; Vadell, Antecedentes, . 
122 BA, IX.--, f.. Florencio García, Administrador, to Francisco de Cabrera, Hermano Mayor,  July . 
123 ‘Luego que llego a esta estancia que fue el  de Noviembre sin bisitarla ni sin conoser los rodeos, caballadas, 
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rode after them, trying to lead a group of ranch hands to round them up, but ‘because he had no experience 
in this, he commanded without knowledge, and with a crowd of people he could not catch any cattle,’ García 
vividly reported, ‘until the Negro Patricio took charge of the rodeo.’124 Patricio had outmanoeuvred 
Rodríguez Villegas on the open range in front of the administrator and other workers, and saved hundreds 
of pesos worth of livestock. Notable though this was, over the following days Patricio would prove he was 
not just a man of action who knew cows and horses: he also understood people’s motivations and could work 
through words as well as deeds.  
Three days after García wrote his scathing report, Don Francisco de Cabrera, the chief officer of the 
Hermandad, arrived from Buenos Aires. A high-ranking Spanish bureaucrat, Cabrera was well-connected 
to the political and economic elites in the viceregal capital.125 He gathered all eight foremen in charge of 
puestos, who ratified García’s dramatic account, adding that cows kept trying to escape from the new corral 
Rodríguez Villegas had spent so much time and resources building. ‘It would have been much better,’ 
Cabrera wrote, ‘if instead they [the cows] had been included into one of the [existing] herds, as the Foreman 
Patricio told him many times, heralding what would happen.’ Furthermore, not enough cattle had been 
branded, even though Rodríguez Villegas arrived in November when there was still time to do so before the 
hot summer months, several foremen agreed. The pens he tried to use for holding cattle during branding 
were too short and weak, Patricio added, as ‘he had told him many times.’ Cabrera went on to ask the 
foremen whether they knew about Rodríguez Villegas paying extra wages to some free men, including a 
friend of his from Mendoza who was supposed to manage the orchard but apparently did no work. All 
foremen said they could not confirm this, except ‘the Foreman Patricio who said that he does know it to be 
true’ and gave further details on two workers to whom Rodríguez Villegas gave extra money. Three times 
the pattern recurred: Cabrera asked questions, the foremen replied, and then Patricio provided more 
damning detail, which Cabrera penned in his elegant calligraphy.126 
Surrounded and supported by his peers (three of whom he had grown up with), Patricio seized the 
unique opportunity of this interview with Cabrera to play on the contrast between the white creole who 
‘commanded without knowledge’ and the black slave ‘of much intelligence in the countryside.’ While Patricio 
 
124 ‘y como no tenia practica para esto mandaba sin conocimiento, y con una multitud de jente no cojia ganado 
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was skilfully navigating his social world, the natural one played into his hand as well: calving season was 
approaching, and spring would be the last chance to brand and castrate cattle before the wheat harvest 
pushed wages up. As Cabrera boarded the ferry for Buenos Aires he must have known a new senior foreman 
needed to be appointed in Estancia Las Vacas, and soon. Patricio must have known it too, because he found 
someone to write letters for him. More than letters, proposals: he was ready to make his case and the 
Hermandad was ready to listen.  
Patricio made no vague promises: if appointed capataz general, between August and March he would 
deliver one hundred fully trained horses, another two hundred tamed colts, and one hundred tame oxen. 
Without hiring any new workers he would also during those months brand all the animals grazing on the 
puestos of Miguelete and Las Armas: , cattle in total, he estimated, who were at risk of being claimed by 
neighbouring landowners. Concerning calving numbers ‘he cannot yet give his word, but will do so later on, 
when, after distributing the herds among all the puestos, he has enough knowledge of the state of the 
livestock in each of them.’ He asked for three things in payment, and they were all about autonomy. First, he 
was to be allowed ‘to rule and direct all the tasks and works of the countryside, choose and fire ranch hands, 
without anyone interfering with his decisions, because otherwise he will not be able to fulfil what he 
promises.’ Second, once he had fulfilled his plan, he would be allowed to buy his freedom for the sum of 
three hundred pesos. Third, he would then continue to work in the estancia, but as a free man earning a 
wage suitable to his position.127 Francisca’s hand was perhaps also behind this proposal—on the backs of her 
successful ploy to grow wheat two months before—as she had managed to raise the money needed for 
Patricio’s proposed manumission.128 
The proposal came at the right time and with the necessary support. Florencio García, the estancia 
administrator, vouched for Patricio with his silver as well as his word: he would not take home his wages 
until Patricio’s seven-month plan was completed.129 In a pre-industrial frontier economy, reciprocity and 
regard meant a great deal.130 Manuel de Lavardén, an estancia owner who knew García well, wrote that he 
was ‘a man of little brilliance, without much knowledge of the countryside, but he overcomes this by asking 
questions to everyone, and thanks to the devotion that the slaves feel for him, amongst whom Patricio and 
 
127 ‘aunque por ahora no se determina a fijar cantidad, por no aventurar su palabra, pero ofrece hacerlo mas 
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ganado en cada uno’; ‘se le degen governar y dirigir todas las faenas y labores de campo, escoger y despedir peones, sin 
que nadie se enmeta a alterar sus disposiciones, porque de otro modo no podrá cumplir lo que promete’ BA, IX.--, 
Capataz y Patricio. Oficios y Propuestas. 
128 Mayo, ‘Patricio’, . 
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Basilio stand out.’131 Perhaps advised by García, who had met the Hermandad leaders in Buenos Aires in 
June, Patricio put forth a second proposal, offering an alternative way to earn his freedom: he would remain 
a slave for three years, in each of them producing the results he had promised in his first proposal, but then 
we would be set free without paying any compensation.132 In the meeting of its Junta on  September , 
just in time before spring, the Hermandad accepted the revised proposal and decided Patricio Belén would 
be the new senior foreman. Eight months later, the administrator was instructed to ensure that when dealing 
with Patricio ‘the foremen, peons, and all other employees are appropriately subordinated to him so that he 
can perform the duties and assignments which have been entrusted to him.’133  
Even if factor ratios gave labour a stronger hand than in other pre-industrial rural societies, bold 
strategies were needed to make the most of the limited agency the frontier environment bestowed on the 
enslaved and their families. Francisca, Domingo, and Patricio used what leverage they had to expertly 
bargain for a significant measure, if not always of freedom, then at least of economic and social autonomy. 
It seems that, for some reason unknown to us, Patricio did not achieve his freedom through his ranching 
expertise as he had intended: when his second son was christened in  the priest still recorded him—but 
not his son or wife—as a slave.134 By then, rebellion was stirring on the grasslands. One of the learned 
advisors of the creole revolutionary leadership, father Dámaso Antonio Larrañaga, rode through the then 
deserted lands of Estancia Las Vacas three years later and reflected on the destructive effects of warfare on 
rural resources.135 The revolution’s program did not contemplate abolishing slavery, but the long cycle of 
revolutionary violence did create a new context for it, which is studied in the next chapter.  
5 Conclusion 
Slavery can be distinguished from other forms of labour exploitation because enslaved workers are coerced 
into being ‘outsiders’ whose social world is purposefully severed. For rural slaves in the Americas, each local 
environment, through its impact on the economic organization of land and labour, shaped the conditions 
in which they struggled to forge new social ties. The case of late-colonial Uruguay, where male slaves often 
supervised white creoles and married free women, demonstrates how the ecological context of a frontier 
region underpinned the profitability of slavery, while at the same time making it possible for slaves to attain 
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positions of managerial authority and build new relationships. In comparison with the major New World 
slave economies, in the unfenced River Plate countryside a largely self-regulated tasking system emerged, as 
masters acknowledged that experienced slaves were in a better position than seasonally-employed creoles to 
manage production, given the long life-cycle of cattle and their associative behavior in the open ranges. By 
fusing grassland ecology with the economics of pre-industrial ranching, this chapter argued animals, 
climate, and topography can (and did) give rural slaves some bargaining strength, as well as reinforce an 
unequal gender division of labour and distribution of resources.  
Historians of Latin America have long argued that the late-colonial period witnessed a change in the 
economic centre of gravity in the territories of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate, from the mines of the 
Bolivian altiplano to the grassy plains of the Platine littoral.136 Buenos Aires and Montevideo, the 
southernmost port cities in the Atlantic, were growing fast in the last three decades of colonial rule, their 
populations rising and their economies expanding thanks to the long-distance trade of livestock by-
products.137 Exploiting the ecological bounty of this frontier required labour for seasonal work as well as for 
the year-round tasks that domestication implies, as an ongoing process involving persistent interaction 
between animals and humans.138 Because agricultural land was available to most free people, there was an 
incentive for large producers to rely partially on coerced labour for such tasks. The production techniques 
best suited to these factor ratios (abundant land, scarce labour, and scarce capital other than livestock) 
required somewhat autonomous riders to herd and slaughter the fabulously abundant cattle who shaped the 
environment and, through their biological alchemy, turned almost worthless grass to valuable leather, that 
multi-purpose commodity of the Atlantic world.  
A detailed analysis of the physical landscape as well as the social transformation of it, through crop 
choices and domesticated animals, contributed to explain not only why this particular labour system existed, 
but also why it was effective, contrary to the conventional wisdom that slaves would be unable to efficiently 
oversee free workers.139 But the ‘spatial code’ which emerged in response to the local environment, from land 
tenure to farming techniques, extended its influence beyond the economics of agriculture itself, shaping a 
wider set of social relations which were traversed by gender. While female voices appear only occasionally 
in the manuscripts and women were under-represented among farm-owners, they were but by no means 
absent, as joint or even as sole proprietors. Widowhood was not the only path towards exclusively female 
farm-ownership in this frontier, as parents lobbied for new land grants for single daughters as well as sons, 
and women also participated in their own right in the land market, which was mostly limited to well-placed 
farmland. Among slave households, while all slaves, by definition, saw their autonomy greatly curtailed, the 
 
136 Halperin Donghi, Revolución. 
137 Moraes, ‘Tendencias’. 
138 Edmund Russell, ‘Coevolutionary History,’ AHR ,  (): . 
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scope for an ‘internal economy’ differed greatly along gender (and age) lines, in favour of young adult men. 
And yet some women within slave households, such as Francisca, managed to engage in market-oriented 
agriculture on their own behalf. 
The late-colonial Banda Oriental might have been a ‘freer’ world of rural slavery by the standards of 
New World plantations, but it was far from a world of free labour, certainly in Marx’s notion of the concept. 
Most free rural workers were not landless proletarians, but peasants who entered temporary relations of 
dependence; they were not ‘freed from, unencumbered by’ property in or access to productive resources, 
notably agricultural land as well as work animals. And rural slaves were, of course, not free from coercion, 
as they formed ‘part of the means of production themselves.’140 Seen within this dissertation’s long-term 
story of economic resources and activities in rural Uruguay, the ‘spatial code’ this chapter has described 
reveals how the colonial origins of the agricultural export economy were tied to the political allocation of 
agricultural land and the existence of markets in labour and in workers themselves. What prevented agrarian 
capitalism from developing in late-colonial Uruguay was not the ‘pre-capitalist’ and ‘rustic’ mentalities of 
rural workers, but a set of relations with the land that allowed peasants to remain to a large extent 
independent producers, and thereby encouraged large landowners to rely partially on the enslaved labour 
of Africans and their descendants. 
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chapter three 
‘Lost Decades’ and Where to Find Them:  
Early Uruguay, c.1820-1870 
 
 
‘Fifty more years of caudillos and chaos.’1 What could such a period possibly have to offer to a historian of 
long-term rural development? The post-independence economic record of Latin American countries is now 
conventionally seen by global economic historians as a harsh mirror for other regions liberated from 
European colonial rule: ‘conflict, violence, and instability’ leading to an ‘abysmal’ growth performance—
‘lost decades indeed’.2 Can these decades be found? And, if so, where should we go looking? 
A large body of previously unexamined or under-explored primary sources from early post-colonial 
Uruguay seems a good place to start. Of course, for an earlier generation of historical and social science 
scholarship in Uruguay and elsewhere in Latin America, these decades were never lost to begin with. They 
were rather understood as crucial times of state-building and capital accumulation (to different extents in 
different countries) which laid the groundwork for either ‘the nation’, in liberal narratives, or a transition to 
peripheral agrarian capitalism, in Marxist mode.3 This chapter takes these older perspectives seriously and 
reframes them to interrogate the current ‘lost decades’ orthodoxy, using some of the methodological tools 
of the new economic history. The focus is on explaining two crucial economic transformations that took 
place during the five decades following the end of colonial rule, and without which modern Uruguay would 
be unimaginable. The first one was the slow and unsteady process of emancipation from slavery, which, 
despite having received so far little attention from economic historians, brought about a fundamental shift 
in the status of many in the agricultural workforce and changed the way in which labour could be mobilised 
in the rural economy. The second one, faster and better documented, saw sheep-farming redefine the 
 
1 That is the summary of Uruguayan early post-independence decades emerging from the hugely influential, 
particularly among neo-institutionalist economic historians, Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the 
Nation-State in Latin America (Pennsylvania, ): . 
2 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson, ‘Lost Decades’, . 
3 Classic works encompassing the whole region are Cardoso and Pérez-Brignoli, Historia económica and Furtado, 
Formac ̧ão Econo ̂mica. Seminal examples from the s and s for the Uruguayan case are, for a liberal and a 
Marxist interpretation respectively, Juan E. Pivel Devoto and Alcira Ranieri, Historia de la República Oriental del 
Uruguay (-) (Montevideo, ); Vivián Trías, Los caudillos, las clases sociales y el imperio (Montevideo, ). 
Uruguayan economic historians writing in the s and s were influenced by both, as well as, methodologically, 
by the Annales school. 
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economic uses of agricultural land in a process dubbed by Uruguay’s most influential historians as quite 
simply ‘the most radical transformation’ in the country’s rural history.4 
The next section reviews the ‘lost decades’ thesis, considers its genealogy, and critiques the standard of 
its evidence as well as its usefulness as a heuristic device for economic historians of Latin America. The 
second section traces the course of abolition in rural Uruguay from the start of the independence revolution 
in  until the end of the ‘great civil war’ in . It relies on new evidence from census enumerators’ 
books to demonstrate the extent and characteristics of rural slavery in the aftermath of Uruguay’s  
constitution, and tries to shed light on the diversity of paths towards independent livelihoods. The third 
section is devoted to the growth and transformations in livestock agriculture between  and ; in 
particular, it explores Uruguay’s ‘sheep revolution’ in relation to two influential theoretical approaches which 
have been invoked to explain export-led economic development in the global periphery: ‘modernization 
theory’ and ‘vent-for-surplus’. The conclusion considers the implications of early Uruguay’s two major 
economic and social transformations for the ‘lost decades’ thesis, and invites reflection upon the causal 
connections between them. 
 
1 From the ‘long wait’ to the ‘lost decades’ 
The prevailing view global economic historians have of early-independent Latin America is one of 
unfulfilled promise, of ‘decades of economic stagnation rooted in the dilemmas of the colonial society.’5 This 
rhymes with enduring tropes about the region and seems to give them a historical genealogy and a material 
basis: following independence, the inequalities of Iberian colonial society coalesced into Latin America’s 
tendency to perpetual political unrest, underneath which the fundamentals of its economic backwardness 
stood still. For a particularly striking and influential example of this narrative in the comparative literature, 
here is David Landes: 
Independence slipped in—a surprise to unformed, inchoate entities that had no aim but to 
change masters. This kind of anarchic negativism invited macho warlordism (caudillismo). 
No wonder the history of Latin America in the nineteenth century was a penny-dreadful of 
conspiracies, cabals, coups and countercoups—with all that these entailed in insecurity, bad 
government, corruption, and economic retardation. Can any society long live in such an 
atmosphere? Or get anything done on a serious, continuing basis? 6  
 
4 ‘Posiblemente no hubo en toda nuestra historia rural una transformación más radical.’ Barrán and Nahum, 
Agricultura, . 
5 Allen, Global Economic History, . 
6 Landes, Wealth and Poverty, . 
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In Latin Americanist scholarship, the origins of this interpretation—which showed much more nuance 
than Landes’s at times essentializing account—can be traced back to Tulio Halperin Donghi’s classic Historia 
contemporánea de América Latina (), perhaps the most reprinted and widely read Spanish-language 
general history of the region. The third chapter, on the decades following independence, was entitled ‘A long 
wait’ and first characterised the period as one of ‘stability in poverty.’7 Halperin’s erudition led him to 
acknowledge variation within this general pattern and to offer a more careful chronology, which 
circumscribed Latin America’s time in the waiting room of economic development to .8 Like the 
economic historians who would later revisit his argument, Halperin also pointed to the lack of growth in 
export values as the crucial piece of evidence. The idea of a protracted and generalised economic crisis 
following independence reached an even broader audience through Bulmer-Thomas’s Economic History, 
which, like Landes, did not cite Halperin, but shared his pessimism as well as his emphasis on the export 
economy.9 Among specialists, Coatsworth took the argument one step further, claiming that the early-
independent decades were the crucial period in the emergence of Latin America’s long-term backwardness 
(relative to the United States or the West more generally).10   
In the twenty-first century, the ‘long wait’ has found new life and gained centre ground in the global 
economic history debate under a new name: the ‘lost decades’. The crucial reference is a  article by Bates, 
Coatsworth, and Wiliamson (henceforth BCW) in which they compare Latin America’s - 
performance with Africa’s since , arguing that both historical settings can be defined as ‘lost decades’ 
for economic development under the shadow of political instability and conflict following independence.11 
With its newfound global audience, this latest version of the thesis has invited renewed criticism by 
economic and social historians of Latin America, on at least two fronts. First, Llopis and Marichal questioned 
the very idea of stagnation or retardation in this period, as not even the most pessimistic estimates place 
Latin American growth rates below the world average: this was, in their view, at most a time of 
‘unexceptional growth’ that only looks catastrophic if compared with the globally-leading growth rates of 
the nineteenth-century United States.12 Second, Gelman argued that the diversity of trajectories in the 
aftermath of independence cannot be easily pieced together into a coherent picture and certainly not one of 
 
7 ‘Una larga espera’, ‘una estabilidad en la penuria’, Tulio Halperin Donghi, Historia contemporánea de América 
latina (Madrid, ): -; . 
8 I am paraphrasing Dipesh Chakrabarty’s ‘waiting room of history’ in his Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial 
Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, N.J., ): . 
9 ‘The great expectations formed at the time of independence had not been fulfilled (…) For most Latin Americans 
the major consolation was that things could only improve.’ Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, . 
10 Coatsworth, ‘Trajectories’. 
11 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson, ‘Lost Decades’. A somewhat similar view, although in comparison with 
North America rather than Africa, can be found in North, Summerhill, and Weingast, ‘Order’. 
12 Enrique Llopis and Carlos Marichal, ‘Introducción,’ in Latinoamérica y España, -: un crecimiento 
económico nada excepcional, ed. Enrique Llopis and Carlos Marichal (México, ). 
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‘post-colonial crisis’.13 It should be said that Halperin himself was not oblivious to very large variations across 
Latin America, and his original formulation of the thesis considered how some of the fringe areas of the 
colonial period (Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay, Venezuela) experienced a much faster recovery after 
independence than the former economic core (Bolivia, Mexico, Peru).14 But there remains a difference 
between acknowledging diversity within a clearly defined general pattern and suggesting, like Gelman does, 
that the degree of variation is so large that we cannot meaningfully speak of a generally shared path of 
economic development in the aftermath of independence.  
Despite these criticisms, the ‘lost decades’ thesis remains the conventional wisdom in comparative and 
global economic history on early-independent Latin America, and BCW’s articulation of it is now the main 
way for non-specialists into the debate.15 Given how thought-provoking their contribution is and how 
influential it has been in consolidating (or from the point of view of some Latin Americanists, reviving) the 
‘long wait’ narrative, BCW’s description of economic stagnation during this period and their causal 
explanation of it deserve further scrutiny.  
While I am extremely sympathetic to efforts to bring Latin America’s and Africa’s economic pasts into 
dialogue with one another, diachronic comparisons such as the one proposed by BCW are difficult to pursue 
systematically given how utterly different the historical contexts are. As Bértola and Ocampo argued, it 
makes much more sense to compare nineteenth-century Latin America with other post-colonial societies at 
the time than with late-twentieth century Africa.16 More to the point, BCW are trying to explain something 
we are not even sure happened, or at any rate have been so far unable to empirically prove: the ‘abysmal’ 
economic performance of the whole of Latin America during the five decades following independence.17 As 
proof of Latin America’s post-colonial failures, BCW relied on the guesstimates of per capita incomes from 
the Maddison database, as they stood at the time they wrote their article.18 As Prados de la Escosura 
convincingly showed, these were in general very problematic for the period before , and an attempt at 
 
13 Gelman, ‘Senderos’; Gelman, ‘Crisis postcolonial’. 
14 Halperin Donghi, Historia contemporánea, -. Cuba was of course not yet independent in this period; on 
the links between export-led growth and independence in the island, see Pedro Fraile, Richard Salvucci, and Linda 
Salvucci, ‘El caso cubano: exportación e independencia,’ in La independencia americana: consecuencias económicas, ed. 
Samuel Amaral and Leandro Prados de la Escosura (Madrid, ). 
15 The thesis is espoused not only by Bulmer-Thomas’s classic economic history, but also by Bértola and Ocampo, 
Economic Development, and the relevant chapter of the Cambridge History of Latin America, written by Halperin himself: 
Tulio Halperin Donghi, ‘Economy and society in post-independence Spanish America,’ in The Cambridge History of Latin 
America, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge, ). The exception in the textbook landscape is a chapter in the Cambridge 
Economic History of Latin America, which takes a more nuanced view: Leandro Prados de la Escosura, ‘The economic 
consequences of independence in Latin America,’ in The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America. Volume II: The 
Long Twentieth Century, ed. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth, and Roberto Cortés Conde (Cambridge, ). 
16 Bértola and Ocampo, Economic Development, . 
17 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson, ‘Lost Decades’, . 
18 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris, ). 
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improving the quality of the figures brought the yearly growth of Latin American per capita GDP from 
BCW’s rate of ‘about zero’ to over ..19 Similarly, on the other side of BCW’s comparison (and of the South 
Atlantic), the reliability of the PPP-adjusted per capita income figures for late-twentieth and even early-
twenty-first century Africa has also been severely criticised.20 
Moreover, Prados questioned the standard use in the literature of the United States as the default 
yardstick for measuring Latin American mid-nineteenth century performance, and pointed out how 
difficult it is to chart a single Latin American path out of independence, owing to very large variations within 
the region: if we trust the growth data, Uruguayan economic growth kept pace with the United States 
between -, while Mexico fell dramatically behind. Again, the emphasis on regional variation is far 
from new in efforts to place Latin America in a global and comparative economic history context. In the 
very first volume of the Annales in , Lucien Febvre emphasised how different ‘Latin Americas’ took 
centre stage across the centuries; two decades later, their special issue on the sub-continent was entitled 
‘Across the Latin Americas.’21 The question now, in my view, is whether historical national accounts are a 
good vantage point from which to assess regional diversity following independence, ascertain its unifying 
features, and draw comparisons with other global experiences of economic development in the nineteenth 
century. 
While I acknowledge that Prados’s GDP per capita figures are an improvement over the ones used by 
BCW, and as a result have replaced them in the latest edition of the Maddison database, I still do not think 
we should have this debate in the Kuznetian arena.22 Unless or until new archival troves are patiently mined, 
or already exploited sources are given new meaning, the data are simply not there to reconstruct per capita 
GDPs and estimate rates of economic growth for the vast majority of Latin American countries before 
c.. To turn to our case, which has one of the best sets of historical economic data for the late-nineteenth 
century, Uruguay’s per capita GDP in the five decades following  is proxied, in the most recent 
Maddison database, by a backwards projection of Bértola’s  estimate (which is based on actual output 
data) adjusted on the basis of the rate of growth implicit in patchy export data from a few Argentine 
 
19 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson, ‘Lost Decades’, ; Prados de la Escosura, ‘Lost Decades?’, . 
20 Morten Jerven, Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It (Ithaca, ). 
21 ‘A travers les Amériques latines’, see Lucien Febvre, ‘Amérique du Sud: un champ privilégié d‘étudies,’ Annales 
d'histoire économique et sociale ,  (): -; Lucien Febvre, ‘Introduction: l‘Amérique du Sud devant l‘Histoire,’ 
Annales d'histoire économique et sociale ,  (). 
22 Cf. for a rather parallel argument in the Great Divergence debate: Kent Deng and Patrick O‘Brien, ‘China‘s GDP 
Per Capita from the Han Dynasty to Communist Times,’ World Economics Journal ,  (). ‘Kuznetian’ refers to 
Simon Kuznets, regarded as the founder of an empirical tradition centred around national income accounting, 
although he was much more aware of the limits of those analytical tools than some of his followers. See Robert William 
Fogel, Enid M. Fogel, Mark Guglielmo, and Nathaniel Grotte, Political arithmetic: Simon Kuznets and the empirical 
tradition in economics (Chicago, ); Simon Kuznets, Modern economic growth: rate, structure, and spread (New 
Haven, ). 
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provinces.23 My unsuccessful efforts to improve upon those figures for the case of Uruguay in the early- and 
mid-nineteenth century led me to the reluctant conclusion that the ‘lost decades’ thesis cannot be upheld or 
falsified with macroeconomic aggregates because the existing sources—of a lower volume and poorer quality 
than those of either the late-colonial or late-nineteenth century periods—have so far closed that 
methodological avenue.24 
Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to take the income guesstimates as reliable evidence for 
‘abysmal growth’ for the first five decades of independent Latin America, there would still be a problem of 
causation in BCW’s thesis. The only empirical basis the authors offer on the causal relationship between 
political instability and lack of economic growth in mid-nineteenth century Latin America comes from an 
unpublished manuscript which applies a neoclassical economic model of household savings and 
consumption to estimate the effects of political instability on growth (via discouraging investment) in post-
independence Mexico.25 In that study, Ponzio proxies the dependent variable, GDP growth, with fiscal 
revenue data from the central government.26 If the very idea that the state was weak is a starting point of the 
analysis, and civil and international wars fought in domestic territory are bound to make tax collection more 
difficult, then how can we trust the size of the state’s tax income as a reliable indicator of the performance of 
the economy? Economic and social historians of Latin America are in general sceptical of using tax data to 
estimate the size of the economy, because most economic activity went untaxed, a problem compounded 
precisely by state weakness, reflected in, and perpetuated by, the lack of reliable tax collection systems in the 
nineteenth and in many cases well into the twentieth century.27 To put it in econometric terms, there is an 
 
23 Bolt et al., ‘Rebasing “Maddison”’, based on Prados’s figures. While Prados is right that ‘it does not seem far 
fetched to assume that Uruguay’s behaviour was rather similar to that on the Argentine side of the River Plate’ the 
problem remains that the Argentine data refer exclusively to exports, which leave aside most of the economy. Prados 
de la Escosura, ‘Lost Decades?’, . For Bértola’s reliable GDP estimates, which sensibly start in  and remain the 
standard reference, see Bértola, PBI de Uruguay. 
24 Patchy data on exports, imports, and government revenue is not enough to produce reasonable GDP estimates 
either from the supply-side (adding up everything produced in the economy) or the demand-side (adding up all kinds 
of income in the economy). Indirect methods of estimating agricultural output from demand are impracticable because 
of the paucity of data on wages and prices, while lack of data on urbanization provides little indirect evidence of the 
non-agricultural output. For a leading example of how the indirect method can, in other contexts, produce useful 
estimates given a wide range of available sources, see Paolo Malanima, ‘The long decline of a leading economy: GDP 
in central and northern Italy, –,’ European Review of Economic History ,  (). 
25 The main finding of the paper is that ‘political instability is responsible for  to  per cent of the reduction 
of the growth rate during the four or five ‘lost decades’ after independence.’ Carlos A Ponzio, ‘Looking at the dark side 
of things: Political instability and economic growth in post-independence Mexico,’ (Mexico City, ), . 
26 For an earlier, and in my view more insightful, discussion of the interplay between political instability and 
economic development in Mexico, see Donald F Stevens, ‘Economic fluctuations and political instability in early 
republican Mexico,’ The Journal of Interdisciplinary History ,  (). 
27 This does not mean that eighteenth- or nineteenth-century Latin American tax data should be entirely 
disregarded, far from it. It can be, for example, very effective at giving us a sense of relative prices or of the performance 
of the state (rather than that of the economy); see Grafe and Irigoin, ‘Stakeholder empire’, . 
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unresolved confounding factor problem in Ponzio’s analysis: the dependent variable (growth of tax revenue) 
is endogenous to state capacity (a variable not controlled for), which is itself directly related to political 
instability, that is, the independent variable. Unsurprisingly, then, one can find a strong negative relationship 
between the central government’s fiscal income and political instability, but that is far from proving that the 
latter caused an ‘abysmal’ performance of the economy as a whole; an economy which was, in Mexico, 
Uruguay and elsewhere in Latin America, overwhelmingly rural, informal, and beyond the reach of taxation. 
As Sánchez Santiró has shown relying on a much broader range of evidence, up until the s Mexico in 
particular experienced significant growth, spurred by market integration and the reorganization of 
production and trade following the recovery from the independence war, all of which is simply not captured 
by looking at fiscal revenue data alone.28 
‘Lost decades’ is a catchy but misleading name for fifty years of Latin American economic history; the 
original formulation—the ‘long wait’—was somewhat teleological but had the merit of confining itself to 
fewer than thirty. The seminal paper which most recently popularised the return of the thesis is based on 
inadequate evidence to describe an alleged ‘abysmal growth’ record and assumes an arrow of causation (from 
political instability to economic stagnation) it should instead endeavour to test. Even if the economic hopes 
surrounding the independence revolutions were not fulfilled in the short term, these cannot be called ‘lost 
decades’ unless by that one means ‘lost to the national accounts framework.’ But it is the framework that 
does not work with the sources available, not the Latin American economies themselves that stood still. To 
prove that point in a specific context, the next sections look at the sources which do exist for the case of 
Uruguay, and rely on them to describe and explain two momentous changes in the rural economy. 
Uruguay is a small case, but if the ‘lost decades’ thesis was to find conclusive evidence anywhere, it 
would be here. The regionally-leading pace of the late-colonial economic expansion (c.-) and of 
export-led growth under the First Globalization (c.-), and the political turbulence in between, 
should make the case for ‘lost time’ easy to make in Uruguay. Political historians have noted how 
representative the volatility of the country’s mid-nineteenth century power struggles were of the region as a 
whole: in the Cambridge History of Latin America, Lynch described nineteenth-century Uruguay as ‘an 
hacienda economy writ large’ where ‘it made sense for the state to be weaker than its most powerful subjects,’ 
a description later applied by Centeno to Latin America as a whole.29 The next sections focus on the two 
crucial transformations in Uruguay’s mid-nineteenth century rural economy, stressing their different paces 
and periods: the slow and unsteady demise of slavery throughout five decades, and the later changes in land 
uses and values brought about by the emergence and consolidation of export-oriented sheep-farming.  
 
28 Ernest Sánchez Santiró, ‘El desempeño de la economía mexicana tras la independencia, -: nuevas 
evidencias e interpretaciones,’ in Latinoamérica y España, -: un crecimiento económico nada excepcional, ed. 
Enrique Llopis and Carlos Marichal (México, ). 
29 Centeno, Blood and Debt, ; John Lynch, ‘The River Plate Republics from Independence to the Paraguayan 
War,’ in The Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge, ): . 
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2 Slow and unsteady: the course of abolition in rural Uruguay, 1811-1851 
In Uruguayan schoolyards there are three flags, each representing a phase of the independence revolution(s). 
All three had a discourse substantially built around emancipation, but none of them abolished slavery. The 
first phase, the war led by Artigas against Spain (-) and Portugal (-), started as a rural 
uprising against the demand for land titles by the colonial government in Montevideo. Even at its most 
radical, when it attempted to grant access to land and cattle brands to farmers of all races in , the 
revolution still upheld rural slavery: free blacks were encouraged to become smallholders, but enslaved 
blacks were to continue being enslaved, and no path for emancipation was charted. The second phase, the 
skirmish war against Portuguese-cum-Brazilian occupation (-), ended in a declaration of 
independence that proclaimed the principle of free birth, but not the freedom of existing slaves. The last 
phase, a series of diplomatic and military struggles involving Argentina, Brazil, Britain, and the 
‘Uruguayan’30 revolutionaries (-), ended in Uruguay’s first constitution, which, like most Latin 
American constitutions at the time, abolished international slave trading but not slavery or even domestic 
slave trading.31 This section tries to make economic sense of that political history (why did revolutionary 
leaders consistently decide not to abolish slavery?) and explains how rural slavery was slowly eroded 
throughout the decades following independence, not least by the ploughs and swords of slaves and former 
slaves themselves. 
2.1. The revolution and rural slavery 
While they shared a chronology and some objectives, the Spanish American revolutions were diverse in 
their social basis of support and political strategies.32 In the case of the Banda Oriental, unlike across the 
River Plate in Buenos Aires, the revolution started as an uprising in the countryside and it remained a rural-
based movement throughout, with Montevideo persisting for years as the last stronghold of Spanish power 
in the region.33 As a result, the revolutionary program was to a large extent a compromise between the 
 
30 Most people did not call themselves ‘Uruguayans’ (uruguayas, uruguayos) in the nineteenth century, even after the 
creation of the republic of that name; their preferred demonym remained ‘orientales’ (i.e. from the eastern bank of the 
Uruguay river); see Ana Frega, ‘Uruguayos y orientales: itinerario de una síntesis compleja,’ in Crear la nación: los nombres 
de los países de América Latina, ed. Juan Carlos Chiaramonte, Carlos Marichal, and Aimer Granados (Buenos Aires, ). 
For convenience, here I use ‘Uruguayan’ or ‘Afro-Uruguayan’ to refer to people who most likely called themselves ‘orientales’. 
31 More precisely, it only prohibited importing slaves (introducción de esclavos), so buying and selling slaves within 
Uruguay remained entirely legal even after the  constitution. 
32 For the classic overview see John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, - (London, ). For the 
opposite, dependentista argument that the independence revolutions in fact shared a political programme and that the 
plurality of independent republics that emerged were a symbol of the defeat rather than the success of that 
revolutionary project, see Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Historia de la nación latinoamericana (Buenos Aires, ). 
33 The three landmark studies about the agrarian roots of the revolutionary movement in what would become 
Uruguay and its political implications are Pivel Devoto, Raíces coloniales; Lucía Sala de Touron, Nelson de la Torre, and 
 
 
 
diverse interest groups of a multi-ethnic rural frontier society, with a significant degree of economic 
differentiation between peasants, free labourers, slaves, and large hacendados (cattle-owners). Let us briefly 
consider how revolutionary violence and revolutionary policy affected slaves, slave-owners, and the 
character of rural slavery in Uruguay.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, livestock and slaves were, in that order, the main forms of wealth in 
the late-colonial countryside. A decade of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence, following the 
first major defeat of the Spanish army at Las Piedras in , did much more to destroy wealth in ownership 
of animals than in ownership of people. One surviving survey of  estancias across Paysandú, at a time 
where that province occupied all the northern half of Uruguay, provides a glimpse of the effects of war on 
rural assets by .34 From a total of almost , cattle in , the estancias recorded in the survey had 
now fewer than ,. While we do not know how many slaves lived there in , by  they still 
represented almost  of extra-familial workers, and estancias with more slaves tended to have more cattle 
as well, as they had done under Spanish rule.35 That same year in Cerro Largo, another large pastoral 
hinterland, a survey of all districts reported an average of about . slaves per household, with over a third 
of the adult population being slaves.36 Baptism records from the largest church in that province studied by 
Palermo suggest that, while at the height of the first revolutionary cycle in - enslaved children 
represented only  of baptisms, their share rose to almost  by , which led him to the conclusion 
that some slaves hid their children in the estancias were they worked, in the ultimately false hope that slavery 
would be abolished by creole revolutionaries.37 While the power of large hacendados as cattle-owners had 
been shaken by the years of war against Spain and Portugal, their control over coerced labour seemed 
relatively secure. 
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Not all historians agree on the rather underwhelming effects of revolutionary violence on the 
hierarchies of rural society in the Banda Oriental. An interpretation most recently articulated by Ricardo 
Salvatore claims that, to the contrary, 
The revolutionary wars transformed the nature of rural society: a society based on the 
estancia system evolved into one based on direct appropriation and cooperative labor. Rural 
inhabitants took advantage of this social arrangement to fully exercise their cultural 
traditions of freedom, illegality, and avoidance of work.38 
As it often happens when writing the history of nineteenth-century Latin America, our assessment of 
the pace and scale of economic and social change hinges on how we construct its colonial baseline. As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, the colonial estancia was not an overwhelming force in the countryside, 
certainly not to the exclusion of direct appropriation from nature in the form of peasant independent 
cultivation, which was widespread and underpinned the very high wages commanded by free agricultural 
workers in the Banda Oriental. The post-uprising scenario was also not as ‘cooperative’ as Salvatore makes 
it out to be, a point about which rural slaves in the s were probably keenly aware. While the large 
estancia, as an economic unit and a social institution, was hit by the loss of livestock wealth resulting from 
war, it was far from vanquished. The agricultural export sector would long remain tied to its productive 
strategies, and revolutionary violence did little to weaken those long-term, even if many individual 
hacendados lost their land and cattle during the revolutionary struggle. 
The revolutionary program itself did not challenge slavery either, and its projected policy for the rural 
economy was more an extension than a dismantling of colonial precedent. The insurrection of peasants and 
hacendados against Spanish rule had been sparked in late  by a decree issued by Montevideo’s governor 
who, in a break from local tradition and trying to raise funds to fight the now rebellious Buenos Aires, 
requested all landowners in the Banda Oriental, large and small, to submit proof of their land deeds within 
 days and imposed a tax to those without legal titles.39 Five years later—at the apex of the revolutionary 
cycle when Artigas presided over a federation of provinces which excluded Buenos Aires—the revolutionary 
government returned to the crucial issue of access to land in its Reglamento Provisorio de la Provincia 
Oriental para el Fomento de la Campaña y Seguridad de sus Hacendados, a series of land laws more 
commonly known as the Reglamento de Tierras.40  
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Rather than attempt to fundamentally change the framework for owning land and mobilizing rural 
labour, the  Reglamento preserved the principle, well-established by local colonial authorities and 
communities, that agricultural land should be formally granted to citizens provided they worked it. Land 
granted under the new bylaws could not be sold or rented, only one grant was to be given to each household, 
and the beneficiaries had to ‘build a shack and two paddocks within precisely two months.’41 In general, 
then, these dispositions reflected more than challenged preceding practices and rules. The radicalism of the 
Reglamento, however, came from explicitly extending these principles to some people the colonial state had 
considered, at best, second-class citizens—‘free blacks and zambos of the same class’ as well as ‘Indians’—
and declaring that ‘the most disfavoured should be the most privileged’ by the new grants of public land.42 
The implicit exception were black slaves, for whom no provisions were made, which makes the idea that this 
revolution represented ‘the abolition of social hierarchies’ tout court unsustainable.43  
Abolishing slavery was never a declared objective of Artigas’s movement, perhaps owing to the broad 
range of rural people that formed its economic and social base of support. The only detailed quantitative 
record of rural households pledged to the revolution, a ‘census’ of families who followed the revolutionary 
army in the aftermath of the siege of Montevideo in late , is often used by historians as proof that this 
was a movement of the rural poor and middling sorts rather than of large hacendados, because most of the 
recorded families did not own slaves and a third of them did not own a single carriage or cart, which can be 
seen as prime examples of (inanimate) capital goods in this rural economy.44 Yet, those same records, 
covering over , people, also show that slave-owners made up a substantial share of total family heads 
() with an average of almost . enslaved workers per slave-owning household, who in almost all cases 
owned at least one carriage, if not several.45 It would seem, then, that the support of slave-owning, mid-size 
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and large hacendados (including, for example, Artigas’s brother and father, who owned  slaves,  carriages, 
and thousands of hectares)46 was not a trivial matter for a revolutionary leadership that was in dire need of 
resources to sustain an almost constant military and diplomatic struggle against Spain, Portugal, and at times 
also Buenos Aires’s revolutionary government who intended to annex the Banda Oriental.  
While abolition was not part of the revolution’s stated goals, and even if its leadership relied politically 
on the support of slave-owners as well as peasants, emancipation could still have occurred as a more or less 
unintended result of the transformations underway and of slaves’ and former slaves’ part in the actual 
fighting.47 In particular, could the revolution’s land policy, if fully implemented, have led to a substantially 
more egalitarian countryside, and, crucially for our discussion, one without slaves? Historians have long 
debated how radical the Reglamento was, with some scholars implying that the revolution’s military defeat 
to the Portuguese (-) and the subsequent years of Brazilian rule (-) prevented the first 
land reform in Latin American history from taking place, or even closed down a more egalitarian trajectory 
for Uruguayan economic development: a ‘farmer path’ (rather than a ‘Junker’ one) to agrarian capitalism.48  
From the perspective of this dissertation, which looks for long-term shifts in the patterns of access to 
and use of resources in Uruguay’s rural development, the Reglamento appears as a variation within a system 
already in place rather than an attempt at a wholesale transformation of it. That variation tended towards a 
more egalitarian outcome, to be sure, as it explicitly expanded the base of potential smallholders, but that 
base already included most rural households: ownership of land was unequal and at the same time 
widespread in late-colonial times.49 All the same, the Reglamento aimed to preserve a relationship with 
nature and a logic of allocation of resources predicated on the political distribution of abundant agricultural 
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land, which remained predominantly in the public domain. This was not a move away from a brisk, capitalist 
land market towards the socialization of land, but the continuation of the predominance of non-market 
mechanisms of allocating land resources, with the same objective that animated local colonial authorities 
before: encouraging settlement in a lightly populated frontier. Revolutionary leaders had, after all, even a 
greater security reason to do so than the Spanish empire had had.  
Therefore, large estates or cattle herds were not questioned nor expropriated, unless they happened to 
belong to political enemies (‘bad Europeans and worse [Latin] Americans’), who had in fact already fled.50 
That being said, several immense estancias did belong to political enemies and they were duly subdivided 
between many beneficiaries, as it happened in  with ‘Estancia Las Vacas,’ which we visited in Chapter  
as a site to explore rural slavery in the late-colonial period.51 If the Reglamento fell short in its credentials as 
a socializing land reform, it was also far from pioneering a farmer road to agrarian capitalism, as the creation 
of a land market was actively discouraged, with rules explicitly preventing beneficiaries from renting or 
selling their farms in any way. Meanwhile, rural livelihoods could still be partially sustained by the direct 
appropriation of nature (timber, firewood, wild cattle, game) among the open fields. With slavery still very 
much legitimate, the hybrid labour system that characterised pastoral agriculture in the region, and which 
included a market in people as well as in (mostly seasonal) free labour, remained untouched by the 
revolutionary program.  
From the vantage point of long-term rural development, then, the Reglamento was not ‘a bold challenge 
to all the colonial past that the revolution was leaving behind,’52 as the conventional wisdom in political 
history, most recently restated by Caetano and Ribeiro, would have it. It was, instead, a pragmatic attempt 
to expand the basis of the rural economy, and of political support for the revolution, without substantially 
changing its foundations in terms of access to resources for agriculture, both natural and human. A 
counterfactual scenario where the application of the Reglamento had not been cut short by the Luso-
Brazilian army has not been explored in the specialist literature, perhaps because of the uneasiness many 
historians feel when confronted with explicit counterfactuals.53 While this is not the place for a full excursion 
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into that alternative past, there is, in my view, nothing in the built-in mechanisms of the Reglamento and 
their potential interactions with local farming practices and environments that would have led to increases 
in the relative value of land in the short term, nor to the weakening of the economic rationale for rural 
slavery. 
2.2. Independence now, freedom later 
In the range of New World post-colonial constitutions in agrarian slave societies (or ‘societies with slaves’, a 
distinction that in this context is not necessarily illuminating), Uruguay’s first () was not an outlier. If 
we think of a continuum between, on the one hand, the outright abolition of slavery in Haiti’s first 
constitution () and, on the other, the emphatic upholding of enslaved labour in the  constitution 
of Kentucky, Uruguay was, like most of Latin America, somewhere in between.54 International slave-trading 
was banned and the freedom of births recognised, but slaves were not emancipated and slavery itself not 
questioned. To my knowledge, Uruguayan constitutional scholars have so far not made these comparisons, 
precisely because they have been misled by the ‘society with slaves’ label.55 This is not the right place, nor 
am I the right scholar, for such an analysis, but the relative lateness with which slavery was even formally 
abolished ( and , on which more in the next section) does suggest that slavery was politically more 
costly to end in early Uruguay than it was in Latin American countries which did abolish it shortly after 
independence: Chile (), the Central American Federation (), and Mexico (). Despite what has 
long been taught in Uruguay’s primary schools, the abolition of slavery in the country cannot be called ‘early’, 
except in comparison with Brazil, Cuba or the United States, and can hardly be taken as evidence of the 
country’s progressiveness.56 
The course of abolition in Uruguay was slow not only because slavery itself was not abolished at 
independence, but because slave importing, even after it was banned, continued. As the extraordinarily rich 
Voyages database shows, the River Plate was the only formerly Spanish American region which imported 
substantial numbers of slaves after , and Uruguay’s was the new flag under which more slave ships sailed 
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in the s, even after the formal abolition of slave trading under the first constitution.57 In the decades 
that followed slave trading became less brazen but remained consequential, if far smaller in scale. The history 
of illegitimate slave trading in early Uruguay has only recently started to be explored, and it included trans-
Atlantic journeys of so-called ‘African colonists’ as well as overland people-smuggling along the vast 
northern border with Brazil.58 Selling and buying slaves within Uruguay, however, was still perfectly 
legitimate, as a look at classified ads in Montevideo newspapers from the s and early s will show. 
While the legal framework of the emerging republic did not explicitly allow or regulate the domestic trade 
in slaves, it remained very much above the board, as even civil servants publicly sold slaves for agricultural 
work on the side: 
FOR SALE. A young negro, suited to a Countryside estate; he knows how to tame horses 
and make beef jerky, has no known vices, and is available at a moderate price. Those 
interested in buying him should come to the Police headquarters to discuss.59 
Besides banning external slave trading, the  constitution followed the  declaration of 
independence in establishing the principle of free births, or ‘freedom of the wombs’ (libertad de vientres): ‘in 
the territory of the state no one will be born a slave any longer.’60 This was not an uncommon formula in 
early Latin American constitutions, and in the case of Uruguay it can be seen as a compromise between 
recognising the large contributions of Africans and their descendants to the revolutionary war effort, while 
at the same time not challenging the property rights of slave-owners.61 It also allowed the government of a 
small buffer state to take a cautious political stand against enslavement without having to pay hefty 
compensation to slaveholders or stoke their fear of a social revolution in the aftermath of independence.62 
Paying compensation was, as the contemporary press noted, a difficult proposition for a fledgling 
government that ruled over a small, dispersed agrarian society, was already heavily indebted, and needed to 
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sustain a standing army.63 The economic cost of independence, or rather of achieving independence through 
protracted war, weighed heavily on public finances: the republic was born with a public debt of  million 
pesos, more than twice its annual budget.64 And because the prospects of peace were not encouraging, the 
army continued to take the lion’s share of that budget for several years: Etchechury’s in-depth study of public 
finances has shown it accounted for more than a third of all government expenditure between  and 
.65 On the revenue side, with its minimal bureaucracy and trying to avoid further political risk, the early 
Uruguayan state depended almost entirely on custom duties. These also served as the prime collateral to 
obtain credit and as the backing for Uruguay’s paper money, all of which was ultimately sustained by the 
agricultural export economy.66 
Whether the motive was fiscal economy, a lack of political commitment to emancipation, or both, the 
constitution’s compromise solution meant that anyone born in Uruguay of a slave mother before  would, 
in principle, remain a slave for life, and so it had much less of a short-term impact on rural slavery and the 
prospects for emancipation than may appear at first sight. Fleeing the estancia where they worked continued 
to be a risk worth taking for many rural slaves, and runaways were still persecuted by the police and 
denounced in newspapers: 
THEY HAVE FLED. Two negroes, one called Marcelino, of short stature, stout body, 
without a beard, scarred in his upper lip,  years of age, who is a countryside negro; the 
other one named Tomas, of tall stature, slim body, scarred in his cheek, of Portuguese nation 
but speaks good Spanish, also a countryside negro. The Police of the Provinces as well as 
the City are informed so that they may find them, or take them to the house of Don Luis 
Gonzalvez Guimaraens, where a reward will be given to whoever delivers them.67 
 
63 Agustín Beraza, ‘Amos y esclavos,’ Enciclopedia Uruguaya  (): . 
64 Washington Reyes Abadie and Andrés Vázquez Romero, Crónica General del Uruguay, vol.  (Montevideo, ): . 
65 Mario Etchechury Barrera, Hijos de Mercurio, esclavos de Marte: mercaderes y servidores del Estado en el Río de 
la Plata (Montevideo, -) (Rosario, ). 
66 Before the s direct taxes always accounted for less than  of government revenue: Camilo Martínez 
Rodríguez, ‘La construcción del Estado Oriental del Uruguay (c.-). Otra mirada con foco en la evolución 
histórica de sus funciones’ (Universidad de la República, ), -. On early Uruguay’s monetary policy, see Mario 
Etchechury Barrera, ‘Más allá del metal. Crédito y usos monetarios de la deuda interna en el mercado financiero de 
Montevideo, -,’ RUHE II,  (). 
67 ‘SE HAN HUIDO. Dos negros, uno llamado Marcelino, estatura baja, grueso de cuerpo, sin barba, tiene una cicatriz 
en el labio de arriba, edad de  años y es negro de campo; el otro llamado Tomas, estatura alta, cuerpo Delgado, tiene una 
cicatriz en un cachete de nacion portuguesa pero habla regular el castellano y Tambien negro de campo. Se avisa a la Policia 
de los Departamentos como a la de la Ciudad para que den noticia de él o lo entreguen en casa de D. Luis Gonzalvez 
Guimaraens donde sera gratificada la persona que los conduzca.’ BN, El Universal, Montevideo,  April , . 
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Rewards for capturing runaways and returning them to their masters were substantial and, in a context 
of monetary uncertainty following the creation of the new republic, were sometimes paid directly in gold.68 
The constitutional ban on slave importing created upward pressure on domestic demand for the labour of 
slaves, which could be temporarily hired. Slaves who were thus ‘rented out’ (conchabados) could keep some 
of the money paid for their labour which they could save for their manumission; most of the payment, 
however, went to their master.69 The institution of conchabo (Spanish vernacular for ‘temporary 
employment’), used in colonial times primarily for renting slaves for household work, was extended to 
market-oriented activities, including beef jerky production for export: 
INTERESTING NOTICE—Several negroes are needed as labourers for a jerky factory 
[saladero], those who would like to be temporarily employed [conchavarse], can come to 
the road of San Miguel number  where they can discuss.70  
The institutional framework was therefore geared towards slow, partial, and uneven abolition, and in 
so doing, I argue, was following more than shaping developments in the rural economy. A series of 
population registers from a range of rural villages and districts in , containing over , individual-
level records, most of them never transcribed by historians before, reveal how widespread slavery still was 
and provide a glimpse into paths to freedom and rural livelihoods. These nominal listings have come to us 
after enduring the accidents of source survival. The second independent government, led by Manuel Oribe, 
set out to conduct a census in mid-, but the plans were interrupted by the start of an eventually 
successful uprising led by the previous president, Fructuoso Rivera. Despite Rivera’s best efforts, his rebellion 
started late enough to allow some enumerators’ books to be completed, and  of them remain safe and 
legible in Montevideo’s Archivo General de la Nación (Illustration ., Map ., and Table .). While their 
coverage is of course not ideal, I would argue that their informational content provides a kind of insight into 
the material history of the period that we can never get from the backwards projection of macroeconomic 
aggregates alone. Furthermore, given the tiny size of early Uruguay’s population, which historical 
demographers estimate at about , people by , our , individual observations in  (just 
before large-scale European immigration started) comprise a respectable share of the total, as they include 
 
68 When Agustín, a slave ‘of the Congo nation,’ fled Francisco Lucas’s estancia in early , his owner promised 
‘an ounce of gold’ as a reward for whoever found him. BN, Revista Oficial, Montevideo,  January , . 
69 The workings of conchabo as an economic institution in this period, and its interaction with slavery and 
emancipation, deserve further study; see Florencia Thul, ‘Trabajo libre y esclavo de la población afrodescendiente en 
Montevideo, -. Los registros de papeletas de conchabo para el estudio del mercado de trabajo,’ RUHE ,  (). 
70 ‘AVISO INTERESANTE—Se necesitan varios negros para peones de saladero, los que quieran conchavarse, 
pueden ocurrir á la calle de Sn. Miguel No.  que encontrarán con quien tratar.’ BN, Revista Oficial, Montevideo,  
January , . 
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several districts in the most densely populated rural areas (the south and south-west).71 Beyond their 
absolute and relative size, these data have the benefit of being, in an etymological sense at least, truly 
‘empirical’ in a way guesstimates based solely on sources for later periods or for other countries are not: these 
primary materials were actually close to, and grounded in, the collective experiences we want to account for. 
In the context of the source hiatus of the decades following independence, especially when it comes to 
quantitative data, their light, however small, shines particularly bright. 
 
ILLUSTRATION 3.1. First page from the enumerator’s book for Rosario (Colonia), 1836 
 
Source: author’s photograph, Archivo General de la Nación (Montevideo). 
 
71 Large-scale European immigration started in the mid-s and picked up pace in the s, while natural 
population growth also increased: by  Uruguay’s population had risen to ,; by  to . million. Juan 
Rial, Estadísticas históricas de Uruguay, - (Montevideo, ); Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, ‘The population of 
Latin America, –,’ in The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume : c. to , ed. Leslie Bethell, 
The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge, ). 
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MAP 3.1. Geographical coverage of 22 enumerators’ books for rural districts, 1836 
 
Note: approximate locations only.  
Source: drawn by the author. 
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TABLE 3.1. Rural households, slaves, freedpeople, and labourers in surviving enumerators’ books, 1836 (continues on next page) 
Village or district (province) 
[map reference] 
Individuals 
recorded 
Household 
heads’ modal 
occupation 
Family 
labour per 
household 
Slave-owning 
households (%) 
Slaves per 
slave-owner 
Free 
blacks (%) 
Wage 
labourers per 
household 
Ethnicity 
(white | black | 
mulatto | Indian) 
Paysandú (Paysandú) [1] 250 Cattle farmer 3.9 25% 1.5 25% 1.0 87 | 7 | 2 | 3 
Soriano, Águila, Bizc. (Soriano) [2] 1,643 Labourer 2.9 12% 2.0 23% 0.5 83 | 7 | 2 | 7 
Víboras (Colonia) [3] 1,088 Tiller 3.2 10% 1.5 26% 0.2 … 
Real de San Carlos (Colonia) [4] 830 Cattle-owner 3.8 22% 2.9 13% 0.2 … 
Rosario (Colonia) [5] 1,798 Farmholder 4.2 16% 2.1 26% 0.8 84 | 6 | 6 | 5 
P. de Belastiquí (Canelones) [6] 354 Cattle-owner 4.5 25% 4.3 27% 0.3 … 
Coello (Canelones) [7] 1,749 Tiller 3.9 15% 3.0 24% 0.2 … 
Guadalupe (Canelones) [8] 1,910 Labourer 3.5 27% 2.4 20% 0.2 … 
Canelón Chico (Canelones) [9] 571 Tiller 4.9 15% 2.4 0% 0.1 … 
A. y Villa Piedras (Canelones) [10] 238 Tiller 3.6 25% 1.8 26% 0.0 … 
Colorado (Canelones) [11] 188 Tiller 3.2 17% 2.6 7% 0.9 … 
Pantanoso (Montevideo) [12] 760 Tiller 5.3 25% 3.4 37% 1.4 … 
Peñarol (Montevideo) [13] 503 Farmholder 5.2 36% 2.9 14% 0.9 … 
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TABLE 3.1. Rural households, slaves, freedpeople, and labourers in surviving enumerators’ books, 1836 (continued) 
Notes: Occupations refer to the modal value of head of household’s occupations (asendado, labrador, trabajador, peon, criador, propietario in the original). ‘Family 
labour per household’ calculated as the mean number of family members in a free household in addition to the household head. ‘Ethnicity’ refers to the ‘class’ 
assigned to each individual in the enumerators’ books, when available for the majority of observations: ‘black’ refers to those described as negro(a) and moreno(a), 
while the category ‘indian’ accounts for indio(a) and chino(a), ‘mulatto’ is chosen as a translation for pardo(a), and ‘white’ is used for those recorded as blanco(a).  
Sources: MVD, AGA, Libros  (Soriano),  (Canelones),  (Cerro Largo),  (San José),  (Paysandú),  (Durazno),  (Maldonado),  (Colonia),  
(Montevideo extramuros). Records for Canelones province taken from the underlying data in Moraes and Pollero, Categorías ocupacionales and corrected by cross-
referencing with the primary sources. 
Village or district (province) 
[map reference] 
Individuals 
recorded 
Household 
heads’ modal 
occupation 
Family 
labour per 
household 
Slave-owning 
households (%) 
Average 
slaves per 
slave-owner 
Free 
blacks (%) 
Wage 
labourers per 
household 
Ethnicity 
(white | black | 
mulatto | Indian) 
Pando (Canelones) [14] 3,140 Tiller 5.2 23% 2.4 6% 0.0 … 
La Laguna (Maldonado) [15] 470 Tiller 4.9 16% 2.1 4% 0.0 94 | 6 | 0 | 0 
Los Ceibos (Maldonado) [16] 589 Tiller 4.9 17% 2.4 15% 0.1 94 | 6 | 0 | 0 
Mynas (Durazno) [17] 91 Cattle-owner 4.1 93% 1.0 36% 1.8 48 | 21 | 21 | 10 
C. de Maciel (Durazno) [18] 143 Tiller 3.9 0% — — 0.0 62 | 0 | 2 | 36 
Chileno (Durazno) [19] 1,133 Cattle-owner 4.2 25% 3.9 12% 0.7 64 | 14 | 7 | 15 
Illescas (San José) [20] 245 Cattle-owner 3.6 41% 3.3 4% 1.2 … 
Cordobés - Tupam. (C. Largo) [21] 337 Not given 3.2 65% 5.2 0% 0.2 … 
Olimar, Yerbal, Cuchilla Grande 
(Cerro Largo) [22] 
323 Not given 4.0 52% 3.7 0% 0.8 … 
Total 18,353 — 4.1 21% 2.7 16% 0.4 — 
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While these local sources cannot be straightforwardly added up to form a national picture, they can 
give us a quantitative sense of how agriculture was structured across different environments, from the fertile 
dark soils of the south-west to the dry stony grasslands of the mid-east and the warmer north-west littoral. 
The rural economy of early Uruguay was still defined by the interaction of peasant grain and vegetable 
agriculture reliant on family labour and extensive cattle-raising by small and large producers alike. Nuclear 
families were more common than large extended ones, probably because fertile land was available for free 
young adults to take up as independent cultivators themselves: the average family size, including the 
household head and children of all ages, was about  people. Again, because land remained abundant, and 
labour the limiting factor, acquiring extra-familial labour was necessary to achieve any scale beyond family 
production. To do so, large producers acquired both work and workers in the market: free wage labour and 
slavery continued to coexist. Because we have no output data to match these demographic sources, we 
cannot establish how much of the required work in cattle-raising was done by free ranch hands or by slaves, 
nor test whether there were advantages in up-scaling and, if so, whether slave-owning ranchers benefitted 
from higher productivity derived from economies of scale. However, we can still glimpse the character of 
rural slavery and its resilience in early Uruguay from the sources we do have. 
In the late s, slavery remained important to the rural economy after over two decades of 
revolutionary warfare followed by a constitution that banned slave trading and enslavement at birth. Five 
out of six black people were enslaved, and they made up about a fifth of the recorded agricultural workforce 
(including family labour). Moreover, rural slavery retained its defining late-colonial traits: it was 
widespread—one in five households owned slaves in a fairly flat distribution—;72 small-scale, with a mean 
of just under three slaves per slaveowner (about half the average in rural São Paulo at the time);73 more 
associated with ranching than with tilling;74 and complementary, rather than alternative, to family and free 
labour: no farm or ranch in the sample was worked solely by slaves, but slaves were almost always present 
in households which employed several extra-familial workers. That being said, a few of the largest producers 
did rely almost entirely on slaves. Joaquín Silba Moreira, a large hacendado in his sixties raising cattle in the 
Chileno district of Durazno, owned  slaves and employed only two free labourers.75 But this was unusual 
in districts were most producers owned slaves, such as in the mid-eastern Cerro Largo province, where slave 
and family labour participated in almost equal measure in production. 
 
72 The Gini coefficient of slaves owned was ., considering only the households who owned at least one enslaved 
person (author’s calculation of the standard Gini coefficient based on data presented on Table . for the provinces of 
Cerro Largo, Colonia, Durazno, Montevideo, and San José). 
73 Francisco Vidal Luna and Herbert S Klein, ‘Slaves and masters in early nineteenth-century Brazil: São Paulo,’ 
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History ,  (): -. 
74 Slave-owning labradores (crop farmers) had an average of . slaves compared with . for hacendados 
(ranchers) (author’s own calculation based on data presented on Table . for the provinces of Cerro Largo, Colonia, 
Durazno, Montevideo, and San José). 
75 MVD, AGA, Libro , ‘Departamento de Durazno. Segunda Seccion. Padron clasificando á todos sus habitantes,’ -. 
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While slavery continued to be an everyday feature of early Uruguay’s rural society, the fortunes of many 
slaves themselves seemed to be changing, albeit unevenly. Young enslaved adults found ways to freedom, 
and so, through them, did their children. Harvesting the data from those enumerators’ books that contain 
age information for all individuals in their district, we can compare the ages of enslaved and free black 
people, in the context of the age distribution of the general population (i.e. including non-blacks as well) 
(Graph .). The age structure of the population at large is the one expected in a pre-demographic transition 
agrarian society: a social preference for high fertility (as peasants safeguarded their future by having more 
potential adult producers) and high levels of mortality resulted in an overwhelming presence of children 
and teenagers. More than half of the people recorded in the enumerators’ books were under .76 The peaks 
and troughs in the age distribution is also typical of a pre-industrial agrarian society: clear evidence of age 
heaping suggesting that a large share of the population were not numerate.77 Applying the methodology 
proposed by A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen, we can estimate that only  of the respondents recorded in the 
enumerators’ books could remember or calculate their own age correctly. The gap in estimated numeracy 
between black slaves and the non-black population was notable:  for non-blacks and  for enslaved 
blacks, whereas among free blacks the estimate is somewhere in between ().78 
  
 
76 On pre-demographic transition fertility strategies, see the seminal John C Caldwell, ‘Toward a restatement of 
demographic transition theory,’ Population and Development Review , / (): -. 
77 Economic historians interpret age heaping as evidence of innumeracy (a lack of ‘ability to count, keep records 
of these counts, and make rational calculations’ according to Emigh) because when individuals struggle to calculate 
their age, they tend to give a figure by rounding off towards ‘attractive’ numbers, generally those ending in  or . Such 
ages are then over-reported, which creates sharp jumps in the aggregate data. See Rebecca Jean Emigh, ‘Numeracy or 
Enumeration?: The Uses of Numbers by States and Societies,’ Social Science History ,  () and Dorothee Crayen 
and Jörg Baten, ‘Global trends in numeracy – and its implications for long-term growth,’ EEH ,  (). 
A long-term study in Latin American context is Kerstin Manzel, Jörg Baten, and Yvonne Stolz, ‘Convergence and 
divergence of numeracy: the development of age heaping in Latin America from the seventeenth to the twentieth 
century,’ EcHR ,  (). 
78 All figures in this paragraph result from the author’s own calculations based on the age data presented in Graph 
. and deploying the transformation of the Whipple Index developed by Brian A’Hearn, Jörg Baten, and Dorothee 
Crayen, ‘Quantifying quantitative literacy: Age heaping and the history of human capital,’ JEH  (). Details can be 
found in the Appendix and the Additional Materials. 
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GRAPH 3.1. Ages of freedom, ages of slavery 
Age profile of population in 12 Uruguayan rural districts in 1836 (N=8,544) 
 
Notes: the height of the curve is scaled so that the area under it equals  for all three populations. Density estimates 
were performed with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of . 
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of surviving enumerators’ books which contained complete age data. Those 
were available for the districts of Mynas, Maciel, Chileno, Rosario, Peñarol, Paysandú, Soriano, Canelón Chico, 
Colorado, Belastiquí, Piedras, Pantanoso, Los Ceibos, and La Laguna. See Table . for details on the primary sources. 
Against this demographic background, the generational divides in the opportunities to attain freedom 
were, it seems, stark. The age structure of enslaved blacks resembled that of the general population closely 
but with a marked lag in its distribution, with most slaves being between  and  years old. On the other 
side of emancipation, slightly older young adults, between their late-twenties and their early-forties, were 
over-represented among free blacks, as were children under the age of . It would seem that adults needed 
some time to save enough to pay for their own manumission, which would explain the very low frequency 
of free blacks in their teens or early twenties. In the case of children, at first sight these age data could be 
considered proof for the emancipatory effects of Uruguayan independence: the ‘wombs law’ contained in 
the  declaration of independence from Brazil and enshrined in the principle of free birth in the  
constitution. Indeed, this would suit the long-established narrative of primary school official reading books, 
which holds that slavery was effectively abolished by the enlightened policy of the independence heroes 
because ‘the Motherland they created was not just for some class or caste. It was for whites and blacks’ as 
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befitted ‘a nation small by its size, but made exemplary by its institutions.’79 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the experiences of freedpeople (negros libertos, or simply libertos) suggests 
that their emancipation was not primarily a consequence of independent Uruguay’s policy. The vast majority 
of free blacks, including children, were free thanks to their own efforts, or that of their parents, rather than 
because of the new legal framework. If we focus on the sub-group of free blacks for whom we have a specific 
status descriptor in the enumerators’ books (condition or occupation), we can infer how they became free 
or how, after becoming free, they sustained their livelihoods (Graph .). 
The ‘freedom of the wombs’ policy had a relatively small effect: at most  of the free black people in 
the sample could be said to have benefitted from it. This was not only because the novel prohibition of 
enslavement at birth was ignored by some slave-owners, on which more shortly, but also because two-thirds 
of free black children were free because their parents were, and so did not owe the recognition of their 
freedom to the constitution. The new policy certainly had a favourable effect on emancipation, but the vast 
majority of freedpeople in the s would have been free anyway without it. 
Almost  out of  free blacks, then, became free through their own devices or those of their close 
family. Graph . reflects the ability of former slaves to re-insert themselves into the rural economy in a 
variety of roles, not only as wage labourers but also as independent producers, including family-based 
farming and even cattle-raising employing hired labour. It also testifies to the ability of early Uruguay’s rural 
society to incorporate them in new roles. This was entirely a bottom-up process: the Uruguayan government 
had no policy towards freedpeople, and their independent livelihoods were forged in a formal institutional 
context which was at best indifferent to their destiny. The social mobility experience of entrepreneurial 
former slaves who managed to become successful livestock producers is particularly revealing. Ignacio 
García, an African cattle farmer in Paysandú near the shores of the Uruguay river, employed two Uruguayan 
mulattoes and a freed African as labourers, and managed his ranch together with Manuel Carapé, a Guaraní 
foreman he hired; Matías Gómez, also a freedman, was included in the productive unit as a labrador 
agregado: an independent tiller who would collaborate with the main estancia during times of peak work 
and could in turn use some of the ranch’s tools and resources on his own plot.80 Freedpeople who, like 
Ignacio García, achieved a scale, as independent producers, that required them to employ extra-familial 
workers (and allowed them to afford it) resorted to a variety of methods for procuring labour within the 
range of institutional arrangements available in the labour-scarce Uruguayan countryside. It should be 
noted, however, that while there are many examples of freedpeople employing other free blacks in different 
roles, I could not find a single case where a former slave became themselves a slave-owner. 
 
79 Roberto Abadie Soriano and Humberto Zarrilli, eds., Democracia. Libro sexto de lectura. (Montevideo, ): 
. See also Verónica Leone, ‘Manuales escolares e imaginario social en el Uruguay del Centenario,’ in Los uruguayos 
del Centenario: Nación, ciudadanía, religión y educación (-), ed. Gerardo Caetano (Montevideo, ). 
80 MVD, AGA, Libro , ‘Padron de habitantes de Soriano y su jurisdiccion, ’, . 
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GRAPH 3.2. How did they become free? 
Condition or occupation of free black people in 16 Uruguayan rural districts, 1836 (N=322) 
 
Notes: ‘status’ categories are defined as follows: ‘wombs’ refers to children born of enslaved parents but who are recorded 
as free because of the constitutional ‘freedom of wombs’; ‘in free household’ refers to free children, siblings, and wives 
who are recorded as related to a household head (man or woman) who is free and has a recorded occupation; ‘employee’ 
refers to freedpeople who are dependent workers (labourers, foremen, etc); ‘producer’ refers to freedpeople who are 
independent producers (farmers, tenant farmers, ranchers, etc.). Age categories are arbitrary: ‘child’ ( years old or 
younger), ‘young’ (-), ‘mature’ (+). 
Sources: author’s calculations on the basis of surviving enumerators’ books for the districts of Mynas, Illescas, Chileno, 
Real de San Carlos, Rosario, Víboras, Colorado, Belastiquí, Piedras, Pando, Guadalupe, Coello, Soriano, Paysandú, 
Pantanoso, and Peñarol. See Table . for details on the primary sources. 
 
The still relatively open access to agricultural land in large parts of Uruguay certainly played an 
important part in many transitions out of slavery. But freedpeople could also make it as tenant farmers, 
particularly on the extremely fertile soils of the south where there was little free marginal land to move into. 
Marcel José Pintos and his wife Teresa, who had disembarked in Montevideo from Angola as slaves, were by 
 free tenant farmers in some of the most fertile land in Uruguay, in the Peñarol district north of the 
city.81 Teresa was explicitly recorded as a tenant farmer herself, but that was exceptional: the enumerators’ 
books tend to grossly underestimate the number of women who were farmers, as they were generally 
 
81 MVD, AGA, Libro , ‘a Manzana, ra Seccion de Extramuros, Peñarol, Padron del Año ’, . 
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recorded as ‘wife’ unless they were considered the head of family themselves (as was the case with widows). 
Women from other minority, subaltern groups, notably the Charrúa (‘native’ to the territory of Uruguay 
over at least several centuries), also managed to sustain independent rural livelihoods as smallholding 
farmers. Lucía Nieves, a single Charrúa young woman with six children aged between  and , was a 
smallholding tiller (chacarera) in the Chileno district of Durazno. In the context of a national historical 
imagination that still reconstructs the rural economy of the past as a largely male world, the economic 
activities of female producers in the aftermath of the independence wars deserve further exploration by 
economic and social historians. 
As freedpeople who became independent producers and hired others showed conclusively, rural slavery 
was not a necessary condition for market-oriented agriculture in early Uruguay. But it was certainly still 
profitable for masters. While we do not have the data necessary to compare the relative costs of enslaved and 
free labour (as the previous chapter did in the late-colonial context), we can infer that slave-owning 
remained an attractive proposition from the persistent importance of slaves for rural wealth: property in 
people still made up  of rural asset value across  full tax assessments I was able to read.82 We can also 
infer slave-owning remained a profitable business because masters refused to give it up. Despite the very 
clear constitutional ban on enslaving newborns after , more than  of black children under the age 
of seven were recorded as slaves in the enumerators’ books. Rural masters also found ways of getting around 
the constitutional ban that prohibited the transatlantic slave trade. Juan Dianobaitía, a white Uruguayan 
rancher in Soriano, had in his estancia five African children who were recorded by the enumerator in  
as ‘rural settlers’ (colonos de campo).83 This fiction of African ‘settlers’ or ‘colonists’ was used in the s by 
Montevidean and Rio de Janeiro-based slave-traders to avoid both Uruguay’s constitutional ban and the 
British persecution of slave ships.84 As these records show, this trick was also deployed by slaveowners in the 
Uruguayan countryside, despite how implausible it was to claim that African children had voluntarily come 
to Uruguay to settle as rural ‘colonists’ without any adults. The rhetorical gymnastics involved in a former 
settler colonial society, now a settler republic, labelling African children ‘settlers’ in order to sustain the 
afterlife of the slave trade could be the subject of further study by intellectual historians. 
 
 
 
82 I stress ‘able to read’: there are many more assessments in the archive but they are unfortunately illegible (at least 
by me and without access to more sophisticated technology), as in many of them the values were pencilled in and the 
handwriting has become too faint to read. MVD-AGA, ‘Planillas estadísticas de cada propiedad’ for Extramuros 
(Montevideo), Villa de San Pedro (Durazno), Garzón (Maldonado), and Castillos (Maldonado), Libros , , .  
83 They were four boys and one girl, all aged between  and ; their recorded ‘homeland’ (patria) was ‘Africa.’ 
MVD, AGA, Libro , ‘Padron de habitantes de Soriano y su jurisdiccion, ’, . 
84 Borucki, ‘African Colonists’. 
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2.3. Civil war and emancipation 
The decisive years for emancipation came during the decade that followed, which was entirely taken up by 
the longest civil war in Uruguayan history. This was no coincidence: emancipation advanced, slowly and 
unsteadily, not only during the successive cycles of political instability in Uruguay’s ‘lost decades’, but to a 
large extent because of them. This is true, from above, in a formal, institutional sense: had Uruguay remained 
either a Spanish colonial outpost or, which seemed more likely at the time, a Brazilian imperial province, 
the chronology of emancipation would have been different and its pace even slower. Slavery was only 
abolished in Brazil in , and in Cuba, one of the two Spanish colonies left in the continent, in .85 
Both Madrid and Rio de Janeiro opposed even gradual or partial abolition until the s, and there is 
nothing to suggest that either government would have felt differently about slavery in Uruguay had they 
retained imperial control of it.86 Indeed, when Uruguay was under Luso-Brazilian rule, slave trading started 
to flourish again in Colonia and Montevideo, and it is difficult to imagine that the numbers of slaves 
disembarked would have decreased so suddenly in the s if Uruguay had not become an independent 
state.87  
But there is also a second, more material sense in which the much-derided political instability of the 
‘lost decades’ contributed to emancipation from below, because slaves and former slaves found themselves 
quite literally on its front lines. Since the initial triumphs against Spanish colonial forces, revolutionary 
troops in the Banda Oriental had been heavily African and Afro-Uruguayan, a point that creole military 
leaders, unlike later historians, vividly remembered when they went from fighting Spain, Portugal, and 
 
85 Puerto Rico also remained a Spanish possession. A brief and insightful comparative analysis can be found in 
Ciro Flamarion Cardoso and Héctor Pérez-Brignoli, Historia económica de América Latina. Vol. II: Economías de 
exportación y economía capitalista (Barcelona, ): -. For the three main economic interpretations of the causes 
and timing of emancipation in Brazil, see: on slavery’s inefficiency relative to free immigrant labour, Florestan 
Fernandes, A revolução burguesa no Brasil: ensaio de interpretação sociológica (Rio de Janeiro, ); on abolitionist 
pressures and the organization of land and labour markets, Pedro Carvalho de Mello, A economia da escarvidão nas 
fazendas de café, - (Rio de Janeiro, ); and on the direct action of slaves, Warren Dean, Rio Claro: A 
Brazilian Plantation System, - (Stanford, ). On the course of emancipation in Cuba’s agricultural export 
economy, see, on changes in the organization of production, José A. Piqueras, ‘El capital emancipado: esclavitud, 
industria azucarera y abolición en Cuba,’ in Azúcar y eslcavitud en el final del trabajo forzado, ed. José A. Piqueras 
(Madrid, ), and, for an environmental perspective, Reinaldo Funes Monzote, ‘Tierras cansadas y quemadores de 
bagazo verde. La interacción con el medio natural y los cambios en la industria azucarera cubana desde mediados del 
XIX,’ in Azúcar y eslcavitud en el final del trabajo forzado, ed. José A. Piqueras (Madrid, ). 
86 On Brazil’s policy and the ‘second slavery’ in the late-nineteenth century, see Sidney Chalhoub, A força da escravidão: 
ilegalidade e costume no Brasil oitocentista (São Paulo, ): -. On the Spanish position on slavery, articulated from 
both Madrid and Havana, and its interaction with the protracted and gradual process of abolition in the island see, 
respectively, José A. Piqueras, La revolución democrática (-): cuestión social, colonialismo y grupos de presión 
(Madrid, ), and Rebecca Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, - (Pittsburgh, ). 
87 On the intensification, during those years, of long-standing Luso-Brazilian trade networks in Montevideo, see 
Fabrício Prado, Edge of Empire: Atlantic Networks and Revolution in Bourbon Rio de la Plata (Oakland, ): -. 
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Brazil to fighting each other in a long civil war: the Guerra Grande (-).88 In the midst of this 
conflict—which became international as Argentina’s own warring factions, Brazil’s regular army, and the 
British and French navies intervened—both Uruguayan sides declared the abolition of slavery and 
strengthened their armies with battalions of freedpeople.89 The wartime abolition of slavery had an 
additional fiscal benefit: the overriding military urgencies meant that slave-owners could be (and indeed 
were) denied compensation by both civil war parties with less political risk than a peacetime government 
would have faced.  
By the time the Guerra Grande ended, not only was slavery illegal and many former slaves were now 
free veterans, but also the war-struck livestock sector which had profited so richly from enslaved labour was 
not in a position to do so as it faced the deepest crisis in its history: Uruguayan cattle herds were reduced to 
. million animals in , down from a conservative estimate of . million in .90 With the short-
term demand for rural labour at its lowest, and the waning economic power of formerly large cattle- and 
slave-owners, the post-civil war governments found it less costly to honour the repeated political 
commitments to persecute slave trading and to uphold the newly declared freedom of former slaves. The 
Brazilian government took the new Uruguayan position on slavery so seriously that, immediately after the 
civil war ended in , it rushed to negotiate an extradition treaty with Montevideo to ensure that Brazilian 
slaves who fled south would be returned to their masters as fugitives, rather than granted freedom as 
Uruguayan slaves.91  
This section has argued that the ‘lost decades’ thesis fails to consider what political conflict and 
instability during and especially since independence meant to slaves and former slaves as a new and 
changing context in which to achieve freedom and economic autonomy. Through direct or indirect access 
to agricultural land (as independent cultivators as well as labourers or agregados) former slaves and their 
families carved out ways to sustain rural livelihoods as free people. Historically-minded political scientists 
 
88 On the erasure of black soldiers in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Uruguayan school textbooks, see 
Jens R Hentschke, ‘Artiguista, White, Cosmopolitan and Educated: Constructions of Nationhood in Uruguayan Textbooks 
and Related Narratives, –,’ JLAS  (). The contributions of Africans and their descendants to the 
revolutionary armies, or indeed to any other aspect of Uruguayan history beyond late-colonial slave-trading, are not 
mentioned in the most widely-read recent general history of Uruguay: Gerardo Caetano and José Pedro Rilla, Historia 
contemporánea del Uruguay: de la colonia al siglo XXI (Montevideo, ). The classic history of the long civil war is Juan 
E. Pivel Devoto and Alcira Ranieri, La guerra grande, - (Montevideo, ); for an English-language study see 
David McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal empire : Britain and the Republics of La Plata, - (London, ). 
89 Laws abolishing slavery were passed by each of the wartime governments in  and ; see, for a recent 
analysis, Borucki, Shipmates to Soldiers, -. For a series of fascinating vignettes on black soldiers’ paths to freedom, 
see Frega, ‘Patria’. 
90 Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, . 
91 On the politics of slavery, manumission, and re-enslavement along the mid-nineteenth century Brazil/Uruguay 
border see Keila Grinberg, ‘Slavery, manumission and the law in nineteenth-century Brazil: reflections on the law of 
 and the ‘principle of liberty’on the southern frontier of the Brazilian Empire,’ European Review of History—Revue 
européenne d'histoire ,  (). 
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often emphasise that Uruguay’s Guerra Grande ‘had enormous consequences for institution building,’ but 
strangely they do not include the effective end of slavery within those.92 As an economic institution, however, 
few changes could be more consequential, especially for a land-abundant agrarian economy. While the 
economics of rural slavery remained sound in Uruguay (wages were still high relative to the cost of land), 
its politics had become untenable, thanks chiefly to the prominent part played by slaves in the political 
instability of the mid-nineteenth century. As freedpeople had demonstrated before, and as we have shown 
through the quantitative analysis of the surviving enumerators’ books of , it was possible for former 
slaves to integrate themselves to early Uruguay’s rural economy in a variety of new roles and sustain 
independent livelihoods. Therefore, when slavery definitively lost its political support by , the existing 
economic opportunities in the countryside, and the ability of former slaves to make the most of them, meant 
that the transition could be completed without major conflicts, which is probably one reason why it has been 
almost entirely ignored by local historiography.93 
The end of physical coercion mattered greatly for the path Uruguay’s rural development would take 
thereafter. While social historians have emphasised the rise of vagrancy laws, the increased penalties for 
rustling cattle, the strengthening of the rural police, and the development of other legal tools to discipline 
the rural workforce from the s to the s, I do not think one could argue that these mechanisms were 
enough to water down the end of coercion.94 When livestock herds started to recover after , enslaved 
labour was no longer an option for medium or large producers, who had to focus on increasing the 
productivity of their abundant resource, leading to an increase in land values and ultimately to changes in 
tenure, notably the widespread physical definition of property rights over pastoral land for the first time in 
the country’s history in the s. For their part, crop farmers who wanted to achieve a certain scale had to 
rely increasingly on wage labour, as traditional systems of collaborative extra-familial labour (agregados) 
became increasingly rare after higher land prices pushed some family farmers off the land. The end of labour 
coercion was crucial in laying the groundwork for rural modernization: it came before—and contributed to 
shaping—substantial mid-century changes in the leading livestock sector, to which we now turn. 
  
 
92 The emphasis in this literature is on the creation of a party system based on a divide between the capital and the 
hinterland, rather than ‘the typical ideological split between conservatives and liberals over the church or free trade.’ 
Fernando López-Alves, State formation and democracy in Latin America, - (Durham, N.C ; London, ): 
-. See also Gerardo Caetano, José Rilla, and Romeo Pérez, ‘La partidocracia uruguaya. Historia y teoría de la 
centralidad de los partidos políticos,’ Cuadernos del CLAEH ,  (). 
93 Two recent exceptions, which also reflect on this historiographical neglect, are Alex Borucki, Karla Chagas, and 
Natalia Stalla, Esclavitud y trabajo: un estudio sobre los afrodescendientes en la frontera uruguaya (-) (Montevideo, 
) and Ana Frega, Alex Borucki, Karla Chagas, and Natalia Stalla, ‘Esclavitud y abolición en el Río de la Plata en tiempos 
de revolución y república,’ in La Ruta del Esclavo en el Río de la Plata: su historia y sus consecuencias (Montevideo, ). 
94 For a long-term overview of vagrancy laws in Uruguay, see Laura Vecinday Garrido and Florencia Thul, ‘Trabajo, 
pobreza y vagancia: Estrategias de control y coerción desde la colonia a nuestros días,’ Emancipação ,  (). 
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3 Changes in the land, 1850-1870 
If changes to the status of the agricultural labour force took a long time to develop since the beginning of 
the end of colonial rule in , patterns of land use in livestock agriculture were then transformed in less 
than twenty years by the fast recovery of cattle herds followed by the phenomenal rise of sheep-farming. 
These changes in the land affected almost all of Uruguay, with the exception of specialised crop-farming 
districts in Montevideo and Canelones, and laid the groundwork for the era of export-led growth under the 
First Globalization from the s onwards. Economic historians of Uruguay have long known these to be 
pivotal shifts for the country’s rural economy, but their broader implications for our understanding of ‘land-
abundant’ development paths in the global periphery remain largely unexplored. If examined under that 
lens, this story could also give us a chance to engage with some influential contributions to social science 
theory (including economics) that have shaped economic and social historiography in Latin America and 
beyond. The rest of this chapter aims to make a first step towards such an interpretation, by taking an 
environmental approach to the causes behind these developments in livestock agriculture as well as their 
short- and long-term impact. In particular, the following pages consider how cattle and sheep interacted in 
the agricultural export economy, and aim to put modernization theory and ‘vent-for-surplus’ approaches to 
the test in the context of Uruguay’s ‘sheep revolution’. 
 
3.1. Anatomy of a recovery 
After the long cycle of independence and civil wars ended, Uruguayan cattle herds grew at an astonishing 
pace, from the low point of . million animals in  to a new record of over  million by .95 The 
sector was environmentally primed for such a V-shaped recovery. Vast swathes of grassland had, by force of 
arms, been rested for the better part of a decade. Given ample food supplies and a series of consecutive years 
without any draughts, herds grew at a rate of over  per year. Fast-increasing cattle populations are often 
checked by disease in other contexts, but not in nineteenth-century Uruguay. Its extensively managed 
grazing lands, without winter stabling, made the spread of contagious illnesses much more difficult than in 
livestock systems which rely on animal confinement.96 This was not only due to avoiding interactions in 
closed spaces which increase the chances of transmitting disease, but also because even when foraging 
outdoors the distance between a cow and its grazing neighbour increases with the scale of the groups, which 
 
95 Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, ; Eduardo Acevedo, Anales históricos del Uruguay, vol. III (Montevideo, 
): . 
96 Contemporary cattle producers were well aware of this, as are, armed with much more comparative evidence, 
present-day life scientists; see, respectively, Domingo Ordoñana, ‘La mentira de las epizootias’, BN, Revista de la 
Asociación Rural, año VIII, n.,  January , -; ‘Zootecnia,’ in Pensamientos rurales sobre necesidades sociales y 
económicas de la República (Montevideo, ), and Phillips, Cattle Behaviour. 
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were large in Uruguay’s livestock sector.97 Herds of  or  thousand cattle spontaneously divided 
themselves in grazing ‘troops’ of ‘forty to one hundred’ animals, in an orderly fashioned which impressed 
Charles Darwin when he visited the country.98 
If these agricultural practices made fast recovery possible, they also placed an upper limit on the stock 
of cattle. As most paddocks were still unfenced, cows grazed with little human intervention beyond two 
weekly roundups, a method already well established in colonial times and discussed in that context in the 
previous chapter. While effective at keeping animals healthy with low labour costs, this system was extremely 
inefficient in its transformation of grass to protein. Cattle have well-defined foraging strategies, and will 
consistently choose to graze on more palatable grasses (tall, dense, dark-green pastures) if they are available, 
rather than making the most of every inch—including herbage close to their dung, which they prefer to 
avoid—before moving on to the next hectare, unless they are physically prevented from doing so.99 Given 
that there were approximately  million hectares of available grassland in mid-nineteenth century Uruguay, 
and each animal needed up to two hectares under these conditions of unfenced grazing management,  
million cattle was not only a record at the time, but also the environmental limit of that mode of ranching.100 
Despite their impressive reproductive performance over the s, cows would see, for the first time in 
two centuries, their spotlight hogged by another animal. In the decade that followed the fast recovery of 
cattle herds, sheep populations soared to reach  million. Until then only a marginal presence in the 
Uruguayan countryside, by  sheep outnumbered cattle for the first time—and have outnumbered them 
ever since.101 The triumph of sheep was also connected to New World political unrest, although not in 
South America. In the early s the US Civil War drove up the international prices for textile fibres, 
and producers across Uruguay responded enthusiastically by adopting Merino sheep (mostly bred from 
imported French animals) on an immense scale.102 Wool exports rose from , tonnes in  to over 
, tonnes in , and would remain amongst the top two Uruguayan export commodities until the 
 
97 As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, staying close together whilst feeding is an overriding 
concern for cattle, but larger groups keep more distance between each individual. M.I. Rind and Clive Phillips, ‘The 
effects of group size on the ingestive and social behaviour of grazing dairy cows,’ Animal Science ,  (). 
98 Charles Darwin, Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History of the Various Countries visited by 
HMS Beagle (Cambridge, []): -. 
99 Phillips, Cattle Behaviour, . 
100 José Pedro Barrán, Apogeo y crisis del Uruguay pastoril y caudillesco, - (Montevideo, ): . 
101 The wool boom started earlier, and developed more slowly, across the Plate in the Buenos Aires province, 
although Buenos Aires wool remained, according to European importers, of a lower quality than Uruguay’s. The 
development of sheep farming also was a longer process in other comparable temperate, land-abundant economies, 
such as Australia and New Zealand. See Sábato, Agrarian capitalism; Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, . 
102 The seminal interpretation remains Barrán and Nahum’s chapter ‘The triumph of sheep’ in the first volume of 
their Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, -, on which more below. 
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early twenty-first century.103 While the recovery of cattle in the s is seen by mainstream local 
historiography as the resurgence of the old, the ‘sheep revolution’ is depicted as the shock of the new.  
 
3.2. Sheep, pioneers of modernization? 
The conventional wisdom credits sheep with much. Besides the effects on growth of the well-documented 
export boom, the mainstream historiography argues that the expansion of sheep farming had far-reaching 
social and even psychological effects. In the book that in  coined the term ‘sheep revolution’ and first 
published most of the quantitative measures of it, Barrán and Nahum argued that  
the sheep eroded in the creole, bit by bit, his adventurous spirit and the lack of concern for 
his economic future that had characterised him until then. It ‘tied’ him to the land; and 
man, as shepherd or labourer, devoted himself to looking after it, he had to necessarily give 
up his traditional nomadism, settle in a place, look more favourably upon the prospect of 
starting a family, and reduce significantly the activities that brought unrest to the 
countryside: uprisings, rustling, banditry, etc.104   
Change, in this interpretation, had to come from the outside in a double sense: the demand for wool 
was external, fuelled by European textile factories; and the people in Uruguay who responded to it were also 
outsiders—entrepreneurial migrants (Basque, British, French, German) who formed a ‘small middle class’ 
of sheep farmers.105 In Barrán and Nahum’s view, which remains the core of the conventional wisdom on the 
subject, the culture of Uruguayan rural people was hostile to accumulation and constituted an obstacle to 
rational market-responsiveness.106 Against that background, the adoption of sheep-raising ‘implied framing 
the creole within a more modern social system, with different objectives, predominantly aimed towards 
production and the attainment of economic goals, [a system] which was essentially alien to the traditional 
creole community and mentality’ (my italics).107 While at first sight innocent of all theoretical discussion, 
 
103 Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, ; María Inés Moraes, La pradera perdida: historia y economía del agro 
uruguayo. Una visión de largo plazo, - (Montevideo, ): -. 
104 ‘La oveja le fue royendo al criollo poco a poco el espíritu aventurero y despreocupado por su futuro económico 
que lo había caracterizado hasta entonces. Lo “ató” al suelo; y el hombre como pastor-puestero o peón, se dedicó a 
cuidarlo, debió renunciar necesariamente a su tradicional nomadismo, afincarse en un lugar, mirar con mejor 
disposición la perspectiva de formar familia, y reducir en grado notorio las actividades que traían intranquilidad a la 
campaña: alzamientos, abigeo, matreraje, etc.’ Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, . 
105 Barrán and Nahum, ‘Rural History’, . 
106 For a critical balance of Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno and its dominant influence on Uruguayan 
historical and social-science scholarship, see Moraes, ‘Más que historia’. 
107 ‘implicaba el encuadramiento del criollo dentro de un sistema social más moderno, con otra finalidad, 
predominantemente dirigido hacia la producción y la obtención de objetivos económicos, que era esencialmente ajeno 
a la comunidad y la mentalidad criollas tradicionales.’ Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, . 
 
 
this influential interpretation was implicitly shaped by modernization theory: the notion that historical 
development hinges on the transformation of a ‘traditional’ society into a ‘modern’ one—the former defined 
by ‘an economic system run on non-economic motives’, where barter is moulded only by custom and 
command; the latter an unprecedented nineteenth-century invention, signalled by a self-regulating economic 
life, where production and exchange are organised under market mechanisms.108 Perhaps unknowingly, 
Barrán and Nahum’s account also takes up the substantivist position that anchors modernization theory in 
space as well as time, claiming that the rational, profit-maximizing, economic behaviour that characterises 
‘modern’ society was a specific cultural construct which was essentially alien to societies outside Europe, at 
least until Europeans forced their way in and imposed the market economy upon them.109 
Whereas Hopkins claims that modernization theory is ‘no longer even a distant memory for scholars 
today’, and substantivist interpretations have been relentlessly falsified in a range of historical contexts in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America,110 I would argue their influence is still felt in a way rather more subtle 
through the persistence of some key assumptions. In global economic history, the dominant institutionalist 
literature is increasingly focusing on long-term ‘cultural traits’ in order to explain why ‘good’ economic 
institutions were adopted in some places and not in others, setting societies in a path of ‘historical 
persistence’—an argument with more than a hint of modernization theory.111 Within Latin American 
economic history, modernization theory is still present not least in the default historiographical divide that 
starkly separates the history of the continent before and after c. as ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’, and which 
this dissertation, with its unusual periodization, deliberately traverses. Given its continued influence, let me 
briefly consider the merits of the modernization theory argument as it concerns the transformation of 
‘traditional’ creole mentalities and communities during the ‘sheep revolution’ in early Uruguay. 
The standard of the evidence Barrán and Nahum offer in support of this characterization of rural society 
is considerably less robust than their admirable reconstruction of the materiality of sheep farming itself and 
its impact on the export economy. The proof of the supposed modernization of the ‘mental habits’ of 
Uruguay’s rural population following the ‘sheep revolution’ rests solely on contemporary comment, mostly 
 
108 The most articulate and influential version of this thesis is Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, []); the quotation above is from page . 
109 Ibid., -. 
110 A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, second edition (London, ): -. For an overview of the 
economic history research that buried the central claims of The Great Transformation at least within the discipline 
itself, see Gareth Austin, ‘The Problem of "Embeddedness" and Global Economic History,’ Third Global Economic 
History Network Conference  (). 
111 For a survey of this literature by one of its pivotal authors, see Nathan Nunn, ‘Historical Development,’ in 
Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (Amsterdam, ). The use of World 
Value Surveys as a way to ‘measure’ cultural differences to then trace them back into history is particularly emblematic 
of this trend, while the idea of ‘good’ economic institutions is itself heavily value-laden. For a discussion of this literature 
from the perspective of Latin American economic history, see Chapter  of this dissertation. 
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by British observers ‘whose opinion is especially relevant because it comes from a foreigner’ (sic).112 John 
McColl, a Scotsman who became a successful rancher in Uruguay as well as a prolific writer, is cited more 
than any other: ‘foremost in the list of civilizing agents, sheep farming is destined to exert a powerful 
influence. The gaucho is already our most steady shepherd’ as ‘he is rapidly being weaned from his 
wandering habits, and made a useful member of society’.113 To be sure, similar opinions were also to be found 
among the Uruguayan elite. A large Uruguayan landowner writing in  and looking back on the 
achievements of the ‘sheep revolution’ was thrilled to announce that ‘we take part in the English axiom that 
sheep are the great universal settler. Thus we see Australia, New Zealand, the Cape of Good Hope, and even 
the River Plate modify their savage habits.’114  
The evidence of contemporary comment is certainly valid, but it must be assessed systematically or used 
in conjunction with other, independent sources, not least because it is always possible to find quotations—
even by the same people—supporting the opposite conclusion, namely that rural folk in Uruguay were very 
much concerned with the attainment of economic goals. Here is, for instance, the very same John McColl 
writing about Uruguayan ranching techniques: ‘the gauchos evidently had well studied the nature of the 
animal when they invented the plan now pursued for working cattle and subjecting them to the dominion 
of man. It has never been improved by the numerous foreigners who have turned their attention to the 
breeding of cattle, so that we may conjecture it to be the system best suited to the country.’115 But merely 
stacking quotation upon quotation cannot settle the issue. Even if we managed to ascertain which position 
predominated, the fact that contemporary elites, foreign or local, thought something was true does not make 
it so. It is after all unsurprising that elites thought that working people valued leisure over consumption or 
had no interest in accumulation; in fact, I believe it would be a reasonable hypothesis for sociological 
research that many in the Uruguayan elite continue to think that to this day. All in all, if modernization 
theory was on trial on the matter of Uruguay’s ‘sheep revolution’, a handful of selected quotations from elite 
men are not the strongest witnesses for the defence. 
Let me briefly introduce two testimonies for the prosecution. First to the stand is the structure of rural 
households in the wake of independence, decades before the ‘sheep revolution’. As Table . showed, the 
rural economy of early Uruguay was not based on the ‘adventurous spirit’ of semi-nomadic, individualistic 
men on horseback, but on family farming and on livestock agriculture reliant to a large extent on extra-
familial labour obtained through markets, with silver or gold being paid for labour time and, before the 
s, also for labourers in the case of enslaved workers. Our large sample of individual listings shows, if 
 
112 ‘y su opinión tiene especial relevancia por venir de un extranjero’ Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, ,  
113 John McColl, Life in the River Plate (London, ): . 
114 ‘participamos del axioma inglés de que la oveja es el gran colonizador universal. Así vemos a la Australia, Nueva 
Zelandia, El Cabo de Buena Esperanza y el Río de la Plata mismo modificar sus hábitos salvajes’ BN, Revista de la 
Asociación Rural, n.,  April , . 
115 McColl, Life in the River Plate, . 
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nothing else, that rural people were not idly waiting for a small entrepreneurial class of sheep farmers to 
appear in order to settle down and discover the benefit of following price signals. As the previous chapter 
argued in colonial context, the ‘nomadic’ livelihoods and ‘archaic’ economic values of rural people in the 
region have been overstated by mainstream historiography. If we acknowledge that most creole ‘gauchos’ 
had long been in fact peasants whose families had access to land, settled there, and engaged in market-
oriented as well as subsistence agriculture, then the mission civilisatrice of sheep appears much less 
formidable. My second witness are sheep numbers themselves: if the adoption of the Merino was so rapid 
and enthusiastic across Uruguay that in ten years almost all provinces—including those with few foreign 
producers—had at least half a million sheep more than before, then rural creole culture was not insensitive 
to economic opportunity in the first place.116 Therefore, the new wool economy did not bring about the 
cultural modernization of the Uruguayan countryside in the sense of encouraging a new economic 
rationality, either substantially different or more dominant over cultural preferences than it had been before. 
This is different from a more concrete and everyday sense of modernization as a set of material 
conditions for expanded capital accumulation or physical infrastructure—what Uruguayan political 
discourse thought of in the nineteenth century as ‘progress’ and now calls ‘development’.117 And in this sense, 
the ‘sheep revolution’ certainly did make major contributions. Sheep are, first of all, capital goods in their 
own right, and their joint exploitation with cattle allowed many producers (mid-sized as well as big) to 
effectively capitalise and up-scale their ranches by substantially increasing their stocking density (i.e. 
livestock units in a given grazing area).118 Secondly, wool offered another pastoral ‘cash-crop’ for Uruguay’s 
export economy and for the Uruguayan state to tax, overcoming a long-standing dependence on leather and 
salted beef and thereby strengthening the prospects for sustained growth.119 Third, because sheep farming 
required more labour than cattle-raising, the ‘sheep revolution’ also created new economic opportunities in 
the countryside as well as new occupations (notably shearers), and so encouraged immigration flows which 
made Uruguay’s tiny population the fastest-growing in Latin America.120 Fourth, sheep made marginal 
drylands in the north and north-east increasingly valuable, and hence laid the groundwork for the transport 
infrastructure that came in the following decades: wool freights became crucial for the bottom line of railway 
companies, and without them the network, one of the densest in Latin America by any measure, would have 
 
116 Estimates of variation in livestock herd composition at the province level are presented in Graph .. below. 
117 I am aware that these terms, like ‘modernization’ itself, are political constructs and have a history of their own, but I 
would argue they still have a concrete material grounding. An excursion into the growing sub-field of Uruguayan conceptual 
history falls beyond the scope of the this dissertation, but see Gerardo Caetano, ed. Historia conceptual. Voces y conceptos de 
la política oriental (-) (Montevideo, ); Gerardo Caetano, La república batllista (Montevideo, ). 
118 Moraes, ‘Capitalismo pastor’, . 
119 Barrán and Nahum, Agricultura, -. 
120 On the changes in work routines and employment opportunities, see the succinct but insightful analysis by 
Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, -. On Uruguayan population growth in this period in Latin American 
context, see Sánchez-Albornoz, ‘Population’, -. 
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been considerably less extensive than it was.121 And finally, wool production created a limited but still 
substantial demand for modern machinery (such as mechanical shearers) as well as linkages for the 
development of Uruguay’s light manufacturing industry in the early-twentieth century.122 
The ‘sheep revolution’, therefore, contributed decisively to the development of rural capitalism, as 
explicitly argued in the s by Millot and Bertino, revising Barrán and Nahum’s interpretation.123 
However, I would argue this was less because with sheep-raising ‘the market economy advanced over the 
subsistence economy’, but rather because it made agricultural land (and especially less fertile pastures) much 
more valuable.124 If the demise of slavery charted in the previous section laid the groundwork for the labour 
market of the late-nineteenth century, the ‘sheep revolution’ expanded the geographical reach of the 
capitalist land market and created new incentives to physically define property rights over grazing land and 
not just over the animals standing on it. 
 
3.3. ‘Vent-for-surplus’, short-term trade-offs, and long-term legacy 
For such an impressive economic transformation, Uruguay’s ‘sheep revolution’ has been remarkably under-
theorised, even if, as we just saw, there are many unacknowledged assumptions behind its mainstream 
interpretation. The exception is the work by María Inés Moraes which uses the concept of ‘technological 
trajectory’, drawn from evolutionary economics, to explain the rise of sheep farming in connection to later 
agricultural innovations on Uruguay’s grasslands: the wire-fencing of paddocks in the s and the 
crossbreeding of cattle since the mid-s, which the next chapter explores in detail.125 Moraes estimated 
 
121 As late as , wool represented more than half of the total cargo loaded in almost  of Uruguayan railway 
stations. This and other calculations based on the returns of railway companies are presented in the next chapter. I published 
an earlier version in Emiliano Travieso, ‘Railroads and Regional Economies in Uruguay, c. ,’ RUHE VII,  (). 
122 Chapter  discusses the prospects and limits of structural change and light industrialization in Uruguay during the 
First Globalization. On the historical development of Uruguay’s woollen textile industry, see María Camou and Silvana 
Maubrigades, ‘The evolution of the Uruguayan textile industry,’ in The Ashgate Companion to the History of Textile Workers, 
-, ed. Lex Heerma van Voss, Els Hiemstra-Kuperus, and Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk (Farnham, ). 
123 Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, -. In fact, Barrán and Nahum themselves acknowledged, elsewhere 
in the same volume cited above, that the sheep revolution ‘had all the characteristics of the classical ‘booms’ observed 
in capitalist economies.’ (‘Lo que hemos llamado el triunfo del ovino en la década del  tuvo todas las características 
de los “booms” clásicos de las economías capitalistas ya maduras.’) Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, . 
124 ‘La economía mercantil avanzó sobre la de subsistencia.’ Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, . Rising land 
prices were carefully documented by Barrán and Nahum: they preceded the expansion of sheep but were sustained by 
them after the initial boom following the recovery of cattle herds in the s. See Lynch, ‘River Plate’, ; José Pedro 
Barrán and Benjamín Nahum, Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno. Tomo II: La crisis económica, - (Montevideo, 
): ; Historia social de las revoluciones de  y  (Montevideo, ): ; La civilización ganadera bajo Batlle 
(-) (Montevideo, ): . 
125 Moraes, Pradera, -. The seminal article on technological trajectories within the sub-field of evolutionary 
economics is Giovanni Dosi, ‘Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories: A Suggested Interpretation of 
the Determinants and Directions of Technical Change,’ Research Policy ,  (). 
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that total factor productivity in Uruguayan pastoral agriculture between  and  grew considerably 
faster than in Argentina, Canada or the United States, and argued that the technical innovations which made 
that possible had started earlier, with the large-scale adoption of Merino sheep in the s and, in 
particular, the development of mixed grazing (i.e. cows and sheep being raised together on the same plots 
of land).126 
More recently, and despite the fact that Moraes’s estimates of rising productivity remain uncontested, 
several works in the specialist scholarship have pointed at the ‘vent-for-surplus’ (VFS) model to explain 
Uruguay’s export-led growth, starting with the ‘sheep revolution’, and used it as a stepping stone for their 
arguments.127 The VFS approach was developed by Hla Myint from his reading of Adam Smith’s intuition 
that the export economy can contribute to development in two ways: through encouraging productivity 
increases (resulting from a greater division of labour), and, alternatively, providing a ‘vent’ for the produce 
of surplus land and labour that were idle before the opening of trade because of the narrowness of the 
domestic market.128 Since Myint’s seminal article, development economists have formalised different 
versions of VFS to explain or evaluate processes of fast agricultural change in developing regions driven by 
external demand.129 While it would be difficult to claim that ‘vent-for-surplus’ applies in its strongest sense 
to late-nineteenth century Uruguay—because that would need both surplus land and labour, and the latter 
was in short supply to begin with—there is an argument to be made that it applied to land. In the comparative 
literature, Uruguay has been, like neighbouring Argentina, held up as an example of a Latin American path 
of development ‘locked into a natural resource “vent-for-surplus.”’130 Therefore, and even if no study has 
systematically examined to what extent VFS fits Uruguay’s ‘sheep revolution’ (or the country’s export-led 
growth in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries more generally), the theory could eventually be 
declared the winner by default. Let us consider it more carefully. 
 
126 Moraes, ‘Capitalismo pastor’, . 
127 Henry Willebald, ‘Are institutions the whole story? Frontier expansion, land quality and ownership rights in 
the River Plate, -,’ in Agricultural Transformation in a Global History Perspective, ed. Ellen Hillbom and Patrick 
Svensson (London, ); Luis Bértola and Gabriel Porcile, ‘Cambio estructural y crecimiento en el Río de la Plata y 
Australasia,’ in Primos ricos y empobrecidos: crecimiento, distribución del ingreso e instituciones en Australia-Nueva 
Zelanda vs Argentina-Uruguay, ed. Jorge Álvarez, Luis Bértola, and Gabriel Porcile (Montevideo, ); Henry 
Willebald and Javier Juambeltz, ‘Land frontier expansion in settler economies, –: was it a Ricardian process?,’ 
in Agricultural Development in the World Periphery. A Global Economic History Approach, ed. Vicente Pinilla and Henry 
Willebald (); Sandonato and Willebald, ‘Natural Capital’. 
128 Hla Myint, ‘The "Classical Theory" of International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries,’ The Economic 
Journal ,  (). 
129 See the references given in Gareth Austin, ‘Explaining and Evaluating the Cash Crop Revolution in the 
“Peasant” Colonies of Tropical Africa, ca. –ca.: Beyond “Vent for Surplus”,’ in Africa's Development in 
Historical Perspective, ed. Emmanuel K. Akyeampong, et al. (New York, ). 
130 Cristóbal Kay, ‘Why East Asia overtook Latin America: agrarian reform, industrialisation and development,’ 
Third World Quarterly ,  (). 
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An expansion of export agriculture is accomplished, in the ‘natural resource’ version of VFS, by bringing 
previously idle land into production. This is distinct from reallocating existing agricultural land to more 
profitable use in that there are no trade-offs: the expansion of the ‘endogenous land frontier’ shifts the limits 
of the production function, without the opportunity costs which would result from diverting resources from 
other activities.131 I think this is a falsifiable proposition in the case of Uruguay’s wool boom: if the rapid 
expansion of sheep in the s was fundamentally a ‘vent’ for the produce of surplus land, then there should 
have been no trade-offs in terms of available pasture for other livestock. Graph . shows this was not the 
case across much of Uruguay, particularly in the provinces with the better soils for fast grass growth, proxied 
by their long-term suitability for rain-fed, low-input agriculture. 
Provinces under the dotted line in Graph . saw a decrease in their stock of cattle over the s, even 
if in the cases which led the wool boom, such as Colonia and San José, the growth in the stock of sheep more 
than compensated for it in the total of livestock available. Because sheep and cattle get along well on the 
grazing range (sheep give way to cows), have different foraging preferences (short and long grasses 
respectively), and do not mind eating near the other species’ dung, they are often thought as complementary 
in mixed grazing systems.132 But there are limits to that complementarity, because both species ultimately 
consume the same finite (albeit renewable) resource, and trade-offs do emerge in environmental settings 
which, like large parts of Uruguay, can profitably accommodate both species. Adopting mixed grazing also 
entailed taking on new managerial challenges and risks, as raising an animal one has not worked with before 
is a process of trial and error, especially so when it implies finding the right balance between species.133 
Getting the herd composition wrong can lead to over-production (weaning too many calves and lambs), 
resulting in weak animals which amounts not only to the ranching equivalent of a bad harvest but also to 
continued capital losses, as poorly fed cows and ewes have a much higher chance of suffering pregnancy 
losses. The province of Florida became notorious for this in the late s, as our evidence demonstrates in 
Graph .. In the words of Florida’s top government official, the origin of these losses were ‘immediately 
linked to the poor quality of the grasses, which, born too late, have not yet acquired the maturity necessary 
for nourishment’ (his emphasis).134 Increased animal competition for resources within the estancias 
(especially forage but also drinking water and preferred spots to rest) was intensified in the winter, when 
grass growth was slower and overgrazing prevented it from reaching maturity. A committee of experts 
appointed by the Uruguayan Rural Association in response to a government request concluded that it was 
 
131 A recent, formalized version of such a model can be found in Ronald Findlay and Mats Lundahl, ‘Natural 
Resources, “Vent-for-Surplus” and the Staples Theory,’ in The Economics of the Frontier, ed. Ronald Findlay and Mats 
Lundahl (London, ). 
132 Phillips, Cattle Behaviour, -. 
133 Barrán and Nahum, Crisis, -. 
134 ‘el origen de la enfermedad se halla inmediatamente ligado con la mala calidad de los pastos que nacidos 
estemporáneamente, no han adquirido el estado de sazonamiento y madurez necesarios para la alimentación’. BN, 
Revista de la Asociación Rural, n.,  July , . 
 
 
the effect such competition had on pastures, and not any sort of diseases transmitted from sheep to cattle or 
within cattle herds themselves, which was to blame for a reduction in the stock of cattle across most of the 
Uruguayan countryside.135 
 
GRAPH 3.3. Was the ‘sheep revolution’ a vent for surplus land? 
Variation in sheep and cattle in 1862-1872 by province (in thousands of livestock units) 
Provinces classified by their estimated suitability for rainfed, low-input agriculture 
 
Notes: Montevideo (with very few livestock) is excluded and some provinces are not labelled to prevent overcrowding 
in the figure. Conversion of sheep and cattle to livestock units based on feed requirements, following the coefficient 
developed by INIA, Revisión for Uruguayan agriculture ( sheep = . cow). Suitability refers to the average suitability 
of soils for rainfed, low input agriculture based on the FAO-GAEZ index (-): ‘low’ = mean suitability index 
below ; ‘moderate’ between  and , ‘high’ between  and , ‘very high’ above .  
Sources: livestock by province: for  from Acevedo, Anales III, ; for  calculated from national totals taken 
from Vaillant, El Uruguay, , and allocated to provinces according to the tax returns published in Acevedo, Anales 
III, . Data on suitability for rainfed low-input agriculture taken from FAO-GAEZ (Fischer et al., Global Agro-
ecological Zones) and average for each province calculated using ArcGIS zonal statistics tool.  
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Looking above the dotted line in Graph ., the provinces which saw a growth in the stock of both 
species over the s were those with areas of less fertile soils where natural grass growth was not enough 
to sustain large cattle herds, such as Paysandú and Durazno. Therefore, it seems that while sheep could graze 
on marginal land in some places, their presence in the countryside was not without its trade-offs across 
much of Uruguay. The only province with extremely fertile soils which did not see a significant shift away 
from cattle as a result of the adoption of sheep was Canelones, the largest cereal and vegetable producer, an 
exceptional region where cattle-raising was already marginal before the ‘sheep revolution’.  
The wool boom could only be accomplished by reallocating pastureland to the benefit of sheep, which 
came with an opportunity cost for cattle-raising, traditionally the leading branch of Uruguay’s livestock 
agriculture. The expansion in wool output was led by regions where pastures were already commercially 
grazed, as shown by the trade-offs in the stock of cattle and sheep. Even if the ‘sheep revolution’ occurred 
with very limited technological change, it relied less on the expansion of an endogenous land frontier than 
on a reallocation of resources to allow for specialization in a new animal and a new commodity in response 
to the demands of external markets. In this sense, and going back to the Smithian origins of vent-for-surplus, 
it was more a case of external demand for wool encouraging Uruguay’s rural economy ‘to improve its 
productive powers’ rather than just giving ‘value to its superfluities’.136 There was still some surplus land 
from the perspective of market-oriented livestock production in  (though not nearly as much as in 
other settler economies at the time), but it was not enough to bring about a ‘sheep revolution’.  
Notwithstanding its trade-offs, then, the wool boom implied an extraordinary aggregate increase in 
rural assets, to the tune of about . million livestock units. It also provided individual producers, and the 
economy as a whole, with a new annual ‘cash-crop’ and offered much-needed insurance against extreme 
climate events: while temperate-zone cows (Bos taurus) tolerate excess rain much better than dry spells, 
sheep are very resilient to droughts. But diversification and insurance came at a cost. Since the s, 
Uruguay’s rural economy needed to sustain two species, rather than only one, to produce its two major 
export commodities. This was not the case in other small successful livestock economies, such as New 
Zealand, which obtained its two top export staples from the same animal.137 
Anthropogenic pressure on land, therefore, increased significantly: the wool boom was responsible for 
the largest and most durable intensification of human land use in Uruguay’s long-nineteenth century. It was 
accomplished on extensive as well as intensive fronts. In much of the north, notably the provinces of 
Paysandú and Salto, the area under constant grazing was expanded; in south-western Colonia and San José 
more livestock units were raised per unit of agricultural land. The result was a much higher stocking density 
overall: according to Moraes’s estimates, while Uruguayan pastures had, by , a rate of about . livestock 
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units per hectare, by  it had raised to ..138 That trend became a secular one and the ‘sheep revolution’ 
revealed itself, in hindsight, as a structural transformation, not a mere conjuncture produced by high 
international prices for wool. Its impacts can now be traced in the long-term ecological record and are visible 
in the present-day landscape. Life scientists have shown that the introduction of sheep and, with them, a 
new grazing regime induced ‘prairie regression’—the third and (at least until now) final stage in the 
evolution of the Uruguayan grasslands, characterised by a loss of soil biological productivity and a series of 
floristic changes resulting in an increase in the proportion of non-grass plant species in the sward.139 
 
4 Conclusion 
As late as , two decades after the Spanish were defeated, a fifth of Uruguay's agricultural workforce was 
enslaved. Livestock farming remained, as in the late-colonial period, dominated by cattle; the export 
economy still depended solely on leather, jerky, and tallow. By  rural slavery had disappeared and cows 
now had to share the grassland with over twenty million sheep, who made wool a mainstay of Uruguay's 
agricultural export economy. These two economic and social transformations redefined the opportunities 
and the limits for productive strategies in rural Uruguay, and they did so at a critical historical juncture, just 
in time before the late-nineteenth century boom in the terms of trade for agricultural commodities. Unless 
we overthink the issues at play, it seems also clear that these were fundamentally positive changes from the 
point of view of long-term development, both in the sense of an expansion of productive forces and of 
human welfare. The decades that ushered in such transformations cannot be seen in any meaningful way as 
‘lost time’ for economic development or for economic historians. 
Besides using Uruguay's example to challenge the ‘lost decades’ thesis in relation to Latin American 
economic history, this chapter has aimed to make two contributions to the specialist literature on Uruguayan 
long-term rural development. First, it relied on a set of newly transcribed enumerators’ books to establish 
the scale and characteristics of rural slavery and emancipation in early-independent Uruguay. The volatile 
social and political context was also explored in some detail, especially when accounting for the cautious 
policy towards slavery that characterised political leaders from the start of the independence revolution 
() to the end of the ‘Great Civil War’ (). Second, it reassessed the historical evidence for the s 
‘sheep revolution’ to test two approaches from social science theory which have been implicitly or explicitly 
 
138 María Inés Moraes, ‘Las determinantes tecnológicas e institucionales del desempeño ganadero en el largo plazo, 
-’ (Universidad de la República, ), . One livestock unit equals the feeding requirements of an adult cow. 
139 Daniel Panario and Mario Bidegain, ‘Climate change effects on grasslands in Uruguay,’ Climate Research  (): 
; M Oesterheld, OE Sala, and SJ McNaughton, ‘Effect of animal husbandry on herbivore-carrying capacity at a regional 
scale,’ Nature ,  (); Paruelo et al., ‘Grasslands’, -. To gain a layman’s understanding of the main message 
from this specialist life sciences literature, I relied on definitions presented in S.P. Cuttle, ‘Impacts of Pastoral Grazing on 
Soil Quality,’ in Environmental Impacts of Pasture-based Farming, ed. Richard W. McDowell (Wallingford, ), 
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used to explain it: ‘modernization theory’ and ‘vent-for-surplus’. Environmental trade-offs in particular were 
brought into focus, emphasising the limits to the complementarity of cattle and sheep in low-input, 
extensively managed grazing. 
While Uruguayan historiography has long acknowledged the far-reaching impacts of the ‘sheep 
revolution’, the conventional wisdom is very much mistaken in thinking of it as ‘the first change to the 
economic structure of the countryside since the colonial period.’140 The slow and unsteady process of 
emancipation, led by the economic initiative and military involvement of slaves and former slaves 
themselves, came before the wool boom and was as structural as a change can be. Uruguay’s modern export 
agriculture was built upon free labour as well as mixed grazing, and both those systems prevailed against 
their alternatives during the so-called ‘lost decades’. Thinking about the causal connections between those 
two processes, while bearing in mind their different chronology, remains a task for future research. 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
140 ‘el afianzamiento de la explotación del ovino significó la primera modificación de la estructura económica rural 
desde el coloniaje.’ Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, . 
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As export-led growth took off in most of Latin America in the s, the livestock economy remained 
Uruguay’s growth engine. On the backs of rising prices for beef and wool—lucky tickets in the ‘commodity 
lottery’ of the day—real wages in Uruguay (and Argentina) were, in , three times higher than in 
Mediterranean Europe.1 Immigrants from across the Atlantic showed up in numbers: relative to the 
population, more than in the United States.2 Canned and frozen beef overtook cowhides and jerky as export 
staples, signalling both the successful transition from ‘pre-modern’ to industrial livestock production and 
the continued dependence on agricultural exports. Despite fast technological change in some key industries 
and large-scale immigration concentrated in towns, Uruguay remained a predominantly rural society and 
agriculture still employed more people than any other sector. A new country in many ways, its comparative 
advantage remained tied to the soils of the natural grasslands, which were by then already becoming 
degraded. 
While Montevideo became a cosmopolitan city, redrawn with electricity and coal (trams and 
streetlights, cranes and steamships),3 the countryside was also bustling with change, perhaps less spectacular 
but just as consequential. The traditional technology of property rights, branding livestock or notching their 
ears, continued to be widely used, but now the land on which the animals stood was also increasingly 
marked. Imported steel wire was the tool of the enclosures that in the s physically divided agricultural 
land in Uruguay (as it still does). Land became economically more valuable and institutionally less 
accessible, reshaping the ways capital could be profitably invested and the opportunities available for labour. 
The two following chapters deal with this period, and its new ‘spatial code’ for rural development, in a 
thematic rather than chronological fashion. Chapter  focuses on landholding and technical innovation, 
exploiting regional variation in cattle crossbreeding rates to take up the long-running debate about the role 
of latifundia in the development of Latin American agrarian capitalism. Chapter  reconstructs the world of 
work from census and birth records’ data, and uses its new workforce estimates to discuss the nature of and 
the limits to rural-based economic development in Uruguay in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century.
 
1 Jeffrey G Williamson, ‘Real wages, inequality and globalization in Latin America before ,’ RHE , S (). 
2 Blanca Sánchez Alonso, ‘The other Europeans: immigration into Latin America and the international labour 
market (–),’ RHE ,  (). 
3 Alfonso Labraga, Mario Núñez, Ana María Rodríguez Ayçaguer, and Esther Ruiz, Energía y política en el Uruguay 
del siglo XX. Tomo I: del carbon al petróleo (Montevideo, ): ; BN, Sala Uruguay, ohe.m.t.., Junta 
Económico-Administrativa de Montevideo, La tracción eléctrica. Discusión y negociado de la concesión otorgada, 
Montevideo: Imprenta a vapor de la Nación, . 
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chapter four 
Latifundia and Agricultural Innovation  
in the First Globalization * 
 
 
The idea that latifundia (very large, privately owned agricultural landholdings) dominated the Latin 
American countryside and stifled its development ever since colonial times was widespread in history and 
the social sciences in the s and s, and has since been rekindled by the new institutional economics 
and, more recently, ‘path dependence’ literatures.1 Economic historians have done much in recent years to 
question the perception of a long-term, persistent pattern of concentrated land tenure in the continent 
stretching back to the colonial period, stressing variation in ownership structures across Latin America and 
changes to asset inequality through time.2 But while the global debate on the impacts of large estates on 
agricultural productivity and innovation extends to other world regions as well, latifundia remain strongly 
associated with Latin America’s economic past in popular historical imagination.3  
However, as we have seen in Chapter , latifundia were not an overwhelming force in late-colonial 
Uruguay, as most free people could access a plot of their own. We encountered them again in Chapter , 
when the livestock sector recovered from the cycle of civil wars and was transformed by the ‘sheep 
revolution’ in the context of the slow demise of slavery. Access to land was becoming more restricted then, 
and very extensive estates started to loom larger. During the First Globalization, when tenant farmers first 
outnumbered peasants as Chapter  will show, large landowners in Uruguay became richer and more 
 
* A shorter version of this chapter is in R&R with the Economic History Review. I thank the two anonymous reviewers 
for their many useful suggestions and Giovanni Federico, editor in charge of the manuscript, for his insightful comments. 
I published an earlier version of the railway data presented in Map . during the first year of my PhD (Travieso, ‘Railroads’) 
so I would also like to thank RUHE’s anonymous reviewers and its editor, Henry Willebald, for their suggestions. 
1 These strands of literature were critically surveyed in Chapter . For a summary of the scholarship on latifundia 
as the root of the relative backwardness of Latin American agriculture, see Marc Edelman, The Logic of the Latifundio: 
The Large Estates of Northwestern Costa Rica Since the Late Nineteenth Century (Stanford, ): -. 
2 For an overview, see Bértola and Ocampo, Economic Development, -. For an example of the new 
quantitative estimates on long-term inequality in Latin America, see Arroyo Abad, ‘Persistent inequality?’. 
3 The first definition of ‘latifundia’ in the Oxford English Dictionary distils the image: ‘large farms, large plantations 
in Latin America.’ For an insightful assessment of the global debate on latifundia and economic development, see 
Giovanni Federico, Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture, - (Princeton, ): -.  
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powerful than ever before. In times and places in Latin American history such as this one where latifundia 
did dominate the landscape, questions on their consequences for economic development are still difficult to 
answer. The conventional wisdom that haciendas (as they mostly were known in Mexico, Central America, 
and northern and Pacific-coast South America), fazendas (in Brazil), and estancias (in the River Plate) were 
defined by an inherently irrational and inefficient allocation of resources has been disproven by 
microeconomic studies which have shown them to be responsive to market opportunities, but their overall 
impact on technical progress and long-term development remains elusive.4 Were latifundia obstacles to 
agrarian capitalism or main sites for its development? Did they strengthen or limit the productivity of 
agriculture and its ability to adopt key innovations?  
Economic historians have long debated the part played by latifundia in Latin American development, 
particularly during periods of ‘transition to capitalism’ or ‘modernization’. Exploiting cross-sectional 
variation across Uruguayan rural districts in the First Globalization, this chapter maps and measures the 
effects of farm sizes on innovation in a small and relatively prosperous agricultural export economy 
dominated by livestock production. The results suggest that, where their environments proved equally 
favourable, areas with different landholding patterns improved the genetic makeup of their cattle herds at 
similar rates: latifundia were not, as a rule, any more or less likely to invest in agricultural innovation. Farm 
sizes did correlate negatively with output per acre, as predicted by the ‘inverse relationship’ thesis, but this 
resulted from the effect scale had on specialization in pastoral or arable farming, rather than from differences 
in the adoption of productivity-enhancing technology. Contrary to what traditional scholarship argued, 
latifundia were neither a structural obstacle nor a historical necessity for the rise of modern agrarian 
capitalism in Uruguay, even if they shaped its regional specialization patterns as well as its distributional 
outcomes.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section  reviews the specialist historiography on the 
rise of agrarian capitalism and ‘rural modernization’ in Uruguay, and considers its empirical and conceptual 
limitations. Section  maps agricultural production and landholding in Uruguay towards the end of the First 
Globalization, and shows that geographical variation at the district level can be exploited to measure some 
of the effects of latifundia on the agrarian economy. Reconstructing the location and freight profile of all 
railway stations, it also considers regional specialization and describes the spatial dispersion of livestock 
rearing when compared to crop farming. Section  uses the new district-level dataset to explore the effect of 
estate sizes and soil quality on cattle crossbreeding; a series of control variables are included, and measures 
of spatial autocorrelation are reported and discussed. Section  relies on this new evidence to argue that 
 
4 Key studies for the two largest Spanish American countries are Alan M. Taylor, ‘Latifundia as Malefactor in 
Economic Development? Scale, Tenancy and Agriculture on the Pampas,’ Research in Economic History,  () and 
Simon Miller, Landlords and Haciendas in Modernizing Mexico: Essays in Radical Reappraisal (Amsterdam, ). 
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districts characterised by larger landholdings were not, as a rule, any more or less likely to invest in this 
productivity-enhancing innovation, whereas soil quality had a positive effect on crossbreeding rates 
regardless of a district’s average farm or ranch sizes. Landholding patterns did affect agricultural 
specialization: areas with larger estates were more likely to specialise in ranching, with higher labour 
productivity and lower land productivity than cropping, and this scale-output relationship prevailed across 
many geographical settings. Section V concludes by arguing that latifundia did not define the extent of 
agrarian capitalism, nor of technical progress: environmental factors, rather than the size of farms and 
ranches, explain regional differences in the adoption of agricultural innovation.  
 
1 Context and debates 
Focusing on the Uruguayan case brings a pastoral twist to the latifundia debate. Farm (or, more 
appropriately, ranch) sizes in commercial extensive grazing are much larger than in arable agriculture, as a 
result of the comparatively low levels of output per acre in livestock rearing, which makes great estates a 
more dominant feature of a pastoral landscape. Arguments on the part played by latifundia in long-term 
economic development (either as an institutional obstacle, a ‘historical necessity’, or large and efficient firms) 
can, therefore, be usefully tested against the experience of technological adoption in a Latin American rural 
economy dominated by ranching. This chapter aims to contribute to the literature on latifundia and the 
transition to agrarian capitalism in three ways: by reviewing Uruguayan historiography on ‘rural 
modernization’ in the context of Latin American economic history; by describing the geography of agrarian 
production and estate sizes in Uruguay towards the end of the First Globalization; and by measuring the 
effects of estate sizes on the key technological transformation in Uruguayan agriculture (the improvement 
of cattle herds through systematic crossbreeding) at the district level using a new spatially-explicit dataset 
based on an agricultural census, historical maps, and other primary sources.  
Uruguay makes for a good site to revisit the debate on latifundia and innovation for two additional 
reasons. First, because it was rich by regional and global standards during the First Globalization: in  
Uruguayan per capita GDP was the second-highest in Latin America (behind Argentina) and in the top  
in world incomes.5 Second, because Uruguay was unusual among prosperous settler economies in not 
having access to an open agricultural frontier. The American West, Canada’s prairie frontier, the Argentine 
south, New Zealand’s North Island, and the Australian outback all allowed for ‘new’ (from the perspective 
of settlers) land to be brought into pasture in the late-nineteenth century. If despite a closed frontier Uruguay 
managed to maintain high and rising living standards in the context of a tripling of its population during 
 
5 Bolt et al., ‘Rebasing “Maddison”’. 
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the decades of mass migration before , it was thanks to a productivity breakthrough in export 
agriculture, dominated by livestock production, which accounted during this period for more than a third 
of GDP and over  of exports.6 Productivity gains in Uruguayan ranching during the First Globalization 
resulted from increased stocking densities and from improvements in the composition of the herds 
themselves. These gains were achieved through three interrelated major changes that proceeded throughout 
the period: the increasing adoption of mixed grazing, the effective enclosure of rangeland, and the systematic 
crossbreeding of domestic cattle with foreign (particularly British) purebreds. As these processes were 
uneven across space, the geography of livestock production can reveal much of interest not only about 
regional inequalities in Uruguay, but also, given that average estate sizes varied widely across the country, 
about the impact of ownership structures and other variables on the propensity to innovate. 
Establishing when, how, and to what extent (analytically and geographically) the Uruguayan 
countryside became ‘capitalist’ or ‘modern’ has been the subject of extensive work by several generations of 
historians of rural society as well as by historically-minded economists. The s and s produced a 
particularly important vintage of books on these issues, ranging chronologically from the late-colonial 
period (c.-) to what became known in local historiography as ‘rural modernization’: the process of 
institutional and technological changes that transformed Uruguay’s agrarian economy under the First 
Globalization (c.-).7 On the latter, Barrán and Nahum’s seven-volume Historia rural became the 
standard reference. One of their key arguments was that latifundia and the ‘diabolical blessing’ of the natural 
grasslands shaped a landowner mentalité that valued hoarding land and cattle over innovation. Particularly 
in ‘archaic’ regions north of the Río Negro, this constituted, in their view, a major obstacle to the 
development of agrarian capitalism.8 Such a narrative found echoes elsewhere in Latin American(ist) 
historical and social science scholarship, as part of a literature that identified latifundia (sometimes ‘the 
hacienda system’ in English-language studies) as a fundamental obstacle to effective capitalist development, 
or, at best, as a backward tenure institution that was the sign of a peripheral, underdeveloped, or incomplete 
agrarian capitalism.9 From a global perspective, this literature can be seen as part of the scholarship 
 
6 Bértola, PBI de Uruguay, ; Moraes, Pradera, -. 
7 The specialist historiography was reviewed in greater detail in Chapter . The key works of this period were: Sala 
de Touron, de la Torre, and Rodríguez, Estructura económico-social; Evolución económica; Barrán and Nahum, Historia 
Rural I; Barrios Pintos, Vaquerías; Campal, Pradera; Jacob, Consecuencias sociales. 
8 ‘la “bendición” era diabólica: hizo posible desdeñar el cambio.’ Barrán and Nahum, Agricultura, -.  
9 For an introduction, see Magnus Mörner, ‘The Spanish American hacienda: A survey of recent research and 
debate,’ HAHR ,  (), Ernest Feder, The Rape of the Peasantry: Latin America‘s Landholding System (Garden City, 
N.Y, ), and Agustín Cueva, El desarrollo del capitalismo en América Latina: ensayo de interpretación histórica 
(México, ): -. To get a sense of unifying themes in the history of large agricultural landholdings across Latin 
America, see the contributions to Florescano, Haciendas, latifundios y plantaciones. 
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connected to the histories of ‘landlord and peasant’ relations of production and their place in the debates on 
‘the agrarian question’ in different areas of what was then called the Third World.10 
More recent work, since the s, argued that soil quality and market access, rather than average farm 
sizes, were the key factors behind different regional rhythms in the agrarian transition to capitalism in 
Uruguay. According to Millot and Bertino the dominance of latifundia was not an obstacle to growth even 
in the ‘backward’ areas in the north of the country, where large landowners were no less capitalist than their 
counterparts in more ‘advanced’ areas.11 Their choice to buy more land rather than invest in innovations 
was explained by their geographical location—which offered them comparatively poorer soils and placed 
them closer to the Brazilian market than to the Atlantic—not by their ‘traditional’ values.12 This re-
assessment of the relationship between latifundia and capitalism was also part of a broader trend in Latin 
American economic and social history, focused on the period of transition to ‘modern economic growth’ 
but not limited to it. Economic historians working across the continent found that latifundia had been 
integral to the rise of agrarian capitalism and the increasing commercialization of agriculture in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century, rather than at odds with it.13 This generation of studies made a more 
explicit use of economic analysis (some of it, but by no means all, influenced by the New Economic History) 
and developed in parallel to social and political histories which produced a more nuanced image of estancias 
and haciendas.14  
The crucial message emerging from these two strands of specialist historiography, for present purposes, 
is that by the turn of the twentieth century in Uruguay there were ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ rural regions, 
defined by their adoption of new techniques (how ‘modern’ their agriculture was). There is no consensus, 
however, on how latifundia related to that divide, on the factors behind it, or on its consequences for our 
understanding of agrarian capitalism in the country. Moreover, it has not been proven that ‘backward’ areas, 
 
10 The language of ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘peripheral capitalism’—coined by dependency theorists A.G. Frank 
and Samir Amin—was highly influential in the literature on ‘transitions to agrarian capitalism’ in Latin America; see, 
for example, the studies collected in Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge, Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on 
the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries (Cambridge, ). 
11 Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, -. 
12 Moraes, ‘Capitalismo pastor’, . 
13 Arnold J. Bauer, ‘Rural Spanish America, –,’ in The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume : 
c. to , ed. Leslie Bethell, The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge, ). Key case studies in this 
strand of literature were Simon Miller, ‘Mexican junkers and capitalist haciendas, –: The arable estate and the 
transition to capitalism between the insurgency and the revolution,’ JLAS , - () and Sábato, Agrarian capitalism. 
14 For an example of scholarship in this tradition influenced by the New Economic History, see Amaral, Rise of 
Capitalism. More recent social histories revising the part played by estancias and haciendas include Roy Hora, The 
Landowners of the Argentine Pampas: A Social and Political History, - (Oxford, ), and Claudio Robles-
Ortiz, ‘Agrarian capitalism and rural labour: the hacienda system in central Chile, –,’ JLAS ,  (). 
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especially when accounting for their poorer soils, significantly underperformed relative to ‘advanced’ areas, 
nor that larger average farm sizes had any bearing on the productivity of agriculture (increasing, decreasing, 
or constant returns to scale) or on the genetic makeup of herds.  
There is also no consensus on the expected results of such an analysis, as there are plausible historical 
and economic rationales for different outcomes. Areas dominated by latifundia could be expected to have 
been less innovative because large landowners had a preference for insurance (of their livestock which were 
their main form of capital as well as their commodities) and chose lower output in exchange for lower risk, 
resulting in high-aggregate, low-unit returns to the owner. Alternatively, it could be argued that latifundia 
owners would be in a much better position than smallholders to take risks, invest, and innovate, having 
access to information flows as well as credit and capital markets from which smaller producers were left 
out.15 Finally, there are convincing reasons to think that, beyond a minimum threshold required for 
commercial extensive grazing, estate sizes would have little or no effect on the propensity to adopt technical 
innovations. Cattle crossbreeding, like other land-saving innovations in agriculture, is to an extent scale-
neutral: successive improvements in herd quality result in higher productivity in latifundia as well as in 
smaller ranches. Moreover, in ranching as well as in crop farming the cost of monitoring workers often 
counters whatever economies of scale a huge estate can benefit from, making the definition of an ‘optimal’ 
farm size very difficult.16  
Previous studies have not been able to quantitatively test these questions because they were limited by 
the tyranny of administrative geography. As they worked with data at the level of provinces (the  political 
divisions, departamentos, which form Uruguay’s second level of government), the number of observations 
and the level of spatial resolution simply did not allow economic historians to quantitatively test 
relationships between variables. It is the premise of this chapter that district-level data, mapped onto the  
court districts (secciones judiciales) which existed at the time, can be used to describe and measure the 
relationships between estate sizes, soil quality, and agricultural innovation across the country. The risk of 
ecological fallacy (interpreting individual characteristics from aggregated data) remains even when working 
with district-level sources, but it is considerably less severe than in all previous studies which explored the 
relationships between these variables only at the provincial level.17 
 
15 These two positions, as they pertained to Latin American landowners, were clearly delineated in the scholarship 
already in the s; see Danilo Astori, Controversias sobre el agro latinoamericano: un análisis crítico (Buenos Aires, ). 
16 Giovanni Federico, ‘Growth, specialization, and organization of world agriculture,’ in The Cambridge History of 
Capitalism. Volume II: The Spread of Capitalism: From  to the Present, ed. Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson 
(Cambridge, ): -. 
17 The seminal text on the problem of ecological fallacy is William S. Robinson, ‘Ecological correlations and the 
behavior of individuals,’ American Sociological Review , June (). 
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In addition to the empirical limits of previous datasets, the debate is also obscured by conceptual 
difficulties, as ‘agrarian capitalism’ and ‘modernization’ themselves are seldom defined in the literature. In 
the classic sense of the term, there is no doubt that the Uruguayan countryside was as a whole capitalist by 
.18 Almost  of agricultural land was privately owned (up from  in );19 land and other factors 
were transferred through the market and their prices responded to relevant international commodity 
markets;20 and most of the agricultural output value was produced in districts where estates relied at least to 
an extent on wage labour rather than exclusively on family labour, or—as had been the case a century 
earlier—a mix of relations of production which included slavery. But for economic historians who have 
written about these issues, ‘agrarian capitalism’ seems to mean something rather more: it implies the rise 
and consolidation of entrepreneurial estancias. That is, the predominance of landowners who adopt the 
practices and processes of ‘modern ranching’ to increase their unit returns, rather than relying on the 
‘traditional’ strategy of acquiring more land. We could think of this as a distinction, at the farm level, between 
land-extensive growth and capital-intensive growth paths. Given that the agricultural frontier was closed 
and that almost all public agricultural land had already been sold, there were obvious limits to an extensive 
growth strategy for the agrarian economy as a whole, although not necessarily for individual producers.21 
Did latifundia remain as a rustic remnant of a backward agriculture, while smaller producers pioneered 
innovation and intensive growth? Given that terminological imprecisions in the literature extend to 
‘latifundia’ themselves, before attempting an answer to those questions we need to think about how 
latifundia can be usefully identified within the economic geography of Uruguayan agriculture in this period. 
 
  
 
18 See the definition of agrarian capitalism proposed in Chapter  and the related discussion (pp. -). 
19 Eduardo Acevedo, Anales históricos del Uruguay, vol. I (Montevideo, ): ; ibid., V: . 
20 Moraes, ‘Capitalismo pastor’, . 
21 For a classic discussion of the economics of the ‘traditional’ ranching strategy in comparison to agricultural 
intensification in the Uruguayan livestock economy, see Instituto de Economía, El proceso, -. 
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2 Data 
2.1. Sources and spatial level 
Almost  of the Uruguayan territory (, square kilometres) is suitable for agriculture, with natural 
grasslands being the predominant land cover in four-fifths of the countryside and elevations rarely reaching 
 metres.22 Recognising the size and diversity of the rural economy, economic historians have relied on 
provincial data on agricultural output, soil quality, and other variables to sustain their arguments, and 
produced maps to that effect.23 Nevertheless, the very high share of land suitable for agriculture and the size 
of the territory (small by South American standards, but larger, for example, than England and Wales 
combined) make describing regional variation at the level of provinces entirely inadequate. Not only are 
some provinces very large, but their borders—drawn in the late nineteenth century as a result of political 
calculations and conflicts—can obscure rather than illuminate fault lines in rural landscapes and economies. 
This chapter overcomes that limitation by mapping data on agricultural output, herd composition, and 
average farm size in  at the spatial level of court districts (n=,  of which were at least partially 
rural). District boundaries were reconstructed from government decrees and by geo-referencing historical 
provincial maps.24 Data on land, labour, livestock, and agricultural output at the district level were 
transcribed from the  agricultural census. Geographical data were taken from statistical yearbooks, 
government reports, and railway companies’ records. Table . summarises descriptive statistics for all 
variables.25 Details on sources can be found in the Appendix; GIS mapping was used to link the different 
data together. 
 
  
 
22 Uruguay’s physical geography was introduced with greater detail in Chapter ; two key references are Enrique 
Marchesi and Artigas Durán, Suelos del Uruguay, vol.  (Montevideo, ); Soriano, ‘Grasslands’. 
23 See, for example, the maps in Barrán and Nahum, Civilización, - and Millot and Bertino, Historia 
económica, . 
24 GIS shapefiles providing boundary and attribute data at the spatial level of court districts (secciones judiciales) 
are available as Additional Material. References for historical maps used as sources for georeferencing can be found in 
the Appendix, along with the details on the sources used for the quantitative data. 
25 The full dataset and code in R language are available in the replication package within the Additional Materials; 
instructions can be found below in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 4.1. Summary statistics for selected variables across Uruguayan rural districts 
 Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Share of cattle crossbred (%) 65.7 25.0 7.1 99.9 
Average farm size (hectares) 677.9 908.6 5.1 7,678.9 
Average soil quality (CONEAT index, Uruguay=100) 101.4 29.4 50.7 168.1 
Enclosure density (kms of wire fencing per hectare) 27.9 34.2 3.9 329.0 
Wheat yield (hundredweights harvested per hectare) 4.2 4.2 0.0 24.2 
Oxen as share of livestock units (%) 5.3 7.9 0.3 45.1 
Stocking density (livestock units per hectare) 0.9 0.5 0.2 5.9 
Bulls per cow (heads) 0.1 0.3 0.0 3.6 
Sheep per cattle (heads) 3.3 2.5 0.1 10.7 
Rainfall (yearly millimetres) 951.7 113.6 720.0 1,152.0 
Mean annual temperature (ºC) 17.0 0.7 16.0 19.0 
Mean altitude (meters above sea level) 96.1 55.8 12.0 238.0 
Distance to nearest railway station (kms) 29.4 25.6 0.7 123.5 
Population density (people per square km.) 18.1 84.5 0.4 907.7 
Foreign-born population (%) 11.5 6.6 2.2 35.3 
Sources: Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Censo General de la República en ; ‘Lluvias. 
Promedios anuales obtenidos en las  estaciones pluviométricas establecidas en la República O. del Uruguay,’ Anuario 
Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay. Años  y ; Clasificación de suelos del Uruguay. Montevideo: 
Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca, ; INUMET, ‘Estadísticas climatológicas’; ESRI World Elevation 
Services; Waterlow and Sons, ‘The Central Uruguay Railway of Monte Video and its Connections, ’ UL, Map 
Room. Maps.... 
 
 provides a good vantage point from which to reconstruct the economic geography of Uruguayan 
agriculture not only because of the quality and variety of primary sources, but also because of its place in 
the chronology of the country’s growth path. Between  and  Uruguay’s real GDP almost doubled, 
as did as well as the livestock sector’s gross value added, reaching levels that would not be met again until 
the s.26 Our benchmark year then is placed almost in the middle of a decade of rapid economic growth 
fuelled by high and rising international prices for Uruguay’s key export commodities (wool, beef, and 
leather).27 As far as the longer-term development of this agricultural economy is concerned,  comes 
 
26 Luis Bértola, ‘Primer Batllismo: reflexiones sobre el crecimiento, la crisis y la guerra,’ in Ensayos de Historia 
Económica. Uruguay y la región en el mundo (-) (Montevideo, ): . 
27 Bértola, PBI de Uruguay. 
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near the culmination of the technological trajectory which emerged in the s with the ‘sheep revolution’ 
analysed in Chapter , which increased stocking densities and encouraged mixed grazing. Innovations 
continued in the form of wire-fencing and enclosures since the late s, and culminated with systematic 
cattle crossbreeding from the s onwards.28 Mapping herds, crops, and agricultural output in  at a 
high level of spatial resolution provides an opportunity to explore the ways in which different regions 
engaged with technical innovation, while also allowing us to test some of the hypotheses in the literature 
regarding the part played by landholding patterns in transitions to agrarian capitalism.  
 
2.2. Estate sizes and the geography of agriculture 
How dominant were large landholdings in Uruguayan agriculture? What did ‘large’ mean in different parts 
of the country? And how did this relate to the regional patterns of agricultural specialization? Map . shows 
average farm sizes for every district in  and the location and primary freight loaded at every railway 
station in the country during . Average farm size can be a misleading indicator of land tenure patterns 
because the mean value could be unrepresentative given within-district disparities. Even though the farm-
level microdata for the agricultural census has not survived, we can get a sense of the relative size of most 
farms in different districts by comparing the density of enclosures. The kilometres of wire fencing per 
agricultural hectare in each district correlate significantly and negatively with the average farm size, 
suggesting that low average sizes are indicative of a predominance of smaller holdings corroborated by a 
denser pattern of enclosures.29 Freight cargo is included because it is an excellent material indicator of the 
composition of regional output, and thereby reveals internal comparative advantages. It was taken or 
calculated from the railway companies’ reports of cargo loaded onto trains in  (details can be found in 
the Appendix). 
 
 
  
 
28 Moraes, Pradera, -. 
29 r = -., p < .. Wire fencing was (and remains) the ubiquitous method of enclosing agricultural land in 
Uruguay; the classic study is Jacob, Consecuencias sociales.  
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MAP 4.1. Average estate size by districts and railway stations’ main freight, c.1908 
 
Note: railway station freight profiles are defined as ‘cattle’ if live animals and cattle hides amounted to more than half 
of the total cargo weight loaded at the station; ‘wool’ if wool did; and ‘crops’ if the added weight of wheat, corn, linseed, 
bran and hay represented more than half of the total. The rest of the stations are classified as ‘other’. 
Sources: ‘Establecimientos agropecuarios por secciones’, Censo General , T.II, P.II: -; Anuario Estadístico 
-, (Montevideo, ); and georeferencing of Waterlow and Sons, ‘The Central Uruguay Railway of Monte Video 
and its Connections, ’ UL, Map Room. Maps... and a series of historical maps detailed in the Appendix. 
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It is apparent that landholdings were in general larger above the Río Negro, both along the eastern 
littoral on the Uruguay River and nearer the Brazilian border, with most districts in those areas returning 
average estate sizes over , hectares, including those regions specialised in cattle as well as those 
concentrating on sheep. While it is problematic to define latifundia by an arbitrary acreage threshold, the 
, hectare mark is useful because it has been widely used in the literature, and more importantly because 
it fits our data: sitting just above the th percentile of the overall acreage distribution, it captures the quintile 
of districts with largest units.30 By contrast, to the south, comparatively smaller estates predominated, 
especially in the grain belt surrounding Montevideo, by far the largest urban market in the country. Railway 
freight data offer a useful measure of the spatial clustering of market-oriented arable farming when 
compared to the greater dispersion of livestock rearing: nearest neighbour ratios are almost twice as high 
for stations loading predominantly cattle when compared to those where crops made up the majority of the 
cargo.31 Stations specializing in pastoral commodities (livestock and wool) were more evenly distributed 
across the territory, and generally increased in number as we move north and away from Montevideo. On 
the other hand, stations specializing in crop farming for the domestic market tended to be more clustered 
and generally located near the capital.32 As a result, livestock and livestock by-products travelled a greater 
distance on average than cereals and other non-livestock cargo, and played a larger role in the bottom line 
of railway companies.33 
This logic is partially explained by the favourable conditions for livestock rearing in most of Uruguay, 
as well as by the technical biases of arable and pastoral farming, but it can be most clearly traced to Uruguay’s 
population geography, which Chapter  will explore in greater detail. The von Thünen model of land use 
suggests that, assuming a closed economy with an isolated city, the spatial location of agricultural production 
is determined by the distance to the city.34 The interaction of the yields of different crops and their 
 
30 The th percentile mark was at  hectares and the st percentile was at , hectares. 
31 A nearest neighbour ratio (NNR) of  would describe a random dispersion of points in a defined space, whereas 
a ratio of  would describe a perfectly clustered set of points. The NNR was . and . for stations loading mostly 
live animals and wool respectively, and . for stations loading primarily grains. Details on the calculation of the NNR 
can be found in the Appendix. Scholars have found similar evidence at the (less disaggregated) spatial level of provinces: 
see Micaela Araujo, Pablo Castro, and Henry Willebald, ‘Actividad agropecuaria en Uruguay (-): localización 
geográfica y hechos estilizados,’ Revista de Economía ,  (). 
32 The mean rail distance from Montevideo’s Central Station was  kms for stations who shipped mostly wool, 
 kms for those that shipped mostly live animals, and  for those that shipped mostly cereals. 
33 Gaston Díaz, ‘Railway investment in Uruguay before : profitability, subsidies, and economic impact,’ 
European Review of Economic History ,  (). 
34 The model was originally put forth by von Thünen in , and was rekindled by Alonso in the s, who 
used it as the basis of a ‘monocentric city model’; see Johann Heinrich von Thünen, Von Thünen‘s Isolated State: An 
English Edition (Oxford, ); William Alonso, Location and Land Use: Toward a General Theory of Land Rent 
(Cambridge, MA, ). 
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transportation costs will determine a pattern of land use in concentric circles, from horticulture and 
dairying, to cereals, and finally cattle grazing. Taking Montevideo (which at the time was home to about a 
third of Uruguayan population) as the central city in von Thünen’s model helps account for the spatial 
distribution of agriculture around . These results resonate with Griffin’s geographical analysis which 
found that this model provided a useful framework for understanding the intensities of land use in Uruguay 
in the late s.35 
The geography of landholding was to an extent explained by the differing land requirements across 
arable and pastoral agriculture, and their distribution across the territory: the ratio between pastureland and 
cropland was higher in districts with larger average estate sizes. Section  below will explore these 
correlations in detail and discuss their implications for the ‘inverse relationship’ thesis, i.e. the negative 
correlation between estate sizes and land productivity, which has been argued over by economists and 
economic historians of Latin America, Asia, and Africa.36 
 
2.3. Cattle crossbreeding as technical innovation 
Against this background, the key question for the long-term development of Uruguayan export agriculture 
is how estate sizes related to the geographical distribution of ‘modern’ ranching production techniques. The 
improvement of the ‘native’ criollo cattle via systematic crossing with British breeds (particularly Hereford 
and Shorthorn) offers a useful measure of the adoption of agricultural innovations. The process of 
crossbreeding of cattle had begun in the s, and was still underway two decades later, with Uruguayan 
producers importing expensive pedigree animals from Britain in increasing numbers.37 The effects of this 
process of agricultural intensification were very unevenly distributed in the countryside, with leading areas 
already having ‘improved’ almost all of their cattle through crossbreeding, while there were more than two 
and a half million purely ‘native’ cattle being raised in other regions. Livestock producers had to invest in 
order to acquire purebred or half-blood Hereford or Shorthorn animals or hire their services and, year after 
year, improve the genetic makeup of the herd. The result were the mestizo cattle: crossbreds who grew faster, 
 
35 Ernst Griffin, ‘Testing the von Thunen theory in Uruguay,’ Geographical Review ,  (). 
36 For the pioneering paper in the literature on the ‘inverse relationship’, see Péter Tamás Bauer, ‘The economics 
of planting density in rubber growing,’ Economica ,  (). The thesis was famously applied to Latin American 
cases by Albert Berry and William R. Cline, Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries (Baltimore, 
). For an overview and a critique, see Graham Dyer, ‘Redistributive land reform: No April rose. The poverty of 
Berry and Cline and GKI on the inverse relationship,’ Journal of Agrarian Change , ‐ (). 
37 In , to take the year of our main benchmark, more certificates for pedigree Hereford animals were granted 
for export to Uruguay than to any other country. UL, The Hereford Herd Book Society, The Herd Book of Hereford 
Cattle Vol. XXIX (Hereford, ): -. 
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gained weight quicker, and resulted in beef of a superior quality than ‘native’ animals. They were also hardier 
than purebred imports, and hence better suited than them to year-round outdoor grazing. 
Selective livestock breeding was, as historians of science and environmental historians have shown in 
other contexts, part art and part science; book knowledge and everyday experience both played a part.38 
While some rich breeders could travel abroad or benefit first hand from veterinary expertise, many 
producers relied on word of mouth, or on learned advice they could get through the Rural Society or even 
from the written press. Individual animals were more valuable than they had ever been in Uruguay, and 
because both the Montevideo market and the external demand were aware of lineages and qualities, 
individual cattle could not be perfectly substituted by others. Letters to the editor of El Siglo’s ‘countryside 
page’ (‘La Página de la Campaña’) asked specific questions about how to look after purebred bulls and 
received detailed answers: 
Question—I would be grateful if you could answer me this query: I have two bulls in my 
stable, animals that are for me a considerable capital suffering from foot-and-mouth 
disease, what must I do to heal them? (signed) A rural man. 
Answer—Keep both animals stabled with a good hay bed that you will change often. Wash 
their mouth ulcers with antiseptic solutions. There are many useful solutions: here are some 
you can easily prepare in your estancia, all of them efficient (…) Keep the animals on a light 
diet of tender fodder and cooked grain.39 
As contemporary press and livestock producers themselves noted, the label ‘crossbred’ (mestizo) could 
refer to very different degrees of ‘improvement’ and breed purity.40 The signature red coat and white face of 
Herefords, for instance, were dominant traits transmitted even to animals who were only / Hereford, 
 
38 Margaret E. Derry, Bred for Perfection: Shorthorn Cattle, Collies, and Arabian Horses Since  (Baltimore, 
): -; Rebecca J. H. Woods, The Herds Shot Round the World: Native Breeds and the British Empire, c. - 
(Chapel Hill, ): -. 
39 ‘Pregunta—Señor Redactor de la “Página Rural de EL SIGLO”—Agradecería me contestase á la siguiente 
pregunta: Tengo dos toros á galpón, animales que para mi representan un capital considerable atacados de aftosa ¿qué 
debo hacer para curarlos?--Rural. Respuesta—Tenga los animales á galpón con buena cama de paja abundante que 
renovará á menudo. Lave las llagas de la boca con soluciones antisépticas. Se emplean muchas: le citaremos algunas de 
las que con seguridad se pueden preparar en una estancia, todas eficaces: (…) Téngase á los animales en una dieta 
liviana de forrajes tiernos y granos cocidos.’ BN, El Siglo,  October , .   
40 Barrán and Nahum, Civilización, -. Cattle breeds themselves are of course entirely a human construct, a 
case of ‘flesh made word’, as Harriet Ritvo puts it in The Platypus and the Mermaid, and Other Figments of the Classifying 
Imagination (Cambridge, MA, ): -.  
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which led to the results of the agricultural census being criticised as excessively optimistic.41 But despite 
genetic disparities within crossbred herds, the distinction between ‘native’ and crossbred cattle was validated 
by specialist markets, the former usually sold by the head and the latter by their weight.42 The geography of 
cattle improvement shows large and revealing regional divides (Map ., right), which did not follow the 
same north-south axis as the changing patterns in land tenure, reproduced here again in the left-side map. 
 
MAP 4.2. Mean estate size and percentage of cattle crossbred by district, 1908 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: ‘Ganado por especies, departamentos y secciones’, Censo General , T.II, P.II: -; ‘Establecimientos 
agropecuarios por secciones’, Censo General , T.II, P.II: -. 
 
41 The official publication of the Uruguayan Rural Society was the main forum for these debates; see, for example, 
BN, ‘La producción de ganados puros y mestizos en el Río de la Plata,’ Revista de la Asociación Rural,  May . The 
same concerns occupied cattlemen in the United States: Woods, Herds, . 
42 This market situation was disseminated by rural newspapers: see, for example, FB, ‘Las exposiciones ferias’, La 
Campaña (Departamento de Río Negro),  April , . See also Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, . 
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The economic geography of agriculture and innovation in  reveals much of interest about the 
relationship between latifundia and agrarian capitalism in Uruguay during the First Globalization. For the 
purposes of this chapter, two insights can be underlined. Firstly, as historiography has long argued and our 
data now proves at a much higher spatial resolution, very large holdings became more common the farther 
north one went. Secondly, the spatial location of large holdings did not correspond to geographical divides 
in the degrees of innovation in ranching (cattle crossbreeding), which were in general higher in the west 
than in the east, with a mixed picture in the north and south: different interactions, revealing diverse 
economic strategies, seem to have predominated in each region. The existence of latifundia in a district 
made some strategies more likely than others, but it is by itself not enough to account for differences in 
crossbreeding rates, which were crucial in explaining differing levels of agricultural productivity. To 
understand the impact of large landholdings in Uruguay’s rural economy we need to explore the effects of 
different patterns of land tenure in the context of other variables in a more systematic way.  
 
3 Method and results 
This section uses the new spatially-explicit, cross-sectional dataset to measure the impact of estate sizes and 
soil quality on cattle herd improvement. Before running any regressions, the main argument is already 
captured by Graph .: crossbreeding rates were higher in districts with better soils, and this applied to areas 
with productive units on average larger than , hectares as well as smaller.  
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GRAPH 4.1. Soil quality index and cattle crossbreeding rates in ‘pastoral’ districts, 1908 
 
Notes: ‘latifundia districts’ are those with average estate sizes above , hectares. ‘Pastoral’ districts are those in which 
the ratio of rangeland to cropland was larger than  to  (n=). 
Sources: ‘Ganado por especies, departamentos y secciones’, Censo General , T.II, P.II: -; Clasificación de 
suelos del Uruguay. Montevideo: Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca, . 
 
We can now measure the relationships between these variables systematically and test their robustness 
to the inclusion of other variables. In order to do so, the effect of unit sizes and soil quality on cattle herd 
improvement is estimated through an ordinary least squares (OLS) model in the following form: 
 yi = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + β1𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹i + β2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦i +  𝛾𝛾 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 [1] 
 
On the left side of equation , the dependent variable yi measures the share (in percentage) of cattle 
that was crossbred (that is, ‘improved’) in the herds of district i in . On the right side, the two main 
independent variables of interest are 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹i, which measures the average size (in hundreds of hectares) 
of the agricultural holdings in district i in , and 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦i, which measures the average soil quality 
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(in CONEAT index, the national average being ) of district i, georeferenced on the basis of the Ministry 
of Agriculture’s  high resolution survey of soil types.43 X is a vector of control variables, and 𝜀𝜀 is an error 
term. Controls include proxies for different agricultural settings and productive strategies (density of 
enclosures, wheat yields per hectare, stocking densities, oxen as share of total livestock units, number of 
bulls per cow, and number of sheep per cow),44 environmental variables (yearly rainfall, mean annual 
temperatures, average altitudes), market access (distance to the nearest railway station and immediate access 
to a land border with Brazil, the single most important market for Uruguayan agricultural exports),45 and 
demographic variables (population density and share of foreign-born population).  
After including the full set of controls, we still find a strong and positive effect of soil quality on the 
share of cattle crossbred, while the effect of farm sizes is not statistically significant (column  of Table .). 
The estimated coefficients suggest that a ten-unit increase in the soil quality index would increase the cattle 
crossbreeding rate by more than . points (that is, an additional . per cent of the ‘native’ cattle in a 
district’s herds being improved through crossbreeding) when compared to the mean. Given the large range 
of values of the soil quality variable in the distribution (from an index value of  to ), and the variation 
in the outcome variable (crossbreeding rates range from  to  per cent), the effects resulting from soils can 
accrue to explain very large gaps between districts. This suggests that the correlation is not only statistically 
significant, but that it also was economically meaningful. 
 
  
 
43 CONEAT is an edaphological system of soil classification that groups homogenous areas in terms of their long-
term potential for livestock production; see Bruno Lanfranco and Gonzalo Sapriza, ‘Incidence of the CONEAT index 
and other quality determinant factors of farmland prices,’ Agrociencia ,  (). The first use of this index by 
economic historians discussing the regional diversity of Uruguay’s rural modernization can be found in the seminal 
work by Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, -.  
44 Livestock Units (LUs) are used to standardise the number of animals according to their grazing or fodder 
requirements. Here I use the coefficients suggested for Uruguay by INIA, Revisión y análisis de las bases históricas y 
científicas del uso de la equivalencia ovino-bovino. Hacia una nueva equivalencia para ser utilizada en Uruguay 
(Montevideo, ). 
45 On the geographical distribution of Uruguayan exports, see Nicolás Bonino-Gayoso, Antonio Tena-Junguito, 
and Henry Willebald, ‘Uruguay and the First Globalization: on the accuracy of export performance, -,’ RHE 
,  (): . 
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TABLE 4.2. Impact of farm size and soil quality on cattle crossbreeding rates, 1908 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farm size  0.007* 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Soil quality 0.321*** 0.450*** 0.411*** 0.409*** 0.355*** 
 (0.108) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.074) 
Agricultural controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Environmental controls No No Yes Yes Yes 
Market access controls No No No Yes Yes 
Demographic controls No No No No Yes 
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 
R2 0.174 0.521 0.570 0.571 0.589 
Notes: Results obtained by estimating equation  using cattle crossbreeding ( of bovines crossbred) as the dependent 
variable. Farm size (in hectares) and soil quality (in CONEAT index) as independent variables of interest. Robust 
standard errors clustered by  Uruguayan provinces (departamentos) reported in brackets. Observations are 
Uruguayan court districts (secciones judiciales). ***, **, and * denote significance at the , , and  levels. 
Sources: See Table .. 
 
The main concern about the validity of these results relates to endogenous spatial autocorrelation. 
Could it have been the case that the geography of cattle crossbreeding was merely the result of the new 
technology spreading across districts, creating clusters of high or low levels of genetic improvement through 
a ‘neighbourhood’ or ‘contagion’ effect?46 As Kelly has shown, a regression analysis could show a much 
inflated explanatory power because the independent variable of interest is soaking up unobserved 
similarities resulting from spatial autocorrelation in the outcome variable.47 The argument pursued here 
relies on exogenous spatial autocorrelation, because the independent variables of interest are themselves 
geographically concentrated: areas closer to each other tended to have similar soil quality levels when 
compared to those further away, and the same can be said of average estate sizes. In other words, we want to 
test whether the regression results allow us to argue that the clustering of different rates of crossbreeding 
 
46 The ideas of ‘neighbourhood’ or ‘contagion’ effects were popularised in economic geography by Lawrence A. 
Brown, Innovation Diffusion: A New Perspective (London, ). 
47 Kelly, ‘Standard errors’. 
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across rural districts was significantly explained by an exogenous variable (soil quality) which is itself 
spatially autocorrelated, rather than predominantly by high or low crossbreeding rates attracting each other 
regardless of soil types.  
To check whether the significance of this relationship is robust to spatial autocorrelation, we calculate 
Moran’s I statistics for the dependent variable, the independent variables of interest, and for the residuals of 
the main regression, giving equal spatial weight to the five closest neighbours to each district and zero weight 
to the rest (Table .). Moran’s I is an inferential statistic that results from comparing the expected spatial 
distribution of a variable under randomization with the observed distribution of the variable (the null 
hypothesis being that the spatial distribution is entirely the result of random processes). A Moran’s I value 
of  would indicate that the spatial distribution of the variable is perfectly clustered (for example, if all the 
high values were concentrated south of the Río Negro, and all the low values north of it) while a value of  
would indicate an entirely random distribution, and a value of - a completely dispersed distribution.  
 
TABLE 4.3. Spatial autocorrelation tests for key variables and model residuals 
 Moran’s I z-score 
Cattle crossbreeding 0.61 14.3 
Soil quality 0.82 19.5 
Farm size 0.31 8.1 
Model residuals 0.20 5.9 
Notes: the Moran’s I statistic is significant for all variables at the  level. Model residuals refer to model  in Table ., 
estimated using equation . 
Sources: see Table ..  
 
The results show that the soil quality variable is highly autocorrelated, as neighbouring soils tend to 
resemble each other. The dependent variable was also highly clustered, and its z-score is high enough to 
confirm that the geographical pattern of cattle crossbreeding was not the result of random chance. The 
model residuals also show spatial autocorrelation, albeit at much lower levels than the independent variables, 
with a Moran’s I closer to a random distribution. When considered together, these tests suggest that cattle 
crossbreeding had a significant component of spatial autocorrelation (it spread between neighbouring areas) 
but that our explanatory variables capture more than two thirds of it: clustering of high and low values of 
crossbreds as a share of cattle responded more to exogenous variables (themselves spatially autocorrelated) 
than to the endogenous ‘spreading’ of crossbreeding as a technology. 
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A second possible area of concern refers to the risk of multicollinearity, particularly as it affects the 
result of the first variable of interest: perhaps the impact of ‘farm’ sizes on innovation is lost by the inclusion 
of other independent variables highly correlated with scale. This was not the case: collinearity diagnostics 
run on the model resulted in a Variance Inflation Factor for Farm_Size of .. 
 
4 Discussion 
These findings have important implications for our understanding of agricultural intensification, and the 
part played by latifundia in it, because a larger share of crossbreds increased output per worker and per 
hectare.48 This is of course unsurprising given the importance of ranching to the rural economy almost 
everywhere in the country and the increased rate at which crossbreds could convert grass to beef. Having 
considered the robustness of the results, let us look closer at the implications of the finding that average 
estate sizes had no significant impact (either positive or negative) on agricultural innovation, as well as the 
mechanisms behind the main effect: the positive impact of soil quality on crossbreeding. The discussion will 
also explore how the Uruguayan case can provide a test of the ‘inverse relationship’ between estate size and 
land productivity, a widely used model in economic analyses of agricultural development in Latin America, 
Asia, and parts of Africa. 
Were latifundia obstacles for technical change in Uruguayan agriculture? If we consider the 
crossbreeding of cattle as a useful measure of innovation, then districts with more presence of latifundia 
were not always, or even predominantly, economic dinosaurs: the range of values of crossbreeding rates was 
very large (from about  to almost ) within the group of districts with landholdings averaging over 
, hectares. Regression analysis showed that, when controlling for environmental factors, the mean size 
of landholdings does not significantly contribute to explain district-level differences in the adoption of 
crossbreeding. This finding, based on a substantially larger and more geographically accurate dataset than 
all previous studies, directly contradicts the central thesis of the standard historiographical account of 
Uruguay’s rural modernization: that, in the classic statement of Barrán and Nahum, ‘the extensive 
exploitation of latifundia produced such large profits for their sole owner that it discouraged change and 
innovation.’49 
 
48 In this sense, cattle crossbreeding in Uruguay was both a ‘landesque’ and a ‘labouresque’ investment, to use 
Amaratya Sen’s categories (‘The choice of agricultural techniques in underdeveloped countries,’ Economic Development 
and Cultural Change ,  (): ). An econometric test of its historically well-founded positive effects on labour 
and land productivity in Uruguay can be found in Table A in the Appendix. 
49 ‘El latifundio explotado extensivamente dejó tan fuertes ganancias en manos de unos cuantos propietarios que 
desalentó el cambio y el espíritu innovador.’ Barrán and Nahum, Civilización, -. 
 
 
 
 
It would seem, then, that the relative ‘backwardness’ of agriculture in some regions cannot be attributed 
to supposed ‘traditional mentalities’ associated with large landholdings. This charge, once a common feature 
in the mainstream of Latin American economic history, is not supported by our evidence. However, this was 
not because great estates were, by virtue of their economies of scale or higher capitalization, a ‘historical 
necessity’ or more ‘capitalist’ or innovative, an idea that can find theoretical support in either the Marxian 
or neoclassical traditions.50 Estate sizes had no significant effect on crossbreeding rates because some 
districts characterised by larger landholdings (average size over , hectares) benefitted from particularly 
good soils for year-round, open-air ranching, while others had to make do with poorer land: mean soil 
quality indexes varied widely among areas dominated by latifundia (from less than  to almost ).  
Whereas landholding patterns do not explain the spatial distribution of innovation, they do account for 
the geography of agricultural specialization and the ratios of land to labour across the country. Districts 
characterised by latifundia were extremely specialised in livestock production (which maximises output per 
worker rather than per hectare), and, conversely, districts with smaller farms were specialised in arable 
agriculture (with a comparatively higher productivity of land and a lower productivity of labour). The thesis 
of an ‘inverse relationship’ between land productivity and size of holding is therefore verified by Uruguay’s 
rural districts (Graph ., A).51 Nevertheless, this was not the consequence of large landowners holding land 
for non-productive purposes, either as a form of insurance or indeed for extra-economic reasons, which the 
classic historiographical account emphasised, as did some development economists in the s.52 Neither 
was it the straightforward result of soils being on average poorer in districts characterised by larger farms; 
in fact, larger holdings do not strongly correlate with poorer soils at the district level (Graph ., C). The 
negative relationship between average holding size and output per hectare is explained by the composition 
of that output: specialization in livestock production (measured as the ratio between the hectares of 
agricultural land left to pasture and those under crops or in fallow) consistently increased with average farm 
sizes (Graph ., B). Thus, the geography of livestock and grain farming followed the scale of holdings rather 
than primarily the typology of their soils: there is not a strong correlation, at the district level, between soil 
quality and specialization in pastoral rather than arable agriculture (Graph ., D). That productive strategy 
was, in turn, an effective response to the relative factor prices facing large landowners, extensive ranching 
allowing them to substitute land for labour. 
 
50 See, for an overview, Frank Ellis, Peasant economics (Cambridge, ): -; -. 
51 On the ‘inverse relationship’ see Partha Dasgupta, An inquiry into well-being and destitution (Oxford, ): -. 
52 ‘For how many, still, the hacienda was more a way of life than a business?’ (‘para cuántos todavía la hacienda 
era más un modo de vida que un negocio’, Barrán and Nahum, Civilización, ); ‘the [Latin American large] estate 
owner is primarily a political, not an economic, man’ Ernest Feder, ‘The latifundia puzzle of Professor Schultz: 
comment,’ Journal of Farm Economics ,  (): . 
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GRAPH 4.2. Estate sizes, output per hectare, soil quality, & pasture-to-cropland ratio, 1908 
 
Notes: ‘latifundia districts’ are those with average estate sizes above , hectares. 
Sources: ‘Establecimientos agropecuarios por secciones’, Censo General , T.II, P.II: -; Clasificación de 
suelos del Uruguay. Montevideo: Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca, ; historical maps used for 
georeferencing and record linkage. See Table . for details on sources. 
 
Hence, larger estate sizes did not reflect a district’s revealed comparative advantage in pastoral 
production; rather, areas characterised by larger units were more likely to be specialised in livestock 
production, regardless of how good their soils were. Factor markets, not natural comparative advantages, 
are the key behind the ‘inverse relationship’ in the Uruguayan context. Land was cheaper for big producers—
who already owned extremely large tracts which they could use as collateral to acquire more land—than for 
small ones, since the frontier was closed, public lands had been almost entirely privatised, and land prices 
rose by a factor of four during the First Globalization.53 Labour, on the other hand, was relatively cheaper 
for small producers (who relied mostly on family labour) than for large ones. Latifundia and larger holdings 
in general also benefitted from the potential for greater specialization of labour, as well as cost economies in 
 
53 See the evolution of the land prices charted by Barrán and Nahum, Crisis, ; Revoluciones, ; Civilización, . 
 
 
 
 
the bulk sales of their output.54 Dual factor markets, with different relative prices for small and large 
producers, explain the ‘inverse relationship’, but fail to account for the different rates of herd improvement 
across the country.  
If estate sizes do not explain regional divides in the adoption of technical innovation in Uruguayan 
cattle rearing, which factors do contribute to explain it? Cattle crossbreeding is the best documented of the 
agricultural investments of the late-nineteenth century, but it can only be understood in connection with 
other forms of investment in what historical ecologists call ‘landesque capital’: long-lasting landscape 
modifications that form ‘a carpet of investments covering the surface of the earth.’55 Imported steel wire 
played a major role in those changes, making the physical definition of property rights cheaper and thereby 
encouraging the definitive consolidation of a capitalist land market, as economic historians have repeatedly 
pointed out.56 But divisions within estates can be as important for capitalist agriculture as the enclosures 
separating them. Whereas before deep ditches needed to be dug or hardwood fences built to subdivide 
pastoral land (both of which were very labour-intensive methods, as we saw in Chapter ), steel wire-fencing 
was more affordable, quicker to set up, and more reliable: a set of three or four strings held between 
hardwood posts could withstand over , kilos of force.57 
Accessible and strong steel wire ‘entirely changed the rearing process’, as one influential rancher put it; 
in terms of the general theme of this dissertation, it brought about a new ‘spatial code’ for cattle husbandry.58 
The creation of smaller, permanent potreros (paddocks) made it easier for producers to separate calves and 
mothers to encourage early weaning, to ensure cattle made the most of a paddock before moving to the next 
section of pasture, and to isolate sick animals. The relationship between these investments in the land and 
the improvements of the herds cut both ways: purebred and crossbred animals were often less hardy and 
more expensive than creole cows, which both encouraged a more intensive use of pastures through more 
micro-managed grazing and made it affordable. While the initial adoption of crossbreeding was closely 
linked to wire-fencing as a method of enclosure, the continued process of genetic improvement was 
facilitated by the potrero system within estates, allowing for more deliberate crossing of different stocks 
 
54 A short and clear theoretical presentation of these mechanisms can be found in Ellis, Peasant economics, -. 
55 Mats Widgren, ‘Pre-Colonial Landesque Capital: A Global Perspective,’ in Rethinking Environmental History: World-
System History and Global Environmental Change, ed. Alf Hornborg, John R McNeill, and Juan Martínez Alier (Lanham, 
): . See, for a survey of the concept across different literatures, Widgren and Håkansson, ‘Landesque Capital’. 
56 See, for example, Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, -; Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, -; 
Moraes, ‘Capitalismo pastor’, . 
57 Details on the different resistance ratings offered by steel wires can be found in contemporary press; see, for 
example, Illustration . below. 
58 ‘Los alambrados han modificado por completo el sistema de crianza’ Ordoñana, ‘Zootecnia’, . Lefebvre’s 
concept of ‘spatial code’ was defined and expanded upon in Chapter ; see Lefebvre, Production, -, -. 
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within or across estates, a practice known as ‘cambio de sangre’ (‘changing the blood’) which prevented 
undesirable characteristics from being passed down in a lineage.59 Given these connections, it is 
unsurprising that ads for purebred bulls and for steel wire could be found side-by-side in Uruguayan 
newspapers at the time (Illustration .). As a result of this anthropogenic intervention in the form of 
investments in landesque capital, the landscape was permanently transformed, and different kinds of 
pastures prospered across paddocks, while woody vegetation could thrive in the niches and galleries 
between them.60 
ILLUSTRATION 4.1. Ads for purebred bulls and wire fencing in El Siglo, October 1913 
‘5 Hereford bulls of pedigree’ and ‘English steel wire: the best in the world’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 On the connection between the initial adoption of crossbreeding and wire-fencing see the ranchers’ guild’s 
advice in ‘Atencion estancieros’, Revista de la Asociación Rural,  (), . On the advantages of ‘changing the 
blood’ see, for example, Domingo Ordoñana, ‘Memoria pastoril,’ in Pensamientos rurales sobre necesidades sociales y 
económicas de la República (Montevideo, ): , and ‘Toros Hereford’, El Siglo,  October , . 
60 Gautreau, ‘Rethinking the dynamics’. 
Source: BN, El Siglo, Año LI, Número ., p. . 
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All these investments were more likely to take hold if soils were more fertile and could sustain grass 
growth better. The fact that local environmental conditions are intimately related to the successful adoption 
of biological innovations (new cultigens, varieties, rotations, or, in this case, new breeds of livestock) is well 
known to students of agricultural history. A major difference between agricultural and industrial technology 
is precisely that the former is much more ‘circumstantially sensitive’, which shapes the pace of the spatial 
distribution of technical progress as well as the limits of successful diffusion.61 Regional agro-ecologies 
defined the geography of cattle crossbreeding in Uruguay through their impact on the grass nutrients 
governing herd performance, which in turn affected the expected profitability of taking up that innovation. 
The ‘cash-crop’ of Uruguayan beef cow producers were weaned calves and young steers, for which meat 
factories paid more than for older animals, so an investment in crossbreeding was much more likely to be 
profitable in the short term if the local environment allowed for faster herd turnovers. The reproductive 
performance of a herd can be summarised in two variables: calving (yearly births as a share of the cows 
exposed to a bull) and weaning (successfully grown calves as a share of those born the previous year). Cows 
who are better and more consistently fed suffer fewer in-utero losses (which represent a larger loss in the 
case of more expensive animals), and their sucklings are more likely to survive and transition to eating grass 
more quickly. While stocking densities were similar across the country, levels of reproductive efficiency were 
not, and they differed depending on the genetic makeup of herds: areas which could support high turnover 
rates tended to have herds with a much higher share of crossbreds than areas with poor reproductive 
performance (Graph .).  
Soils have a defining impact on the consistency of natural vegetation growth and the dry matter yield 
of grass, which in turn put a limit to the reproductive efficiency of cattle in pasture-based ranching.62 These 
factors affected producers whatever their scale, and shaped the decision about whether to invest in 
improving the genetic makeup of their herds. The spatial distribution of innovation in Uruguay’s rural 
modernization did not follow the geography of latifundia, but that of soils. The ‘diabolical blessing’ of the 
fertile natural grasslands was not so diabolical after all, at least from a regional perspective. Whether the 
consolidation of the country’s specialization in livestock rearing had negative consequences for national 
economic development is a different question, one which Chapter  will take up. 
 
 
61 Robert E Evenson and Larry E Westphal, ‘Technological Change and Technology Strategy,’ in Handbook of 
Development Economics, ed. T.N. Srinivasan and Jere Behrman (Amsterdam, ): ; Federico, Feeding the World, 
-. 
62 W.H. Schacht and P.E. Reece, ‘Impact of Livestock Grazing on Extensively Managed Grazinig Lands,’ in 
Environmental Impacts of Pasture-Based Farming, ed. Richard W. McDowell (Wallingford, ); Marcelo Pereira 
Machín, Manejo y conservación de las pasturas naturales del Basalto (Montevideo, ). 
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GRAPH 4.3. Calf crop percentage in districts with low and high crossbreeding rates 
 
Notes: Calf crop percentage estimated as the calving rate (calves born the previous year divided by number of adult 
female cows) times the ratio between weaned young steers (novillos) and calves (terneros), as a proxy for the weaning 
rate. Values over  suggest that ranches acquired additional steers in -. 
Sources: ‘Ganado por especies, departamentos y secciones’, Censo General , T.II, P.II: -; ‘Ganado puro por 
razas, departamentos y secciones’, ibid.: -; ‘Ganado mestizo por razas, departamentos y secciones’, ibid.: -
; ‘Ganado criollo, por departamentos y secciones’, ibid.: -. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Through a quantitative analysis of livestock production and natural environments in Uruguayan rural 
districts in , this chapter took up the long-running debate about the role of latifundia in the 
development of Latin American agrarian capitalism. While latifundia were very much present in one of the 
continent’s most successful cases of export-led development during the First Globalization, their effects on 
technical change in agriculture have been overstated by traditional historiography. Despite having a decisive 
influence on the specialization of market-oriented agriculture that predominated in different regions of the 
country, patterns of landholding did not substantially alter the effect that local environments, particularly 
soils, had on the adoption of cattle crossbreeding, the key biological innovation in Uruguay’s rural economy. 
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The historically far-reaching regional income divergences that were forged in this period, with most areas 
which lagged behind in the adoption of agricultural innovations remaining significantly poorer to the 
present,63 cannot be laid at the door of latifundia alone, although a concentrated pattern of land tenure may 
have shaped the broader economic and social impact of their relative technical backwardness. 
Ongoing research on Latin American historical economic geography will make it possible to map the 
rise of agrarian capitalism in the continent at large and the part that latifundia have played in it. In the 
meantime two conclusions can be put forward. Firstly, very large estates were neither an obstacle nor a 
necessity for rural modernization during the First Globalization. Uruguay’s rural geography revealed that 
latifundia were not, simply as a consequence of being so large, any less likely to invest in cattle crossbreeding, 
a technology which increased output per worker as well as per hectare. It is quite possible that many large 
landowners did not see themselves as ‘modern capitalists’ and that they shared with other rural people the 
psychological attachment to land and livestock that historians have more often assumed than proved. But 
even if this was true it was not necessarily bad for business, as it did not constitute an obstacle to the adoption 
of productivity-enhancing innovations, or to the development of a different ‘spatial code’ which consisted 
in a landscape of wire-fenced estates, as well as in a more deliberate use of pastures and a greater attention 
to individual animals. At the same time, the results do not conform to the expectation of great estates being 
necessarily more efficient or innovative than smaller ones, an argument which has found theoretical support 
in followers of Marshall and Marx alike. Soils, rather than scale, hold the key to understanding the uneven 
spread of biological innovation in Uruguay’s agricultural export economy during the First Globalization.  
Secondly, the mechanisms driving the inverse relationship between the size of productive units and 
output per acre matter greatly and may be substantially different depending on the specifics of place and 
period. In Uruguay during the First Globalization, the inverse relationship was not an expression of a 
revealed natural advantage of some districts in pastoral or arable farming; rather, the specialization in 
extensive or intensive production resulted from the pattern of land tenure that each district inherited from 
preceding history. Areas with larger holdings were, regardless of their geography, more likely to be 
specialized in ranching, whereas those with smaller units specialized in cropping, even if their soils were not 
ideally suited to it. 
A final word on inequality. This chapter has focused on the effects of large landholdings on biological 
innovation and agricultural specialization rather than on issues of distribution. The latter, however, should 
not simply be cast aside. The distributional outcomes of concentrated patterns of land tenure are of course 
crucial to our understanding of agrarian capitalism in Latin America, particularly in comparative 
perspective. The point that districts characterised by very large landholdings were not as a rule technically 
 
63 Martínez-Galarraga, Rodríguez Miranda, and Willebald, ‘Patterns’. 
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‘backward’ is not intended as a moral defence of latifundia, nor as an argument for their ‘historical necessity’ 
in Uruguay or elsewhere. In fact, the quantitative analysis pursued here suggests that large landholdings 
were not more innovative than smaller ones, and were therefore far from necessary for the development of 
agrarian capitalism. These conclusions should be taken as an invitation to consider land tenure institutions 
and landholding patterns through their productive interactions with landscapes and factor endowments, 
and to think about inequality in that context. 
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chapter five 
Occupations and the Nature of 
Rural Development, 1890-1908 
 
 
The previous chapter examined how the livestock economy of modernising Uruguay made productive use 
of land, demonstrating the impact of specific kinds of soils and landownership structures on economic 
strategies. This chapter focuses on people, as population and as labour resources, mapping their distribution 
across the territory and between economic sectors to quantitatively reassess one dimension of the 
contribution of workers to Uruguay’s rural development at the height of the country’s ‘modernization’. In so 
doing, it attempts to answer three interrelated questions: what was the impact of agricultural modernization 
on rural workers and their livelihoods; how large and how productive was the agricultural workforce; and 
to what extent did export-oriented agriculture contribute to wider economic development. 
Between  and  the volumes of meat and wool produced per hectare in Uruguay more than 
doubled.1 The conventional wisdom has long been that the livestock economy achieved this largely without 
creating more jobs, because of its reliance on increasingly wire-fenced, capitalised, and specialised large 
estates, which had outsourced some of the more labour-demanding ranching tasks (slaughtering, skinning, 
droving) to meat factories, tanneries, and railroad companies. As a result, in this account, pastoral 
agriculture was unable to create opportunities for employment or technological change, and, therefore, 
could never become the cornerstone for long-term development.2 Meanwhile, crop farmers working smaller 
holdings are thought to have been generally too poor themselves to employ more workers. And so, across 
the ‘latifundia/minifundia’ divide, the rural economy expelled workers rather than retain them. Because 
most people in Uruguay still lived in the countryside, it is widely accepted that this process led to widespread 
rural poverty which fuelled both political violence, in the uprisings of  and , and rural-to-urban 
migration.3 Scholars have found exceptions to this general pattern, pointing to some labour-intensive niches 
 
1 Moraes, Pradera, . 
2 For two classic statements of this argument, from economics and history respectively, see Instituto de Economía, 
El proceso and Barrán and Nahum, Agricultura, -. 
3 The classic account of rural impoverishment (pobrerío rural) in this context is Barrán and Nahum, Barrán and 
Nahum, Revoluciones, -. See also Aldo E. Solari, Sociología rural nacional (Montevideo, ); José Pedro Barrán 
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such as sheep shearing.4 But the premise that the rise in agricultural output and productivity during 
‘modernization’ destroyed more rural jobs than it created remains nearly universal, despite the fact that no 
detailed occupational data has been mobilised to prove this point, and no pre- estimates of the 
employment structure of the economy even exist.  
This chapter fills that gap by examining the history of occupational structures in the period. It provides 
original, detailed, and internationally comparable data on the occupations of informal as well as formal 
workers in rural and urban Uruguay in  and . To do this, a diverse but cohesive set of sources was 
explored, including population and agricultural censuses as well as individual-level sources (Table .). The 
emphasis throughout is on relative shares more than absolute numbers, not only because margins of error 
are smaller for the former, but also because very fast demographic growth in this period means that in 
absolute terms employment across most sectors must have grown significantly. In the two decades before 
, Uruguay received, relative to population, more immigrants than the United States, and was only 
behind Argentina and Canada in global immigration rates.5 Natural population growth contributed as much 
as immigration to population increases, as fertility rates remained at pre-demographic transition levels while 
mortality decreased.6 Changes or continuities in agricultural employment should be then understood as 
reflecting primarily the livelihoods and choices of new entrants to the labour market, whether immigrants 
or young Uruguayans.  
  
 
and Benjamín Nahum, Batlle, los estancieros y el Imperio Británico (Montevideo, ); Millot and Bertino, Historia 
económica, ; Moraes, Pradera, -. On the idea that wire-fencing caused widespread ‘technological 
unemployment’, see Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, -. 
4 Diego Piñeiro, Mariela Bianco, and María Inés Moraes, Trabajadores de la esquila: pasado y presente de un oficio 
rural (Montevideo, ); María Inés Moraes, El trabajo de la esquila y los esquiladores: algunos aspectos de su historia 
social (-) (); Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, -. For a description of sheep shearing crews and 
their work, see Roberto J. Bouton, La vida rural en el Uruguay (Montevideo, ): -. 
5 Sánchez Alonso, ‘The other Europeans’, . On Uruguay’s migration policy, see Carlos Zubillaga, La utopía 
cosmopolita. Tres perspectivas históricas de la inmigración masiva en Uruguay (Montevideo, ): - and María del 
Pilar Cagiao Vila, ‘La inmigración gallega en Uruguay (-),’ Anuario Americanista Europeo,  (). 
6 Adela Pellegrino and Raquel Pollero, ‘Fecundidad y situación conyugal en el Uruguay. Un análisis retrospectivo,’ 
in Cambios demográficos en América Latina: la experiencia de cinco siglos, ed. Dora Estela Celton, Carmen A. Miró, and 
Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz (Córdoba, ). 
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TABLE 5.1. Sources for reconstructing the occupational structure of Uruguay, 1890-1908 
Notes: ‘Adults’ refers to people  years old and older. ‘Adults with occupation’ refers to those people who were recorded 
with gainful employment. 
Sources: Dirección General de Estadística: Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Censo General de 
la República en , Tomo II, Parte II, ; Anuario Estadístico , p. ; Anuario Estadístico , p. ; Junta 
Económico-Administrativa de Montevideo: Censo Municipal del Departamento y la Ciudad de Montevideo, 
Montevideo: Establecimiento Tipográfico Oriental, ; Registro General de Estado Civil (Uruguay), Libros de 
Partidas de Nacimiento. 
 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first section reconstructs the employment of women and 
men in , as well as district-level population densities across the country, to paint a picture of the sectoral 
demands for labour resources towards the end of ‘rural modernization’. The second section studies the pre-
census period making extensive use of the birth records from the Registro de Estado Civil, an extremely rich 
archival trove resulting from the state taking over registration from the Catholic Church and which, to my 
knowledge, has never been systematically used by historians before. The third section offers new estimates 
of sectoral productivity and uses them as a vantage point to revisit the debates on the potential of export 
agriculture to sustain long-term development in Uruguay and beyond. The conclusion takes stock of the 
results and summarises their challenges to the conventional wisdom. 
 
 Male 
occupations 
Female 
occupations 
Spatial 
resolution 
Date 
Adults with 
occupation 
Method used 
1908 Uruguay 
population census 
209 61 Provinces 12/10/1908 297,975 men 
57,846 women 
Coding of all 
data 
1908 Montevideo 
population census 
212 58 Province 12/10/1908 120,189 men 
21,624 women 
Coding of all 
data 
1908 Uruguay 
agricultural census 
4 4 Districts Sep-Nov 
1908 
69,399 men 
22,917 women 
Recalculation 
(see text) 
1890 Uruguay      
birth records 
67                
(in sample) 
inconsistently 
reported 
Districts Jan-Dec 
1890 
27,899 fathers Random 
sample 
1890 Montevideo 
birth records 
58                      
(in sample) 
inconsistently 
reported 
Districts Jan-Dec 
1890 
8,218 fathers Random 
sample 
1889 Montevideo 
population census 
175 61 Province 18/11/1889 73,812 men Coding of all 
data 
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1 The world of work in 1908 
The  population census provides the best starting point for reconstructing Uruguay’s occupational 
structures in the period of export-led growth, large-scale immigration, and agricultural change during the 
First Globalization. It was part of a major statistical project (including agricultural, industrial, and housing 
censuses) with which the government, emerging victorious from the last civil war (), tried to cement 
its programme of reforms. An unprecedented and carefully planned operation using the latest technology 
available, the  population census is considered a seminal enumeration by historical demographers, and 
one reflecting the planning concerns of an emerging welfare state.7 Moreover, and crucial for present 
purposes, it was the first nation-wide enumeration to record people’s occupations and its planning 
commission were keenly aware of the need for detail in such data. Census-takers were instructed to ‘avoid 
terms which are too general, such as merchant or dealer, factory worker, artist, teacher, employee, or day 
labourer’, and to prompt ‘the maker or dealer to make explicit the kind of articles he produces or deals in; 
the artist to say whether he is a painter, a musician, a theatre actor, or a poet, etc.; the sculptor whether he 
works on wood, marble, etc.’, as well as, and quantitatively more importantly, asking ‘the day labourer 
whether he is a farm worker, a ranch hand, a meat factory worker, a rail worker, a builder’s labourer, a road 
worker, etc.’8 
 
1.1. The 1908 census: promise and pitfalls 
Despite the population census’s generally well-executed ambition, from the point of view of its potential to 
provide high-quality occupational data it proves problematic on two fronts. First, the general returns 
reported a considerable share (c.) of day labourers (jornaleros) in the male workforce, without offering 
any indication as to their sectoral employment. Given that the enumerators’ books were destroyed on 
account of the answers to questions concerning religious beliefs needing to remain anonymous, the planners’ 
 
7 Juan José Calvo, ‘Introducción,’ in Detrás de los tres millones, ed. Programa de Población (Montevideo, ): ; 
Adela Pellegrino, La población de Uruguay. Breve caracterización demográfica (Montevideo, ). 
8 ‘Se evitarán los términos demasiado generales de comerciante ó negociante, industrial, artista, profesor, 
empleado, peón jornalero, etc., debiendo especificarse con precisión el ramo de comercio, industria, arte-enseñanza ó 
trabajo del censado, y hasta en ciertos casos, la materia que se elabora; el fabricante ó comerciante expresará la clase de 
artículos que fabrica ó en que comercia; el artista dirá si es pintor, músico, dramático, lírico, etc.; el escultor; si lo es en 
madera, marmol, etc.; el profesor, si lo es de dibujo, esgrima, instrucción primaria, etc.; el mecánico ó maquinista, si lo 
es de ferrocarril, vapor, etc. el empleado público, si lo es de policía, correos, aduana, etc.; el empleado privado, si lo es 
de tienda, almacén, café, banco, ferrocarril, telégrafo, etc.; el peón, si lo es agrícola, de estancia, saladero, ferrocarril, 
albañil, caminero, etc.’ BN, Sala Uruguay, Registro Número , Dirección del Censo Nacional, “Instrucciones para 
el levantamiento de los censos,” item VIII, questions  and  (September th, ).  
 
 
 
 
efforts to provide posterity with detailed information about the work of labourers were foiled. Second, the 
official figures seem to grossly underestimate female labour in agriculture: the implied share of primary 
sector workers who were women is below . Taken at face value, this figure would lend support to the idea 
that (especially export-oriented) agriculture did not offer women opportunities to make money. Let us 
consider how male day labourers can be allocated to the sectors they worked in, as well as how the problem 
of the under-reporting of female agricultural workers can be tackled. As we will see, these issues are far more 
than a matter of statistical hair-splitting and can reshape our understanding of agricultural work and workers 
in modernising Uruguay.  
The methodological problem of estimating the agricultural/non-agricultural breakdown of a 
considerable number of workers described as ‘labourers’ in historical sources is not unique to Uruguay. It is 
also not simply a result of problematic registration practices, but an issue revealing of seasonality in 
employment opportunities and composite, multi-sited economic strategies: the same worker could harvest 
wheat in January and build roads in May, and was not necessarily in employment all year round.9 In the 
context of late-nineteenth century Uruguay, the expression peones jornaleros, or simply jornaleros, can be 
translated as ‘day labourers’: employees paid in money wages which were calculated on a daily basis. They 
worked in farms and ranches, but also in factories or docks, or even for the state building roads. This lack 
of precision in the registration of such workers is found in many other places: a similar description would 
fit, for example, about a third of adult male workers in England and Wales in , according to a quasi-
census of employment produced by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social 
Structure.10 In the British case several methods have been used to allocate labourers between sectors, 
resulting in widely different pictures of the shape of the economy: Crafts allocated all labourers to 
agriculture; Broadberry, Campbell, and van Leeuwen assumed that the labourers’ agricultural/non-
agricultural split was analogous to that of non-labourers (which is basically the same as not including 
labourers in any sector); Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley used the labourers-to-non-labourers ratio across sectors 
of a later census, while Keibek estimated the number of labourers required by agriculture through parish-
level regression analyses.11  
 
9 Juan Rial, Población y desarrollo en un pequeño país: Uruguay, - (Montevideo, ). 
10 P.M. Kitson et al., ‘The creation of a “census” of adult male employment for England and Wales for ,’ Cambridge 
Working Papers in Economic and Social History,  (). 
11 N. F. R. Crafts, British Economic Growth During the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, ): ; Stephen Broadberry, 
Bruce Campbell, and Bas van Leeuwen, ‘When did Britain industrialise? The sectoral distribution of the labour force and 
labour productivity in Britain, –,’ EEH ,  (): ; Leigh Shaw-Taylor and E. A. Wrigley, ‘Occupational 
structure and population change,’ in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud, Jane 
Humphries, and Paul Johnson (Cambridge, ); Sebastian A.J. Keibek, ‘Allocating labourers to occupational 
(sub)sectors using regression techniques,’ Cambridge Working Papers in Economic and Social History,  (). 
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In the Uruguayan case, these methods are either implausible (allocating all labourers to agriculture in a 
country with an urbanization rate of c. would be ill-advised, and assuming labourers distribute 
themselves in sectors just like workers with specific trades seems unwise in most contexts), or impracticable 
due to lack of sources: the next census returns reliably reporting labourers by sector are from , by which 
point technology and production processes were very different in agriculture; and labourers in the  
returns are reported only at the level of  provinces, a spatial resolution which cannot produce meaningful 
estimates on the regional labour requirements of agriculture based on soil quality and other factors. However, 
the number of male labourers in the primary sector can be estimated by comparing the returns of the  
population census with the agricultural census conducted that same year. These enumerations not only 
counted the agricultural workforce (L) in , but they did so from different perspectives. The population 
census asked questions with the aim of describing the workforce from the perspective of their ‘profession’, 
differentiating between men with specific rural trades (𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) such as shearers, horse-breakers, and drovers, 
and those agricultural labourers (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) with no specified occupation (equation ).  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 is unknown to us, 
however, because the final census returns add up all labourers (agricultural or not) in the same category, and 
no other returns survive. On the other hand, the agricultural census looked at labour relations, asking whether 
men in the countryside were wage-earning employees (Lw) or employers (Le), reporting the number of ‘male 
staff ’ in each rural district as well as the number of farms or ranches ‘exploited [worked] by their owners’ 
(equation ). Given I will classify occupations based on descriptors reflecting both the specific tasks 
performed at work and the hierarchy in the workplace, these two complementary ways of looking at the male 
workforce can be used to calculate  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, that is, the number of rural labourers (equation ). 
 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 [1] 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 + 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 [2] 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 =  𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 + 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 −  𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 [3] 
 
Because the agricultural census and the population census were both taken during spring (when labour 
requirements were higher than in winter, but lower than in summer), this simple calculation offers a 
plausible estimate for the average agriculture/non-agriculture split of labourers throughout the year, and one 
which has the advantage of being based on primary sources from the time and place for which the estimate 
is produced. The resulting figure for  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 was added to the agricultural workforce and divided between 
arable and pastoral agriculture using the agricultural census’s categorization of productive units. The 
remaining labourers were allocated -to- between the secondary and tertiary sector, as the former 
containing the sub-sectors more commonly associated with labourers according to the census board’s 
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instructions to census-takers. These labourers were included in the residual categories within those sectors, 
as I was not able to allocate them to specific industries. 
A similar approach can be taken to the problem of female participation in the primary sector. The figure 
reported in the agricultural census of women employed in farms and ranches is much higher than the 
population census’s total of women with occupations in arable or pastoral agriculture. This suggests that the 
assumption some scholars have made that the population census counted people engaged in domestic labour 
in the countryside as agricultural workers is mistaken.12 Again, given that the censuses were taken in the 
same season of the same year, it can be reasonably assumed that the population census, which had the 
household as its unit of analysis, generally recorded women as ‘farmers’ or ‘ranchers’ only if they owned the 
land or were considered the head of their household. In addition, a small share of women were recorded 
with specific agricultural trades (orchard grower, vine grower, herder, etc.), but there was no occupational 
category for farmers’ wives or daughters who worked the land. The agricultural census’s returns, however, 
had farms and ranches as units of analysis, and the respondents presumably included everyone (or at least 
closer to everyone) who worked in the productive unit, distinguishing between men, women, and children. 
Therefore, I have recalculated the female workforce in agriculture by adding the number of adult female 
staff in farms and ranches reported in the agricultural census (which presumably includes women with 
specific rural occupations) to the number of female ‘farmers’ and ‘ranchers’ recorded in the population 
census. This results in the female share of the agricultural workforce increasing from below  to over : 
likely still an understatement, but a much more reasonable figure that more accurately describes women’s 
contribution to arable as well as pastoral farming, on which more later.  
With all these corrections, we can produce a detailed occupational structure of Uruguay in  
(Table .).13  
  
 
12 See, for the most influential example, Juan José Pereira and Raúl Trajtenberg, Evolución de la población total y 
activa en el Uruguay, - (Montevideo, ). 
13 The occupational classification is based on the PSTI system, September  version; details can be found in 
the Appendix and the data are available in Excel format in the Additional Materials. PSTI is an occupational coding 
system designed by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure for international 
comparison, on the basis of E. A. Wrigley, ‘The PST System for Classifying Occupations,’ (Cambridge, ). Even 
though the Uruguayan sources report workers of all ages, all the data presented here refers to workers over  years 
old, to allow for comparison with the rest of the countries where the PSTI occupational data has been produced. 
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Notes: values in columns - refer to the percentage of gainfully employed people (men, women, or both) working in 
each (sub)sector; column  (‘female share’) refers to the share of total workers in any one (sub)sector who were women. 
Sources:  population census and  agricultural census (see Table . for source details). 
 
  
 Male workers Female workers All workers Female share 
  Primary   38.5 36.3 38.0 21.1 
 Arable farming  20.1 15.7 19.1 18.0 
 Livestock farming  18.0 18.4 18.1 22.4 
 Rest of primary  0.3 2.3 0.8 65.3 
  Secondary   29.0 18.1 26.6 15.0 
  Construction   6.5 0.1 5.1 0.2 
 Food industries  2.6 1.3 2.3 12.2 
 Textiles  2.4 4.1 2.8 32.6 
 Clothing  0.1 12.7 2.9 96.9 
 Blacksmiths and metalworkers  1.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 
 Printers, bookbinders  0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 
 Leather industries  0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 
 Tools and machines  0.8 0.0 0.6 0.0 
 Rest of manufacturing  2.3 0.3 1.8 4.1 
 Mining and quarrying  0.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 
 Rest of secondary (incl. labourers) 11.5 0.9 9.2 2.1 
Tertiary 32.5 45.5 35.4 28.3 
  Retail and wholesale   9.5 0.9 7.6 2.6 
 Government  6.1 0.0 4.8 0.2 
  Transport   3.1 0.1 2.4 1.2 
 Domestic and personal service  1.5 30.5 7.9 85.2 
 Financial and commercial services  1.2 0 0.9 0.7 
 Food and accommodation services  0.4 5.1 1.5 76.8 
 Education  0.4 3.4 1.0 72.5 
 Law  0.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 
 Medicine  0.2 0.0 0.1 1.3 
 Other employees in services  6.5 4.4 6.1 16.1 
 Rest of tertiary  3.2 1.0 2.7 8.2 
 Total  100 100 100 22.0 
 Participation rate  88.4 26.1 57.9 
 
TABLE 5.2. Occupational structure of Uruguay, 1908 (shares) (including labourers) 
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1.2. Population geography and employment: solving the rural paradox 
This new estimate of Uruguay’s occupational structure sheds new light on the nature and extent of rural 
development at the height of the era of export-led growth during the First Globalization. Until now, the 
consensus among historical demographers that Uruguay’s population was still predominantly rural by , 
with about  of people living in small settlements of under , inhabitants, has not been reciprocated 
by economic historians with a similarly agreed-upon figure for the size of the agricultural workforce (Table 
.).14 The most influential estimates published to date suggest that fewer people worked in pastoral or arable 
farming ( or  per cent) than in the service sector, with only about half of the rural population employed 
in agriculture. These would suggest either extremely diversified village economies that do not fit their very 
low population densities, or widespread unemployment and poverty across much of the countryside, which 
is inconsistent with the still relatively low incidence of rural-to-urban migration: in this period the growth 
of Montevideo and other cities was due more to overseas immigrants and natural population increase than 
to rural-to-urban migration.15 The only other published estimate provides a much higher figure for 
agriculture’s share of the workforce (almost  per cent) which would suggest either that productivity gains 
in livestock agriculture were much less impressive than economic historians have established, or that rural 
under- or occasional employment predominated over year-round work.16 More importantly, all three 
existing estimates do not use any other primary sources beyond the  population census to allocate 
labourers, nor do they correct the undercounting of female workers.  
No new estimates have been published since , so more recent contributions to the debate on the 
nature and consequences of rural modernization have simply chosen one of these three existing estimates.17 
The existing figures tell two incompatible stories: either Uruguay’s successful agricultural economy was 
unable to sustain the livelihoods of its mostly rural population, or productivity gains during ‘rural 
modernization’ were not as impressive as economic historians have shown. 
 
 
 
14 The first official census reporting urbanization rates for Uruguay is from ; demographers estimate, on the 
basis of district returns, that between . and . percent of population lived in towns of more than , inhabitants 
by . See Juan Rial and Jaime Klaczko, Uruguay: el país urbano (Montevideo, ). 
15 Large-scale rural-urban internal migration in Uruguay consolidated after the period under study, particularly 
in the second half of the th century; see Mario Lombardi and Danilo Veiga, ‘Estructura socioeconómica y distribución 
espacial de la población en el Uruguay,’ Cuadernos del CIESU  (). 
16 See, for an overview of productivity improvements in the period, Moraes, ‘Capitalismo pastor’. 
17 See, for example, Millot and Bertino, Historia económica, -; Bértola, ‘Primer Batllismo’, ; Martínez-
Galarraga, Rodríguez Miranda, and Willebald, ‘Patterns’. 
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TABLE 5.3. Published estimates of the workforce in agriculture in Uruguay, 1908 
Sources: Rama, Ascenso; Klaczko, ‘Población’; Rial, Población, and author’s calculations (see text). 
 
Neither of those stories hold up to the evidence. Our new estimate offers the first attempt to solve the 
agricultural/non-agricultural split of labourers with reference to primary sources rather than a guesstimate, 
and recalculates agricultural employment on the basis of individual occupational categories, rather than 
taking the census’s subtotals at face value. The results demonstrate that by  Uruguay’s rural economy 
was still overwhelmingly agricultural. Arable and pastoral farming remained the foundation of rural 
livelihoods for two out of three adults, as agriculture was the employer of last resort for most rural people 
and the largest sectoral employer in the economy at large. This fundamentally challenges the picture painted 
by Rama’s influential estimates, popularised in the most widely cited economic histories of Uruguay and 
Latin America by Finch and Bulmer-Thomas respectively, which implausibly suggested that the relative size 
of the Uruguayan agricultural labour-force was very similar to Australia’s or New Zealand’s, economies with 
average incomes  higher than Uruguay’s.18 
On the other hand, my new estimate is, as we will see below, more optimistic than Klaczko’s about the 
labour productivity of the Uruguayan livestock sector, and so is more in line with rural historians’ account 
of agricultural change in the period. Moreover, with about  the population living in rural areas and 
villages, the fact that less than  of workers were employed in agriculture suggests that agricultural 
 
18 M. H. J. Finch, A political economy of Uruguay since  (London, ): ; Bulmer-Thomas, Economic 
History, . For income comparisons, see Bolt et al., ‘Rebasing “Maddison”’. 
 Workforce in 
agriculture (%) 
Largest 
employer 
Method of allocation of labourers 
Sectoral classification 
method 
Rama (1969) 28.5 Services Allocated equally between 
secondary and tertiary sectors 
Census’s subtotals by sector 
Klaczko (1979) 44.1 Agriculture All labourers living outside the 
capital allocated to agriculture 
Census’s subtotals by sector 
Rial (1981) 33.4 Services None: labourers subtracted from 
the workforce 
Census’s subtotals by sector 
New estimates 
(this chapter) 
38.0 Agriculture Calculated labourers in arable and 
pastoral agriculture from primary 
data; remaining labourers allocated 
2-to-1 between secondary and 
tertiary sectors 
Sectoral employment 
calculated from individual 
occupational categories 
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productivity was high enough to sustain not only large urban centres, but also a degree of differentiation 
and labour specialization in market towns as well.   
While agriculture remained in  the largest employer, farming and ranching no longer accounted 
for most of the workforce. The age structure of male workers by sector offers a picture of the process 
underway, with older workers concentrated in agriculture and younger men, especially the teenage new 
entrants to the labour market, finding employment mostly in the secondary sector (construction and 
manufacturing) and services (Graph .). As we will see below, this age structure also relates to the 
demographic profile of migrants, who were on average younger than local economically active men and 
tended to find work outside agriculture. 
 
GRAPH 5.1. Male occupational structure by age groups in Uruguay, 1908 
Share of the male workforce by age cohort and sector (not including labourers) 
 
Source:  population census (see Table . for source details). 
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These employment dynamics also shaped the spatial distribution of Uruguay’s population, which we 
can now map for the first time in detail: an almost empty central plain surrounded by a few towns (Map 
.). The dominance of livestock over crops, central to the ‘spatial code’ of agrarian capitalism in the country, 
promoted the population geography characteristic of modern Uruguay: an expanse of lightly populated 
grassland villages surrounded by a few distant cities, rather than many small market towns.19 The areas of 
horticulture, dairy production, and especially grain and wine farming in the south and south-west, islands 
of ploughs in a sea of pastures, were the regional space that came the closest to a continuum of sizable 
settlements.  
This pattern of occupations is consistent not only with Uruguay’s urbanization rate, very high by Latin 
American standards, but also with the size of its capital in particular.20 Montevideo was by  a 
metropolitan city of over , inhabitants, and would remain throughout the twentieth century about 
ten times more populous than the second largest town.21 From an economic geography perspective, 
Montevideo combined a series of agglomeration advantages and catalysts that explained its size: it was the 
political capital as well as the major port and, except for meat-packing in the western littoral, it was also 
home to the largest factories. These advantages, consolidated in the context of agricultural intensification in 
this period, contribute to explain why Uruguay does not follow the rank-size rule of urban hierarchy, a 
regularity found in historical demography when the second city in a country is about half as large as the first 
and so on.22 
 
 
  
 
19 See Chapter  for an analysis of the geography of agriculture in this period. The link between pastoral 
specialization and population geography in Uruguay was first hypothesised by Susana Prates, Ganadería extensiva y 
población (Montevideo, ) and Danilo Veiga, Regional Development and Population Distribution in Uruguay 
(Montevideo, ). The concept of ‘spatial code’ was introduced in Chapter ; its original formulation can be found 
in Lefebvre, Production. 
20 Rial and Klaczko, País urbano. 
21 Juan Rial, ‘Uruguay. La génesis de un país urbano macrocefálico,’ Revista EURE-Revista de Estudios Urbano 
Regionales ,  (). 
22 For a discussion of the rank-size rule and urban hierarchy in economic history, with particular reference to England, 
see Wrigley, Poverty, -. For European evidence in support of the rule, see the seminal Jan de Vries, European 
Urbanization - (London, ). 
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MAP 5.1. Population geography of Uruguay, 1908 
Districts in each category add up to 10% of the national population 
Towns over 10,000 inhabitants shown. Montevideo in inset map 
 
Sources: drawn by the author from the district-level returns of the  population census (see Table .). 
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The importance of services and manufacturing in the occupational structure is also a function of 
comparatively high average living standards, which, given different income elasticities of demand, made the 
market for manufactures and services grew faster than the market for foodstuffs. Moreover, the variety of 
non-agricultural occupations can be linked to improvements in schooling in the late-nineteenth century, 
leading to Latin America’s highest literacy rate (c. in ) for women as well as men. This was a result 
of both state investment in public schools and living standards being high enough to allow many children 
the free time to go to school daily.23 The expansion in primary education was fundamentally built upon 
female labour: schoolteachers were mostly young and came from rural villages, even if they were all trained 
in Montevideo since .24 Educational attainment beyond primary schooling can also be seen in the 
occupational data, which already showed the first female university graduates as physicians and lawyers in 
the first decade of the twentieth century. 
Given the lack of directly comparable estimates for other Latin American countries, we cannot yet 
ascertain how typical or atypical this structure is in the continent, or how representative it is of the Southern 
Cone in particular. Nevertheless, comparison with Spain and Italy, from where most migrants came to 
Uruguay in this period, is particularly instructive. The share of the labour force in agriculture only dived 
below  in Italy in the s and in Spain in the s, a full half century after Uruguay.25 Despite being, 
like them, an agricultural exporter, Uruguay’s livestock economy required a much smaller share of the 
workforce than Spain’s or Italy’s agrarian production. Given such different economic structures, it is 
unsurprising that real wages in Uruguay were three times higher than the southern European average.26 The 
hundreds of thousands of migrants that disembarked in Montevideo were therefore moving to an economy 
with a substantially different employment pattern, and they adapted and contributed to it. As part of the 
‘late’ wave of movers in the age of mass migration, they were mostly male and young.27 Migrants entering 
the labour market found employment disproportionately in the secondary sector: foreign-born males, who 
represented by   of the total adult male population, constituted in my estimates up to half of the 
 
23 Sokoloff and Engerman, ‘Institutions’. 
24 For an excellent account of the part played by female schoolteachers in the expansion of mass education in rural 
as well as urban Uruguay, see Jens R Hentschke, ‘More than “queens of the home”: positivist modernisation, teacher 
training, and gender mobility in Uruguay, –,’ Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies ,  (). 
25 Natalia Mora-Sitja, ‘Spain,’ in Occupational Structure and Industrialization in a Comparative Perspective, ed. 
Osamu Saito and Leigh Shaw-Taylor (Cambridge, forthcoming); Paolo Malanima and Vittorio Daniele, ‘Italy,’ in 
Occupational Structure and Industrialization in a Comparative Perspective, ed. Osamu Saito and Leigh Shaw-Taylor 
(Cambridge, forthcoming). 
26 Williamson, ‘Real wages’. 
27 María Magdalena Camou, ‘Family formation, gender and labour during the First Globalization in Montevideo, 
Uruguay,’ in Cliometrics of the Family (). 
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male workers in construction and machine making, and more than  of those in textile production and 
shoemaking as well as food and accommodation services.28 Social historians have shown that Spaniards and 
Italians were also over-represented among owners of manufacturing firms and workshops, and often 
outnumbered locals in the leadership of trade societies and unions.29 Female migrants, for their part, made 
up  of adult women in , and those who entered the workforce had an employment structure much 
more similar to that of Uruguayan female workers, concentrating in some of the same sub-sectors (domestic 
service, textiles, and clothing), although foreign women were over-represented in food and accommodation 
services and significantly under-represented in livestock farming. This is, to an extent, the result of human 
capital dynamics: most farmers of any sort were born into farming families, and thereby acquired specific 
skills. But it was also related to the issue of access to land: unlike in next-door Argentina, the agricultural 
frontier in modernizing Uruguay had been closed for longer, and so relatively fewer immigrants could 
become farmers.30 
This under-representation in pastoral agriculture extended also to male foreigners, who accounted for 
only  of those working with cattle and sheep. Livestock farming remained predominantly an employer 
of Uruguayans, women and men, who also made up the vast majority of landowners (almost ) and of 
managers of pastoral farms and ranches (more than ), and owned the majority of cattle and sheep ( 
of livestock units).31 The fact that agricultural land, the key natural resource for the leading sector, remained 
in the hands of Uruguayans has long been considered by local historiography as a key difference with other 
Latin American economies, where natural resources were predominantly owned by foreign capital.32 This 
would have ensured that most of the profits were reinvested in the country. The evidence presented here 
 
28 By ‘adult population’ in this context I mean people at least  years old. My calculations on the  population 
census returns. DGE, Anuario Estadístico -, Tomo II, Parte II, Montevideo: VII, XIV. 
29 Alcides Beretta Curi, Inmigración europea e industria: Uruguay en la región (-) (Montevideo, ): 
-; Sergio Rodríguez Villamil and Graciela Sapriza, La inmigración europea en el uruguay. Los italianos 
(Montevideo, ). 
30 On immigrant farmers in late-nineteenth century Argentina, see Julio Djenderedjian, Gringos en las pampas: 
inmigrantes y colonos en el campo argentino (Buenos Aires, ). On the failure of public and private attempts to 
promote agricultural settlement in Uruguay since the late-nineteenth century, see Isaac Morón, ‘Problemas de la 
colonización en el Uruguay,’ in Anales de la Universidad de Montevideo (Montevideo, ); for an account of a success 
story, see the local history by Omar Moreira, Colonia Suiza Nueva Helvecia. En el ojo de la lupa (Colonia Suiza, ). 
31 My calculations on the basis of the  agricultural census returns. DGE, Anuario Estadístico -, Tomo 
II, Parte II, Montevideo: ; ; -. Livestock units are used to standardise the number of animals according 
to their grazing or fodder requirements (a cow is equivalent to roughly five sheep, and so on). Here I use the coefficients 
suggested for Uruguay by INIA, Revisión. For a discussion on different methods of calculating LUs in Uruguay, see 
Jorge Álvarez, ‘Instituciones, cambio tecnológico y productividad en los sistemas agrarios de Nueva Zelanda y Uruguay. 
Patrones y trayectorias de largo plazo’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Universidad de la República, ), -. 
32 Barrán and Nahum, Civilización. 
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suggests that labour was also predominantly Uruguayan in livestock production, which must have also 
contributed to the spill-over effects of pastoral agriculture through increased demand without part of the 
incomes being ‘lost’ (from the perspective of the domestic economy) to remittances.33 
1.3. Women and market-oriented agriculture 
The gender dimension deserves further consideration. The mainstream historiographical view of female 
labour in the Uruguayan rural economy stressed their seasonal participation in arable farming and 
considered their contribution to market-oriented agriculture, and ranching in particular, to be largely 
limited to times of crisis or civil war.34 The erasure of the work of women in livestock farming in this period 
extends beyond economic historiography to reach more influential realms, notably art. In Juan Manuel 
Blanes’s famous oil paintings of rural scenes from this period (to be found in every school history textbook 
in Uruguay), women, when they appear, are never dressed for ranch work and their presence suggests that 
men are taking a break from it, as women often offer them a drink of mate (Illustration .).  
Illustration 5.1. Uno de los tres chiripás, 1881 by Juan Manuel Blanes (oil on canvas) 
 
 
  
 
33 Remittances are a topic deserving further study in the case of Uruguay as well as other settler economies. For a 
pioneering analysis, see Warren Dean, Remittances of Italian Immigrants: From Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and USA, 
- (New York, ). 
34 José Pedro Barrán and Benjamín Nahum, Barrán and Nahum, Historia Rural I, . 
Source: Museo Nacional de Artes Visuales, Montevideo. 
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Our new estimates, which correct the pervasive under-counting of female rural workers in the 
population census, demonstrate that almost a quarter of all livestock workers were women. Female livestock 
workers represented in fact a larger share of the female workforce than their male counterparts did of 
gainfully occupied men. Indeed, female participation in pastoral agriculture was higher than in most other 
sectors and even above the overall share of women in the national workforce (Graph .). Without their 
contribution it is difficult to imagine how the output of livestock agriculture could have grown as it did in 
the closing decades of the nineteenth century, because wages would have had to rise in the sector in order 
to attract extra men. 
 
GRAPH 5.2. Female workers as share of the total workforce by sub-sector, 1908 
Dotted line represents the share of women in the total national workforce 
 
Sources:  population census and  agricultural census (see Table .; Table . contains source details). 
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This new perspective on female rural labour complements the ongoing reassessment in the literature 
on the urban economic activities of women in the period, and suggest that there is much scope for rewriting 
the history of female labour in Uruguay.35 In particular, my new estimate of the general female activity rate 
in  (i.e. the share of the adult women who were economically active) results in a significant increase 
from the up to now accepted figure of  to .36 This can fundamentally change our perspective of 
women’s participation in the labour market in the twentieth century, as it suggests that female activity rates 
remained relatively stagnant, rather than significantly grew, between the s and s, an important 
finding the implications of which fall beyond the chronological scope of this dissertation and should be the 
subject of future research. 
 
2 Before the census 
Useful as the corrected figures of the  census are to paint a picture of the Uruguayan economy at the 
end of our period, we can only get a sense of structural change during Uruguay’s ‘rural modernization’ if we 
compare them with the structure of employment in the previous decades. The lack of national censuses or 
any other comprehensive enumeration recording occupations before  means that we have to resort to 
individual-level sources, and rely on a method that allows us to construct a representative picture from them.  
Uruguay’s political past turns out to be, in this context, very generous to the economic historian. As a 
result of the relatively—by Latin American standards—short-lived colonial period (less than a century 
passed between the foundation of Montevideo and the start of the independence revolution), the Uruguayan 
Catholic Church did not wield a temporal power comparable with the influence it enjoyed elsewhere in the 
continent. It could be said the Church’s hold on the country was, much like the Spanish colonial state’s had 
been, ‘weak because it was tardy.’37 By the late-nineteenth century, Uruguay was, to borrow Real de Azúa’s 
eloquent definition, ‘the faintest star in the Catholic firmament of Latin America.’38 It was therefore 
politically possible for successive governments to progressively take on functions and spaces the Church 
once monopolised (graveyards, schools, hospitals, record-keeping), establish free, secular, and mandatory 
primary school attendance, and eventually establish Uruguay as a completely secular state in the  
 
35 For an overview of the expanding female roles in the urban economy, see Camou, ‘Family formation’. 
36 For the most recent published estimates of female participation rates, see Sebastián Fleitas and Carolina Román, 
‘Evolución de la población económicamente activa en el siglo XX: un análisis de la estructura por sexo, edad y 
generaciones,’ Boletín de Historia Ecónomica VIII,  (). 
37 Gerardo Caetano and José Pedro Rilla, Historia contemporánea del Uruguay: de la colonia al Mercosur 
(Montevideo, ): . 
38 Carlos Real de Azúa, Uruguay, ¿una sociedad amortiguadora? (Montevideo, ): . 
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constitution, all without facing great opposition.39 This matters for present purposes because in  the 
national state took over vital registration from the Church: births, marriages, and deaths had to be recorded 
with the newly created Registro de Estado Civil (Civil Registry) before any religious sacraments took place.40 
Birth registration was mandatory within twenty days (ten days in urban areas), free of charge, and issued by 
Justices of the Peace in each court district. A copy of the certificate was sent to each provincial capital and 
to the national record office in Montevideo, where they remain to this day. This government takeover of 
registration turned out to be much more than a change of management, forms, and stamps: it pioneered the 
first drive to full vital registration in Latin America.41 
 
2.1. Sources 
The new secular birth records, unlike the previous religious ones, included children born out of wedlock 
and, crucially, recorded the father’s occupation (Illustration .). Another significant advantage is that they 
were centrally processed and kept, which means that the rate of source survival does not depend on the 
circumstances of the district where the birth was recorded. The records follow a narrative template which 
contains information about the place of birth, as well as the nationality, age, and occupation of parents, 
grandparents, and witnesses to the registration. Because the father was asked to declare his own age and to 
sign the register, these records could also be relied upon to estimate numeracy and literacy rates (in the 
example in Illustration . the father says he is thirty years old and does not know how to sign his name), 
among many other possible uses for economic and social historians. Despite the wealth of individual-level 
data offered by the birth records, the usually readable handwriting of court clerks, and the almost perfect 
rate and conditions of source survival, scholars have, to my knowledge, never explored them systematically 
as a source, other than for reconstructing individual family histories or for tracing particular lineages.  
 
 
39 José Pedro Barrán, Iglesia Católica y burguesía en el Uruguay de la modernización (-) (Montevideo, 
); Gerardo Caetano and Roger Geymonat, La secularización uruguaya (-): Catolicismo y privatización de 
lo religioso (Montevideo, ). 
40 Religious ceremonies remained recognised as legal basis for marriage until , when secular ceremonies were 
ruled by law to be the only ones valid in the eyes of the state.  
41 Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter, ‘Recognition and Registration: The Infrastructure of Personhood in World 
History,’ in Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History, ed. Keith Breckenridge and Simon 
Szreter (Oxford, ): . A similarly rigorous procedure was followed for civil marriage registration, and the resulting 
records contain valuable information regarding the occupation of women, both single (i.e. the bride) and married (the 
mothers of bride and groom). I have not been able to access them freely yet, but, if scholars are granted free access to them 
by the authorities, they could powerfully contribute to our understanding of female work in the late-nineteenth century. 
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ILLUSTRATION 5.2. Example of birth record: Eugenio Domingo Alonso Morales (b.1879) 
Father’s occupation (labrador, i.e. tiller) highlighted 
 
Source: author’s photograph, Dirección General del Registro de Estado Civil, Montevideo. 
 
The reasons for such neglect fall beyond the scope of this chapter, but at least two factors should be 
mentioned. First, these sources are not held in an archive, but in a civil registration office, an arena more 
familiar to lawyers and notaries than to historians and economists, and one where access to records is not 
free of charge.42 The second problem is that insights from this large corpus, containing millions of 
 
42 The office charges  Uruguayan pesos (about ., at current exchange rates) per item issued, a problem I have 
circumvented by largely relying on the microfilms of birth records freely available at the Family History Centres of the 
Church of the Latter-Day Saints, which have excellent coverage especially since . The microfilms of Uruguayan birth 
records (along with those of many other countries) are accessible online through the Family Search platform, but only 
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manuscript individual records from  up to  (when files became digital), can only be gained by 
systematically extracting large amounts of information, which requires a significant time investment by 
expert staff, as some contextual knowledge is required for effective transcription. A large team of scholars 
and a significant research grant would be needed to fully extract the data contained in all the records. The 
alternative is to work with representative samples. Given that the seminal historiography on this period was 
written before personal computers and statistical software were widely available, and that most historians 
remain unfamiliar with the potential and limitations of sampling methodologies, neither path has been 
explored until now and the potential of birth records emerging from the early years of state-led registration 
and recognition remains untapped. 
A crucial question regarding the usefulness of these birth records as sources, at least from the 
perspective of quantitative history, is the extent and quality of their coverage. Even if some under-
registration of births, particularly in rural areas, undoubtedly must have occurred, scholars have generally 
regarded the coverage of vital statistics in Uruguay through individual records in this period as reliable 
according to international standards.43 Moreover, the implied fertility rates calculated on the basis of these 
records ( live births per , women in reproductive age in , or about  live children per woman 
throughout her life) are in line with what can be expected of a pre-demographic transition society, which is 
how historical demographers have characterised Uruguay in this period.44 This scenario of high fertility 
rates also improves the chance that fathers (and their occupations) will be representative of men in general, 
as it makes it more likely that men in a fertile relationship will appear in the birth records as fathers. Because 
fathers were more likely to be young adults (the average age of fathers in the sample was  years old) than 
elderly men, if young adults were not representative of the overall male occupational structure, then the 
potential of birth records to estimate sectoral employment would be compromised. Fortunately, the 
occupational structure of men in  by age cohort shows men in their thirties to be the most representative 
age-group of the overall picture.45 
 
through computers connected to the Church’s Salt Lake City servers. I accessed them in the Family History Centre 
located in the Church of the Latter-Day Saints in Cherry Hinton (Cambridge, UK). I have repeatedly contacted the 
Uruguayan Registry authorities to try and gain free access to the original records, so far unsuccessfully. I trust free access 
for scholars will be granted eventually, once the authorities are convinced of the potential of the sources. 
43 Anne-Emanuelle Birn, ‘Uruguay‘s Child Rights Approach to Health: What Role for Civil Registration?,’ in 
Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History, ed. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter 
(Oxford, ): -. 
44 Pellegrino and Pollero, ‘Fecundidad’. 
45 See Graph . above.  
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2.2. Method 
The quality of the occupational data produced from these birth records depends not only on the reliability 
of the registration practices which produced the underlying data (which, I have argued, we have reason to 
think was relatively high) and on the fertility and age specificity of different occupations (which 
demographic scholarship and the  census’ age cohort data suggest does not produce large distortions), 
but also on the method used to extract information. Ideally, a quasi-census of fathers could be constructed 
extracting the father’s occupation from each birth record. Indeed, this method could (and hopefully will in 
the future) make up at least partially for the census hiatus in Uruguayan history, not only before  but 
also (and beyond the chronological boundaries of this thesis) between  and . However, such an 
approach is quite simply impracticable for a single researcher working within the time constraints of a three-
year doctoral dissertation. Fortunately, the specific questions this chapter asks of these birth records (what 
was the occupational structure of fathers, and, in particular, what was the share of fathers who worked in 
agriculture?) do not necessarily require, if we are willing to accept certain margins of error, the transcription 
of every single case. A sample which is random and large enough can give a reasonably representative image 
of the whole population of fathers who appear in the records. Let us consider how such a sample can be 
drawn, how large it should be, how accurate can it aspire to become, and finally how well can it ‘predict’ the 
actual male occupational structure calculated on the basis of a comprehensive census. 
Given that birth records are organised by court district and date, and therefore there could be 
periodicities that would bias the results, I chose to take a random sample rather than a systematic one.46 The 
choice of sample size depends, as always, on the variation of the population in the variable of interest (which 
in turn depends on the question we ask the data), as well as on the margins of error we are comfortable with 
and the likelihood of being wrong that we are prepared to accept.47 In this case, we are trying to make an 
inference about the share of male workforce employed in different sectors. In particular, we are interested in 
knowing what share of fathers were engaged in agriculture. Because we do not know how large that share 
was in the total population, we assume the maximum possible variation (i.e.  of fathers worked in 
agriculture,  did not). If we are further willing to accept a  in  chance of drawing an unlucky sample 
(in statistical terms, producing an estimate with a  confidence interval) within a margin of error of +/- 
 
46 I numbered all records sequentially and used the function ‘sample’ of the base package of the statistical software 
RStudio to provide a sample of  observations without replacement (the choice of sample size will be explained 
shortly). For a clear discussion of the difference between random and systematic samples, and the latter’s limitations 
for historical research, see Roger Schofield, ‘Sampling in historical research,’ in Nineteenth-Century Society: Essays in 
the Use of Quantitative Methods for the Study of Social Data, ed. E. A. Wrigley (Cambridge, ): -. 
47 The classic discussion of sample size estimation in traditional (i.e. non-Bayesian) sampling methods is William 
G. Cochran, Sampling Techniques (New York, ): -. The mathematics behind the calculations that follow can 
be found there. 
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. (that is, our estimate for the share of men in agriculture being within a  of the actual share), then a 
sample of as few as  birth records should suffice.48 
 births are of course an irrelevant proportion of all babies recorded in Uruguay in any given year, 
but this does not necessarily hinder their representativeness. What matters is how the sample is drawn 
(whether every observation has the same chance of making it to the sample) and what is the absolute size of 
the sample, not its relative share of the total population, a logic which can seem counterintuitive to many 
historians.49 Because in reconstructing Uruguay’s occupational structure we are interested in what was 
typical rather than exceptional, and because almost every birth record provides valuable information, 
statistical theory tells us that there are decreasing returns to the understanding we gain from each additional 
observation. In drawing the samples, I found some exceptional records which do not contain occupational 
data, and which must be substituted by ‘new’ draws. About  of the records randomly drawn did not report 
the father’s occupation, in most cases because the child was recorded as ‘illegitimate’ (hijo natural), and was 
registered by a single mother or by an orphanage.50 For each such record, a new observation was drawn at 
random from the same seed state.51 
However useful these theoretical considerations are, the ultimate measure of the quality of evidence 
constructed from individual-level sources is to compare the estimates with an independent and reliable 
primary source from the same place and period. To test the quality of the Uruguayan occupational data 
produced by sampling late-nineteenth century birth records, I started by drawing a sample of  records 
from all births recorded in Montevideo province (that is, including the countryside as well as the city) in 
, which could be compared with the census taken there in November . There is no comparable 
enumeration for Uruguay as a whole in the late-nineteenth century, but Montevideo offers a good test case 
because, while unrepresentative of the country at large, it is the province where we would expect to see the 
most occupational complexity and variation, because it was home to the largest city, the main port, and the 
administrative capital of the republic, as well as to several rural districts. Graph . compares, by sector and 
 
48 The estimated sample size 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜 for the share of fathers working in agriculture (p, which to be safe we place at its 
maximum possible variation: ) and the share of those not in agriculture (q, also ) can be expressed as 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜 = 𝑠𝑠×𝑞𝑞𝑉𝑉 ,  where 𝑉𝑉 is the desired sample variance, in turn calculated as 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑑𝑑2𝑡𝑡2 , where d is the confidence error 
margin (±5%) and t is ., the normal deviate for our chosen confidence interval (). This equation yields .. 
49 A concise and entertaining exposition of the problem can be found in McCloskey, Econometric History, -. 
50 Other cases which were discarded were when the father had died before the birth and was recorded as ‘deceased’ 
(finado) or when the father had no gainful occupation (because he lived off property or family rents). 
51 A seed state value corresponds to a sequence of randomly generated numbers within a given vector of numbers. 
By using the same seed we can be sure that if we draw, say,  more observations at random those will be different from 
the hundreds of observations we drew beforehand.  
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sub-sector, the male occupational structure ‘predicted’ by our sample of Montevideo birth records with the 
‘actual’ male occupational structure constructed on the basis of the full returns of the provincial census.  
 
GRAPH 5.3. Testing birth record sampling: occupations in Montevideo province, 1889-90 
% of the male workforce calculated from birth records sample (orange) & census returns (blue) 
 
Sources: Montevideo  census and author’s random sample (n=) of Montevideo birth records. 
 
The results of this pilot analysis are very encouraging. The shares of male workers across the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary sectors estimated on the basis of a sample of  birth records are within a  error 
margin (which we defined as acceptable) of the ‘true’ values for the population as a whole, as recorded by 
the census. Our sample also accurately predicts the share of those described as ‘labourers’ in the census, who, 
as we have seen, were an important group as late as . Indeed, even across all sub-sectors, with the 
exception of government and retail trade, the estimates are near the mark, no more than  off from the 
occupational structure constructed on the basis of the census’s comprehensive enumeration. The fact that 
government’s share is underestimated may have to do with civil servants being more affluent than most 
workers in services, and therefore tending to have fewer children. This should not pose a large problem for 
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the rest of the country, where civil servants were far fewer than in the capital. Conversely, the largest sub-
sector in services, wholesale and retail trade, appears to be overestimated by the sample of birth records. 
This is probably a consequence of one very general occupational descriptor, ‘trade’ (comercio), which occurs 
often in birth records but was disaggregated by further questions asked by census-takers, and it does not 
appear in the census returns as such. This test proves that the data constructed from a random and 
sufficiently large sample of birth records is useful to estimate the male occupational structure of late-
nineteenth century Uruguay across large sectors, while noting that, as far as sub-sectors are concerned, this 
method has a tendency to under-represent the government’s share of employed males and over-represent 
those working in retail trade. 
We are now ready to apply this methodology to construct a picture of male occupational structure in 
Uruguay as a whole in that same year (), which can give us a new perspective on the agricultural 
workforce and the nature of economic development during the First Globalization. 
 
2.3. Results 
A random sample of more than  fathers recorded in  with an occupation was drawn, using the 
number of registered births in Montevideo and provinces from the rest of the country to weigh the number 
of records to be taken from the capital.52 Almost exactly as in the  census, about  of male workers 
were recorded as ‘labourer’ and, given the lack of other sources of occupational data, we cannot allocate 
them to a sector in . Therefore, the total sample size was increased further in other to obtain  
random observations containing specific occupational descriptors.53 The results are shown in Table . in 
comparison with the male occupational structure two decades later, calculated also by subtracting labourers 
from the totals presented earlier in the chapter. 
  
 
52 The total number of randomly sampled records was , of which  had to be discarded because they did not 
report the father’s occupation, either because the father was ‘unknown’ and the child recorded as ‘illegitimate’ or for 
any of the reasons mentioned in footnote  above. 
53 The most common non-sectoral occupational descriptors were, besides ‘labourer’, ‘worker’ and ‘owner’. 
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TABLE 5.4. Male occupational structure of Uruguay, 1890 and 1908 (shares)  
(excluding labourers) 
  1890 1908 
  Primary    39.2 39.3 
 Arable farming   25.7 22.4 
 Livestock farming   13.0 16.6 
 Rest of primary   0.5 0.4 
  Secondary    23.6 21.2 
  Construction    7.8 7.9 
 Food industries   2.3 3.1 
 Textiles and clothes   3.9 3.0 
 Blacksmiths and metalworkers   0.8 1.6 
 Printers, bookbinders   0.5 0.6 
 Leather industries   0.8 0.6 
 Tools and machines   0.3 0.9 
 Mining and quarrying   0.8 2.7 
 Rest of manufacturing   6.5 0.7 
Tertiary  37.1 39.5 
  Retail and wholesale    17.4 11.5 
 Government   2.6 7.4 
  Transport    4.4 3.8 
 Domestic and personal service   1.6 1.8 
 Financial and commercial services   1.3 1.4 
 Food and accommodation services   0.5 0.5 
 Education, law, medicine   0.8 1.2 
 Other employees in services   6.5 7.9 
 Rest of tertiary   2.1 3.9 
 Total   100 100 
Sources: for : author’s random sample (n=) of birth records containing specific occupations from the provinces 
of Canelones, Colonia, Minas, Montevideo, Soriano, and Rocha;  census (see Table .). 
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In  agriculture was the largest sectoral employer, with ‘farmer’ (agricultor) or ‘tiller’ (labrador) as 
the modal occupation. The words agricultor and labrador had almost identical meaning and it seems they 
were used interchangeably for farmers working their own land, tenants, and also permanent farm workers.54 
The sectoral shares were in general also very similar to those observed almost two decades later, and the 
main changes seem to be within agriculture rather than across large sectors, with pastoral production 
gaining ground over arable farming, the latter being much less export-oriented. This is the shifting pattern 
we would expect, as livestock exports increased and the arable sector continued to feed the domestic 
population, albeit one that was growing. 
Moreover, the stability of the relative size of the agricultural workforce at large is consistent with the 
drivers behind demographic growth and the different labour trajectories of foreigners and locals. Historical 
demographers have demonstrated that natural population increase and immigration were equally important 
drivers of population growth in this period. As shown earlier in this chapter, foreign men were 
disproportionally concentrated in manufacturing, construction, and services, whereas agriculture was by far 
the largest employer of Uruguayan men. Montevideo, where foreigners represented a much larger share of 
the population than anywhere else in the country, remained exceptional in both benchmark years, with the 
tertiary sector as by far the largest employer in the province and ‘trader’ (comerciante) as the most common 
occupation.  
This persistence of agriculture’s share of the workforce over the two peak decades of ‘rural 
modernization’ should bring into question the idea that the agricultural economy was not capable of 
absorbing new entrants to the labour market, or that the productivity gains within export agriculture led to 
widespread rural unemployment. Throughout this period there were still opportunities to make money in 
market-oriented agriculture, where labour remained in high demand, as mechanization was yet to show its 
full force. The agricultural economy was more capable of generating employment than previously assumed 
in the literature.55 This was true of both large pastoral landholdings, which had not yet introduced significant 
labour-saving technologies and therefore needed more, rather than fewer, permanent wage workers, and of 
the much smaller crop farms, which reduced fallow periods and expanded their cultivated acreage. As 
argued in the previous chapter in relation to soil quality and agricultural innovation, the latifundia-
 
54 The strongest evidence of this is that the  census returns aggregated both categories together, suggesting 
that court officers simply chose one or the other whenever someone described themselves as engaged in arable 
agriculture year-round. I can offer an additional piece of empirical, if anecdotal, evidence: my great-great-grandfather 
was recorded as an agricultor when my great-grandmother was born, and as a labrador when my grandmother was 
born, but I have it on good authority (my grandmother’s) that his actual occupation never changed: he continued to 
farm the same smallholding. 
55 For a succinct summary of the mainstream view on this point, see Moraes, Pradera, . 
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minifundia framework that has informed most scholarship is not always helpful to trace rural development. 
Technical improvements in large estates during this period, after enclosures and wire-fencing but before 
widespread mechanization, were not as labour-saving as traditional scholarship assumed, nor were small 
landholdings unable to invest and change their productive strategy. Across both scales there was significant 
change, but it was mainly predicated on biological innovation (cattle crossbreeding), new industry patterns 
(with ranches specializing in different stages of the life cycle of livestock), or new crop repertoires 
(diversifying and increasing the acreage permanently cultivated), rather than in the introduction of capital-
intensive, labour-saving machinery and technologies. Even if the countryside was increasingly punctuated 
by railway stations, machines remained a rare sight. In  there were only  tractors compared to over 
almost , ploughing oxen and horses, while most of the  million sheep were sheared with hand 
blades, as there were only  machine shears in the whole country.56 The muscle energy of animals and 
people continued to be the main way of working land and livestock. 
Occupying by  only  of the total agricultural land and producing only  of agricultural output, 
crop farmers have been described by the mainstream view as being in this period ‘synonymous with 
economic difficulties and misery.’57 However, the pace of growth of output during the previous two decades 
was larger in arable agriculture than in any other sector, including livestock production.58 The evidence 
points to a diversification of crop choices, within a production function still dependent on traditional energy 
sources and farming techniques, and an increase of the area under crops of almost  between  and 
. Wheat and maize retained their secular primacy in the Uruguayan crop repertoire, but the expansion 
was led by other cultigens, as farmers responded to the expanded urban demand buttressed by immigration: 
the acreage cultivated with barley, potatoes, and sweet potatoes doubled in less than twenty years.59 The 
more than threefold expansion of the land occupied by vineyards over the same period is particularly 
emblematic of rural responses to the rise of urban populations and disposable incomes.60  
 
56 Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Censo General de la República en  (henceforth Censo 
General ), Tomo II, Parte II, Montevideo,  p. LXXV. On the incremental improvement in oxen- or horse-driven 
ploughs in Uruguayan agriculture in this period, see Alcides Beretta Curi, ‘Elite, agricultura y modernización: el programa 
de la Asociación Rural del Uruguay, -,’ in Agricultura y modernización, -, ed. Alcides Beretta Curi 
(Montevideo, ): -. For an analysis of the part played by animals Uruguay’s long-term energy economy, see Reto 
Bertoni, Energía y desarrollo: la restricción energética en Uruguay como problema (-) (Montevideo, ): -. 
57 Barrán and Nahum, Crisis, . Data on the number and extension of crop farms from Censo General . 
Sectoral output figures for  from Piñeiro, Bianco, and Moraes, Trabajadores, . 
58 Luis Bértola, ‘El PIB per cápita de Uruguay -: una reconstrucción,’ Documentos de Trabajo de la 
Facultad de Ciencias Sociales DOL  (): Anexo I. 
59 ‘Estadística Agrícola ’, pp.-; Censo General , Tomo II, Parte II, pp. -. 
60 Vineyards occupied , hectares in , up from , in . ‘Anuario de Estadística Agrícola ’, 
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This set of changes was adopted by tenant crop farmers as well as land-owning producers, both of whom 
bought imported machinery, albeit still worked by animal energy: the stock of harvesters tripled between 
 and .61 The balance between landowning farmers and tenants tended to change, however, as 
ownership shrank following the increased value of land which was in part a consequence of these productive 
choices. While land-owning croppers still outnumbered tenants in , by   of crop farmers were 
tenants: proletarianization, albeit quite slow, was underway.62 Throughout this period, however, arable 
agriculture remained dominated by small farmers producing for the market: there was an average of only 
. hired dependent workers per crop farm in  as well as in .63 Therefore, the image of widespread 
rural poverty and the depopulation of former crop farming villages which so impressed social scientists in 
the second half of the twentieth century seems to have been projected backwards to the late-nineteenth 
century by mainstream economic historiography and historical imagination.64 
Despite these caveats, the fact remains that arable agriculture employed twice as many people as 
livestock farming while contributing far less to GDP. This is not, therefore, an entirely Boserupian story, or 
rather it shows that, as Federico has argued, Boserup’s model works much better for very long-term changes 
in agriculture than for (relatively) short-term ones: the crop-farming sector did not immediately respond to 
demographic change in Uruguay with radical innovations to increase yields.65 While we do not know enough 
about the micro-level diffusion of mechanization in Uruguayan crop farming in the late-nineteenth century, 
the information we do have points to it being much slower than in the other two Southern Cone economies 
 
returns published in Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay. Año , Montevideo: DGE, , 
p.; Censo General , Tomo II, Parte II, p.. For a social history approach to the networks that made such 
expansion possible, see Beretta Curi, ‘Caminos de innovación’. 
61 Censo General , p.; ‘Estadística Agrícola ’. 
62 Among crop-farming estates (establecimientos agrícolas) there were , land-owning farmers and , 
tenants in ; by  there were , farm-owning producers and , tenant farmers, while the rest owned part 
of the land they farmed and rented the rest. ‘Estadística Agrícola ’, p.; Censo General , Tomo II, Parte II, 
p.. On the evolution of land prices, see Luis Bértola, Leonardo Calicchio, María Camou, and Gabriel Porcile, 
‘Southern Cone real wages compared: a purchasing power parity approach to convergente and divergente trenes, –
,’ DOL/FCS-UM;   ().  
63 ‘Estadística Agrícola ’, p.; Censo General , Tomo II, Parte II, p.. 
64 The best overview of later, mid-twentieth century changes in rural population and economic opportunities is 
Diego Piñeiro and María Inés Moraes, Los cambios en la sociedad rural durante el siglo XX, El Uruguay del Siglo XX 
(Montevideo, ). The most important primary source on rural poverty in the s is the report by CLAEH-
CINAM, Estudio económico y social del Uruguay rural (Montevideo, ). 
65 Giovanni Federico, 'Population, Agricultural Growth and Institutions: The Real Long View,' EH.net Book 
Reviews (); Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under 
Population Pressure (London, ). 
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(Chile and Argentina).66 It is unsurprising that investments in physical as well as ‘landesque capital’ followed 
the domestic comparative advantage and concentrated in livestock agriculture.67 While fallow periods were 
reduced, intensification was otherwise fairly limited in crop farming: it still took a quarter of the workforce 
(excluding labourers) to feed the population. This is a very different story from the large-scale genetic 
improvement of six million cattle studied in the previous chapter. The lack of intensification in the arable 
farming sub-sector, which was responsible for feeding Uruguay’s growing population, could have also 
limited the expansion of livestock agriculture, by denying it land and labour. 
Beyond the dynamics within rural production, the lack of a continued shift of employment out of 
agriculture (and into manufacturing) at the height of ‘rural modernization’ could be seen as proof that the 
economy of modern Uruguay had grown but not developed during the First Globalization, as the 
dependentista tradition has long argued. Should the era of ‘rural modernization’ be understood as merely an 
episode of export-led growth? Or rather as a period of broad economic development rooted in agriculture? 
It is to that debate that we turn now. 
 
3 Rural development and long-term economic growth  
The analysis of occupational structures can shed new light on both the potential and the limits of rural 
development in Uruguay to sustain long-term economic growth.68 Let us start with its contributions. First, 
the expansion in arable agriculture kept domestic food supply in pace with the demographic growth, as 
population grew at a very fast rate of about . per year between  and  without requiring larger 
food imports.69 Second, the increases in the physical productivity of the livestock sector—in the context of 
favourable terms of trade for beef, wool, and leather—contributed to obtaining foreign exchange: 
agricultural produce accounted for more than  of Uruguayan exports. In turn, that increased import 
capacity became the cornerstone of the fiscal revenue of the expanding national state, which relied mostly 
on custom duties and could therefore fund public investment without imposing direct taxation on its 
 
66 Castro Scavone, ‘La mecanización’. 
67 ‘Landesque capital’ is a generic term to encompass persistent landscape modifications that increase yields in 
agriculture. See, for an overview of the concept, Widgren and Håkansson, ‘Landesque Capital’. 
68 As a conceptual tool for thinking about the contributions of the rural economy to wider development I follow 
here the framework outlined in the seminal paper by Bruce F Johnston and John W Mellor, ‘The role of agriculture in 
economic development,’ AER ,  (). 
69 Population data from Censo General  and Programa de Población, Base de Datos Sociodemográficos 
(Montevideo, ). 
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citizens.70 As one essayist put it some decades later, Uruguay’s was a ‘peculiar welfare state, standing on 
hooves, grass, and mud.’71 Third, because it remained the largest employer in the economy, agriculture 
sustained more livelihoods than any other sector, contributing therefore to the rising domestic demand that 
fuelled Uruguay’s ‘early’ manufacturing industry focused on nondurable consumer goods (clothing, 
beverages, cigarettes, etc.).72 
But the lack of a continued shift in employment out of agriculture also points to the limits of the rural 
economy to induce economic development, understood as a process of structural change characterised by 
the emergence of new sectors. While we can hypothesise that the early decades of modernization (s-
s) saw a shift of labour-shares out of agriculture in the context of enclosures and the effective closing of 
what had been a relatively open frontier, that process did not continue into the late years of export-led 
growth.73 In this sense, agriculture did not entirely succeed in ‘releasing’ labour to further encourage the rise 
of manufacturing, one of its classic roles in long-term economic development. Moreover, the agricultural 
export economy could be expected, in contexts such as modernising Uruguay, to make a large net 
contribution to the capital required by industrial investment. Profits from livestock exports were 
concentrated in the hands of large landowners, and were mostly directed to acquiring more rural assets 
(fundamentally land and livestock) rather than being channelled towards new sectors, and so did not create 
a spill-over effect beyond the more immediate connections with meat and wool production, or the financial 
investments surrounding government debt.74 Traditional economic historiography and revisionist 
interpretations disagree on how rational this investment strategy was, the former arguing it reflected the 
tenacity of an archaic ‘livestock-mania’ (ganadomanía) and the latter claiming it made economic sense for 
agents to continue to invest in capital goods which kept gaining value in the short term, but what is clear is 
 
70 Custom duties represented well over  of the total fiscal revenue of the Uruguayan state in the period -
, and about  in -. Bértola, ‘Primer Batllismo’, . 
71 Alberto Methol Ferré, El Uruguay como problema en la cuenca del Plata entre Argentina y Brasil (Montevideo, ). 
72 Industrial growth in this period is known as ‘early’ in the literature because it came before the core expansion 
of manufacturing after  and, especially, the short but momentous period of state-led industrialization in the s 
and s. The best analysis of such developments is Luis Bértola, La industria manufacturera uruguaya -: un 
análisis sectorial de su crecimiento, fluctuaciones y crisis (Montevideo, ). For an overview of the literature on 
Uruguay’s ‘early industry’ see Javier E Rodríguez Weber, ‘Nueva luz sobre viejos problemas: incidencia de la 
cuantificación en la historiografía sobre la industria temprana en Uruguay,’ América Latina en la historia económica, 
 (). 
73 I hope in the future to gain free access to birth records from - to be able to test this hypothesis. 
74 There were exceptions to this pattern within Latin America: the profits of the coffee export economy in São 
Paulo were invested by large producers on the emerging textile industry, as shown in the seminal work of Warren Dean, 
The Industrialization of São Paulo, - (Austin, ). 
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that such behaviour did not contribute to structural change.75 The kind of livestock agriculture that 
dominated the export economy—extensive, highly specialised, and with cattle and sheep as its main form of 
capital—had, in Hirschman’s sense, a very limited linkage potential to underpin broad-based economic 
development.76 As shown by the early development of the dairy industry in contemporary New Zealand, 
further linkages could have been developed even within a specialization pattern centred on pastoral 
agriculture.77 
Another possible contribution of a leading sector to broader economic development is to provide 
demand for productivity-enhancing innovations which can then be used in other sectors of the economy. 
The case of steam, a general-purpose technology originated in coal production in Britain, is perhaps the best 
known case of this dynamic in comparative economic history, but by no means the only one.78 As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, the modernization of Uruguay’s livestock agriculture was predicated on making 
better use of natural pastures, through simple yet effective means: closing off paddocks, grazing sheep and 
cattle together, introducing new breeds of livestock, encouraging some ranches to specialise in weaning 
calves and some in fattening them. While these changes were crucial to the expansion of output (in total and 
per acre) they did not require substantial changes in production processes or farming techniques. Such 
agricultural growth, against the background of a largely unchanged mechanical technology in the 
countryside, could not result in a dramatic drop in the share of the workforce in agriculture. Given how 
context-specific the innovations were, they could not be easily transferred to other sectors, nor did they 
create a demand for the local production of new technologies. In this sense, modernising Uruguay provides 
evidence for the argument, central to the Latin American structuralist tradition, that the in the modern 
world economy agricultural commodities have less capacity than manufactures to induce or create 
incentives for technological innovation.79 
 
75 The positions are succinctly and clearly argued in Barrán and Nahum, Civilización, Ch. and Millot and Bertino, 
Historia económica, -. 
76 Albert O Hirschman, ‘A generalized linkage approach to development, with special reference to staples,’ 
Economic development and cultural change  (). On staple theory in particular, see Melville H. Watkins, ‘A Staple 
Theory of Economic Growth,’ The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne 
d'Economique et de Science politique ,  (). For a more recent historiographical review and an attempt to refine 
the theory, see Morris Altman, ‘Staple theory and export‐led growth: constructing differential growth,’ Australian 
Economic History Review ,  (). 
77 I have pursued that comparison further in Travieso, ‘United by grass’. 
78 N. F. R. Crafts, ‘Steam as a general purpose technology: a growth accounting perspective,’ The Economic Journal 
,  (). 
79 The pioneering works are Raúl Prebisch, El desarrollo económico de la América Latina y algunos de sus principales 
problemas (New York, ), and ECLAC, Estudio económico de América Latina  (Santiago, ). For an overview 
of the structuralist school, see Octavio Rodríguez, El estructuralismo latinoamericano (Mexico City, ). 
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Another analytical tool from the same school which can be useful to construct the balance sheet of 
agrarian development is the concept of ‘structural heterogeneity’: the large productivity gaps between sectors 
(typically following the divide between the domestic non-tradeable economy and the export economy) that 
characterise developing economies.80 One way of assessing how lopsided Uruguayan rural-based 
development was is to compare output per (male) worker across sectors at the height of modernization, 
which our new estimates allow us to do. The results suggest that there was some diversification underway. 
Between  and  the value of output per worker in manufacturing almost doubled, converging 
towards the levels of livestock agriculture, which continued to produce about a third of GDP with less than 
a fifth of the labour force. For its part, arable agriculture, which provided most of the foodstuffs eaten by the 
increasingly numerous urban dwellers, also experienced very fast productivity growth, albeit starting from 
a much lower level (Graph .).  
Comparing productivity across sectors is never straightforward, and it is even more problematic in this 
case because of the lack of an input-output matrix for Uruguay before .81 All the while, the faster growth 
in output values per worker in manufacturing than in livestock agriculture suggests a degree of structural 
change. Indeed, nominal output per worker was, towards the end of modernization, higher in domestic 
manufacturing than in export-oriented agriculture. This was to some extent a result of changing relative 
prices, in the context of high tariffs (even by Latin American standards) which increased the profit margin 
of domestic factories competing with imports.82 But it was primarily due to the increased physical output of 
domestic manufacturing, which more than doubled across its main industries, according to Bértola’s 
estimates.83 Given the standard relationship between labour productivity and wages, these results also imply 
that incomes were rising faster for urban workers than for rural ones. To briefly return to the central 
argument of this dissertation, the rising productivity leadership of the early light manufacturing sector 
 
80 The original formulation is Aníbal Pinto, ‘Naturaleza e implicaciones de la “heterogeneidad estructural” de la 
América Latina,’ El Trimestre Económico , () (). For a recent, more mathematically formalised, application, 
see Mario Cimoli and Gabriel Porcile, ‘Technology, structural change and BOP-constrained growth: a structuralist 
toolbox,’ Cambridge Journal of Economics ,  (). 
81 Nominal values were chosen because Uruguay’s currency was tied to the gold standard throughout, which was 
characterised in this period by low inflation rates, so changing price levels are not a significant concern. The first reliable 
input-output matrix with detailed relative costs of factors across sectors was produced for  as part of the first complete 
national accounts; see Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Cuentas Nacionales (Montevideo, ): B. 
82 In this period Uruguay had the highest custom duties per capita in Latin America, and probably anywhere the 
world; see María del Mar Rubio, ‘Protectionist but globalized? Latin American custom duties and trade during the pre-
 Belle Époque,’ (unpublished) (). For an overview of the modern history of Latin American tariffs, see John 
H Coatsworth and Jeffrey G Williamson, ‘Always protectionist? Latin American tariffs from independence to Great 
Depression,’ JLAS ,  (). 
83 Bértola, PBI de Uruguay, Table VI. 
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should also be seen against the background of the bottlenecks in livestock agriculture, whose technical 
trajectory remained tied to the same farming processes and patterns of resource use, and therefore could 
not continue to increase output per worker at the same rate it had done before.  
 
GRAPH 5.4. Estimates of labour productivity across three large sectors, 1890 and 1908 
(in current pesos) 
 
Sources: this chapter’s estimates for labour-force size; sectoral output from Bértola, PBI de Uruguay. 
 
Yet, within the ‘liberal’ interpretation of Uruguayan economic history, these new productivity estimates 
could be taken as further proof that state intervention in relative prices, since the late-nineteenth century, 
distorted the allocation of resources that should have followed, and further encouraged the ‘naturally’ higher 
productivity of livestock agriculture. Even if the government’s motive for its tariff policy was fiscal economy, 
the unintended consequence, in this account, was to start a long tradition of distortive protectionism that 
 
 
 
 
limited economic growth.84 To the contrary, for a structuralist interpretation this significant expansion of 
light manufacturing resulting from a change in relative prices was a step in the right direction, although it 
proved insufficient for it to move out of the shadow of livestock agriculture and contribute to a shift in the 
country’s development path.85 Finally, for dependentistas the transfer of rents from export agriculture to 
light, import-substituting manufacturing created some positive spill-over effects for average urban incomes, 
but strengthened, rather than threatened, the political economy basis of peripheral underdevelopment.86  
From a resource perspective, and in light of the new evidence presented here, I would propose that we 
think of Uruguayan rural-based development during the country’s ‘modernization’ as statically efficient but 
dynamically limited. Resources were allocated in a way that expanded output per worker across sectors, and 
per acre in agriculture, and so this proved to be a Pareto-efficient trajectory. This model was, however, 
dynamically limited in terms of its linkages with other sectors and its ability to channel profits and provide 
incentives to push Uruguay’s ‘early’ (by Latin American standards) industrialization beyond its infant phase 
and contribute to the further diversification of the economy.87 Its short term impact was an increase in living 
standards, which proved widespread despite concentrated landownership because of (a) the continued 
demand for labour in crop and animal farming, in the context of increased domestic and external demand 
for agricultural commodities and very limited change in agricultural techniques and technologies, and (b) 
the transfer of rents, via relative prices shaped by custom duties, from the export-oriented livestock sector 
to import-substituting light manufacturing, which could absorb new urban entrants to the labour market.  
 
84 An influential articulation of this thesis of Uruguayan economic history, written by an academic economist who 
was also a policy-maker, is Ramón P. Díaz, Historia económica de Uruguay (Montevideo, ). See also, from a 
neoclassical welfare economics perspective, the contributions to Michael B. Connolly and Jaime De Melo, The Effects 
of Protectionism on a Small Country: The Case of Uruguay (Washington, D.C., ). 
85 For a concise and insightful structuralist interpretation of this period, see Bértola, ‘Primer Batllismo’. On how 
getting relative prices wrong can be a sound development policy for late industrialization, see the seminal work by 
Amsden, for example Alice Amsden, ‘A theory of government intervention in late industrialization,’ in State and Market 
in Development: Synergy or Rivalry?, ed. Louis G. Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Boulder, ). For an 
overview of her influence in Latin American debates, see Helen Shapiro and Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, ‘Alice Amsden‘s 
Impact on Latin America,’ Brazilian Journal of Political Economy ,  (). 
86 A nuanced dependentista interpretation, drawing from both classical and Marxist economic theory, can be found 
in the fluently written and highly influential Instituto de Economía, El proceso. See also Luis Macadar, Uruguay, -
: ¿un nuevo ensayo de reajuste económico? (Montevideo, ). 
87 By c., when comparative data is first available, manufacturing’s share of GDP was . in Uruguay and 
. in Argentina, whereas it was below  in most of the continent, with the exceptions of Brazil (.), Chile 
(.), and Mexico (.). Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, ; see also, for the discussion surrounding the 
original Uruguayan manufacturing data, Julio Millot, Carlos Silva, and Lindor Silva, El desarrollo industrial del 
Uruguay, de la crisis de  a la posguerra (Montevideo, ). 
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The long-term legacy of this pattern of agrarian development, however, was less positive. Diversification 
remained limited, as shown by the fact that agriculture was still the largest employer, and the fundamentals 
of the leading livestock sector did not change: extensive techniques continued to dominate because the 
landownership structure made them profitable for large producers, but this limited the sector’s potential for 
further productivity increases. Perhaps the most crucial long-term problem inherited from the 
consolidation of this insufficiently diversified economic structure during ‘modernization’ was a tendency to 
high levels of growth volatility, which underscored the disappointing twentieth-century performance of the 
Uruguayan economy.88 
 
4 Conclusion 
The analysis of occupational structures has revealed much about the nature of and the limits to rural-based 
economic development in Uruguay in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. Scholars have long 
debated whether the experience of Uruguay (and Argentina) during the First Globalization boom should be 
understood as a fragile prosperity built on exceptionally high relative prices for their primary commodities 
in the world market, or if the regionally-leading income levels in these countries reflected an economic 
structure which was genuinely more complex and provided more opportunities for improving living 
standards than that of the rest of Latin America.89 From the perspective of global economic history, this 
question is relevant far beyond the River Plate: can the rise, or the transformations within, modern export 
agriculture in the periphery strengthen the prospects for self-sustained development rather than simply 
produce episodic growth? 
This chapter constructed new evidence from primary sources to discuss that question for the case of 
Uruguay. It demonstrated, first, that agriculture was still the main employer in the economy by . This 
finding implies that the structural shift out of the primary sector preceded  and was not further 
deepened during the height of ‘modernization’: Uruguay’s rural economy remained overwhelmingly 
agricultural throughout the period, with at least two-thirds of rural livelihoods tied to crop or livestock 
farming. Second, and relatedly, it proved that the very limited mechanization of Uruguayan agriculture in 
this period meant that it continued to demand labour in pace with population growth, and that the 
 
88 The volatility of Uruguayan long-term growth rates and terms of trade are very high even by Latin American 
standards: see Luis Bértola and Fernando Lorenzo, ‘Witches in the South: Kuznets-like swings in Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay since the s,’ in The Experience of Economic Growth, ed. Jan Luiten Van Zanden and Sakari Heikenen 
(Amsterdam, ) and Bértola and Ocampo, Economic Development, . 
89 The wider debate was surveyed in Chapter . For an overview of the Argentine case, see Roy Hora, Historia 
económica de la Argentina en el siglo XIX (Buenos Aires, ): -. 
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contributions of female rural workers in particular have been significantly underplayed in the literature. 
Third, it showed that the pace of productivity growth at the height of modernization was far higher in the 
burgeoning light manufacturing industry than in the livestock sector, while output per worker in arable 
agriculture expanded rapidly, but from a much lower base. 
These challenges to some of the evidential bases of the conventional wisdom allow for an interpretation 
of economic change in this period that, while closer to the ‘structuralist’ perspective than to others, 
introduces some environmental nuance. Uruguay’s rural development during the long-nineteenth century 
culminated, in the three decades following , in a process of agricultural intensification. This was led by 
a few biological innovations in agriculture, especially the adoption of new breeds of cattle and changes to 
the crop repertoire, operating within the same technological frontier, defined by rainfed and animal-
ploughed crop farming and extensive grazing management by workers on horseback in the livestock sector. 
While those few innovations did much to improve the efficiency of land use, within both pastoral and arable 
farming and in the balance between them, they left agricultural practices and the tools which empowered 
rural labour fundamentally unchanged across the vast majority of farms and ranches. The result was an 
impressive short-term expansion predicated on capitalising on Uruguay’s comparative advantage on 
extensive livestock agriculture on natural pastures, which came at a long-term cost for both natural and 
human resources. The persistence of traditional livestock management practices applied to substantially 
larger herds than ever before contributed, particularly during times of overgrazing in autumn and winter, to 
the process of grassland degradation that life scientists have described as characteristic of the Uruguay’s 
pastures in the long-term.90 For human resources the long-term consequences were also problematic: while 
Uruguay in the late-nineteenth century benefitted from an early (by Latin American and by global 
standards) schooling revolution, economic growth did not translate into substantial investments in human 
capital in the decades that followed.91 
The priorities guiding census-taking became emblematic of the perceived hierarchy between natural 
and human resources, and in particular of governments’ idea of where the wealth of the nation lay: over the 
six decades that followed, the Uruguayan state successfully counted cattle and sheep herds an additional 
seven times and population only once more, to the great dismay of several generations of scholars.92 The 
methodology introduced in this chapter has the potential to overcome that bias and open a new trove of 
 
90 Panario and Bidegain, ‘Climate’. 
91 Luis Bértola and Reto Bertoni, ‘Educación y aprendizaje: su contribución a la definición de escenarios de 
convergencia y divergencia,’ Documentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales DOL  (). 
92 In the six decades following the population and agricultural censuses , comprehensive livestock censuses 
were taken in Uruguay in , , , , , , and ; the only nation-wide population enumeration 
in that period was in . 
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historical data for Uruguayan social science. The systematic examination of birth records can fill in the gaps 
created by the lack of demographic censuses between  and , which prevents us from answering 
such basic questions as when did Uruguay become a predominantly urban nation. Such new data, 
constructed from primary sources rather than projected backwards from late-twentieth century evidence, 
will be crucial in assessing the long-term legacy of agricultural intensification during Uruguay’s ‘rural 
modernization’.  
The hypothesis suggested by this chapter is that rural development in this period was, in a sense, 
successful in the short term, perhaps too successful for its own good. After the productivity breakthrough 
provided by cattle crossbreeding and its related innovations, Uruguayan agriculture was not capable of 
encouraging further productivity gains in its leading sector. Export-oriented livestock agriculture stayed 
fundamentally unchanged in terms of its ownership structure and the basis of its international 
competitiveness, and remained highly vulnerable to international prices that were beyond its control. While 
export volumes and prices grew throughout this period, thanks to the demand for beef and other livestock 
by-products being reasonably income-elastic, Uruguay’s share of their global trade decreased, as larger 
producers entered the market. In terms of structural change, the limits to diversification, which stalled after 
the initial growth of light manufacturing, made the entire economy vulnerable to such price swings, as 
successive crises during the twentieth century went on to show. 
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conclusion 
The agrarian origins of modern Uruguay * 
 
 
Uruguay is a small, highly urbanised country, where more than a third of the population live in the capital 
city. It has a well-founded reputation for progressive politics, often associated with its interventionist state 
and a close-proximity, relatively homogenous society. The export economy is, however, tied to its lightly 
populated countryside, where large estates practise specialised, extensive temperate-zone agriculture. These 
defining traits can be explained (and in some respects can only be explained) in relation to the rural 
‘modernization’ of the late-nineteenth century: a shift from a variety of relations to land in subsistence and 
commercial farming to capitalist agriculture dominated by large estates. But, this thesis argues, part of the 
reasons contemporary Uruguay is the way it is are rooted in the history of agrarian development before , 
and have to be explained with reference also to what did not change in the wake of ‘modernization.’ 
While Patricio Belén, Francisca Ximénez, and other rural workers of the late-colonial period, whether 
free or enslaved, would have been surprised by much of Uruguayan agriculture a century later (wire fencing 
and landholding systems, emancipation and labour relations), they would have been able to take part in the 
actual farming in almost all estates without any further training. The dynamics of the crop repertoire, the 
calendar and methods of sowing and harvesting, the daily routines of herding, the cycles of calving and 
gelding—they could have started work on all of these minutes after stepping out of the time machine. The 
mechanisms through which rural resources were allocated had changed profoundly, and with them the 
prospects for accumulation, but most agricultural techniques proved surprisingly stable and remained 
dependent on so-called ‘pre-modern’ patterns of environmental use. The agrarian origins of modern 
Uruguay are to be found in that contradiction, which might also help us think about its future. 
This conclusion is a coda to that story over three movements. The first section explains how some 
features of historical rural development came to preside over modern Uruguay. The second section reflects 
on ‘agrarian capitalism’ as a conceptual device to analyse that development, and also discusses how useful 
different definitions of capitalism—a concept that has recently regained its lost audience—are for the task at 
 
* The title of this conclusion is taken, along with much inspiration, from Thomas C. Smith’s remarkable book The 
Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (Stanford, ). 
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hand. The final section considers how the contradiction between changes in resource ownership and 
allocation, on the one hand, and continuities in patterns of environmental exploitation, on the other, can be 
studied by (economic) historians, and with what consequences for our understanding of long-term 
development in Uruguay and beyond. 
 
Agriculture, structural change, and relative backwardness 
Labour scarcity and open access to agricultural land encouraged the people of ‘pre-modern’ Uruguay to 
choose high fertility strategies. Importantly, younger generations were not retained in the household. For 
the colonial period, Chapter  demonstrated how relatively open access to land saw parents petitioning for 
new plots for their children when they reached adulthood, while the population registers of the s 
studied in Chapter  showed many families of the same last name living near each other, but not as part of 
a single peasant household. The result was a countryside of mostly large, young, nuclear families up to and 
including the decades of ‘rural modernization’ during the First Globalization. By  those families still 
represented the majority of Uruguay’s population, and more of them worked in arable agriculture than in 
ranching. Nevertheless, the environmental advantages for ranching made it the cornerstone of export 
agriculture and labour productivity in the sector was far higher than in crop farming and in manufacturing 
by , as Chapter  showed. 
Against this background, changes in access to land interacted with technical change in agriculture, but 
not in a straightforward way. Chapter  explored a comparatively overlooked subject in the global history of 
agriculture, technical innovation in cattle rearing,1 and found that estate sizes did not explain different 
regional rates of adoption of cattle crossbreeding in Uruguay in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in the specialist historiography, latifundia-owners were 
willing to act as capitalists, while smaller producers were also able to do so. Differences in local 
environments, rather than in the scale of productive units, affected the expected profitability of adopting 
innovation and hence its take-up. But even if the ‘modernization’ of export-oriented livestock agriculture 
could have happened without latifundia, the fact is that it did not, and this had far reaching consequences 
for urban as well as for rural development. 
The new ‘spatial code’—characterised by wire-fenced estates, more capitalised ranches, and the rise of 
farm tenancy agreements—encouraged demographic transition and funnelled immigrants to towns. In this 
sense, more limited opportunities to make an independent living in the rural economy promoted structural 
change and urbanization. Immigrants allowed the growth of light manufacturing to develop without having 
 
1 I thank Giovanni Federico for drawing my attention to this. 
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to draw people out of the rural workforce, as demonstrated in Chapter . Domestic food supply could be 
thus sustained without major technical improvements in crop farming, and the labour force in export 
agriculture could continue to increase, all the while achieving the second-largest share of manufacturing in 
output in Latin America (c., behind Argentina) in the early-twentieth century.2 The state coffers grew 
as well and became, per capita, the largest in the region.3 International trade (tariffs on agricultural exports 
and especially on the manufacture and coal imports they sustained) became the cash-cow of the 
modernizing Uruguayan state, which allowed it to invest in public education and physical infrastructure to 
a larger extent than most other Latin American countries, and to do so without having to rely mainly on 
direct taxation of its citizens. 
But as Chapter  also argued, there were stark limits to this development path. Productivity gains in 
pastoral agriculture were already stagnating in the late-nineteenth century, and the international 
competitiveness of the sector remained tied to a favourable ratio between high prices in the world market 
and the low domestic cost of the ecological services of the natural grasslands. Some diversification did occur, 
but productivity in arable agriculture remained low, while labour and capital continued to be comparatively 
scarce, limiting the further development of manufacturing. A comparatively strong fiscal capacity, 
insufficient diversification, and a population geography characterized by vast open spaces surrounding a 
few towns and only one large city: these would all become long-term features of Uruguayan development. 
As such, we should bear them in mind when explaining Uruguay’s development as well as its backwardness, 
including the relative prosperity of the late-nineteenth century, the decades of stagnation since the mid-
twentieth, and the renewed cycle of growth in the early twenty-first. 
Rural development and ‘agrarian capitalism’ 
Since when can Uruguay’s rural development be described as ‘capitalist’? In what sense, if any, is it useful to 
think of it in those terms at all? In the long-nineteenth century, Uruguay was transformed from a rural 
economy in which landholding was widespread and negotiable (either from above through political grants 
or from below through collective squatting) and agricultural labour outside the family depended on slavery 
as well as on (mostly seasonal) free labour, to one where access to land was restricted to those who could 
buy it, tenants outnumbered landowning peasants, and the only form of extra-familiar labour was paid in 
wages. These contrasting patterns of resource allocation were connected in non-linear ways to political and 
social actors and processes: slavery and abolition, states colonial as well as national, and wars both 
revolutionary and civil.  
 
2 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, . 
3 Ibid., . 
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Chapter  introduced a working definition of ‘agrarian capitalism’ as a system in which rural economic 
resources are allocated primarily through markets and are privately owned, including labour owned by the 
workers themselves.4 Thus defined, the term is, I think, useful to reflect on agrarian change in the context 
of our case study. It brings into analytical focus the fundamental changes in the way factors of production 
were organized for accumulation in rural Uruguay, while conveying the interconnections between property 
rights, markets, and the broader cultural world they emerged from and of which they were part.  
On the subject of culture, which has been relegated to the sidelines for most of this dissertation (for no 
other reason than because I thought marginal returns would be greater in pursuing overlooked themes, and 
culture was not one of them), I should note that the shift towards a capitalist ‘spatial code’ in Uruguayan 
rural development had enormous cultural sway. This is epitomized by the controversies surrounding the 
nation-building myth of the gaucho, those fiercely independent ‘centaurs of the pampas.’5 Gauchos were not 
only taken as a leitmotiv by artists of all stripes, but their looming cultural presence was also seen by essayists 
and scholars as evidence that there had been no peasantry proper in Uruguay—yet another proof of 
supposed exceptionalism in the Latin American context, connected to the once dominant view that the 
abundance of cattle made farming an unpalatable occupation and semi-nomadism an appealing prospect.6 
The irony is that (plot twist!) gauchos were peasants all along. The gaucho left the grasslands for the legends 
precisely when the ‘spatial code’ that allowed widespread peasant family smallholding on fenceless lands 
faded, and with it the ability to seek only temporary employment while retaining a subsistence foothold. 
Mid-nineteenth century contemporaries seem to have been less confused than later scholars: as Garavaglia 
pointed out, Francisco Muñiz’s  dictionary of River Plate Spanish defined gaucho first and foremost as 
‘peasants whether working in livestock or arable farming.’7 The echoes of this myth reach the present, when 
scholars and media hardly ever speak of ‘peasants’ (campesinos) in Uruguay, preferring the term ‘family 
producers’ (productores familiares).8 
 
4 Of the range of recent definitions of ‘capitalism’ available in the literature, the one I proposed in pages - has 
the most in common with Jürgen Kocka’s in his Capitalism, -. For a critical survey of the early-twenty-first century 
conceptual debates, see Gareth Austin, ‘The Return of Capitalism as a Concept,’ in Capitalism: The Reemergence of a 
Historical Concept, ed. Jürgen Kocka and Marcel van der Linden (London, ).  
5 See, for an insightful overview, Raúl O Fradkin, ‘Centaures de la pampa: le gaucho, entre l‘histoire et le mythe,’ 
Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales ,  (). 
6 See Virginia Rossi, ‘La producción familiar en la cuestión agraria uruguaya,’ Revista Nera ,  (). Chapter 
 surveyed the relevant historiography in detail. 
7 ‘campesinos bien sirvan como peones en la ganadería o en la labranza’, Francisco Muñiz, Voces usadas con 
generalidad en las Repúblicas del Plata, la Argentina y la Oriental del Uruguay () cited in Garavaglia, ‘Gauchos’, . 
8 Mercedes Figari, Virginia Rossi, and Rosario González, ‘Los productores familiares,’ in El campo uruguayo, ed. 
Marta Chiappe, Matías Carámbula, and Emilio Fernández (Montevideo, ). 
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Less demanding definitions of capitalism are, I think, ill-suited to describe Uruguay’s historical rural 
development over the long period covered by this thesis. If capitalism means simply dependence on the 
market for economic survival, or the prevalence of profit-oriented mental attitudes, or the dominance of 
‘the imperative and strategies of private investment’, then colonial estancias could be called capitalist.9 
Indeed, there was plenty of scope for market behaviour, profit-seeking, and price signalling in so-called ‘pre-
modern’ Uruguay, all of them reaching significant scale and dynamism in the case of livestock and their by-
products. As Chapter  demonstrated, however, while late-colonial estancias were sites of organized 
production for long-distance trade, with time horizons stretching far beyond the next harvest as required 
by the long life-cycle of cattle, they operated in a rural economy in which more capital was held in slaves 
than in farms and ranches, and where access to agricultural land was only rarely gained through the market. 
If we were to consider that a capitalist economy, then ‘capitalism’ would become a mostly superfluous 
concept to describe the long-term changes studied in this dissertation because anyone whose way of making 
a living included producing cowhides for sale (and there were many such people in late-colonial and early-
independent rural Uruguay) would be a capitalist. 
Furthermore, whilst some definitions of ‘agrarian capitalism’ can help us make sense of the history 
covered by this dissertation, the concept does not lend itself well to precise dating: it would be unhelpful to 
look for the one day when by evening it suddenly became clear that capitalism had won over the Uruguayan 
countryside. We can instead identify a series of crucial turning points along the way: the demise of colonial 
mercantilism in the s, slave emancipation since the s and especially in the s, the large-scale 
adoption of merino sheep in the s, the mass wire-fencing of estates in the s, systematic cattle 
crossbreeding since the s. Instead of choosing a single golden spike among these candidates, I want to 
emphasise that if the death of the ‘pre-capitalist’ spatial code was slow, its afterlife was long and eventful. 
The last civil war was fought in  still under the banner ‘free air and fat beef.’10 Many rural people did 
not agree that the time of flexible landholding and direct appropriation of nature had ended, and the 
democratic opposition to a free market in land evidenced by the revolutionary-era Reglamento de Tierras of 
, studied in Chapter , remained vibrant among them almost a century later. It was enough to go to war 
over because, as Chapter  demonstrated, agriculture continued to be the basis of rural livelihoods for two 
out of three adults in , when most people still lived in the countryside.  
 
9 As Samuel Amaral does for rural colonial Buenos Aires in Rise of Capitalism. The emphasis on ‘organized market 
activity that took place over long distances’ as a threshold for the beginning of the rise of capitalism is present in the 
definition by Larry Neal, ‘Introduction,’ in The Cambridge History of Capitalism. Volume I: The Rise of Capitalism: From 
Ancient Origins to , ed. Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson (Cambridge, ): . Some ‘new’ historians of 
capitalism argue that ‘we can add an “ism” to “capital” only when the imperatives and strategies of private investments 
come to dominance’, see Joyce Appleby, The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism (New York, ): . 
10 ‘Aire libre y carne gorda.’ The classic study is Barrán and Nahum, Revoluciones. 
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‘Agrarian capitalism’ can therefore be a helpful concept to think about the major shifts in Uruguay’s 
rural development during the long-nineteenth century, which implied a greater division of labour and spaces 
between agriculture and the processing of agricultural products. However, the agrarian basis of modern 
Uruguay are also about what did not change: the persistent dominance of livestock over crops, of land-
extensive techniques over labour-intensive ones, and the continued reliance on ‘cheap’ nature (in the form 
of abundant grass cover, reliable yearly rainfall, and natural freshwater courses) to produce export 
commodities at competitive prices. 
 
Landscapes and long-term development 
This dissertation has tried, from the title onwards, to think about Uruguay’s grassland landscapes as 
economic resources which are mobilised for production (i.e. ‘land’) and as situated environments which are 
themselves produced (landscapes). This double-edged meaning opens, I think, a promising avenue for the 
reciprocal integration of economic and environmental history. It can also contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the part played by natural resources in historical development, because, as Morrison 
argues, landscape ‘rather than land as unadorned nature as in neoclassical economics, is thus closer to 
capturing the actual conditions of situated agricultural production.’11 In my own sub-field of economic 
history, our account of the diversity of development paths across Latin America (as well as within and 
between other world regions) will be enriched by a more careful consideration of their changing landscapes. 
I think the two dimensions implicit in the concept of ‘landscape’ capture the contradiction at the heart 
of the history of change in rural Uruguay, both before  and in our own days. In the early twenty-first 
century technological change, in the form of livestock traceability and precision soybean agriculture, has 
again renewed the economic potential of Uruguay’s grasslands, while new landholding patterns have 
emerged as transnational corporations coordinate production across a number of large estates.12 However, 
 
11 Kathleen D. Morrison, ‘Capital-esque Landscapes: Long-Term Histories of Enduring Landscape Modifications,’ 
in Landesque Capital: The Historical Ecology of Enduring Landscape Modifications, ed. Mats Widgren and N. Thomas 
Håkansson (Walnut Creek, ): . 
12 On mandatory cattle traceability in Uruguay and its potential see Kimberly L VanderWaal et al., ‘Network Analysis 
of Cattle Movements in Uruguay: Quantifying Heterogeneity for Risk-based Disease Surveillance and Control,’ Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine  (); on the debates surrounding precision soybean agriculture, Matilda Baraibar, ‘Green 
Deserts or New Opportunities? Competing and complementary views on the soybean expansion in Uruguay, -’ 
(PhD diss., Stockholm University, ); on ‘land grabs’ by foreign corporations, Gabriel Oyhantçabal and Ignacio 
Narbondo, ‘Land grabbing in Uruguay: new forms of land concentration,’ Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue 
canadienne d'études du développement ,  (). For a contextual overview of agrarian change in early-twenty-first 
century Latin America, see Leandro Vergara‐Camus and Cristóbal Kay, ‘Agribusiness, peasants, left‐wing governments, 
and the state in Latin America: An overview and theoretical reflections,’ Journal of Agrarian Change ,  (). 
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large-scale, highly specialised, extensive land use practices remain the standard, and the competitiveness of 
export industries is tied to the relative cheapness of resources (water, nutrients, and the topsoil itself) which 
replenish much more slowly than they are spent or eroded. Narrow agricultural specialization over 
extremely large tracts of land also risks reducing biodiversity, further deepening grassland degradation. 
Although we have seen that in the nineteenth century there were exceptions to this pattern, with shrubland 
formations regaining their footing after steel wire enclosures, they were unintended and indeed exceptional. 
Aware that reconstructing the past is already hard enough, historians are rightfully wary of speaking of 
the future. Economic historians in particular are used to seeing their economist friends struggle with 
prediction, and so know better than to try. And yet it is difficult to not see the history of agrarian change in 
Uruguay as a warning of what is to come. While a cycle of specialized rural development can be a potent 
engine of growth, if its changing environmental basis is not taken into account, its ability to generate 
employment and income within and beyond agriculture will soon find its limits. 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix is a brief guide to readers interested in reproducing, testing, or modifying the quantitative 
exercises and data visualizations presented in the thesis. It also contains some additional evidence 
mentioned in the main text but not detailed there for reasons of space. If the data are unclear, or if readers 
find any other problem in working with the code or the supplementary files, please get in touch with me at 
emiliano.travieso@gmail.com, and I will do my best to assist you. Likewise, if you encounter any 
inconsistencies in the data, the code, or the shapefiles, please let me know. The default typefaces for the 
visualization themes are Minion Pro and Montserrat, which need to be installed in the target system for 
them to look exactly like the graphs in this dissertation, but can of course be substituted by any other 
typeface. 
 
chapter 1 
The ‘Data’ folder contains the replication package for Figures ., ., and . in R language (‘Chapter  
code.R’). The underlying data are presented in CSV format. They were taken, respectively, from Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Colonial Origins’, and the Maddison Database (Bolt et al, ‘Rebasing Maddison’). 
Latitudes are from Google Public Data Explorer. The ‘Map’ folder contains the shapefiles necessary to 
reproduce the map in Figure ., including the grassland sub-regions (taken from Soriano, ‘Rio de la Plata 
Grasslands’), Uruguay’s provincial (departamentos) boundaries circa , and the location of towns which 
had a regular station coach connection with Montevideo in the mid-nineteenth century (taken from The 
Republic of Uruguay ()). 
 
chapter 2 
The raw data for Table . is available in Excel format (‘Land titles.xlsx’) in the ‘Data’ folder. The calculation 
of the present value of slaves and free workers in Estancia Las Vacas can be reproduced in R-Studio with the 
replication code (‘Chapter  code.R’) available in the same folder. Peón wages were taken from BA, IX.--
, ff.; supplies for slaves from BA, IX.--, ff.-; interest rates from  surviving loan records 
printed in Pivel Devoto, Colección, -; and average slave price from Newland and San Segundo, 
‘Human Capital’. 
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Asset valuations and wealth composition 
In  the governor of Montevideo led a small military campaign against the Minuanes, a native 
community in the northeast of the Banda Oriental which the settlers intended to push further north. Taxing 
foreign trade was the prime and, together with fiscal transfers (situados), the only source of government 
revenue, so the Cabildo decided to levy an extraordinary wealth tax ( imposed on total asset value) on 
the vecinos of Montevideo. The surviving records of the appraisal values (tasaciones) of the assets of  
heads of household resulting from this one-time tax provide useful price data on slaves, livestock, and landed 
property. I rely on these appraisals to estimate the economic value of the assets reported by the first attempt 
at a population count in the history the region, the Estado de vecinos y almas of , carried out three 
decades after the foundation of Montevideo, which provides us with  sets of household assets, comprising 
, people (about  of the estimated population living in the city).1 The resulting dataset can be found 
in Excel format as ‘Wealth composition.xlsx’ in the relevant ‘Data’ folder. Using the  enumeration rather 
than relying only in the tax records from  not only results in a much larger sample size, but it also 
eliminates one likely bias: the fact that assets might have been poorly counted or underreported as they 
formed the unit of taxation. 
Table A provides measures of inequality in wealth ownership in the of households recorded by the 
 enumeration.2  I use the technique developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki, ‘Income inequality’, and 
decompose the Gini index for asset ownership as follows (equation A): 
𝐺𝐺 = �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 [A1] 
for all asset categories 𝐹𝐹, where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  is the share of a particular category of wealth in total wealth, 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 gives the 
Gini index for that particular category of wealth, and 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 gives the Gini correlation of wealth in that asset 
category with the distribution of total wealth. 
 
  
 
1 For a historical demographer’s analysis of the source, see Osvaldo Pérez, ‘El Montevideo colonial a la luz del nuevo 
censo,’ Revista del Instituto de Estudios Genealógicos del Uruguay  (). 
2 For a comparable analysis of wealth inequality in another newly settled, pre-industrial society in the southern 
hemisphere in the th century, see Johan Fourie and Dieter Von Fintel, ‘The dynamics of inequality in a newly settled, pre-
industrial society: the case of the Cape Colony,’ Cliometrica ,  (). 
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TABLE A1. Asset inequality between Montevideo households, 1757 (N=299 households) 
Asset category 
Share of 
wealth 
Gini of asset 
category 
Correlation with 
total wealth 
Share of total 
asset inequality 
Cattle 0.44 0.91 0.96 0.53 
Urban property 0.22 0.69 0.79 0.17 
Slaves 0.11 0.83 0.84 0.10 
Estancias (ranches) 0.06 0.73 0.81 0.05 
Chacras (arable farms) 0.05 0.82 0.77 0.04 
Sheep 0.05 0.89 0.87 0.05 
Oxen 0.03 0.88 0.74 0.03 
Horses 0.02 0.91 0.88 0.02 
Total wealth 1.00 0.73   
Sources: ‘Estado que manifiesta los vecinos y almas que hay en esta ciudad, y las haciendas que poseen. Montevideo, 
Octubre º de ’, AGN, Biblioteca Nacional, Legajo , Inventario ; 'El Cabildo al Gobernador de 
Montevideo, Tasación de ,' published in Apolant, Padrones. The reference price for oxen was taken from Moraes, 
Economías agrarias, -. 
 
chapter 3 
The replication code for Figures . and . is available in the file ‘Chapter  code.R’, which also contains the 
age heaping calculations cited in the discussion, based on the methodology by A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen, 
‘Quantifying’. The relevant datasets extracted from the enumerators’ books called by the code are available 
in CSV format in the same folder; details on the enumerators’ books available in Montevideo’s Archivo 
General de la Nación are given in Table .. Figure . can be reproduced from the same code (lines -
), calling the data in ‘diff_livestock.csv’, taken from Acevedo, Anales and Vaillant, El Uruguay (details in 
Figure .). The boundary data for the districts shown in Figure . can be found in the folder ‘Data’ which 
contains the shapefile ‘Districts .shp’ and associated files.  
 
chapter 4 
The shapefiles in the ‘Maps’ folder contain boundary data at the spatial level of the Uruguayan court districts 
(secciones judiciales) existing in  (‘Uruguay_districts_.shp’ and associated files), as well the railway 
stations in  (‘Uruguay_stations_.shp’ and associated files). These were created through geo-
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referencing historical maps and governmental decrees (references by variable below) and are provided in 
SHP format. They are optimised for the coordinate system WGS  Web Mercator (auxiliary sphere); 
linear units are meters. In order to produce the maps in the chapter, or to conduct other analysis or 
representation on those boundaries, attribute data at the same spatial level is required. These are provided 
in CSV format (‘Uruguay_districts_data.csv’) in the ‘Data’ folder. These can be joined to the .SHP files using 
any mapping software (ArcGIS, QGIS, or others). The definitions and units of measure for each variable are 
provided in a separate file (‘Uruguay_districts_definitions.xlsx’). The CSV file also contains all the data 
necessary to replicate the rest of the analysis and visualizations using the R code included in the ‘Data’ folder 
(‘Chapter  code.R’). 
 
Attribute data 
Altitude 
Mean altitude in each district calculated with data from ESRI World Elevation services. 
Crops 
Hectares sown and hectolitres harvested of wheat, maize, barley, other cereals, potatoes, sweet potatoes, 
beans, and other vegetables. Source: «Cultivos por departamentos y secciones, y según nacionalidad de los 
agricultores», Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Censo General de la República en 
, Tomo II, Parte II, Montevideo , pp. -. 
Farms 
Number of holdings, crop agriculture and pastoral agriculture area, kilometres of wire fencing, workers, 
capital, output value, and wages (all in nominal pesos). Source «Establecimientos agropecuarios por 
secciones», Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Censo General de la República en , 
Tomo II, Parte II, Montevideo , pp. -. 
Livestock 
Head of cattle and sheep by breed (purebred, crossbred, ‘native’) and by kind (bulls, calves, oxen, etc.). 
Source: Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Censo General de la República en , 
Tomo II, Parte II, Montevideo , pp. -; -. 
Railways 
Access to railways was estimated as the linear distance from each district’s centroid to the nearest station. 
Station coordinates georeferenced from Waterlow and Sons, ‘The Central Uruguay Railway of Monte Video 
and its Connections, ’ UL, Map Room. Maps.... Freight cargo taken from or estimated on the 
basis of primary sources described below in ‘III. Railways’.  
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Rainfall 
Average annual rainfall was obtained for  meteorological stations for the period - (or longer 
periods where possible) from statistical yearbooks, and each district was assigned the average yearly rainfall 
recorded by the meteorological station closest to it. Source: “Lluvias. Promedios anuales obtenidos en las  
estaciones pluviométricas establecidas en la República O. del Uruguay”, Anuario Estadístico de la República 
Oriental del Uruguay. Años  y , Montevideo: DGE, , p. . 
Population 
District-level population taken from Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Censo General 
de la República en . 
Soils 
Soil types and quality indexes (CONEAT) were taken from the Uruguayan Ministry for Agriculture’s  
high resolution survey and projected onto the court district map, assigning to each district the soil type that 
occupied most of its agricultural land. Source: Clasificación de suelos del Uruguay. Montevideo: Ministerio 
de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca, . 
Temperatures 
Mean annual temperature in each district calculated from the - averages by Uruguay’s National 
Institute of Meteorology (INUMET) ‘Estadísticas climatológicas’. 
 
Historical maps for boundary data 
Araujo, Orestes. Diccionario geográfico del Uruguay. Montevideo: Dornaleche y Reyes, . 
“Carta del departamento de Cerro Largo.” Dirección de Topografía (MOP) (), Archivo Nacional de 
Planos de Mensura, Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas, Montevideo. CPV. 
“Carta del departamento de San José.” Archivo Nacional de Planos de Mensura, Ministerio de Transporte y 
Obras Públicas, Montevideo. CPV. 
“Mapa del departamento de Canelones.” Dirección de Topografía (MOP) (). Archivo Nacional de 
Planos de Mensura, Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas, Montevideo. CPV. 
“Paysandú. Creación de una nueva sección judicial.” Decreto del Poder Ejecutivo //, published in 
Matías Alonso Criado, Coleccion Legislativa de la República O. del Uruguay, Tomo XXIII, Montevideo: 
Barreiro y Ramos, , p. . 
Pereda, Setembrino. Paysandú y sus progresos. Montevideo: Imprenta El Siglo Ilustrado, , p.. 
“Secciones Judiciales del Departamento de Montevideo.” Archivo General de la Nación, Montevideo. 
Mapoteca, Planera . 
“Soriano. La obra colonizadora en el departamento.” Instituto Nacional de Colonización (). Colecciones 
digitales de la Biblioteca Nacional, Montevideo. 
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Crossbreeding and productivity 
The specialist economic historiography agrees that cattle crossbreeding had a positive impact on Uruguayan 
agricultural productivity, both of labour and land.3 Because Chapter  uses crossbreeding rates as an 
indicator of the adoption of productivity-enhancing innovation, this relationship needed to be tested. Using 
the output value returns from the  agricultural census, it is possible to measure the effect of 
crossbreeding on labour and land productivity and compare it with the effect of estate sizes, while 
controlling for other variables. It should be noted that the census-takers themselves acknowledged that 
output value was underestimated by the agricultural census’s returns, as under-reporting of output was likely 
widespread.4 Nevertheless, these data remain the best way we have to confirm whether crossbreeding had 
an effect on productivity across varied geographical settings.  
The effect of cattle herd improvement and farm sizes on the productivity of agriculture is therefore 
estimated through an ordinary least squares (OLS) model in the following form: 
 yi = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + β1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 +  β2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹i +  𝛾𝛾 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 [A2] 
 
On the left side of equation A, the dependent variable yi measures the agricultural productivity in 
district i in . Productivity of labour (in hundreds of nominal pesos of yearly output per worker) or of 
land (in hundreds of nominal pesos of yearly output per hectare) are used in different specifications; 
logarithmic transformations were applied to smooth the right-skewed distribution of these variables. On the 
right side, the two main independent variables of interest are 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔i, which measures the 
share (in percentage) of cattle that was crossbred (that is, ‘improved’) in the herds of district i in , and 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹i, which measures the average size (in hectares) of the agricultural holdings in district i in . 
X is a vector of control variables, and 𝜀𝜀 is an error term. Agricultural controls include enclosure density (in 
kms of wire fencing per hectare), wheat yields (in hundredweights harvested per hectare), oxen as share of 
livestock units (in ), stocking density (livestock units per hectare), bulls per cow (heads), and sheep per 
cow (heads). Environmental controls include soil quality (in CONEAT index), rainfall (in yearly 
millimetres), temperature (annual mean in ºC), and altitude (average meters above sea level).  Market access 
controls include distance to the nearest railway station (linear, in kms), and access to an immediate land 
border with Brazil (dummy). Demographic controls include population density (people per square km.) and 
 
3 See, for an overview, Moraes, ‘Capitalismo pastor’. 
4 Census-takers had the same reservations regarding the Montevideo manufacturing census, which suggests that under-
reporting output value was not exceptionally problematic in agriculture. Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del 
Uruguay, Censo General de la República en : LXXV, LXXIX. 
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share of foreign-born population (in ). Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table . in 
the main text. 
After including the full set of controls, I still find a strong and positive effect of both cattle crossbreeding 
and landholding sizes in the labour productivity of agriculture (column  of Table A). By contrast, the 
results show a negative, and also statistically significant, effect of large holdings on land productivity 
(column ). Genetic improvements in cattle herds, on the other hand, retain a positive and significant effect 
on land productivity (column , row ). While the sizes of the effects implied by the coefficients are subject 
to significant margins of error arising from the under-reporting of output values in the agricultural census, 
these results are useful in confirming in a systematic way the intuition present in the specialist literature 
about the positive effect of cattle crossbreeding on productivity in modernising Uruguay. 
 
TABLE A2. Impact of cattle crossbreeding & farm size on productivity, 1908 
 Dependent variable: 
 Labour productivity (log) Land productivity (log) 
 (1) (2) 
Cattle crossbreeding 0.013*** 0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Farm size 0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Agricultural controls Yes Yes 
Environmental controls Yes Yes 
Market access controls Yes Yes 
Demographic controls Yes Yes 
Observations 197 197 
R2 0.343 0.734 
Notes: OLS regressions, with logarithmic output value in hundreds of pesos per worker (col.) and logarithmic output 
value in pesos per hectare (col.) as dependent variables. Cattle crossbreeding ( of bovines crossbred) and farm size 
(in hectares) as independent variables of interest. Observations are Uruguayan court districts. Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the , , and  levels. 
Sources:  see Table .. 
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Railway stations 
Location and cargo 
Railway transportation is negligible in present-day Uruguay. The vast majority of stations are not in 
operation for either freight or passenger travel. Therefore, the location of all stations was reconstructed by 
georeferencing a  map drawn in London at the request of the largest railway company in Uruguay, the 
Central Uruguay Railway Company (CUR).5 Latitudes and longitudes were cross-checked against the 
location of the abandoned or repurposed buildings of the stations, which remain standing in most cases, 
and can be seen in satellite imagery. The shapefile containing the locations is available as part of the 
Additional Materials (‘Uruguay_stations.shp’ and related files). 
The station-level freight cargo dataset by product group is available in CSV format also in the relevant 
folder in Additional Materials (‘Uruguay_train_stations.csv’); values refer to kilograms of volume of each 
commodity transported in . The volumes of freight cargo for each station were calculated as follows. 
For the stations belonging to the Central Uruguay Railway’s combined system or to the North-eastern, 
Northern, and Eastern railway companies the Statistical Yearbook offers station-level cargo data in 
kilograms disaggregated by product groups and in some cases by individual products (Anuario Estadístico 
de la República Oriental del Uruguay -, Tomo I con varios datos de , Montevideo, , pp. 
XXX-XXXVIII). Livestock is the exception: cargo is measured in numbers per type of animal (cattle, sheep, 
pigs, horses, and riding horses). Average weights from contemporary sources and from Bertoni, Energía 
were used to arrive at the final figure for total cargo weight dispatched by each station. Weights used are as 
follows: kg for cattle, kg for sheep, kg for pigs, kg for horses and riding horses. The estimated 
weight of animals transported is used to classify stations according to the volume of their cargo. 
For the Midland Uruguay Railway Company the primary sources only provide us with aggregate data, 
which made it necessary to distribute the total between the stations of each section. In order to arrive at 
plausible estimates a three-step plan was followed:  
a) The cargo data was divided between the main branch (Paso de los Toros—Paysandú—Salto) and 
the secondary branch (Algorta—Fray Bentos). This was done by comparing the figures from -
 (when the Algorta—Fray Bentos extension had not been built) to the figures from - 
(the first full year after that extension was opened), and imputing all new cargo to the new branch.  
Midland’s  report mentions that the increase in receipts for freight cargo, particularly livestock, 
was due to the Fray Bentos extension, which gives some support to this assumption (The Midland 
Uruguay Railway Company, Limited. Report of the Directors to the Proprietors with Statement of 
Accounts, for the year ended th June , p. ). This thus permits working separately with the 
cargo from the main branch and the new extension. 
 
5 Waterlow and Sons Limited, ‘The Central Uruguay Railway of Monte Video and its Connections, ’, London. UL, 
Map Room. Maps.... 
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b) Main branch. The main stations in the other networks dispatching ‘merchandise’ (i.e. manufactured 
goods) are near ports, such as Montevideo’s Central Station or Salto, or border cities, such as Rivera. 
Since data was already available on cargo dispatched from Salto (as it was a CUR station), all cargo 
in the ‘merchandise’ category of this branch was assigned to Paysandú, the only port on the main 
branch line. This is without doubt an exaggeration, but it seems plausible that almost all of the 
manufactured goods on the Midland’s main branch were dispatched from Paysandú. The rest of the 
cargo weight transported on the Midland’s main branch was divided thus:  livestock,  wool, 
 building materials,  cereals, and  company traffic (coal and railway building materials). 
Since the stations are near each other the distribution of the cargo between them does not 
significantly alter the interpolation analysis, so each station is assigned the same share of cargo. A 
random specialization pattern would result in  of the stations being specialised in livestock and 
 in wool. The assumption can be made that the stations closer to Paysandú, where saladeros 
were in operation, specialised in livestock and that stations further away from Paysandú and toward 
the centre of the country (where most of CUR’s stations specializing in wool are) specialised in wool. 
Of course, this arbitrary imputing of specialization patterns offers much room for improvement, 
but the only results significantly affected by it are the broad-brush classification of stations and the 
nearest neighbour analysis.  
c) Algorta—Fray Bentos extension. The increase in livestock traffic after the opening of the branch is 
assigned equally to each station between Algorta and Fray Bentos, except Algorta (which was 
already part of the main branch), Parada Liebig, and Fray Bentos. All the cargo classified as ‘frutos 
del país’ is assigned to Parada Liebig, and all ‘merchandise’ and building materials to Fray Bentos. 
Nearest Neighbour Ratio 
The nearest neighbour ratio (equation A) usefully compares the sum of the observed mean distance 
between each station and its nearest neighbour of the same kind (D�O) (A) with the expected mean distance 
which would result from a random distribution of stations of that kind in the territory (D�E) (A).  When the 
ratio is closest to zero it suggests greater clustering, whereas if it is closest to  it suggests the observed 
distribution was closer to a random distribution.  The expected mean distance arising from a random 
distribution is calculated in relation to the minimum enclosing area around all features (𝐴𝐴), which was set 
as the total land area of the Uruguayan territory.   
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =  D�OD�E  [A3] 
D�O =  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1𝐶𝐶  [A4] D�E =  0.5
�𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴
 [A5]
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chapter 5 
The occupational data behind Tables . and . are available as Excel files in the folder ‘Data/Dataset’. These 
include the detailed results of the  census and the  sample for male workers, both coded using the 
PSTI system (at the sixth point, September  version).6 The visualizations presented in Figures ., ., 
., and . can be reproduced or modified with the replication package ‘Chapter  code.R’ available in the 
folder ‘Data/Visualizations’, which also contains the CSV files for which the code calls. The files necessary 
to construct map in Figure . can be found in the folder ‘Population’. These include the shapefile containing 
district boundaries (‘districts.shp’), the population data, including the variable ‘poppercent’ 
(‘population_districts.csv’), and the layer symbology definition (‘pop.lyr’). The primary sources for these 
attribute and boundary data are the same as those cited above for Chapter . 
 
6 The definitions of occupational categories are available at: 
https://www.campop.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/occupations/datasets/coding/ 
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